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The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) archive, based in Arusha, Tanzania, 
contains over 4,000 linear metres of documents. It offers a window into the 1994 Rwandan genocide, 
captured by the testimony of the 3,200 witnesses that took part in the ICTR’s trials, and further 
represents the institutional memory of the Tribunal. Over time, the archive became both a significant 
aspect of the Tribunal’s legacy and a site of controversy as the ICTR’s main stakeholders disagreed 
over who owned the archive, where it should be located and what function it should serve. 
Consequently, the dissertation assesses how and why the archive exists as it does, and what this can 
tell us about the main question posed here: whose archive?  
 
The dissertation argues that the archive was produced as it was because of the ‘conditions’, 
‘processes’ and ‘politics’ of truth operating within the Tribunal. Whilst the witnesses (largely those 
that had endured the genocide), played a significant role in the creation of the Tribunal’s records, the 
systematic way in which their interests were subsumed by the needs of the other stakeholders 
demonstrates that the Tribunal and its archive were not created, nor did they function, with the 
interests of those who had suffered during the genocide in mind. Rather it was the Tribunal’s legal 
actors, along with political actors at both the United Nations Security Council and within the 
Rwandan government, who benefited from the way in which the archive was created. This was 
reflected in the very form of the archive, and demonstrates the inseparable nature of law and politics, 
and further questions the legitimacy of international criminal justice as it currently exists. This 
dissertation also presents a re–evaluation of the role of the witness in this process, showing that whilst 
they played a far more significant role in the trials than is normally considered, they were also pushed 
to the periphery of the Tribunal’s interests (and more so over time). Finally, understanding why and 
how it was that the archive came to be as it is, and why it was that particular stories about past acts of 
violence were told during the ICTR’s trials, allows for an appreciation of the potential value of these 
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We should admit that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging 
it because it serves power, or by applying it because it is useful); that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 




International criminal trials produce an overwhelming volume of information. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) archive, based in Arusha, Tanzania, 
alone contains over 4,000 linear metres of documents (this excludes the archives of the Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) and Chambers, which remain inaccessible to the public).2 Sitting at 
the heart of the ICTR’s archive is the testimony of the witnesses, who formed the main 
evidence base at the ICTR, given throughout the Tribunal’s history. This totals 26,000 hours 
of testimony, produced by 3,200 witnesses across 6,000 trial days.3 In addition, thousands of 
exhibits have been entered into the archive, along with the countless records of motions, 
correspondence, decisions, strategic reports, and other administrative documents. The archive 
is not only a considerable record of the violence that engulfed Rwanda in 1994, when in just 
100 days nearly one million people were killed. It is also a record of the Tribunal as an 
institution created by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 8 November 1994 to 
bring peace and security to the Great Lakes region by offering truth, justice, and 
                                                     
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1977), 27. 
2 This is if all of the records were stacked upright. Tom Adami, ‘Judicial Record Management/Archiving’, ICTR 
Legacy Symposium – 20 Years of Challenging Impunity, 06/11/2014. 
3 S/PV.6678, 6678th Meeting, 07/12/2011, 8; and S/2015/884, Letter Dated 17 November 2015 From the 
President of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed to The President of The Security 
Council: Report on The Completion of The Mandate of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as at 
15 November 2015, 17/11/2015, 5. 
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reconciliation.4 Moreover, as the ICTR’s website makes clear, the archive was more than a 
passive remnant of the Tribunal’s existence; it was intended to help secure a more peaceful 
future for the international community as a whole: 
The records related to the investigations and prosecutions provide insight into the 
motivations and causes that led to these atrocities, thereby having the potential to 
educate and inform in the interest of preventing the occurrence of future violations 
of international humanitarian law.5  
 
The archive was therefore central to the UN’s ongoing mission to deliver international peace 
and security.  
 
Over the life span of the Tribunal, the archive became an increasingly central feature of the 
ICTR’s legacy. It also, however, became a subject of controversy when, beginning in 2006, 
discussions began about what should happen to the archive after the ICTR closed. This 
dispute focused on whether or not the archive consisted, as the UNSC argued, of the 
Tribunal’s legal and institutional memory, which therefore meant it was required in Arusha 
where it could support the ongoing work of the Residual Mechanism (the institution that was 
to complete the ICTR’s left over work after it closed).6 Or if it, as the Rwandan government 
argued, contained key records relating to the history and memory of Rwanda, as it had been 
                                                     
4 The strategic function of the Tribunal at its outset will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, but for 
good insight into this see Richard Goldstone, ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace–Making: Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals’, Journal of International Law and Politics, 28 (1995), 485–504. 
5 ICTR Archive website, at: http://www.unmict.org/en/about/archives–international–criminal–tribunals, (last 
accessed 25 May 2016). ‘The Arusha Branch of the Residual Mechanism will also be the home of the ICTR 
archives. Those archives will hold the nearly 900,000 pages of transcripts and audio and video recordings of 
more than 6,000 trial days, as well as more than 10,000 interlocutory decisions and the judgements of all 
persons accused at the trials. As one of our longest–lasting, most permanent legacy projects, the archives will 
help to ensure that the international community remains conscious of the battle against impunity that the ICTR 
has fought for so many years.’ S/PV.6678, 8. 
6 S/PV.6041, 6041st Meeting, 12/12/2008, 14; and S/2012/849, Letter dated 16 November 2012 from the 
President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the President of the 
Security Council: Progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron (for the period from 1 July to 14 November 2012), 16/11/2012, 3. 
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created by and for Rwandans as they tried to overcome the 1994 genocide.7 With this the 
Rwandan government argued the archive should be returned to Rwanda.  
 
Underpinning this dispute were the questions of: Who should the archive serve? What was its 
purpose and what value do its records hold? Who had played the most significant role in 
creating it? Did the archive contain, as Rwanda claimed, the Rwandan witnesses’ accounts of 
their experiences violence, or did these, as the UNSC seemed to think, represent primarily 
legal records of legal and institutional value? This dissertation takes this as a springboard to 
explore the overarching question that arose from this dispute: whose archive?  
 
Analysing the archive also allows for a subsidiary line of enquiry to be pursued. For as the 
UNSC claimed, the archive also captured the institutional memory of the Tribunal, and as 
such it is worth questioning what the archive can tell us about the institution that surrounded 
it, and what the Tribunal’s purpose was, and whose interests it, more broadly, served. Indeed, 
the dispute over the archive was not the only time when the different interests of the 
Tribunal’s stakeholders clashed; tensions at one point or another seemingly existed between 
every combination of the Tribunal’s stakeholders: defendants and defence counsels, the 
UNSC, the Tribunal as a quasi–independent institution (tensions also existed within the 
Tribunal between the prosecution, registry and chambers), the victims and Rwanda. Indeed, 
throughout its 21–year existence, the Tribunal was a site of contestation where different 
actors with different priorities competed in order to determine how the Tribunal functioned, 
                                                     
7 See: S/PV.5453, 5453rd Meeting, 07/06/2006, 32; and S/PV.5697, 5697th Meeting, 18/06/2007, 33. 
13 
 
to what ends and in whose interests.8 As such this thesis will also consider what mark these 
contestations left on the archive, and what this can tell us about the purpose of the Tribunal.  
 
The dissertation argues that the key to understanding why the archive exists as it does lies in 
exploring the rules that determined what could be uttered within the courtroom and the ways 
in which the relationships between the Tribunal’s various stakeholders influenced what was 
archived, in what manner, and how this changed over time. Ultimately, despite that a number 
of different actors influenced how the archive was produced, including the witnesses, who 
played an important role here, the archive was created in the image, and reflected the 
interests, of the Tribunal’s legal actors, along with the political actors at the UNSC and 
within the Rwandan government. As will become clear, this had important consequences for 
the role that the Tribunal played as part of the UN’s response to the 1994 genocide.  
 
Key to this dissertation, then, is understanding what it is these courts are for and in whose 
interests they function. To date, similar questions have been addressed by a number of 
different scholars from fields including history, law, transitional justice and peacebuilding 
studies. These debates have tended to revolve around a series of binaries that hold that the 
different functions and interests reflected in international criminal trials are mutually 
exclusive. These binaries are: truth vs. justice; justice vs. reconciliation; international vs. 
local; and politics vs. law. These will be explored in turn, in order to set out the parameters of 
this dissertation, before I subsequently outline the methodology adopted for the dissertation 
and the content of the empirical chapters.  
                                                     
8 This point has been made in relation to transitional justice more generally. See Phil Clark, ‘Tensions in 
Transitional Justice’, in After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post–Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation 
in Rwanda and Beyond, ed. Phil Clark et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 381–93. 
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International Courts as Sites of Contestation 
 
Truth vs. Justice 
 
The ‘Holocaust trials’, which emerged in the wake of World War Two (WW2) as a response 
to the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and its allies,9 were seen as moments where the 
historical truth about the past would be revealed.10 As Robert Kempner, a prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg trials—where the allies prosecuted 22 leading German officials for crimes 
committed in the build up to, and during, WW2—stated, these trials were to be the ‘greatest 
history seminar ever held in the history of the world’.11 The international trials held at the 
outset of the 1990s, when the ICTR was created along with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), built on the legacy of the Holocaust trials, and 
were seen as institutions that could both administer justice and provide an accurate historical 
account of past violence.12 Beyond the interests of lawyers and academics, these courts were 
seen as assisting those directly affected by violence, both through the reintroduction of order 
                                                     
9 It should be noted that the idea of ‘Holocaust trials’ is a retrospective label that captures those post-WW2 
prosecutions that have come to be seen as primarily concerned with the Holocaust. In reality, however, these 
dealt with a wide array of crimes, and were driven by manifold political motives that were often at odds with 
capturing the Holocaust as a distinct historical event (discussed below).  
10 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 11–13. This relationship between trials and history predated Nuremberg. Carlo 
Ginzburg, ‘Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian’, Critical Inquiry 18:1 (1991), 79–81. 
11 Lawrence Douglas, ‘History, Memory and Crimes against Humanity: A Response to Todorov’, Salmagundi 
128–129 (2001), 320.   
12 Supra note 4, 485–504; Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice 
(London: 3rd Edition: Penguin Books, 2006), xxiii–xxv; Dan Stone, ‘Genocide and Memory’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Dirk Moses and Donald Bloxham (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2010), 
111–2; Richard Goldstone, ‘From the Holocaust: Some Legal and Moral Implications’, in Is the Holocaust 
Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide, ed. Alan Rosenbaum (Oxford: Westview Press: 2nd Edition, 
2000), 41–7; Pierre Hazan, Judging War, Judging History: Behind Truth and Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press: 2nd Edition, 2010), 12; Jose Alvarez, ‘Lessons from the Akayesu Judgement’, Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 5 (1998), 364; and Rosemary Byrne, ‘Promises of Peace and 
Reconciliation: Previewing the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, European Review 
14:4 (2006), 485. 
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and the rule of law and by revealing the truth behind what happened, helping, as Mark Osiel 
has argued, to generate a new collective memory.13 
 
Over time, however, this association was questioned by two different groups of scholars. 
First, a number of historians questioned whether courts could ever function as sites of 
historical exploration. Donald Bloxham and David Pendas, for instance, argued in relation to 
Nuremberg and the Frankfurt trials—which prosecuted 22 low to mid-level Auschwitz 
officials—respectively, that the law framed these courts’ narratives so tightly that they 
produced a distorted image of the violence being examined. At Nuremberg, the London 
Charter (the court’s statute) meant that crimes against humanity (the crime best suited to 
capturing the Holocaust) had to be linked to a charge relating to crimes of aggression, 
meaning that the Holocaust became subsumed in a narrative of aggressive war, rather than 
becoming a distinct atrocity.14 Similarly, the need to secure a verdict rather than provide a 
comprehensive account of what happened meant that the prosecution presented a stunted 
historical account that conflated similar acts of violence together (for instance, all camps 
were treated as being identical) and ignored others that were superfluous to the legal purpose 
of the court (such as ‘Operation Reinhardt’—a key moment in the evolution of the 
Holocaust).15 Likewise, the Frankfurt court’s use of a nineteenth century penal code meant 
that the prosecution had to provide evidence of base motives, such as a lust for killing, when 
establishing the crimes committed at Auschwitz, which worked to conceal the industrial 
                                                     
13 Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 1–6. 
14 Ibid., 226–7; Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust and 
Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 73 and 106; Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgement: 
Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 48–9; Allan 
Ryan, ‘Jewish Identity, the International Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Eichmann Trial’, in From the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion to Holocaust Denial Trials, ed. Debra Kaufman et al. (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2007), 
102–3; and Laurel Leff, ‘Jewish Victims in a Wartime Frame’, in Kaufman, Protocols of the Elders of Zion,  
80–2. For a counter–argument see Michael Marrus, ‘The Holocaust at Nuremberg’, Yad Vashem Studies 26 
(1998), 1–32. 
15 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, 101, 114–5, 123, and 127. 
16 
 
nature of the violence.16 Historian Henry Rousso thought the purpose and practice of history 
to be so distinct from law that he refused to participate as an expert witnesses at the 1994 trial 
of Maurice Papon (a Vichy bureaucrat), believing that the information produced by the trial 
would actually harm the nations’ historical understanding of its past.17 Rousso argued that the 
Manichean world of the courtroom could not possibly capture the intricacies of people’s 
participation in crimes like the Holocaust where one individual (like Papon) could be 
variously collaborator, ideologue, and resister.18  
 
This understanding of the poor quality of trial histories speaks to those transitional justice 
scholars who see the pursuit of justice (here a narrow retributive justice) as being 
incompatible with ascertaining the ‘truth’—a notion that particularly gained traction in the 
wake of the perceived success of the 1995 South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (SATRC).19 In particular these scholars argue that the perpetrator–centric nature 
                                                     
16 David Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
53–79, 295 and 316; Rebecca Wittmann, ‘Indicting Auschwitz? The Paradox of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial’, 
German History 21:4 (2003), 510–12; Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt (London: Atlantic, 2009), 153; Rebecca 
Wittmann, ‘The Wheels of Justice Turn Slowly: The Pre–trial Investigations of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial 
1963–65’, Central European History 35:2 (2002). 531; and Katharina von Kellenbach, ‘Vanishing Acts: 
Perpetrators in Post–war Germany’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 17 (2003), 314. 
17 Henry Rousso, The Haunting Past: History, Memory and Justice in Contemporary France (Pennsylvania: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 73.  
18 Supra note 13, 126–7; Rousso, Haunting Past, 64; Richard Golsan, ‘Introduction: Maurice Papon and Crimes 
against Humanities in France’, in The Papon Affair, ed. Richard Golsan (London: Routledge, 2000), 13; Gerry 
Simpson, Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007), 101–13. For more on the politics of Holocaust trials and memory in France see Nancy 
Wood, ‘Crimes or Misdemeanours?: Memory on Trial in Contemporary France’, French Cultural Studies 5 
(1994), 55 and 62–3 and 68; Richard Golsan, ‘The Legacy of WWII in France’, in The Politics of Memory in 
Postwar Europe, ed. Richard Lebow et al. (London: Duke University Press, 2006), 102–3; and Nathan Bracher, 
‘La Mémoire Vive et Convulsive: The Papon Trial and France’s Passion for History’, The French Review 3:2 
(1999),  319. For a variation of this argument, which contends that the pursuit of history in courts damages law, 
see Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin, 2006), 3–13; 
and Buruma, Wages of Guilt, 142. 
19 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 47; Nancy Rosenblum, ‘Justice and the Experience of Injustice’, in Breaking 
Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law and Repair, ed. Nancy Rosenblum et al. (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2002), 83 and 88; Claire Garbett, ‘The Truth and the Trial: Victim Participation, Restorative Justice, and the 
International Criminal Court’, Contemporary Justice Review 16:2 (2013), 194–9; and Eric Brahm, ‘Uncovering 
the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact’, International Studies Perspectives 8 (2007), 18–
9 and 21; and Robert Rotberg, ‘Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation’, in 
Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commissions, ed., Robert Rotberg et al. (Princeton: Princeton University 
17 
 
of these procedures and the pursuit of a final legal verdict mean that witnesses are prevented 
from testifying to their experiences in full, limiting the potential historical value of these 
courts’ accounts.20 Moreover, it is argued that law’s epistemology further limits the courts’ 
ability to reveal meaningful historical accounts, as it focuses its narratives around the actions 
of what it sees as conscious autonomous individuals (a hangover from its enlightenment 
origins). When this is combined with law’s drive to divide the world neatly into those that are 
guilty or innocent, it is not surprising that, as Mark Drumbl has argued, law struggles to deal 
with the complex and collective nature of crimes like genocide.21 
 
A number of scholars have, however, pushed back against this position. Lawrence Douglas 
argues, for instance, that courts can, and do, perform a didactic role where law is 
administered and a historical consciousness is generated. In fact, despite some shortcomings, 
Nuremberg and the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem (1961) captured the public’s 
imagination exactly because they were trials, as the spectacle and dramatic nature of these 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Press, 2000), 3–22; Jonathan Tepperman, ‘Truth and Consequences’, Foreign Affairs 81:2 (2002), 130–1; 
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events enabled the creation of a shared historical consciousness concerning the Holocaust.22 
At Nuremberg, the screening of the Nazi Concentration Camp film ‘imprinted on the western 
consciousness the images which have come to characterise the Final Solution’23 and the 
figure of six million dead became an accepted truth.24 The state of Israel put on a staggering 
history lesson by conducting Eichmann, integrating the Holocaust into the nation’s 
conscience as the victims of the Holocaust were heard for the first time.25 Douglas 
acknowledged that these accounts were not perfect, and that much of the fault lay, as 
Bloxham and Pendas argued, with the law itself and the way in which it framed the trial’s 
narratives. However, Douglas also contends that law is an adaptive beast; as a result of its 
encounters with crimes like the Holocaust, it responded by producing the new legal idioms of 
crime against humanity and genocide, which were better able to capture these acts of 
violence.26 As such, there is nothing inherently built into law that means that it cannot 
produce accurate histories of past violence, but it becomes more a question of using the 
‘right’ law in order to tell the best possible story.27  
 
In a similar vein, Nigel Eltringham has convincingly argued that the attempt to draw a line 
between history and law is erroneous as both construct narratives about the past in strikingly 
similar ways. Both entice testimony from witnesses, shape these around particular interests, 
and adopt a particular understanding of how it is that agents in history act.28 In fact, for 
                                                     
22 Douglas, Memory of Judgement, 66 and 71. See also Marrus, ‘Holocaust at Nuremberg’, 1–32. 
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Eltringham, the archives of these courts are very much like oral history archives, and the 
judgements function as catalogues for that archive, as their footnotes contain markers of 
where the key testimony can be found.29 Similarly Charles Maier argues that both judges and 
historians turn the complex social world into a comprehensible story with a false sense of 
cohesion, finality, and impartiality.30 Richard Wilson has argued that not only do these courts 
inevitably produce historical narratives—making the sharp division between the two 
disciplines futile—but that history became legally relevant at the international trials of the 
1990s, particularly due to the role that historians and social scientists performed as expert 
witnesses.31 These historical narratives became particularly important when producing the 
background and context upon which the court could interpret complex, and essentially 
collective, crimes like genocide. Osiel develops this idea yet further, arguing that not only is 
it inevitable that courts will produce histories and collective memories, but that judges should 
be more aware of their obligation to fulfil this task as best they can, as these trials, as Douglas 
argued, form key moments in the development of a national consciousness.32 
 
These scholars rightly question the divide between law and history that historians, such as 
Bloxham, and those from transitional justice, such as Martha Minow, have erected. They also 
open the exploration of these courts up to different questions which move beyond the 
entrenched, and not particularly fruitful, discussion of whether they produce good or bad 
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histories, to ask what histories and why? These subsidiary questions, which form a key part of 
this enquiry, are important for several reasons.  
 
As Kirsten Campbell has argued, courts do not simply find or uncover the particular 
memories that populate its archive, but they actively construct them.33 What this instantly 
suggests is that these are not neutral or impartial accounts but rather are constructed from a 
particular perspective, and that it is thus important to determine under what conditions and to 
what effect these are produced as they are. Foucault has similarly argued that it is important 
to understand how different sites produce, control, and exclude knowledge in particular ways, 
which allows for an understanding of the politics of knowledge production, something that is 
not currently addressed within this debate.34 Additionally, it is (while not reverting back to 
the dichotomy of law vs. history) also important to retain a sense of the specificity of the 
courtroom as a legally focused site of knowledge production and to determine how this 
influences the way in which particularly accounts of violence are produced. This resonates 
with the work of James White, whose idea of ‘justice as translation’ states that as the social 
world is translated into law the translation (as with all translations) results in both exuberance 
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(as meaning is added) and deficiency (as meaning is lost).35 The question is, how, in what 
ways, and to what effect, does this translation take place. 
 
The point is that clearly not any history could be told, so it is important to further explore 
what shapes the relationship between law and history. What accounts did the prosecution tend 
to construct during the ICTR’s trials? Was this the same for all defendants? Did law always 
produce a Manichean understanding of the social world? How did the understanding of 
individuals as conscious actors influence how the prosecution constructed their accounts? 
How did law account for other actors involved in these crimes, such as the victims and even 
bystanders? If law is truly an adaptive beast that responds to the violence it encounters, in 
what ways did law evolve over the course of the ICTR and what did this mean for how it 
captured the violence that occurred within Rwanda? Finally, as an important (but usually 
ignored) question, what types of stories did the defence tell about these crimes?36  
 
Two additional aspects need to be considered here. First, these accounts focus almost solely 
on the effects of law on the way that violence was accounted for. As will be discussed shortly 
it is also important to consider the effects of other factors, such as the political landscape 
surrounding these courts, in determining what accounts were produced and why. Second is 
the role that the witness plays in this process. Douglas, like many others, sees that Eichmann 
established a more rounded account of the Holocaust principally because of the space 
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afforded to the witnesses.37 But Eichmann was also an anomaly as the trial was explicitly 
used as a state–building exercise, where its central function was to produce a historical 
consciousness about the Holocaust. As such, Eichmann saw a stream of witnesses who had an 
incredible value in presenting the full horror of the Holocaust but had little to nothing to say 
about Eichmann.38 What role were witnesses afforded in other international courts, such as 
the ICTR? This question has occupied transitional justice scholars in what can be seen as the 
‘justice vs. reconciliation’ debate, discussed next. 
 
Justice vs. Reconciliation  
 
In the wake of Eichmann, a harmonious relationship appeared to exist between witnesses and 
courtrooms. Annette Wieviorka argues that Eichmann marked the beginning of the ‘era of the 
witness’, where the power and importance of the witness within contemporary society was 
recognised.39 This moment also signalled an evolution within legal practice, as lawyers 
appeared to move away from Nuremberg’s scepticism of witness testimony, towards an 
acceptance of its value.40 Perhaps not just coincidentally, during a similar time frame the 
notion of victim’s rights also came to be associated with discourses about justice, and these 
ideas even started to influence courtroom procedure as the rights of the victims came to 
supplement the more traditional concerns with the rights of the accused.41 This relationship 
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was developed further at the ad hoc tribunals in the 1990s where witness testimony featured 
prominently during the prosecutions. Indeed, at that ICTR witnesses were almost the only 
evidence available. This was not initially seen as a problem, but rather added to the 
potentially positive impact that these trials could make, as they could both secure justice 
against the accused whilst providing the witnesses with a moment of cathartic relief as they 
unburdened their souls.42 Consequently, international courts very much were seen as spaces 
for victims. This is a claim that continues to be made by advocates of international criminal 
justice when justifying the legitimacy of these institutions.43 
 
Whilst this is very much the rhetoric that emanates from the halls of international criminal 
justice,44 the extent to which this matches reality is debatable. From the late 1990s onwards, 
several scholars, such as Martha Minow, Marie–Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslem, 
began to argue that the courts’ legal processes and goals meant that they were more likely to 
‘silence’ victims than offer them a space for personal reflection and truth telling.45 There is 
now general consensus that victims are powerless as the court constructs its account of the 
past, as while they are testifying victims are only allowed to answer those questions that they 
are asked by the prosecutor, defence attorney, or judge without any elaboration or deviation.46 
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This drastically limits their testimony to what is legally relevant to the court, focusing their 
narratives on the criminal responsibility of the defendant in what is seen as a perpetrator–
centric process.47 This, as Franke and Henry argue, recreates the initial violence of the crime, 
as it removes the subject’s ability to speak in their own voice, much like the initial act of 
violence which inflicted a un–narratable trauma upon the subject.48 Thereby the victim–
witness becomes a passive object within the courtroom. Courts are now often seen as 
potentially dangerous spaces for victims, as witnesses are faced with a dual risk of re–
traumatisation by being forced to reclaim the position of the victim: first as a result of having 
to relive the horrors of the past and second as they are silenced by legal actors in the court.49  
As Jenny Edkins has similarly argued, these processes in many ways co–opt the witness’s 
voice and memory for their own purposes and, building on Walter Benjamin’s concern with 
the practices of history, end up concealing the radical potential of witness testimony: to 
unveil the sovereign’s and the wider political system’s responsibility for creating the 
conditions whereby that trauma became a possibility.50 Instead, by constructing 
understandings of ‘victimhood’ through the witnesses’ testimony, these sites treat past acts of 
violence as being successfully redressed, thus ignoring (and facilitating) the revitalisation of 
those systems of power that brought about the violence in the first place.51 The implication 
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here is that these trials most certainly do not work in the interests of the witnesses, as the 
contents of the archive are, consequently, likely to reflect. 
 
Whilst correctly raising the question of for whom these courts are really working and 
beginning the process of critiquing the courts’ claims to be spaces that work for victims, 
several factors imply that the witnesses’ role within the trial process warrants further analysis. 
First, those studies that emphasise the passivity of the witnesses only consider the role 
afforded to victim witnesses during these trials, while ignoring perpetrator and expert 
witnesses, who featured prominently at the ICTR’s trials. Whilst Eltringham, Wilson and 
Campbell have demonstrated that experts could have a significant impact (both positive and 
negative) on the trial process,52 no attention has been paid to perpetrator witnesses, whose 
testimonies, especially in the later years of the ICTR, made up a significant part of evidence 
during trials. It is therefore important to question whether or not all witnesses were treated the 
same within the courtroom and, if not, how were the various groups treated differently and 
why. This also opens up a new line of enquiry: how does examining the role of perpetrator 
and defence witnesses challenge or support the idea that these are ‘perpetrator–centric’ 
spaces?  
 
Additionally, whilst Dembour and Haslem’s account remains the most empirically grounded 
study, even this is only limited to one particular trial at the ICTY, which is insufficient to 
make conclusive findings. This is something that they themselves acknowledge, noting that 
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the field is ‘[crying] out for a debate on the way in which legal stories are fashioned’.53 I also 
believe that it is likely that witnesses were treated differently at the ICTR compared to the 
ICTY. For unlike the ICTY, where other evidence was drawn on in the final accounts, the 
ICTR relied, with very few exceptions, solely on witnesses. 54 To what extent, then, did this 
mean they were afforded a more central and important role during the trial process? 
Moreover, as Eichmann demonstrated, witnesses can in certain situations meaningfully 
participate within these proceedings, and as such the question needs to be under what 
conditions can witnesses significantly contribute towards, and shape, the content of a trial’s 
account of violence and hence the archive?55 Did the trials at the ICTR mark a moment, like 
Eichmann, where the victims were not only afforded the chance to speak and be heard (re–
introducing their subjectivity), but that, consequently, a radical history (in the sense 
suggested by Walter Benjamin) was created?56 If so does this, as Arendt feared, de–centre the 
position of the defendant to the point where the trial became something other than law?57 
Finally, whilst these studies are keen to show what these witnesses were not permitted to 
discuss, there is little attention given to the content of their evidence. Currently courts are 
seen only as ‘consumers of the memories of others’58 rather than, as Campbell has suggested, 
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sites that produce memories.59 What, then, do witnesses end up testifying to, and why is this 
the case?  
In contrast to the claims of passivity noted above, Nancy Combs argued that witnesses 
manipulate (rather than are manipulated by) the trial process due to the fact that they, Combs 
claims, frequently lie in court. This is not a minor issue; Combs found that a large number of 
witnesses (around 50 percent at the ICTR) significantly altered their testimony during the 
course of a trial.60 Having considered possible ‘cultural’ explanations for this phenomenon, 
Combs concludes that witnesses wilfully committed perjury, either for political reasons, such 
as securing a desired verdict, or personal reasons, such as gaining access to the Tribunal’s 
resources.61 This would imply that these were spaces that (even if inadvertently) work for the 
witnesses, but also that international courts, such as the ICTR, are, to all intents and purposes, 
spaces devoid of truth.  
 
There are, however, several problems with Combs’ analysis. These include that Combs’ work 
only examines trials that deal with atrocities committed in the ‘Global South’, as she argues 
that there is less to be learnt from trials that addressed crimes committed in the ‘Global 
North’—such as at the ICTY—because witnesses there are more ‘like us’.62 This adds an 
orientalist undertone to her argument that is only amplified by Combs’ superficial treatment 
of possible ‘cultural’ explanations—this included witnesses’ ‘uneducated’ status and their 
poverty—to explicate shifts in witnesses’ narratives. I also refute the claim that the majority 
of witnesses wilfully and deliberately lied: a change within a witnesses’ testimony is not 
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enough evidence to reach Combs’ conclusions. Combs does not consider, for instance, how 
such changes might be accounted for by a difference in focus between the questions asked by 
the investigators and the trial counsel. In short Combs reaches too easily for the explanation 
that witnesses lied before really exploring the question in sufficient detail. As such I argue 
that attention needs to be paid to how and under what conditions might a witness’s testimony 
have evolved over the course of retelling the ‘same story’ in order to find an alternative 
explanation that accounts for the shifts in narratives that occur over the course of a trial.63  
 
In sum, it is clear that the witnesses’ (whether victim, perpetrator, or expert) relationship to 
the trial process needs to be re–evaluated in order to ascertain in whose image the archive 
was created and whose interests these courts served. This apparent ‘clash of interests’ 
between witnesses and these courts also points to another binary, and set of seemingly 
irresolvable tensions, that is often associated with these courts. For this suggests that there are 
at times conflicting interests between the actors from the international community, who set up 
these trials in order to contribute towards ‘justice’ and international peace and security, and 
the needs and expectations of witnesses (or the victims) of violence. This has been framed as 
being a conflict between the ‘international’ and the ‘local’, which has also been the subject of 
much academic debate in recent years.   
 
International vs. Local 
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For some time now, there has been a concern that international criminal justice represents a 
new form of imperialism due to its fixated gaze on the Global South.64 Whilst the Holocaust 
trials and those at the ICTY complicate this argument, the track record of international 
criminal justice does undoubtedly appear, at least, as a form of ‘White Man’s Justice’—an 
almost absurd form of victor’s justice, whereby those most powerful within the international 
system escape all (or at least most) scrutiny. Does, then, international criminal justice serve 
the ‘local’—those that experience and suffer violence directly—or those that gain most by the 
international system remaining as it is, namely those states from the Global North.  
 
This concern also underpinned the most recent ‘turn’ in transitional justice: the local turn.65 
Beginning with key studies by Phil Clark on Rwanda’s Gacaca courts and most crucially 
Paul Gready’s article on ‘distanced justice’, transitional justice scholars have questioned the 
extent to which traditional transitional justice mechanisms, as modes of justice rooted in 
western thought and constructed through a western epistemology, have any possible value in 
non–Western communities and societies.66 Rosemary Nagy took these arguments further and 
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Realities After Genocide and Mass Violence, ed. Alexander Hinton (Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 
2012), 5; Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein, ‘Introduction: Conflict, Justice and Reclamation’, in Stover, My 
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forcefully (and convincingly) questioned the roots and origins not only of individual 
mechanisms of transitional justice, but transitional justice as a whole. By asking ‘who’, 
‘when’, and ‘what’ transitional justice as a discourse focuses on, Nagy points to the biases 
and asymmetry currently rooted in transitional justice, as it continues to represent the 
interests of the powerful to the detriment of those that are ‘weaker’ within the international 
system.67 
 
It is, then, unsurprising that international courts are often seen unfavourably within 
transitional justice scholarship. Indeed, a number of scholars have questioned if the ICTR, as 
a mode of ‘western’ justice, could have ever served the needs of Rwanda.68 Tim Kelsall 
similarly argued that due to its epistemological roots, international criminal justice struggles 
to comprehend non–western crimes.69 In his exploration of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
he found that even the hybrid nature of the court (which supposedly integrated a ‘local’ 
element into the procedure) could not overcome the gap between the ideas and ways of 
knowing rooted within the law and local Sierra Leonean culture. This was particularly the 
case when it came to the court’s less than adequate understanding of forced marriages, child 
soldiers, and magic.70 Taking this further, Joseph Fink has argued that the deontological 
nature of international criminal law means that it is inevitably incapable of understanding the 
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specificity and cultural contexts within which violence occurs, as it generalises and abstracts 
episodes of violence to the detriment—here specifically referring to the relationship between 
Rwanda and the ICTR—of the local community.71  
 
Parts of this argument are convincing, and it is hard, for instance, not to see that these courts 
regularly appear to fail to meet the needs and interests of communities affected by violence. 
Moreover, a particularly important element from this debate that will need to be considered 
when assessing the ICTR’s archive, particularly in Chapters Two and Five, is the extent to 
which the epistemological roots of international criminal justice affect how violence was 
seen, accounted for and recorded with the archive. As such, the dissertation takes as a central 
concern the question of which, and whose, viewpoints, perspectives and interests drove the 
construction of the ICTR’s archive, who and what were excluded from this.  
 
However, this argument is not without its problems. First, this argument has been clouded by 
an almost orientalist praise of the inherent value of the ‘local’, which seems not always to be 
deserved.72 For instance, Gacaca, whilst undoubtedly revolutionary, also very much worked 
to embed the authoritarian power of the post-genocide regime in Rwanda and was, as 
Susanne Thompson and Nagy argue, relatively prescriptive as to how individuals were 
expected to participate, to the detriment of serving ‘local’ interests and producing a ‘holistic’ 
account of the violence that could contribute towards reconciliation.73 The extent to which a 
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72 See also Elizabeth Drexler, ‘The Failure of International Justice in East Timor and Indonesia’, in Hinton, 
Transitional Justice, 50–1. 
73 Thompson and Nagy, ‘Law, Power and Justice’, 20–30. 
32 
 
division between the local and the international can be maintained is also questionable. Post–
colonial scholarship, for instance, has shown that as a result of colonial encounters both the 
local (here the Global South) and the international (the Global North) co–constituted each 
other, fundamentally altering each other’s existence, and that these encounters had a 
significant impact on the nature of international system, and international law.74 This, then, 
complicates the notion of ‘imposed’ or ‘distanced’ nature of international criminal justice.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that calls for prosecutions repeatedly originate from the 
Global South. Such was the case when Rwanda requested the creation of the ICTR because of 
its demand for justice. As this also begins to suggest, it is important that even as scholars try 
to question this imbalance of power, we must also recognise the agency and authority that 
exists within these communities and the role that they have played in the construction, and 
practice, of international criminal justice. This is particularly needed when exploring the 
relationship between Rwanda and the ICTR, where Rwanda’s effective utilisation of the 
process (discussed throughout) needs to be accounted for.75 What this leads back to is a need 
to understand the processes through which international criminal courts like the ICTR 
function, in whose interests, and what this means for the question of whose archive?  
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Politics vs. Law 
 
As this also suggests, international courts are seen as very much ‘politicised’ spaces where 
different competing interests influence how these trials unfold. This much has been clear 
since Nuremberg, which is often seen as an example of victor’s justice, as the Allies’ crimes 
were swept under the rug. The political nature of Eichmann has also already been noted, as it 
was used to tell a particular story about the Jewish people in order to justify the existence of, 
and demonstrate the need for, the Israeli state.76 Whilst Wilson believed that the truly 
international nature of the late twentieth century international courts (which marked a 
significant development from the previous attempts) offered the chance of a less politicised 
form of justice, the work of Rachel Kerr and Kenneth Rodman in particular demonstrates that 
these remain spaces that are strongly influenced by politics.77  
 
Kerr showed that politics influenced each stage of the ICTY, from its creation by the UNSC 
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to its reliance on diplomacy to function, and to its 
political purpose, which was to bring violence to an end and to assist in the peace process.78 
Similarly Rodman has shown how the dependency of international courts on states for 
enforcement, staff assistance, and finance, makes them reliant on the political whims of 
states.79 However, whilst this is the case, Kerr, in a similar fashion to Wilson, importantly 
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argues that, at the ICTY, politics stopped at the door of the courtroom, where law and justice 
took over; the process, whilst political, was never politicised.80  
 
These studies well capture the courtroom as being an interface of law and politics, and they 
also take steps towards pulling down the dichotomy of ‘peace vs. justice’ that dogged 
transitional justice for some time.81 In fact, Kerr has shown with her assessment of the ICTY 
that not only can justice function alongside a peace process but that it can form a crucial part 
of this, and that international law needs politics to function.82 Consequently, there is scope to 
see that there is a harmonious relationship between law and politics and that these courts can 
work in the interests of political and legal actors as well as the affected communities.  
 
There is, however, also room to take this understanding of the relationship between law and 
politics further and push back against seeing these as two necessarily distinct disciplines 
doing essentially different tasks. This follows Chris Reus–Smit’s call to see law as both 
constitutive and constituting of politics.83 First, as Kerr acknowledges the judges at the ICTY 
were very aware of their role in developing and expanding jurisprudence.84 Duncan Kennedy 
has argued in respect to municipal courts that these types of (and in fact all) jurisprudential 
developments are the result of the judges making political and ideological decisions as they 
settle tensions between what are often ambiguous and conflicting laws when deciding a 
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case.85 This is presumably even more so with international criminal law, as its relative 
infancy leads to greater ambiguity about what the law is, which consequently requires greater 
levels of interpretation from the judges. This, in turn, seems to have likely resulted in judges 
having greater space to impose particular ideological and political perspectives within their 
legal decisions. Moreover, with Edkins’ and Elizabeth Dauphinee’s assertion that courts play 
a role in perpetuating violence within the international system, it becomes important to 
determine to what extent these decisions reproduced what might be considered ‘problematic’ 
political discourses.86 As such, it is important to ask: what political and ideological positions 
underpinned the judicial decision making at the ICTR? Did this adjudication process, as 
Edkins and Dauphinee suggest, render some forms of violence legitimate, and hence some 
individuals as legitimate targets of violence? And if so, who and why?  
 
This also points towards an understanding of law that moves past seeing it as a neutral set of 
timeless rules. Instead law is recognised for its performative, dynamic and political nature, as 
the statutes, rules of evidence and procedure, and customary law (the bedrock of the legal 
process in international courts)87 are constantly re-interpreted, contested and regenerated by 
different actors within the courtroom and beyond.88 As Sally Merry has emphasised, a wide 
variety of different actors (e.g. representatives of NGOs, international organisations, 
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academics, lawyers and witnesses) take international norms and fundamentally remould these 
as they are put into practice, which, as has been argued by John Hagan and Ron Levi, 
actualises law, making it real.89 This is not to state that these actors have carte blanche over 
how law is mobilised, and it is important to understand how substantive and procedural rules 
of the courtroom also constrain practice.90 It is therefore important to explore how the 
relationship between the rules and actors involved in the production of law at the ICTR 
influenced the shape and nature of the archive and to what effect. 
 
Second, O’Barr’s and Conley’s examination of the treatment of sexual violence testimony in 
municipal courts shows that the presence of patriarchal discourses means that this type of 
testimony is less likely to be believed.91 Campbell’s work on the ICTY demonstrates that 
similar issues plague international courtrooms, as gendered discourses worked to bring 
female testimony, particularly concerning rape, under greater levels of scrutiny compared 
with testimony relating to other crimes.92 Both Catherine McKinnon’s and Binaifer 
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Nowrojee’s work further highlights the systematic way in which sexual violence has been 
treated as a secondary concern by international courts generally, and the ICTR specifically, 
and Martha Walsh—building on the work of Hilary Charlesworth—has emphasised how 
international criminal justice systematically excludes the voices of women.93 As such, how do 
political discourses, such as gender, end up influencing the way legal decisions are made and 
hence influence the contents of the archive?  
 
Finally, there is a need to consider the effects of the internal politics at work within these 
institutions. As Eltringham has pointed out, whilst ‘the Tribunal’ is often thought of as a 
homogenous space whereby the different organs work together in pursuit of a shared, singular 
goal, in fact there was a wide spread of conflicting views between, and even within, each of 
the Tribunal’s organs.94 How, then, did this mode of politics affect the trial process, how was 
the Tribunal changed over time, and how did this influence the archive?  
  
The preceding section helps form the basis for this dissertation. It demonstrates the 
importance of considering a variety of different factors when understanding how and why 
international courts like the ICTR function as they do and the possible implication that this 
has for the way in which the archive was constructed—a crucial stepping stone in pursuit of 
the question whose archive. These include, the way in which law and politics frame this 
process, the roles played by different types of actors (such as lawyers and witnesses), and the 
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possible tensions that can exist between these actors’ interests. As has also been argued, 
however, the current framing of enquiries into international criminal justice around a series of 
the dichotomies needs to be challenged. Moreover, whilst offering a starting point, as was 
identified at the end of each sub–section, many fundamental questions remain unanswered. 
How and why do international courts, such as the ICTR, produce the accounts of violence 
they do? What role do different actors, particularly witnesses, have in this process? What 
does this mean for what these trials tried to achieve? And ultimately the central question, 
whose archive?  
 
The dissertation will argue that whilst numerous actors played an important role in the 
creation of the archive, not least the witnesses themselves, overall, the manner in which 
witnesses, and Rwandan society more generally, were treated by the Tribunal shows that the 
Tribunal and its archive were not created with their interests in mind. Rather it was the 
Tribunal’s legal actors, along with the outside political actors at the UNSC and within the 
Rwandan government, that all appeared to benefit from the way in which the archive was 
created. Before setting out this argument in greater depth and outlining the structure of the 












Within this dissertation the archive performs the dual role as an empirical site of investigation 
and as a theoretical and methodological tool. As an empirical site, the archive consists of the 
records that have been produced by the Tribunal and related institutions (i.e. other UN 
organs) as a result of Tribunal’s execution of its mandate to prosecute those responsible for 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide.95 This can be viewed and put to use in three different ways. 
First, the archive is the site where the totality of the Tribunal’s records that it has produced 
about the Rwandan genocide are deposited, the analysis of which forms the central 
component of the thesis as I determine what accounts of the past have been produced by 
Tribunal. Second, this thesis is also concerned with why that record exists as it does. To 
understand this, the conditions that surround the Tribunal, and make different statements 
possible, and hence leave a material and physical trace within the accounts of violence 
rendered at the Tribunal, must be explored too. To do this, the physical archive that needs to 
be examined exceeds the records depositary in Arusha, and must also include documents 
produced across multiple other sites that have interacted with, and influenced, practices at the 
Tribunal. These include, for instance, documents deposited at the UN’s archive that relate to 
the Tribunal.  
 
Finally, as this begins to point to, the archive is both an empirical site of interest in and of 
itself, but also a portal through which it is possible to understand the institution that it sits 
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within. 96 The archive is the site where the practices and discourses that make up the Tribunal, 
as discussed more below, sediment and reveal their material effects and as such give a 
window through which to understand the manner, purpose and function of this institution and 
the wider discourses that it speaks to.97    This is to take seriously the constituting and 
constitutive nature of the archive as it both captures and produces a particular ontology of the 
social world, so as to explore what particular reality is conjured and made real through the 
construction of the archive.98 It is for this reason too that the archive is always, as Foucault 
argues, a politicised space, and where knowledge becomes wedded to power, as certain ways 
of knowing, seeing, and being are privileged through their inclusion in the archive and others 
are excluded. To return to the opening quote: 
We should admit that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it 
because it serves power, or by applying it because it is useful); that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.99 
 
It is this consciousness of the particular, exclusionary and political nature of the archive that 
also forms the bedrock of Foucault’s archaeological methodology, which provides the 
theoretical and methodological basis of this thesis, and marks the second use of the archive 
here. 100  The archive here is the totality of all possible statements that can be legitimately 
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made within a particular discourse,101 and the task becomes to determine the ways and means 
through which the contents of an archive is both limited and made possible: what rules 
determine what can and cannot be recorded, and from which perspective an archive’s records 
are produced, and whose voices and perspective might be excluded from this process.102 
These rules, which Foucault terms the ‘rules of formation’,103 can be determined by 
uncovering the regularity with which statements and records are made for (and excluded 
from) the archive.104 Foucault categorises these statements as subjects, objects, enunciative 
modalities (the different subject positions possible within a discourse), and concepts.105 As 
Colin Gordon summaries, 
This project of an archaeology is conceived as the study of forms of knowledge and 
rationality at the level of their material manifestation as bodies of discourse 
composed of finite sets of oral or written utterances. The aim is to render these 
discourses accessible to description and analysis as constituting a specific order of 
historical reality whose organisation is irreducible to either the history of the 
careers, thought and intentions of individual agents (the authors of utterances) or to 
a supra-individual teleology of discovery and intellectual evolution (the truth of 
utterances).106 
 
It is, then, the ability of Foucault’s understanding of the archive to pull together a disparate 
array of principles, practices and rules to account for the totality of what can be said within a 
particular discourse that makes it such a valuable concept for this dissertation, as I look to 
explain why it is that the accounts of violence rendered within the Tribunal exist as they do.  
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A number of other comments are required about the approach adopted here. First, the notion 
of enunciative modalities directs the focus of the analysis to also consider who is permitted to 
contribute to the construction of knowledge, where, and in what ways. As the quote from 
Gordon suggests, however, this is not about focusing on individual subjects and their 
conscious interventions within a field. Rather, this is about considering which types of actors 
are permitted to act in certain ways and to what effect.107 Second, Foucault’s approach urges 
scholars to examine, in addition to the regularity with which statements are made and who is 
permitted to make them, how they relate to each other. Foucault stresses that it is in the 
relationships between these types of statements that a discourse generates its specificity.108  
 
Foucault’s idea of apparatus is also important here. Foucault describes an apparatus as an 
assemblage of heterogeneous discourses and non–discursive sites that intervenes in a 
situation in the attempt to solve a particular problem.109 This notion as such captures the 
complexity of international criminal justice as a tool that is aimed at securing ‘international 
peace and security’ and is created as result of a variety of different actors from different fields 
(lawyers, politicians, and even social scientists acting as experts) and drawing on a variety of 
discourses (e.g., humanitarian and human rights law). This, however, also draws our attention 
to additional pathways that need to be explored. First, an apparatus intervenes, as Foucault 
argues, to solve a particular ‘problem’. This ‘problem’, however, is not ‘discovered’ but is 
created in a particular way through the apparatus and this generates the apparatus’ purpose, 
or ‘strategic function’ (which also forms a key anchor point around which its components —
                                                     
107 Supra note 106, 72, 92–5 and 99. 
108  Ibid., 4 and 42; Giles Deleuze, ‘What is a Dispositif?’, in Michel Foucault: Philosopher, trans. Timothy 
Armstrong (Hemel Hampstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 160.  
109 Michel Foucault, 'The Confession of the Flesh’, in Gordon, Power/ Knowledge, 194-5. 
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subjects, objects, etc.—assemble).110 This, then, begs the question of how a particular 
problem is imagined and what an apparatus’ strategic function is. Finally, when exploring an 
apparatus, it is important to understand the rules and logics that function within the various 
discourses that populate, and thereby create, the apparatus, but also how these discourses 
relate to one another.111  
 
Consequently, this, like other modes of discourse analysis, is about identifying common 
linguistic structures (or patterns) that are present within the narratives constructed in a 
particular setting—here a tribunal.112 This approach argues that it is possible to suggest what 
a particular discourse demands of a statement to be considered legitimate by identifying the 
consistency with which the repetition of certain features occurs within these statements.113 By 
extension this points to the importance of analysing what is excluded, and hence deemed 
illegitimate within a particular discourse, by looking for what is absent or silenced.114 As 
                                                     
110 For instance, the asylum, and associated disciplines and discourses, as an apparatus did not ‘discover’ 
madness as a problem and then go about trying to overcome this, but very much produced madness as a 
particular problem that needed to be solved in a particular way. With this, moreover, it can be said that the 
strategic function of the apparatus was determined as a result of how it was that madness was imagined. See 
Foucault, Michel, Madness and Civilisation: a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, translated by. Richard 
Howard (London: Routledge, 2003); Foucault, Archaeology, 4 and 42; and Deleuze, ‘What is a Dispositif?’, 
160. 
111 Foucault, 'The Confession of the Flesh’, 194–5. 
112 See Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and 
Behaviour, (London: Sage, 1987); Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, ‘Discourse: Noun, Verb or Social 
Practice?’, Philosophical Psychology 3:2 (1990), 205–17; Stephanie Taylor, ‘Locating and Conducting 
Discourse Analytic Research’, in Discourse as Data, ed. Margaret Wetherell et al (London: Sage, 2001), 5-49; 
and Robin Wooffitt, Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis: a Comparative and Critical Introduction 
(London: Sage, 2005), 49-51. 
113 Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, ‘Discourse Analysis and the Identification of Interpretive 
Repertoires’, in Analysing Everyday Interpretations, ed. Charles Antaki (London: sage, 1988), 171. Another 
possible approach to this project would have been to conduct a conversation analysis (CA). However, its focus 
on the micro–issues of linguistic exchanges does not make it suitable for a project such as this which focuses on 
a large number of sources. Moreover, CA is more concerned with what can be learnt in the interaction between 
different speech acts in a conversation, rather than the content of that conversation, which is of central 
importance for the analysis here. I also take issue epistemologically with the notion that CA should only read the 
‘micro’ and not move towards ‘macro’ conclusions unless the data is ‘self–evident’. For an account that 
demonstrates the possibility of using CA in courtroom analysis see: Ronald Atkinson and Paul Drew, Order in 
Court: The Organisation of Verbal Interaction in Juridical Settings (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 
1979), 1–33. 
114 Wooffitt, Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis, 45 
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such, a central part of the analysis throughout the dissertation is exploring what accounts of 
violence are permitted to enter the courtroom, in what form, and which are prevented from 
entering the courtroom, and what are the similarities that exist between these. This will allow 
me to determine what rules explain why these accounts exist as they do and also who was 
permitted to contribute to their construction and to what effect. More specifically, within each 
trial I will trace how the witnesses’ stories evolved as a trial progresses and compare this to 
other instances of narrative formation in order to ascertain how the apparatus imposes certain 
restraints on what can be testified to.115  
 
A shortfall of Foucault’s ideas, however, is that these methodological and theoretical models 
struggle to account for change within these systems, or at least to explain why change occurs. 
This is important because even a cursory look makes it is apparent that international criminal 
justice has changed considerably between Nuremberg and the ICTs of the 1990s (such as the 
role afforded to the witnesses). This omission is primarily due to Foucault’s apparent 
rejection of individual agency. For Foucault, the individual is more a conduit for the 
discourse than a conscious individual operating with purpose. If individuals are produced by 
and function solely within the discourse, along with the objects, subjects, and concepts of 
these discourses, it is hard to imagine how individuals might think outside of the hegemonic 
discourse and induce changes to practice or ways of thinking or being, at least over relatively 
short time-frames.116 As such, whilst I retain the importance of Foucault’s archaeological 
methodology for understanding how knowledge is produced in particular ways, I also believe 
                                                     
115 Supra note 106, 74. 
116 Foucault’s understanding of discourses does allow for new types of statements to be made (which remain 
products of the discourse whilst they continue to abide by the same rules that maintain the regularity of the 
discourse), and he also signifies that change is possible and new discourses can emerge when statements are 
made which force a reformulation of the rules of formation. But, it is unclear how, when or why these shifts 
occur. Moreover, Foucault’s model is more conducive for looking at longer term (‘epochal’) shifts rather than 
temporally more restricted studies like this. 
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it’s important to supplement this with a theory and approach that can better account for 
changes in practice within particular fields and institutions, where this is required.  
 
In this respect, I have found Pierre Bourdieu’s field analysis to be instructive. Fields are, in 
essence, limited domains of action that are populated by different agents fulfilling different 
roles, whereby all agents agree, more or less, to abide by a set of rules about how each should 
function within the field and about the broader purpose of that field.117 These rules, norms, 
and assumptions—often unspoken—form the Habitus of a particular field.118 A variety of 
different forms of capital are available to these different agents, but these forms of capital are 
unevenly valued, and unevenly distributed, between the agents meaning that a hierarchy of 
agents is produced within the field.119 So far this is relatively similar to Foucault’s 
understanding of individuals and agency. With both Foucault and Bourdieu, individuals very 
much function within a system that is already in existence and perform specific 
predetermined roles. Moreover, Foucault’s understanding of enunciative modalities mirrors 
the concern here for the different roles (subject positions) that can be taken up within the 
field. The difference, however, is that Bourdieu introduces a notion of competition between 
agents within the field in order to account for change.120 Agents compete with each other to 
acquire capital, but also crucially to change the ascribed value of different types of capital 
within the field, which determines their position in the hierarchy as each type of agent has 
different levels of access to different types of capital.121 This, however, not only results in a 
change in the value of the different forms of capital, but also a shift in practices within the 
                                                     
117 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 10–6. 
118 Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Force of Law: toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’, The Hastings Law Journal 38 
(1987), 807; and Supra note 121, 72–96. 
119 Supra note 121, 13–4. The hierarchy between different types of agents is captured within Bourdieusian 
language as the ‘divisions of labour’. Here Bourdieu argues that within a field there is a constant struggle 
between actors, who simultaneously oppose each other, and rely on each other, for their position within the field 
and for the existence of the whole field itself. Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, 808. 
120 Hagan and Levi, ‘Crimes of War’, 1503. 
121 Supra note 121, 195–8; and Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field’. 
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field.122 What this demonstrates is that, as a result of competing interests, the way in which a 
field functions, and even the purpose of that field, is likely to be subjected to change over 
time.  
 
Dixon and Tenove have already shown the value of using this concept in relation to 
international criminal justice.123 They argue that the international criminal justice field was 
created through the overlapping of the three global fields of diplomacy, criminal justice, and 
human rights advocacy and that international criminal justice’s agents were (and are) drawn 
from these three fields.124 Each of these groups of agents rely on different forms of authority 
(a term that is analogous to Bourdieu’s term ‘capital’), which are replicated in both their own 
field and within international criminal justice: delegated, legal, moral, and expert.125 
Diplomatic agents rely largely on delegated authority; legal agents draw principally on legal 
and moral authority; human rights agents draw on moral authority; and all agents employ 
expert authority.126 As such, throughout the analysis I will identify which agents appeared to 
be driving shifts in practice within the field, and how, or if, this offers evidence of the shifts 
in the value of different types of authority available for different agents. The importance of 
this will become particularly clear in Chapters One and Six.  
 
                                                     
122 Change in the practices and importance of the adjacent fields in relation to the international criminal justice, 
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This dissertation draws on material from three trials at the ICTR in order to explore how and 
why international trials produce particular accounts about past violence and what this means 
for the question whose archive? From the large number of cases heard at the ICTR, I selected 
three trials that were spread over the lifespan of the Tribunal: Jean–Paul Akayesu (1998); 
Emanuel Bagambiki, Samuel Imanishimwe and André Ntagerura, otherwise known as 
Cyangugu (2004); and Jean–Baptiste Gatete (2011).127 For a detailed description of these 
trials please see the Appendix.  
 
These trials were chosen for a number of reasons. From a methodological perspective, whilst 
no two trials could ever represent exactly the same sequence of events, it was important to 
select three trials that were dealing with relatively similar charges, in order to ascertain more 
clearly what factors influenced how the Tribunal accounted for the violence and whether 
there were any patterns in how this occurred. Each of these trials was concerned with 
capturing how the national level orchestration of the violence linked to the local level and, 
importantly, each set of indictments contained a spread of charges that covered: genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes; attacks against places of refuge (which was possibly 
the most common type of crime documented by the Tribunal); and evidence relating to sexual 
violence crimes. I also elected to study Cyangugu both in order to represent the ‘multi–
accused’ cases that were common in the second phase of the Tribunal’s history (from 1999 
until about 2003), but also as a failed trial—from the prosecution’s perspective. Not only 
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were Bagambiki and Ntagerura acquitted completely, but on appeal Imanishimwe’s genocide 
conviction was overturned, meaning that whilst Imanishimwe was convicted of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes no defendant at the trial was convicted for genocide. As 
such, this allowed me to explore what was distinctive about these moments when the 
prosecution failed and the defence succeeded. Moreover, this trial, along with Gatete, marked 
another failure, which concerned the OTP’s prosecution of sexual violence charges. This 
counter–balanced the success story offered by Akayesu (known as the first trial to have found 
that rape could constitute an act of genocide), which is often seen within the literature as an 
aberration rather than the norm.128 The timing of these three trials was also important, since 
each captured a distinctive moment in the Tribunal’s history, including the first ever 
contested trial, the introduction of the completion strategy in 2003 (see Chapter Six), and one 
of the last trials. The spread of these trials over the lifespan of the Tribunal also meant I could 
examine whether the shifting political landscape outside of the courtroom affected how, and 




My analysis drew on three main types of sources. The first, and the main, set was each trials’ 
case files, which contain: pre–trial statements, indictments, trial transcripts (of both the trial 
and appeals hearings), trial exhibits, motions, decisions, and judgements (of both the trial and 
appeals hearings). Each of these will be examined to determine the rules and regularities with 
which the different agents in the courtroom constructed accounts of violence, paying 
particular attention to the role played by witnesses. As such, the trial transcripts for each trial, 
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where the witnesses took centre stage, form the bedrock of the thesis. In addition to this, I 
drew on documents from the ICTR’s other trials (particular from judgements) to supplement 
my analysis of these three trials where required. 
 
A number of challenges, however, were encountered with accessing some of these 
documents. The first was my initial failure to realise that witness pre–trial statements were, 
the vast majority of the time, not accessible to the public. As such, for insight into these, I 
have relied on moments in the trials when legal counsels used pre–trial statements in order to 
try to undermine a witnesses’ in–court testimony or when issues specific to the investigations 
and the taking of pre–trial statements were raised (both relatively frequent occurrences). 
Second, due to delays in digitising parts of the archive, I was not able to access audio-visual 
recordings of the trials, as I had initially hoped. As such I have only had access to trial 
transcripts in order to piece together the way in which the Tribunal constructed its accounts 
of violence. As Eltringham has pointed out, much is lost in transcripts, most notably the tone 
of the testimony, the unspoken interactions between the different participants, and, 
importantly, silences.129 I am aware of these limitations, and this no doubt affects my 
findings. However, I believe that with the types of questions that I am seeking to answer 
(essentially looking at patterns in the ways in which accounts of violence are discursively 
produced) the negative effects of this will be limited. Moreover, an upside to only analysing 
trial transcripts is that it has meant that I could examine more of these and consequently more 
trials than otherwise feasible.  
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Second, in order to see how the political landscape and the strategic function of the court was 
constructed and changed, I also drew on administrative documents held largely in the UN’s 
online archive,130 including: external reports (such as by the UN’s Fifth Committee), internal 
reports (particularly ICTR biannual reports, and completion strategy updates to the UNSC 
and UN General Assembly [UNGA]), strategy documents (such as those by the Office for 
Internal Oversight Services), and UNGA and UNSC discussions of the ICTR. Where 
possible, I also attempted to place these UN discussions within a broader context and tried to 
analyse as many policy briefings and reports that were produced by the UNSC and Secretary 
General (UNSG) on similar topics (such as peace–building and transitional justice) as 
possible. Again, there were a number of sources that I had hoped to obtain but could not since 
these have not yet been made public, including documents relating to the Tribunal’s legacy 
policy. However, there were sufficient sources available here for this not to adversely affect 
my findings. Moreover, the interviews I conducted partially compensated for these 
absences.131  
 
Finally, I conducted 19 semi–structured interviews with actors from each of the Tribunal’s 
organs to elucidate how the trials’ participants approached the trials at the Tribunal, how 
changes both inside and outside the Tribunal affected this, and also what they understood the 
Tribunal’s strategic function to be. These interviews also allowed for a potential dissonance 
to come to the fore as individual actors had the chance to express their motivations and 
experiences of the Tribunal in a manner that might challenge how I understood these 
processes to have unfolded.132 These interviews were largely conducted whilst I was a ‘legal 
                                                     
130 http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.html (last accessed 30/08/2019) 
131 I found these documents both on the Tribunal’s website, where they store the annual reports, but also by 
searching the UN’s online archive. To narrow my search I limited the results to records that contained the exact 
term ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’.  
132 Eltringham, ‘When We Walk Out’, 545. 
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researcher’ at the ICTR from April–July 2015, where I was offered the chance by James 
Arguin—head of the appeals division—to work on the ‘Genocide Story Project’ (GSP). This 
project, which was the initiative of Arguin, attempted to construct a narrative of the genocide, 
a form of ‘official history’, based only on the Tribunal’s adjudicated facts from the trial 
judgements, aimed at improving the ‘relevance’ of the Tribunal to the outside world. When I 
left Arusha in July 2015, I had managed to complete a rough draft of the narrative (building 
on considerable work done prior to my arrival) which essentially consisted of the adjudicated 
facts (kept, for the most part, as exact quotes from the judgements) arranged to tell both a 
chronological and thematic account of the genocide (e.g. how the genocide spread throughout 
the country, and key sites of killing, such as roadblocks). To my knowledge, the project has 
not, however, been taken any further to date. This, and my time at the Tribunal requires a 
number of  additional comments.   
 
Working at the Tribunal brought with it a number of advantages and disadvantages for my 
research. Fundamentally, a large amount of what I have been able to achieve would not have 
been possible had I not had a position at the Tribunal. Without this, I have no doubt that I 
would have conducted a tiny fraction of the interviews that I ultimately conducted, as many 
of these, especially with the senior figures at the Tribunal, were arranged thanks to Arguin. 
That I already had a professional relationship with several of the interviewees meant that the 
interviews were, on the whole, less guarded than might otherwise be the case with ‘elite 
interviews’ (and this certainly seemed so when I compare these to the interviews I did with 
people I didn’t know). Additionally, had I not been able to go to Arusha in person, I would 
not have been able to gain access to many of the documents that I relied upon. Whilst these 
were all public documents, the issues with the online archive, especially when I began my 
research, meant that it would have been very difficult for me to get the case files I used 
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without knowing some of the archivists and being able to meet with them in person. Finally, I 
was also, as a result of my time at the Tribunal, permitted to observe the final appeals hearing 
and to witness some of the preparations that went into this.  
Whilst I must stress that these interviewees were only ever supplementary to my archival 
work, I cannot, however, claim that my interview pool was an objective sample of Tribunal 
staff over the lifespan of the Tribunal. Interviewees were largely drawn from the OTP (where 
I worked) and were mainly those that were still at the Tribunal at the end. Against this, 
however, is the fact that many of the interviewees had been at the Tribunal for a considerable 
part of its existence, and so provided an incredibly valuable pool of information as they 
offered a window into large periods of the Tribunal’s existence where they had witnessed 
many of the changes that interested me. It is also important to note that I agreed with the 
Tribunal not to utilise any observations made whilst working there. Whilst it is impossible 
not to subconsciously draw on some experiences from my time at the Tribunal, I have not 
explicitly used anything in this dissertation that comes from either private discussions with 
members of the Tribunal nor any observations made whilst I was working there. I do not, 
however, think that drawing on this would have altered my dissertation’s findings, and I also 
had more than enough on record from the interviews to avoid doing this. This agreement 
extended to my work on the GSP, and this is one of the reasons why I do not discuss this at 
any great length here. However, the GSP is also excluded for reasons of coherence. This 
dissertation is concerned, for the most part, with the way in which the archive has been 
constructed and so is essentially ‘backwards’ looking. The GSP, in its attempts to shape how 
the genocide is understood by the outside world is, instead, essentially ‘forward’ looking in 
its nature. As discussed further in the conclusion, there is a need to consider the ‘afterlife’ of 
the archive, which would also need to address the GSP, and this will form the basis of a 




Despite this agreement, there is no doubt that I was affected by my time spent at the Tribunal. 
It was significant for me to see the Tribunal as a ‘living organism’, rather than an abstract 
concept that I read about and studied, which affected people’s lives. I certainly felt very 
strongly—and in a way that I hadn’t thought I would—about seeing ‘genocidaires’ on trial. 
This, in particular, brought into focus more clearly my obligation to be more reflective and 
more critical about my own position and research, ensuring that I pursued this as 
meticulously as possible. However seemingly abstract this type of research appears, its topic 
is something that is starkly real for many people: those accused of acts of genocide, those that 
suffered at the hands of it, and those that now partake in the legal redress of this. So, whilst I 
do not think this has tempered my critique and criticism, I hope that at the very least it has 
made it more rigorous.  
 
In order to facilitate the analysis of these sources, I used Nvivo coding software.133 It must be 
stressed however, that I refrained from using any of the more quantitative tools (which I 
would argue offer only limited value to the types of questions asked here) and instead relied 
on some of the more basic functions, such as being able to organise all of the sources into one 
database. Additionally, Nvivo offers the tools with which it is possible to keep track of 
various patterns identified in these sources, providing something akin to a digital highlighter. 
This is made possible by creating a number of ‘nodes’ which can then be linked to specific 
passages in each individual source. I created the nodes around themes that I was interested in 
exploring more, as identified during the literature review, such as ideas about ‘victims’ or 
‘perpetrators’, or how procedural rules influenced what could and could not enter the 
courtroom. Having tagged all relevant sections in these sources (which I did alongside taking 
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more conventional notes), I could then revisit each of these highlighted section (Nvivo 
collates all references to each node in one place) to ascertain the patterns that existed with 
how these objects, subjects and concepts were constructed, and what rules more generally 
determined what could enter the courtroom and in what form. Piecing together the results 




This dissertation is an exploration of the contents of the ICTR’s archive, in order to determine 
whose archive. To this end, the empirical chapters are divided as follows. 
 
Chapter One analyses the UN’s intervention in Rwanda as a starting point to understand the 
Tribunal’s (and therefore the archive’s) strategic function. It argues that, whilst state interest 
and bureaucratic stumbling blocks go some way to explain why the UN failed to ‘do more’ 
during the genocide, this alone is not sufficient. Instead, it highlights the significance of the 
way in which the UNSC, and the ‘international community’ more generally, understood the 
violence in Rwanda, and the relationship of the international community to that violence. 
This rendered the genocide something that was not only outside of the UNSC’s responsibility 
but also as something that could not be stopped. As will be argued, a key turning point 
towards the UN ‘doing more’ was when the UN increasingly understood (and presented) the 
problem within a legal framework when it labelled the violence ‘genocide’. This both 
rendered the international community as the victim of the crime and also offered a potential 
solution to the violence in the form of trials. This formed the basis of how the ICTR came to 
be seen as a potential solution to the violence in Rwanda. The final section of the chapter will 
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explore the other hopes and expectations that were attached to the Tribunal as it was created 
and through this identify who the important ‘stakeholders’ at the Tribunal were. This 
discussion also captures the strategic function of the Tribunal and its archive as they were 
created.  
 
Chapter Two explores the extent to which the archive was produced solely as a result of the 
prosecution’s legal interests. The prosecution played an important role in determining the 
scope and function of the archive, as it was the prosecution that were given the main 
responsibility for interpreting the Tribunal’s mandate after the UNSC created the ICTR under 
Resolution 955. The chapter will show the significance of the prosecution’s legal priorities 
and goals in determining how it produced its records, as these decisions influenced the scope 
of the accounts of violence produced. However, as will be shown, a number of important 
non–legal discourses and priorities also came to shape these accounts. This chapter 
introduces the idea of the ‘conditions of truth’ as a concept that can bring together the various 
facets that led the prosecution’s account to be created as it was. The final section will show 
that, whilst it was clear that at first the prosecution pursued extra–legal goals, over time they 
became more focused simply on the legal output of the trials, which in turn altered the sense 
of who it was that the prosecution was trying to assist. Why this was the case will be explored 
in Chapter Six.  
 
 Chapter Three builds on Chapter Two as it considers the role played by prosecution 
witnesses in the archive’s construction. Whilst this reveals that witnesses performed a very 
significant role in determining the shape and contents of the archive, it also begins to point to 
the fact that these interventions were only permitted with the consent of the legal actors of the 
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courtroom. The chapter also explores the RPF’s interventions during these trials under the 
guise of defending the interests of victims. This again shows that actions that appeared driven 
by a desire to empower the victims of the genocide were, underneath the surface, driven by 
alternative (and political) motives. Combined this brings caution to the idea of these courts 
becoming ‘victim–centred’ spaces, something that will be further explored in Chapter Six. 
This chapter highlights the importance of the different roles afforded to different actors as the 
archive was constructed and as a result introduces another concept, the ‘processes of truth’, to 
help to explain why the archive exists as it does.  
 
Chapters Four and Five consider the influence that the interests and priorities of the defence 
and judges had, respectively, on the archive. Chapter Four argues that the defence drew on 
three different narratives structures (which I have labelled: ‘did what they could’; chaos and 
diminished responsibility; and ‘counter–histories’), each governed by the ‘conditions of 
truth’, along with a number of cross–examination and other interventionist strategies, when 
trying to establish that their clients were innocent. Like Chapters Two and Three, this also 
considers how witness testimony was used in the production of these accounts. The chapter 
concludes that, whilst these accounts focused on the accused, the specificity of the accused 
and their experiences were lost within them. In this vein, it also argues that during the ICTR’s 
trials the defendant was, to an extent, ‘de–centred’ within the trial process, which challenges 
the idea that this was essentially a ‘perpetrator–centric’ space.  
 
A number of comments are required about the division of the chapters here as there is an 
imbalance between the focus on the prosecution and their witnesses (which receives two 
separate chapters) and the defence and their witnesses (which is condensed into one). Beyond 
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space, this was for two reasons. The first was because, as I argue at the end of Chapter Four, 
whilst a number of similar constraints cut across both prosecution and defence witnesses, it 
was possible to far more succinctly and neatly compartmentalise the different types of 
narrative structures employed by the defence and their witnesses’ than it was for the 
prosecution and their witnesses. This suggested both greater homogeneity in defence witness 
accounts but also what appeared to be a less dynamic relationship between the defence and 
their witnesses. This both justified treating these witnesses separately, but also allowed me, as 
such, to be more economic with my analysis here and combine the defence and their 
witnesses into one chapter. I also decided that it was inappropriate to divide the chapters 
between ‘lawyers’ and ‘witnesses’, as I was interested in exploring how the defence and 
prosecution approached their tasks differently. 
 
Chapter Five similarly explores the judges’ influence over the archive. This is both in their 
management of the trials, but most importantly in the way they constructed the judgements, 
where again the importance of the conditions and processes of truth come through. This 
shows once more both the influence of the legal actors within the courtroom in dictating the 
court’s accounts of violence and also the complex relationship that they had with the 
witnesses. Whilst on the surface the witnesses continued to play an important role in shaping 
the judgements, underneath this lay a more problematic relationship. This will be highlighted 
by showing how the judges’ attitudes towards witnesses changed over time and highlighting 
the influence of gendered and patriarchal discourses on the judges’ decisions.  
 
The final empirical chapter explores the question of why the prosecution’s and judges’ 
approach shifted over time and the way in which this impacted on the role afforded to the 
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witnesses. By extension this also explores what this meant for purpose of the archive. It 
offers two answers for this. First, as the Tribunal progressed the legal agents were able to take 
greater control over the proceedings as their novelty wore off. However, more important in 
this respect was the intervention of the UNSC, when in 2003 it ordered the Tribunal to close 
down as soon as possible. With this all extra–judicial goals were pushed to the side, and the 
witnesses were treated in an increasingly utilitarian manner. This narrowing of the Tribunal’s 
strategic function is explored further at the end of the chapter as I show a number of 
problematic ways in which the Tribunal interacted with Rwandan society. With this, 
moreover, a final concept of the ‘politics of truth’ is introduced as I demonstrate the 
importance of taking into consideration the external political landscape to the Tribunal when 
exploring why the archive existed as it did.  
  
Overall, this dissertation will argue that the archive was the product of the interactions 
between the Tribunal’s different stakeholders who were driven by different interests and 
assigned different roles within the apparatus. This formed a key element of the rules which, 
along with the influence of legal and non–legal discourses, account for why the archive is as 
it is and are captured by what I have termed the ‘conditions’, ‘processes’, and ‘politics’ of 
truth. When considering the question of whose archive, the analysis demonstrates that the 
actors that drove the construction of the archive with greatest consequence were: legal actors 
within the court, due to their consistent control over which statements were made during 
trials (something which only grew over time); the Rwandan state, which whilst denied 
possession of the archive fundamentally shaped its appearance in crucial ways (most notable 
over their successful obstruction of investigations into RPF crimes); and the UNSC, who 
overall had the most significant influence over the way the Tribunal functioned. Indeed, the 
UNSC decision in 2003 that the Tribunal was to close as quickly as possible had significant 
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consequences for both what was recorded within the archive and how the records were 
produced. Whilst Chapter Three highlights the significant contribution that witnesses made to 
construction of the archive, ultimately the manner in which their interests were consistently 
disregarded demonstrates that this process was never driven by a concern for their needs. 
This could, as Chapter Six makes clear, have a significantly negative effect on their 
wellbeing. 
 
This dissertation offers several contributions to the literature. First, it offers a sustained 
analysis of the ICTR as an institution, amongst the first to explore the Tribunal over the 
duration of its existence.134 This provides a key insight into the evolution of international 
criminal justice at a key moment in its history. Second, the analysis advances an 
understanding of how and in whose interest international courts function. This highlights the 
political nature of these courts, and it also pushes forward the current understanding of the 
relationship between politics and law, as I examine how politics influenced the very way that 
the trials functioned and what constituted ‘justice’. This also leads to questions about the 
current legitimacy of international criminal justice. Third, I offer a re–evaluation of the role 
of the witness in this process, who I will argue has so far been rendered too passive within the 
trial process. Fourth, in determining how it is that the archive has been produced, I provide an 
understanding of why it is that particular stories about past acts of violence have been told 
within these courts, and hence what potential value they have, and what role that they might 
play, in the future. 
                                                     
134 See also Thierry Cruvellier, Courts of Remorse: Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010). 
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This chapter looks at the lead up to the creation of the ICTR, and explores the UN’s 
interventions in Rwanda before, during and after the genocide. It examines: the logic and 
rationalities that underpinned these interventions; the link between the UN’s understanding of 
the violence in Rwanda and its sense of responsibility to Rwanda; and how these factors 
intersected with other interests at play and other events happening elsewhere in the world—
particularly the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. This will primarily focus on the UNSC—and 
especially the P5—who largely controlled the UN’s engagement with Rwanda. This 
exploration explains both how the Tribunal came to be seen as a solution to the genocide and 
how it resulted in the ICTR’s specific strategic function at the Tribunal’s outset, which 
ultimately had a bearing on: how the Tribunal functioned; what it was to achieve; who it was 







The UN in Rwanda  
 
The conflict between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwanda government entered 
a new phase of increased intensity when the ‘civil war’ broke out in 1990.1 In February 1993, 
after three years of conflict—where the early signs of the genocide had already been noted by 
international observers—the two sides agreed to a ceasefire and started a peace process that 
resulted in the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords (APA).2 With the assistance of France, 
which convinced Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana of the merits of the agreement, 
both the RPF and the Rwandan government lobbied the UN to send in a UN monitoring force 
as part of the APA to ensure the maintenance of the ceasefire and to aid both parties in 
implementing the agreement.3 After initial reluctance the UNSC increasingly came around to 
the idea of intervening in the resolution of the conflict.4 After all, in a rare occurrence, all 
parties wanted the UN’s presence, and the task was seen as a simple handholding exercise. 
Over time the UN saw Rwanda as an ‘easy win’, a chance to rebuild the UN’s shattered 
reputation after their ill-fated intervention in Somalia.5  
 
The APA were finally signed on 4 August 1993. As Michael Barnett has argued, however, 
despite the UN provisionally agreeing to a UN presence in Rwanda prior to this, the 
bureaucratic cogs of the UN—with its fragmented organisation and endless protocols—led to 
                                                     
1 What to label the conflict is a contentious issue, as will be explored later. It is usually described as a civil war, 
but this does not really capture the international nature of the violence due to regional and international 
involvement of countries such as Zaire, Burundi, Uganda and France.  
2 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (London: Flamingo, 2003), 338; 
S/1999/1257, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the Rwandan 
Genocide, 16/12/1999, 6; and S/PV.7155, 7155th Meeting, 16/04/2014, 4. 
3 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (London: Cornell University Press, 
2002), 60–1. 
4 S/1999/1257, 41. 
5 Supra note 3, 13 and 65; Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide 
(London: Zed Books: 2nd Edition, 2009), 94. 
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a delayed introduction of a UN force in Rwanda.6 It took until October 1993 for the UN to 
finally approve the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was 
only fully deployed in Rwanda in November 1993.7 Even then, the strength of the force and 
the scope of its mandate were far less than was initially anticipated (due to both the UK’s and 
the US’s successful attempts to water down the mandate to make it less costly and some 
genuine concern for the capabilities of an overstretched UN peacekeeping office), and even 
when ‘fully formed’ it lacked basic equipment.8 This meant that the reduced force with its 
reduced mandate never reached the foreseen capacity and by late February UNAMIR was so 
weak that they had to stop foot patrols. 9 From the very outset, then, both a lack of ‘political 
will’ and certain bureaucratic practices influenced how the UN responded to the violence in 
Rwanda, something that was also seen in the failure to pass on to UNAMIR the Special 
Rapporteur for Rwanda’s 1993 report, which suggested genocide had already occurred during 
the conflict.10  
 
Any hopes that Rwanda was going to be a quick win for the UN were quickly revised. The 
deteriorating conditions inside the country, the government’s obstruction over the installation 
of a ‘broad based transitional government’—one of the key pillars of the APA—and a spike 
in politically motivated assassinations made it apparent that something more was going on 
than just the mere stalling of the peace process. If any doubt existed over the potential 
seriousness of the situation then this should have been finally set straight by General 
Dallaire’s (head of the UNAMIR forces on the ground) famous 11 January 1994 cable. This 
cable passed on key information to the UN Secretariat that Dallaire had received convincing 
                                                     
6 Supra note 3, 62–3. 
7 S/1999/1257, 8. 
8 Melvern, People Betrayed, 94; S/1999/1257, 30–32; and Supra note 3, 70–1. 
9 S/1999/1257, 40; and Melvern, People Betrayed, 116.  
10 S/1999/1257, 31.  
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evidence from an informant (Jean–Pierre) that extremist Hutu elements, determined for the 
APA to fail, had begun to systematically prepare for a campaign against the Tutsis by 
compiling lists of potential victims, stockpiling weapons, and converting the civil defence 
forces into armed militia.11 The cable—sent from Dallaire to Kofi Annan—was never passed 
on to the UNSC for consideration, and when Dallaire requested permission to intervene and 
seize the weapons that had been stockpiled, he was told that those actions would exceed his 
mandate and that he should not raid the arms caches.12  
  
This response is often presented as the watershed moment in the UN’s involvement in 
Rwanda. Adam LeBor goes as far as to suggest that raiding the caches, as Dallaire had 
wanted, could have stopped the genocide.13 Showing at best negligence, and at worst 
calculated indifference, this (in)action, it is argued, set a trend for what came next, when the 
UN stood idly by whilst the massacres of up to one million people occurred. During the 100 
days of killing, which began when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, the 
(in)action of the UNSC and the UNAMIR forces meant both parties became complicit in the 
killing as they gave the genocidaires a green light to act with impunity. 14 A number of events 
encapsulate this failure, including: the failure to protect Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana; the downsizing of the UNAMIR force to just 270 after the death of ten 
Belgian troops; the withdrawal of all westerners whilst leaving all Rwandan staff to their own 
fate—which was also one of the only moments when UNAMIR was authorised to use 
increased levels of force; and the consistent failure to label the violence as genocide.15  
                                                     
11 Ibid., 10.  
12 Adam LeBor, ‘Complicity with Evil’: The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide (London: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 168; and Melvern, People Betrayed, 107–9. 
13 LeBor, Complicity with Evil, 168–70; and Melvern, People Betrayed, 107–9. 
14 LeBor, Complicity with Evil, 177; Helen Hintjens, ‘Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 37:2 (1999), 274; and Peskin, International Justice (see Intro., n. 75), 155. 
15 Melvern, People Betrayed, 134–70. 
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Three explanations are frequently offered as to why the UN failed to do more during the 
Rwandan genocide. The first revolves around the idea of state interest, here meaning that a 
lack of interest in Rwanda geographically, economically, and strategically meant it was 
thought that Rwanda was not worth spilling blood over.16 Both the US and UK, who 
throughout this period remained the most influential members of the UNSC, not only lacked 
interest in Rwanda but were actively hostile to any major intervention. Both remained more 
concerned with the former Yugoslavia and South Africa; Rwanda, in comparison, offered no 
strategic value.17 This argument is bolstered by the Clinton’s administration unveiling of the 
PDD–25 during the genocide, which was a presidential directive that essentially produced a 
checklist that would determine whether or not the US would intervene in a situation.18 Based 
on these criteria, Colin Powell, then Joint Chief of Staff, argued:  
As long as I am chairman of the JCSs, I will not agree to commit American men and 
women to an unknown war, in an unknown land, for an unknown cause, under an 
unknown commander, for an unknown duration.19  
 
It was almost as if the PDD–25 were written based on the US’ perception of the (lack of) 
importance of Rwanda. Rwanda was such a non–issue for the Clinton administration that 
Clinton did not convene even one meeting with his senior advisors to discuss this matter.20 
Not only does the lack of interest explain the lack of willingness to do anything, but it also 
explains why even when action was agreed upon it was systematically under–resourced. The 
UK’s and US’s desire to not get involved any further meant, moreover, that throughout the 
violence they repeatedly, and deliberately, avoided using the ‘G–Word’, with a US State 
Department memo warning: ‘Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—
                                                     
16 See, Ibid; William Wallace, ‘British Foreign Policy after the Cold War’, International Affairs 68:3 (1992), 
423–42; Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Zed Books, 
1995), 180–242. 
17 Linda Melvern and Paul Williams, ‘Britannia Waived the Rules: the Major Government and the 1994 Rwanda 
Genocide’, African Affairs 133:401 (2004), 3–11; and Power, Problem from Hell, 359. 
18 Power, Problem from Hell, 342–3. 
19 Melvern, People Betrayed, 191. 
20 Supra note 18, 335. 
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Genocide finding could commit USG [the US government] to actually “do something”’—an 
unthinkable proposition.21 
 
Barnett offers a slightly different perspective on this, as his focus falls less on the individual 
member states’ involvement in Rwanda, than on the UN as an institution. Barnett argues that 
the UN’s bureaucratic machine, with its own rules and practices, defined which actions were 
considered desirable during the violence in Rwanda. He argues that the UN’s response in 
Rwanda has to be understood in light of the UN’s catastrophic intervention in Somalia, which 
put the UN’s bureaucracy into a ‘self–saving’ mode.22 Whilst a number of scholars highlight 
the ‘shadow of Somalia’, Bartlett offers a more nuanced account, suggesting that this self–
saving mode created a space within which it became morally acceptable not to act in 
situations—such as Rwanda—where the potential for failure would mean that the 
organisation itself may suffer further.23 This was reinforced by a tendency, Barnett argues, 
that exists within all bureaucratic organisations. Referencing Arendt, Barnett notes: 
The banality of evil bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the banality of 
bureaucratic indifference. A bureaucratic mentality inspires ordinary individuals to 
tolerate evil. Bureaucratic virtue is not found in tolerating the existence of immoral 
acts. Note that we are no longer speaking of unrelenting pressures but rather of the 
predispositions of all bureaucracies.24 
 
This helps to explain decisions that cannot be accounted for by state interest alone. These 
include the decision by Annan not to pass on Dallaire’s cable, the generally poor flow of 
                                                     
21 Ibid., 359. 
22 Ibid., 4–12. 
23 Ibid., 175. 
24 Ibid., 165. 
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information to the UNSC, and Boutros–Ghali’s failure to apply pressure on the UNSC to do 
more.25  
 
These accounts only take us so far, however, for in the face of such large–scale violence how 
could the UNSC justify their inaction to the outside world, and why was there not greater 
clamour amongst the wider international community, and particularly the populations and 
media of the main international powers (i.e., those best positioned to lead a successful 
intervention) for something to be done? In order to understand this, it is important to 
understand the third strand of the argument, which is that the UN and the media 
(mis)understood (or deliberately misrepresented) the violence in Rwanda, as being either 
simply part of the civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government, or rooted in 
‘tribalism’, which meant it was therefore something that could not be stopped.26 As will be 
argued below, this helped to construct Rwanda as a helpless case where nothing could be 
done, where the ‘international’ was separate from the violence that consumed ‘the local’ and 
so did not make any further intervention appear necessary. Whether or not this understanding 
of the violence really did shape what it was thought could be done, or whether this was a 
skilful deployment of rhetoric by the US and UK and other states to avoid becoming more 
involved, this demonstrates the importance of such discursive understanding in legitimising 
certain forms of (non)action. Moreover, these same ways of understanding also came to 
influence the creation of the ICTR. 
                                                     
25 Barnet notes, for example, that Boutros–Ghali’s rhetoric was much weaker when discussing Rwanda than 
regarding Somalia. Supra note 3, 119–20.  
26 Supra note 18, 373; Anne Chaon, ‘Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media?’ in The Media and the 
Rwandan Genocide, ed. Alan Thompson (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 162–3; Alan Kuperman, The Limits of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 25–8; Linda 
Melvern, ‘Missing the Story: the Media and the Rwanda Genocide’, in Thompson, Media and the Rwanda 
Genocide, 208; Lindsey Hilsum, ‘Reporting Rwanda: the Media and the Aid Agencies’, in Thompson, Media 
and the Rwanda Genocide, 172; and Alan Kuperman, ‘How the Media Missed the Rwanda Genocide’, in 
Thompson, Media and the Rwandan Genocide, 256. 
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Understanding Rwanda  
 
Throughout the UNSC’s discussions concerning the violence in Rwanda, the language drawn 
upon by the member states was peppered with a distinctive ‘Othering’ of both the nature of 
the violence in Rwanda and of Rwanda itself. The violence became something that almost 
appeared natural to Rwanda, simply an inevitability; its potential had always existed, and 
whilst it had been contained in the past it now ‘erupted’ uncontrollably.27 This belief in 
Rwanda’s innate tendency towards violence was also emphasised as the UNSC presented 
Rwandan history as a never ending ‘cycle of violence’, producing the sense of self–
reinforcing, perpetual violence.28 The Othering came through most strongly in the repetitive 
use in official UN documents of similar linguistic phrases to describe the killing: ‘orgy of 
violence’, ‘blood bath’, ‘tribal’, ‘carnage let loose’, and ‘barbarity’.29 This way of 
understanding the violence also dominated the western media’s coverage of the genocide, 
particularly in the right–wing press, where discussions were underpinned with the same 
descriptions of the violence, focusing on the ‘tribal’ nature of the killing and the 
‘bloodthirsty’ savages.30  
  
                                                     
27 S/PV.3368, 3368th Meeting, 21/04/1994, 3–4; and S/PV.3377, 3377th Meeting, 16/05/1994, 7. 
28 This was further reinforced by constant references to the ‘Rwandan tragedy’, which emphasised the 
inescapable and inevitable nature of the violence. S/PV.3368, 2–4; and S/PV.3337, Provisional Verbatim Record 
of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and Thirty–Seventh Meeting, 17/02/1994, 12. 
29 S/PV.3337, 4; and A/48/PV.93, 487th Session: 93rd Meeting, 14/04/1994, 2 and 4; S/PV.3377, 7; and 
E/1994/SR.8, Provisional Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, 14/06/1994, 7. 
30 Kuperman, ‘How the Media Missed the Rwanda Genocide’, 256–60; ‘Britons Marooned by Massacre in the 
Mist’, Daily Mail, 11/04/1994; ‘Safely Home after Hell of Rwanda’, Daily Mail, 13/04/1994; ‘Massacre of 
Orphans’, Daily Mail, 04/05/1994; ‘Faces of Suffering Amid the Slaughter, Daily Mail, 16/05/1994; 
‘Paratroopers in Race to Rescue’, Mail on Sunday, 10/04/1994; ‘Rwanda Bloodbath Toll Hits 500,000’, Mail on 
Sunday, 15/05/1994; ‘Innocents in a Hospital of Hell’, Mail on Sunday, 22/05/1994; and ‘The Lake of Death; 
40,000 Bodies Float Down River from Rwandan Massacre’, Daily Mail, 23/05/1994. This position needs to be 
nuanced slightly as the left–wing press, in the UK at least, did have a better grip on what was happening. They, 
for instance, identified the largely one–sided nature of the violence and the targeting of the Tutsis early on and 
that this was something detached from the civil war. ‘Thousands Massacred in Rwanda’, The Guardian, 
12/04/1994. However, even this was peppered with a distinctive othering. See, for examples: ‘Blood Bath at the 
Bottom of the Barrel’, Guardian, 08/04/1994; and ‘Rwanda PM Killed as Troops Weak Carnage’, Guardian, 
08/04/1994; ‘French Lead Flight From Rwanda’, Guardian, 11/04/1994. 
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Within the UNSC not all states responded in the same way to Rwanda or drew on the same 
Othering discourse. The Non–Aligned countries, along with the New Zealand and Czech 
delegations, more accurately described the violence as a genocide, being primarily directed 
against the Tutsis, and also called for greater intervention,  advocating the strengthening of 
the UNAMIR force at the time when the consensus appeared to be for total withdrawal.31 
Yet, despite these dissident voices, the overwhelming understanding of the violence was 
constructed within this discursive reality worked to Other the violence.  
 
It must be stressed that this way of understanding the violence was completely unjustified. 
The genocide in Rwanda was not random nor something that just ‘erupted’, and most 
certainly was not ‘tribal’, but was the result of careful state–led coordination, where a 
political elite produced the conditions whereby the masses (for a variety of reasons) would 
participate in a plan that would, like all genocides, produce a ‘stronger’ state and society. 
This was not the consequence of a ‘failed’, or absent, state as these descriptions suggested, 
but, if anything, a state functioning at full capacity, where its organs (administration, military, 
security, etc.) were put to work, as was a sophisticated media strategy, to devastating effect. 
Moreover, the description of this being simply an ‘internal’ affair concealed the very 
international nature of the conflict, particularly evident through France’s role in supporting 
the genocidaires throughout the genocide. Rather, this perspective of the violence resulted 
from the entrenched view of Africa as the ‘dark continent’.32 Within this discourse, it is 
possible to see clear traces of Chinua Achebe’s famous description of the West’s portrayal of 
Africa as ‘the other world, the antithesis of Europe and therefore of civilisation, a place 
where a man’s vaunted intelligence and refinement are finally mocked by triumphant 
                                                     
31S/PV.3377, 15–6; S/PV.3391, 3391st Meeting, 20/06/1994, 2; and S/1999/1257, 20–1. 
32 Whilst the term ‘Western’ is a problematic one, this better encapsulates the states and publics being referred 
to here than other possible terms, such as the ‘Global North’, since within the UNSC it was mainly the UK, US 
and France that controlled how the violence in Rwanda was addressed.  
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bestiality’.33 Within this conception it came as no surprise that violence ‘descended’ upon the 
‘tiny African state’.34 
 
The Western media also matched the P5’s greater interest in the violence in the former 
Yugoslavia.35 The Guardian newspaper, which throughout the genocide was possibly the 
only UK media outlet to consistently refer to the violence as genocide, captured much of 
this:36 
The collapse of Yugoslavia is a particular crisis for Europe. It's our doorstep, our 
house even [...]. Ending the war is in our interests as nations, not just in our interests 
as peace–loving people. That's one of the differences between Bosnia and Rwanda.37 
 
This language was repeated in the descriptions of violence by UK MPs, which relied on the 
same logic that drove PDD–25, where based on a particular calculation the Yugoslavian 
conflict became ‘our’ problem, whereas Rwanda—a distant place—was for someone else to 
deal with.38 Anne Chaon has noted that even Le Monde (which would be expected to pay 
greater attention to Rwanda given French interest and involvement) published 1665 articles 
on the former Yugoslavia and only 756 on Rwanda in 1994.39 
 
                                                     
33 Chinua Achebe, ‘An Image of Africa’, Massachusetts Review 18:4 (1977), 784. 
34 ‘Thousands Die in Orgy of Bloodletting’, Daily Mail, 09/04/1994. 
35 Chaon, ‘Who Failed in Rwanda’, 162. 
36 ‘Blood at the Bottom of the Barrel’, Guardian, 08/04/1994; ‘Foreigners Flee Bloody Horrors of Rwanda’, 
Guardian, 11/04/1994; and ‘UN Troops Stand by and Watch Carnage’, Guardian, 12/04/1994. 
37 ‘Aid Agencies Condemn UN Pull–out from Rwanda’, Guardian, 23/04/1994. 
38 S/1999/1257, 44. Rwanda’s lack of significance to the UK government was perhaps best seen by their 
attempts to avoid discussing this in Parliament, with the first time–tabled debate only taking place on 23 May 
1993. Tony Worthington speech, Hansard: written answers to questions. House of Commons, London, UK 
(hereafter Hansard HOC), 23/05/1994. All discussions of Rwanda were also driven by opposition MPs and 
Lords, and throughout, Rwanda remained a problem for someone else to deal with and was portrayed in othering 
language that meant that little could be done about it. For examples see Lord Henley speech, Hansard: Written 
Answers to Questions. House of Lords, London, UK, (hereafter referred to as Hansard Lords), 29/04/1994; John 
Reid speech, Hansard HOC, 4/05/1994; and Baroness Chalker speech, Hansard Lords, 19/05/1994; Douglas 
Hurd speech, Hansard HOC, 15/06/1994; Bruce Grocott speech, Hansard HOC, 12/04/1994. 
39 Chaon, ‘Who Failed in Rwanda’, 162. 
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There was something about the violence in the former Yugoslavia that meant that violence 
was of concern to Western states (and particularly those within the P5) and was, as a result, 
something that could and should be stopped. It is also important to recall here that a crucial 
turning point in the calls for intervention in the former Yugoslavia was the Holocaust-esque 
imagery of the Muselmann behind the barbed wire of camps such as Omarska and Trnopolje 
that signified in 1992 that something similar to one of the last great horrors to befall Europe 
was happening again. There were no similar symbols to ignite this same passion from 
Rwanda, which continued to be portrayed as representing bestial acts of violence committed 
by the ‘Other’.40 As Dallaire also noted: ‘I was self–conscious about saying the killings were 
“genocidal” because, to us in the West, “genocide” was the equivalent to the Holocaust or the 
killing fields of Cambodia’.41 There was simply never a clamour—or at least not until it was 
too late—for something to be done. Chaon sums this up by citing a New York Times article 
that uncritically accepted the state of affairs:  
No member of the UN with an army strong enough to make a difference was willing 
to risk the lives of troops for this ‘failed central African nation–state with a 
centuries–old history of tribal warfare and deep distrust of outside intervention’. 
[The articles headline read:] ‘For the West, Rwanda is not worth the political 
candle.’42 
 
This nomenclature of violence drastically reduced the type of action the UNSC saw as both 
possible and desirable, and also lessoned what was expected by western publics. This 
description of the violence had two effects on these discussions about interventions as it 
meant both that nothing could be done and also that there was no sense that the UNSC was 
responsible to do more to help stop the violence.43 Like the violence itself, the solution had to 
                                                     
40 This distinction continued even in the aftermath of the conflicts through the differential treatment of the ICTY 
and ICTR (discussed more below). 
41 Supra note 18, 358. 
42 Melvern, ‘Missing the Story’, 202. 
43 S/PV.3368, 3; and S/PV.3377, 6 and 8; and S/PV.3326, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand 
Three Hundred and Twenty–Sixth Meeting, 06/01/1994, 7. What is further interesting here is that the French 
were also warning about the need to ensure that the intervention was as economical as possible. Two 
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come from within.44 The APA was presented as the solution, as this would (re)introduce a 
‘strong’ government to help stop the tribalism and chaos.45 As a result, the violence remained 
Rwanda’s problem, outside of the realms of the international and the UN’s sphere of 
responsibility. What this also meant was that—almost inexplicably—the UNSC allowed the 
Rwandan government to retain their seat on the UNSC throughout the genocide and, further, 
continued to call for a state–based solution to the problem (failing to see that this was not a 
problem of a failed state). As something that was not its responsibility, nor a state of affairs 
where any action would help, the UNSC’s obligations switched towards protecting itself, as 
Barnett suggests.46 This was most clearly seen with the decision to scale down the UNAMIR 
forces in April as the genocide entered full swing. 
 
This particular framing of the violence was also underpinned by a separation of the global 
order into the two separate spheres: the international (with the UNSC at its head), as the site 
of order and peace; and the local—as the site of barbarity, almost positioned as ‘outside’ of 
humanity in the state of exception where bare life could be taken without consequence.47 This 
worked to conceal the deeply implicated involvement of international actors within the 
violence in Rwanda, whether this was the effect that the downsizing of the UNAMIR force 
had on convincing the genocidaires they could act with impunity, or France’s persistent 
                                                                                                                                                                     
interpretations can be read into this. The first is that there was a genuine concern with the economics of the 
mission—an issue that becomes more important in Chapter Six. The second is that the French were utilising this 
discourse in order to create the conditions whereby intervention was limited in order to assist their friends within 
the Rwandan state. Either way, the centrality of the economics of the processes of intervention is key. 
A/C.5/48/SR.57, Fifth Committee: Summary Record of the 57th Meeting: Financing of the United Nations 
Observer Mission Rwanda, 29/03/1994, 2–3. 
44  ‘[UNAMIR] have performed a very commendable task in holding this situation together in order to buy time 
for the many internal manifestations to work themselves out.’ S/PV.3368, 3. See also S/PV.3377, 6 and 8.  
45 S/PV.3326, 5, 11, and 13–14; and S/PV.4049, 4049th Meeting, 30/09/1999, 7; and S/PV.3371, 3371st Meeting, 
30/04/1994, 3. 
46 Supra note 3, 175. 
47 A/48/PV.93, 2 and 4; S/PV.3368, 3 and 4; S/PV.3377, 3–4 and 7; E/1994/SR.8, 7; and S/PV.4049, 2. See also, 
E/CN.4/1997/L.81, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the 
World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories, 15/04/1997. See 




support for the genocidaires. It meant that France could legitimately discuss ‘what could be 
done’ about Rwanda, whilst supporting the Rwandan government militarily and allowing 
weapons to be sold freely.48 This also meant that the murder of the Belgium troops became 
the symbol of the West’s sacrifice in a conflict they had no hand in making, rather than a 
targeted and symbolic attack at the former colonial rulers of Rwanda.49 Throughout, the 
international community was presented as innocent and sat outside the violence, rather than 
tied up with the violence itself.  
 
Whilst I am not suggesting that these discourses on their own resulted in the course of 
(in)action taken in Rwanda, the widespread acceptance of the underlying imaginings of 
Africa, and the local and the international, permitted certain (non)actions to be accepted as 
legitimate.50 This position is also compatible with the ideas of state interest discussed above. 
For either the discursive imaginings described here were created in order to shield some 
states from criticism for pursuing their interests with concern for little else (meaning that 
these discourses were seen to have a purchase with the communities that these actors were 
speaking to), or they contributed towards a ‘genuine’ understanding that the violence in 
Rwanda was simply not of concern to the UN, or perhaps more exactly the UNSC. The 
strength of the first explanation can be seen in the Rwandan government’s description of 
violence at the UNSC as being the result of spontaneous outpouring of emotions, as it no 
doubt hoped the ‘international community’ would continue its non–interventionist policy.51 
However, several factors demonstrate that the latter view played at least some part. First, this 
Othering discourse spread far beyond interested member states, but was also repeated within 
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the media in countries like the UK and US (which at the very least helped remove pressure 
from the UNSC and P5 countries to do more). Second, it appears that in some quarters this 
understanding of the violence being tribal or natural, which meant little could be done, did 
seem to shape policy. As Pru Bushnell (US Deputy Assistant in the Department of African 
Affairs), said: ‘[P]eople didn’t know that it was a genocide. What I was told was “Look Pru, 
these people do this from time to time.”’52 This underlies the notion that one of the reasons 
that more was not done was because this did not look like the ‘Holocaust’, a ‘western’ crime. 
It is also telling, as explored below, that it was only when this was reframed legally as being 
genocide that the UNSC decided try to do more to stop the violence.  
 
Moving towards ‘Intervention’ 
 
The UNSC’S first implicit allusion to ‘genocide’ came on 30 April 1994 when a UNSC 
statement drew on the wording of the United Nations Genocide Convention (hereafter 
Genocide Convention), noting: ‘[I]n this context the killing of members of an ethnic group 
with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime which is 
punishable under international law’.53 This was, however, the result of a compromise as New 
Zealand had initially pressed for the UNSC to explicitly use the term ‘genocide’, but the P5, 
led by the UK and US, vetoed this insertion; both worried about what the literal use of the g–
word might mean for their responsibility to ‘do more’.54  
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The first explicit use of the term genocide was on 16 May 1994, as the New Zealand delegate 
Keating stated, after condemning the farce that had allowed Rwanda to continue to hold a 
seat on the UNSC, that there needed to be an enquiry into the genocide, with the Czech 
delegate stating that ‘[i]n the view of my delegation, the proper description is genocide’.55 
Whilst during this meeting only New Zealand and the Czech Republic used the term, the 
wording of the Genocide Convention was again mobilised in order to condemn the violence 
and to threaten possible sanctions for guilty parties, marking a step–change in how the 
violence was perceived. This was also the meeting that finally agreed, through UN 
Resolution 918, to increase the size and role of the UNAMIR forces, ultimately creating 
UNAMIR 2, as the UNSC, and the UN more generally, appeared to begin to see a greater role 
for themselves in bringing the violence to an end.56 Indeed, as Djibouti’s representative 
argued during the meeting on 16 May, ‘if there is a positive development in the relentless 
Rwandan tragedy, it is the apparently universal recognition that in some significant way the 
international community must now become directly involved.’57 On 31 May 1994 the 
Secretary General finally declared that ‘there can be little doubt that [the killing] constituted 
genocide’.58 Here, the Secretary General made it clear that the level of violence in the 
presence of the UN had reached the point where failure to bring the violence to an end would 
irrevocably damage the UN’s reputation.59 
 
The introduction of the legal term ‘genocide’ accompanied a reframing of how the violence 
in Rwanda was understood and brought with it a different understanding of the international 
communities, and specifically the UNSC’s, responsibility and possibility to act, to ‘do more’. 
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The turn to the legal idiom coincided with the simultaneous admonition that more had to be 
done and also brought with it the threat of possible future action through prosecutions of 
those responsible.60 Also crucially, this sense of responsibility, and the possibility of 
intervention, came as the violence that had previously only occurred in relation to the local 
(where it was considered chaotic and without sense) was brought into closer contact with the 
international, as it now represented a violation of one of the international community’s legal 
norms, which rendered the whole community a victim of the violence as it became a crime 
against humanity.61 This was, moreover, also seen in the Secretary General’s warnings that 
recognised the harm that the UN’s inaction had caused to the reputation of that community 
now that the violence had been identified as genocide. The adoption of the term genocide 
coincided with the UNSC no longer being able to avoid direct involvement.62 
 
There was, however, never a complete shift in how the violence, and the possible response to 
that violence, was seen. Even after the UNSG’s report of 31 May 1994, UNSC members were 
reluctant to refer to the violence as genocide, as they now dragged their feet over the logistics 
involved in creating the enlarged UNAMIR 2 force.63 Many states continued to describe the 
violence with the same Othering terms mentioned previously, as something that was simply 
part of the conflict (regrettable, but not something that had to be stopped).64 Only the Czech 
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Republic and New Zealand delegates, again, were willing to explicitly and repeatedly call 
this genocide and nothing else. In June, as the genocide continued, in a seemingly desperate 
appeal for more to be done, the Czech delegate drew on the Holocaust to describe the killing, 
noting: 
The regime in Rwanda has been attempting to do something similar [to the Nazi’s] 
—with Machetes instead of gas chambers; with the notorious Interahamwe, 
comparable to the SS, with the Mouvement Républicain National pour la 
Démocratie et le Développmenent [MRND] and Coalition pour la Défense de la 
République [CDR], comparable to the Nazi Party.65  
 
However, this was an exception, and there seemed to remain a belief, supported by a 
continuation of the Othering discourse, that the violence was a problem for someone else to 
deal with. Even when the responsibility for stopping the violence spread beyond Rwanda, it 
was presented as a specifically ‘African problem’,66 for Africa to deal with.67 As such, it was 
expected that the African nations would supply the vast majority of troops required for 
UNAMIR 2.68 The UN member states’ (notably the US) refusal to support these nations’ 
participation in UNAMIR 2 resulted in the continued delay of the UNAMIR 2 forces, which 
did not arrive until October 1994. 
 
As this suggests, Rwanda remained a ‘local’ problem, of no great interest to the West and the 
UNSC, reproducing the divide between the international and the local. The strength of this 
discourse was most clearly illustrated by the UN’s reasoning that accepted the legitimacy of a 
French ‘multi–lateral’ force—comprising a tiny contingent of Francophone Senegalese 
personnel—to intervene with Operation Turquoise until the UNAMIR 2 force was ready. 
Here, the French—representing the international—were seen as neutral outsiders who could 
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intervene without political interest; its neutrality was seemingly further ensured due to the 
‘humanitarian’ principles that underpinned the operation.69 This provided a particularly clear 
example of the international being ‘outside’ of the violence, where they were positioned to be 
able to ‘step in’ to ‘bring peace’ and restore order.70 Indeed, this discourse was so strong that 
it seemed that little consideration was given to the appropriateness of France heading up the 
intervention, despite its colonial history and close support for the genocidaires, something 
that was only questioned by China, Brazil, and Russia.71   
 
The Rwandan genocide largely came to an end with the RPF’s victory on 17 June 1994.72 
Whilst, the above has argued that the reframing of the crisis as ‘genocide’ coincided with a 
change in the UN’s response to the violence (even if a number of problematic imaginings 
persisted) it was once the genocide had come to an end that the UN intervened with greater 
commitment. At this point it deployed its different offices and organs, each with its own 
expertise—human rights, development, and governance—to contribute to the processes of 
‘normalisation’, ‘reconstruction’, and ‘reconciliation’.73 This normalising process was very 
much rooted in a particular imagining about how peace could be established both within 
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Rwanda and within the international system as a whole. As it had during the genocide, this 
imagining constructed Rwanda as a ‘malfunctioning’ state rather than a product of the 
international system.74 This brought with it not only domestic instability but—due to the 
interconnected nature of the global order—wide spread regional and international instability, 
as was being witnessed in Rwanda’s neighbouring countries due to the refugee crisis and the 
continuing violence (and genocide) that this brought with it.75 The understanding, however, 
meant that the solution to the problem was to (re)build the failed state in a particular image 
(rather than consider that the fault might lie with the system as a whole); thus, the 
international community, led by the UN, set about embarking on a distinctly neo–liberal 
state–building exercise based on: ‘good governance’; introducing democracy; repairing the 
country’s military and security forces; and creating a strong economy that was supported, and 
made possible, by a healthy and literate population (required to compete in the ‘global 
market’).76 
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As a result of various factors discussed in the following section, international criminal justice 
was seen as being able to contribute towards the process of rebuilding Rwanda and on 8 
November 1994, the UNSC, under Resolution 955, brought the ICTR into existence.77 Like 
the ICTY, to which it was partially joined (they shared a prosecutor and the appeal 
chambers), the Tribunal (a quasi–independent institution that would answer to the UNSC) 
consisted of three organs—chambers, registry, and prosecution—and was charged with 
prosecuting individuals responsible for violations of international criminal law—including 
crimes against humanity, violations of common articles 2 to the Geneva Convention (war 
crimes), and genocide—within Rwanda or neighbouring states between 1 January 1994 and 
31 December 1994. As a Chapter 7 mission, the Tribunal was a response to what was seen as 
a continuing threat to international peace and security, and it became an important tool in the 
‘process of national reconciliation and […] restoration and maintenance of peace’.78 But how, 
exactly, was it supposed to achieve this? Why was international criminal justice seen as a 
useful tool in response to the violence? The final section of this chapter will explore the 
Tribunal’s strategic function during its formative years as it was establishing itself as an 
institution of international criminal law, to begin to determine, at the outset at least, who the 
Tribunal was created to serve and what it was supposed to achieve.  
 
International Criminal Justice and the ICTR’s Strategic 
Function 
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Perhaps most obviously, the Tribunal was created to help Rwanda reconcile and overcome 
the consequences of the genocide.79 It is often forgotten that Rwanda, headed by the new RPF 
government, requested that the UNSC create an international tribunal. Acknowledging that 
the Rwandan legal system was all but destroyed, the RPF government called on the UN to 
bring justice where it couldn’t, citing the ICTY as a precedent. The UN’s creation of the 
ICTY meant that after this request had been made it would have been very hard not to agree 
to a similar tribunal for Rwanda (it is more than doubtful that the UN would have acquiesced 
to this demand had the ICTY not already been created). This is perhaps the most important 
element that can help to explain why the Tribunal came into existence.  
 
Beneath this almost instinctive call for ‘justice’ lay a number of other ideas that appeared to 
make international criminal justice the right tool to help Rwanda recover from the genocide. 
First, it was thought that an international court could help address the refugee crisis, which 
the UNSC saw as a serious threat to international peace and security, as this infringed upon 
the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries, risked destabilising the whole region, and 
marked a new phase in the genocide as the killing continued in the camps under the command 
of the ‘government in exile’.80  
  
Several factors supported the apparent usefulness of a tribunal here. First, it would help 
remove the leaders of the genocide from the picture. These persons were seen as being 
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responsible for the continuing instability in the refugee camps, and the region more generally, 
as they formed a ‘government in exile’ and continued to rule and to commit acts of genocide 
within the camps.81 It was also hoped that the administration of impartial justice and holding 
individuals to account would convince Hutus in the camps (the majority of the refugees) that 
they could return to Rwanda in the knowledge that they would be treated fairly without fear 
of collective punishment or reprisals.82 This ultimately resulted in the UNSC enlarging the 
Tribunal’s geographic jurisdiction from covering only crimes occurring in Rwanda to crimes 
committed in neighbouring countries so as to specifically capture the refugee crisis and the 
violence that came with it.83 This showed the first signs of law’s ability to mould itself 
around acts of violence, as it responded to the political needs of those that mobilised it.  
  
It was believed that this form of justice would also have extensive additional benefits for 
Rwanda more generally, and could help it reconcile. As Madeline Albright, argued:  
Our goal must be individual accountability and responsibility […]. We must fix 
responsibility on those who have directed these acts of violence. In so doing, we can 
transform revenge into justice, affirm the rule of law, and hopefully bring this 
horrible cycle of violence to a merciful close.84 
 
Justice, then, would help the victims overcome the desire for revenge and also help avoid 
ideas of collective guilt and responsibility, which would have seen the whole of the Hutu 
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population charged and prosecuted for the violence. Drawing strongly on the logic that also 
underpinned Nuremberg, justice here would help to identify those that were guilty so that the 
innocent could reintegrate into society.  
 
Throughout its formative years, it was also held that the Tribunal could help Rwanda, and in 
particular the victims of the genocide, by offering them the ‘truth’ about what had 
happened.85 This was particularly advocated for by the first prosecutor of the Tribunal, 
Richard Goldstone, who saw the Tribunal as a space where the victims could speak of their 
traumatic experiences and directly hold those that were responsible for the crimes to account. 
In doing so, a light could be shone on the past, and an irrefutable account of the genocide 
could be produced to act as a bulwark against those that would continue to deny what had 
happened.86 As Payam Akhavan—involved with the creation of the ICTY—noted: 
A fundamental condition for reconciliation is widespread recognition of the truth 
that what transpired in 1994 was a genocide in which the Rwandan population was 
decimated and that there was nothing inherent or inevitable about the whirlwind of 
hatred and violence which swept through the country; and a recognition that Hutu 
and Tutsi walked the road to hell, victim and perpetrator alike, at the instigation of 
extremist leaders whose interests it served, and that the people of Rwanda are not 
doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. Thus, through the International Tribunal, 
as well as national trials, the Rwandan people may be witness to the truth and 
thereby exorcise themselves from the spectres of the past.87 
 
 This would help both the victims and society to move forwards, having built this truth into a 
new collective memory.88 As this suggests, this was seen as building on the legacy of the 
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Holocaust trials, and particularly Eichmann, which were used as precedents to justify these 
notions. 89  
 
This concern for the accuracy of the Tribunal’s account of the genocide also led the UNSC to 
partially acquiesce to the Rwandan government’s demands that it expand the Tribunal’s 
temporal jurisdiction to include crimes committed prior to the 6 April 1994, the original start 
date for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, so that it could capture the planning of the genocide. As a 
result of this intervention, the start date of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ended up being 1 
December 1994—whilst not extending as far back as the Rwandan government would have 
wished this nonetheless again shows how law bent to political concerns.90 Similarly, the 
Tribunal also extended the end date of the jurisdiction from 17 July 1994 (the date of the 
RPF’s victory) to 31 December 1994 so as to capture on–going violence in both Rwanda and 
the neighbouring region after the genocide had ‘stopped’.91  
 
As was suggested above, in many ways law also became the ‘natural’ response to the 
problem. Law’s hold on how the violence was understood and, as a result of this which 
interventions were imagined as a possibility, was already visible within the veiled references 
to the occurrence of international crimes and the threat of prosecutions made by the UNSC on 
30 April and 16 May 1994.92 The idea of a legal response to the violence was reinforced by 
the Human Rights Special Rapporteur report on the violence in Rwanda, commissioned by 
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the Economic and Social Council (ESC) on 28 June 1994.93 The report, the first in–depth UN 
report into the violence, left no doubt that the violence in Rwanda constituted genocide and, 
as a result, called for those responsible for these crimes to be brought to account.94 The 
escalation of this judicialising of the problem continued with the UNSC’s creation of a 
Commission of Experts on 1 July 1994, which, on 4 October 1994, confirmed the Special 
Rapporteur’s findings that genocide had occurred and called for the creation of an ad hoc 
international tribunal.95 Seeing the violence in Rwanda as a violation of international legal 
norms, then, started off a chain reaction whereby an international court was increasingly seen 
as a legitimate and necessary response.96 The creation of the ICTR’s statute, and the 
affirmation of the legitimacy of holding individuals to account for acts of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes marked the culmination of this process. This, and the 
following trials, brought to life what were, at this point, a relatively poorly defined set of 
conventions, treaties, rules of evidence and procedure and customary law, and contributed 
towards the institutionalisation, and solidification, of international criminal justice as a 
distinct field of practice.97 In many respects  the Tribunal, as a site of law, had become 
(almost tautologically) for the law, and with this, for the legal agents that would later come to 
populate it.  
 
The Tribunal would also, it was hoped, make important contributions to the international 
community—beyond bringing peace to the Great Lakes region. This was to be achieved, as 
with the work of the ICTY, by solidifying the principles of law that governed certain 
                                                     
93 E/CN.4/1995/7. 
94 S/PV.3377, 14–5.  
95 S/PV.3400; S/1999/1257, 28; S/1994/1125, 5; S/1994/1115, 3–4; and S/PV.3566, 8–14. 
96 S/PV.3640, 8–19; A/51/PV.78, 51st Session, 78th Plenary Meeting, 10/12/1996, 5 and 10–6; and S/PV.3453, 8, 
12–13 and 15–7. 
97 For a similar argument see Frederic Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field’ (see Intro., n. 
88). The dynamic and performative nature of law was also clear here, as the statute’s jurisdiction covered war 
crimes committed in non-international conflict, which at this point in time was not considered as customary law.  
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practices within the international community, by establishing that international criminal 
justice was a possibility, and also by demonstrating the conscience of the international 
community.98 Symbolically, the Tribunal functioned to reinstate the international 
community’s humanity that was lost during the genocide.99 As the Malaysian delegate to the 
UNSC stated in December 1996: ‘[T]he Tribunal serves as the conscience of the international 
community. It is the manifestation of the moral outrage of humanity over the transgressions 
of civilizational norms and ethics.’100 
 
More cynically, the Tribunal offered a way of making this type of statement (showing that, 
despite their (in)actions during the genocide, the international community really did care) but 
in a relatively cost effective and risk free manner.101 From the very outset an ‘economic’ 
element was inserted into the court’s mandate, which would see it under–resourced for its 
duration, but particularly during its formative years. In its first budget, for instance, the 
Tribunal had a relatively meagre initial request (considering what was being attempted) of 
$0.5million cut by 20 percent and then the budget proposal for 1995 was refused because the 
UN’s Fifth Committee (in charge of finance) argued it had not been justified.102 The 
allocation of resources would also, once again, show the prioritisation of the former 
Yugoslavia over Rwanda, as funds were unevenly distributed between the two institutions, 
giving the impression once more that black bodies mean less than white ones.103  
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For each of these contributions to be realised it was understood that an international court 
would be needed in addition to domestic trials in Rwanda. From a practical perspective, in 
addition to overcoming (or sidestepping) Rwanda’s lack of infrastructure, an international 
court, with an international jurisdiction and backed by the UN (and most importantly the 
UNSC), seemed to offer the best chance of capturing and prosecuting those most responsible 
for the violence, the vast majority of whom were not in Rwanda.104 International trials would 
also ensure that impartial and neutral justice would be delivered. The RPF also acknowledged 
that this would be the benefit of an international court, which would help ease concerns that 
Rwanda’s domestic courts would become sites of revenge and ‘victors’ justice.105 Whilst 
plans had initially been made for the Tribunal to be seated in The Hague, along with the 
ICTY, it was ultimately thought that an African seat was better suited to the Tribunal’s goals 
of assisting Rwanda, as this both retained the ability of the court to be independent from 
Rwanda, but also meant that it could be close enough to the location of the crime to be 
important symbolically—justice must be seen to be done—and practically, as it would help 
with accessing the crime sites and witnesses. As a result, Arusha, Tanzania, was selected as 
the place where the Tribunal would sit. 106  
 
However, with this decision the divide between the international and the local re–emerged, as 
the local once again became the site of the savage and the international that of the saviour.107 
                                                                                                                                                                     
was given greater attention at UN meetings than the ICTR. See: S/PV.4229, 4229th Meeting, 21/11/2000; 
A/57/PV.36, 57th Session: 36th Plenary Meeting, 28/10/2002, 15; and S/2003/946, Letter dated 3 October 2003 
from the Secretary–General Addressed to the President of the Security Council: Completion Strategy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 06/10/2003, 2 and 4. 
104 Senior Appeals Attorney – ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (Arusha, Tanzania: June, (2015). 
105 Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide, 29. 
106 Ibid., 35–8; Peskin, International Justice (see Intro., n. 75), 166–7. 
107 Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviours’ (see Intro., n. 74), 201–45. See also Otto, ‘Subalternity’ (see Intro., 
n. 74), 337–64. 
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One of the reasons why this argument for an international court made sense was that it 
reaffirmed the impartiality of the international and their lack of involvement with the 
violence in the first place allowed for the international to ‘step in’ and ‘bring peace’ through 
the administration of justice.108 The creation of the Tribunal also demonstrated the possible 
tensions between the international and the local as, despite having initially requested the 
Tribunal, Rwanda ultimately voted against its creation.109 Underpinning this dispute was the 
sense that there were two competing conceptions of justice at play. Whilst the Rwandan 
delegate at the meeting that created the ICTR agreed that the UN could deliver neutral and 
impartial justice, they equally felt that this ‘distanced justice’ would not meet with 
Rwandan’s expectations of justice. Geographically the Tribunal was seen as too removed 
from Rwanda (which was precisely one of the UN’s rational for the Tribunal); the narrow 
temporality of the crimes to be considered would fail to capture their historic suffering and 
their struggle; and the lack of a death sentence meant that justice delivered internationally 
would not be of equal strength compared with that delivered locally.110  
 
The resolution of this tension in favour of the international clarified the superiority of the 
international over the local, which was further established as the ICTR was given primacy of 
jurisdiction.111 This primacy meant that: states were obliged to transfer suspects when 
requested to do so; states had an obligation to amend laws that might otherwise prevent them 
from cooperating with the Tribunal; and—whilst the reciprocal was prohibited—a person 
who had been tried under domestic law could be tried again at the ICTR if the Tribunal found 
                                                     
108 S/PV.3371, 3.  
109 S/PV.3453, 14–6.  
110 Ibid.; and Peskin, International Justice, 162. Whilst I fully support the UN’s stand on its commitment to 
eradicate the death penalty from the world, the imposition of this seemed particularly hypocritical as three of the 
P5 retain the death penalty within their national jurisdictions.  
111 See Article 8 of the Statute. S/RES/955, 08/11/1994.  
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that the trial was in any way inadequate.112 Such protection against the potential inadequacy 
of the ICTR was apparently not, it seems, required.113 As such, even at the outset there 
appeared to be a conflict between different understandings of who the Tribunal was supposed 




This chapter has made five key findings. First, it has highlighted the distinctive logics and 
ways of seeing that determined the UN’s course of action throughout the genocide and as it 
created the ICTR. What is striking here are the elements that flow throughout each of these 
stages, and in particular the sense of the difference between the international and the local, as 
well as the continued impression after the genocide that Rwanda, as an African state (of 
continuing little interest), remained marginalised as the UNSC focused its attention on the 
ICTY.114 Second, this has also shown how the genocide became understood as a legal 
problem in need of a legal solution, which played a significant role in, first, escalating the 
UNSC’s response to the genocide and, second, in seeing that an international court was 
required for peace to be achieved. Third, the Tribunal’s ‘strategic function’ evolved to 
respond to the changing needs on the ground, in this instance expanding its geographical and 
temporal jurisdiction to capture crimes related to the refugee crisis, and to be able to more 
accurately account for the build-up to the genocide. The first signs of how this type of shift 
could affect the archive can be seen as this determined what crimes could be captured, and 
                                                     
112 See Article 9 of the Statute. Ibid. 
113 S/PV.3453, 5.  
114 Two of my interviewees noted that within the legal community the ICTY was considered ‘the place to be’, 
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with. Appeals Judge – ad hoc International Tribunals (Copenhagen, Denmark: June. 2016); and Senior ICTR 
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hence what could be archived—something explored further in the following chapter. Fourth, 
at the outset there were a myriad of different functions and stakeholders that became attached 
to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was to be a space of law, history, memory, politics, and 
reconciliation. It was to serve the interests of: political agents who created and oversaw it; 
legal agents who worked within it; the victims, Rwandan society and the Rwandan state 
whom it represented, spoke for, and allowed to speak; the defendants, and perpetrators more 
generally—both because these are inevitably the focus of a criminal trial, but also because of 
the idea that uncovering the guilty would also determine the innocent; and most broadly for 
the ‘international community’ or ‘humanity’. Fifth, underneath the idea that the Tribunal 
could act as a multipurpose space for all of these actors and goals lay a different picture of 
competing interests and priorities, which could come into conflict with each other, as the 
Rwandan government’s rejection of the court suggests.  
 
As this also begins to show, whilst much rhetoric surrounded the Tribunal concerning, for 
instance, its role in reconciliation or its assistance to the victims, little thought was given to 
how, or if, these multiple goals could be pursued simultaneously.115 This leads to two 
subsequent tasks that will be pursued in the following chapters. The first will go beyond the 
rhetoric of the promises of justice to explore the practice of different actors at the Tribunal. 
In doing so I will ask: Who controlled and benefited from the trials as they were practiced at 
the Tribunal? How, and in whose interests, were the tensions between the different actors 
resolved? What does examining the practice of different actors reveal about what different 
goals were being pursued and their (in)compatibility? Second, as the above section has 
already suggested, how did the way the trials were approached influence how the archive was 
                                                     
115 See these minutes from an UNSC meeting, whereby these vague, ill–defined, notions about the ICTR’s 
possible impact are set out. S/PV.3640.  
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constructed? How did these competing interests impact this? What does looking at the way 
the archive was constructed reveal about what interests and discourses shaped it, and what 
does this do for our understanding of what the archive was for and, ultimately, the question of 
whose archive? 
  
The following chapter will begin this process by considering how the prosecution approached 
the trials, what it prioritised and attempted to archive, and the effect that had on the way in 
which the archive was constructed. 
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As I have shown, the Tribunal was initially set up as a forum that could serve the various 
interests of its different stakeholders and act as a site of law, history, and memory and as a 
venue where political interests were also pursued. However, after the UNSC assigned the 
mandate for the Tribunal under Resolution 955, it fell to the office of the prosecution (OTP) 
to develop a strategy to prosecute the genocide, deciding who to prosecute and what to 
prosecute them for, thereby determining how (or if) the various goals the Tribunal became 
associated with were to be achieved. So, what can be learnt about the archive and its purpose 
from the way the prosecution approached these trials?  
 
This chapter explores the archive from the prosecution’s perspective, considering what 
accounts of violence it produced and why it did so. It builds upon the ideas previously 
introduced about the nature of the histories produced by international courts, drawing 
particular attention to the law’s influence on both shaping the broader parameters within 
which the prosecution’s account had to fit, as Douglas and Bloxham identified, and also how 
it constructed understandings of the actors, such as perpetrators, that populated these 
accounts, as Drumbl and Kelsall suggested.1 The first two sections of the chapter will 
consider each of these in turn. Whilst the idea that law shapes these accounts may appear a 
                                                     
1 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial (see Intro., n. 12), 73 and 106; Kelsall, Culture under Cross–examination (see 




truism (it is, of course, a court of law), it is important nonetheless to set out clearly the logic 
of how this process worked and to disturb the obvious in order to understand who it was that 
controlled these processes and to what ends. This also offers a chance to critique the 
Tribunal’s claims that it could serve different interests simultaneously. Moreover, as this 
chapter will also demonstrate, whilst the legal function of the courtroom played a significant 
part in determining the type of records the prosecution produced, this alone is insufficient to 
explain why the accounts of violence were created as they were. To this end, the second half 
of the chapter will explore the extent to which the OTP’s strategy was politicised as a result 
of the influence of certain non–legal discourses, and the OTP’s active pursuit of extra–
judicial goals. 
 
Law as Framework 
 
Determining the Scope of Testimony 
 
At the forefront of the prosecution’s duties was securing convictions against those deemed 
responsible for the Rwanda genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law. 
The absence of a Nuremberg style paper trail produced by—and then used against—the 
perpetrators meant that, with few exceptions, the prosecution had to rely on witnesses in 
order to establish their cases against each accused. Any other non–oral evidence (which for 
the most part were submissions of the investigation documents: photos, diagrams, etc.), were 
very much supplementary evidence to this testimony.2  
                                                     
2 The two partial exceptions to this that I have found were the ‘Media trial’ (which drew on transcripts of the 




During each of the trials the prosecution encouraged the witnesses’ testimony to unfold in 
particular ways in order to establish the legal requirements of their case for each of the crimes 
alleged in the indictment, so as to secure guilty verdicts. The rules of the court dictated that 
the testimony had to speak to one of the charges contained within the indictment, which in 
turn was limited in its potential scope by the Tribunal’s statute (and hence restricted 
geographically, temporally, and in terms of subject–matter and personal jurisdiction). Forcing 
the testimony to remain within these boundaries helped to ensure that the defendant was 
afforded a fair trial, as this would allow the defence to know the prosecution’s case before the 
trial commenced, which enabled them to properly contest the case put forward in court. Each 
provision of the statute played an influential role in determining what evidence the 
prosecution would employ during the trials. Most important here were the court’s subject–
matter jurisdiction (Articles 2–4 of the statute) and personal jurisdiction (Articles 5–6) which 
when combined provided almost a check sheet of the evidence necessary for the court to find 
the defendant guilty of each crime.3 
  
The three crimes within the courts statute—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes—produced three different overarching frameworks within which the prosecution 
would construct their accounts of the violence.4 Each crime came, in turn, with three distinct 
elements that had to be established: mens reas, actus reus and a contextual in chapeau 
element (which limited each crimes applicability to a particular context). Testimony had to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al, Case No. ICTR–98–44, ICTR–98–44–4803/1, Judgement and Sentence, 
02/02/2012, 181–92; Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR–99–52, ICTR–99–52–1323/1, 
Judgement and Sentence, 03/12/2003, 39–80.  
3 S/RES/955, ICTR Statute, 08/11/1994. The ICTR’s statute can be found at: 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/documents/statute–and–creation (last accessed 24/05/2017). 
4 Articles 2-4 ICTR Statute. 
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match these elements in order to meet the ‘relevance threshold’ that governed what was, and 
what was not, allowed to enter the courtroom. During Cyangugu, the prosecution argued: 
Your Honours, the theoretical basis of admissibility adopted in common law 
jurisdictions requires that the Prosecution must prove [the] actus reus and […] mens 
rea. It is this requirement of proof that carries the admissibility of evidence based on 
its relevance and the issues in question.  
To this end, all relevant evidence is admissible, subject to a judge's discretion […].5 
 
For example, to establish that genocide had occurred the prosecution had to prove through the 
witnesses’ testimonies that one of the crimes recognised as genocide had been committed 
(such as causing ‘serious bodily or mental harm’) against a protected group within the 
Genocide Convention (religious, national, ethnic, or racial)  in order to establish the actus 
reus; that it had been committed with intent, establishing the mens rea; and that it was 
committed with the intent to destroy that protected group ‘in whole or in part’, establishing 
the dolus specialis (special intent) which formed the in chapeau element here.6 For war 
crimes or crimes against humanity the prosecution had to similarly establish that a crime 
recognised as such by the statute (such as murder) had been committed intentionally against 
individual non–combatants within the context of a non-international armed conflict or a 
group on political, racial, religious, ethnic, or national grounds in an attack that targeted a 
civilian population.7 
 
In addition to these conditions the prosecution had to establish that the accused was 
individually responsible for the crime, as specified under Article 6 of the court’s statute. 
There were two modes of liability that the prosecution could apply. The accused were either 
                                                     
5 Prosecutor v. Andre Ntagerura et al, Case No. ICTR–99–46 (hereafter ICTR–99–46), TRA000434/2, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 14/02/2001, 14/02/2001, 8.  
6 Article 2 of ICTR Statute. 
7 Article 3 and 4 of ICTR Statute.  
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directly responsible under Article 6(1) for the violence because they had planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed (later incorporating Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)), or otherwise aided 
and abetted a crime, or they were responsible under Article 6(3) as a superior for failing to 
prevent or punish their subordinates for committing crime (as limited by Articles 2–4).8 
 
In each instance the prosecution would charge the accused under the relevant provisions of 
the statute for specific acts of violence that could be attributed to them, thereby creating a 
map through which their evidence would unfold during the trial. One example of this was the 
sexual violence charge against Akayesu for the crimes committed at the Taba bureau 
communal. The allegation here was that Akayesu had overseen, instigated, and aided and 
abetted the mass occurrence of sexual violence at the bureau communal as perpetrated by the 
Interahamwe. The following extracts from the prosecution’s examination-in-chief of Witness 
JJ highlights how this framed the witnesses’ testimony. 
Prosecution: Witness JJ, when we left off you were explaining to us how you were 
taken by some Interahamwe and brought to the cultural center [sic] […] At this 
time, how many of these men were escorting you to the cultural center?  
Witness: There were many, there were very many at that that time. In fact we did 
not have the presence of mind to be able to count them.  
Prosecution: At this time, you mentioned to us that Akayesu was in the yard, the 
courtyard, of the compound. Can you tell us exactly where he was at the time that 
you passed him?  
Witness: He was standing there in front of the bureau communal of Taba. 
[…] 
Prosecution: I may have asked you this before, and forgive me for reasking if I 
did, but at the time you saw Akayesu, was he there alone or with someone?  
Witness: He was with policemen and some Interahamwes who met him there.  
 […] 
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Prosecution: When you were being taken to the [cultural centre], were you being 
taken was this voluntary, or were you being taken by force?  
Witness: They dragged us by force.  
[…] 
Prosecution When you entered into the cultural center, what did you see upon 
entering into the room?  
Witness: When we entered the house, the Interahamwe pounced on us and started 
raping us.   
[…] 
Prosecution: Do you know whether or not at that time or after you were raped 
[Akayesu] ever came to the area of the cultural center?  
Witness: I remember one time he came in front of the center and he addressed the 
Interahamwe and told them, "So, never ask me what a Tutsi woman is like.9  
 
This string of questioning established the location of the crime, those that were responsible, 
the presence of Akayesu, the ethnicity of the victims and also that, as capture in the final 
exchange, the women were targeted because of their ethnicity. Combined with other witness 
testimony, which demonstrated Akayesu’s authority over the communal police and the 
Interahamwe and, more generally, over the population, this established Akayesu’s 
responsibility for the violence. Authority over the police and Interahamwe meant that under 
Article 6(3) he had a responsibility to prevent or punish the commission of a crime, and 
further that his presence whilst these crimes occurred (and without condemning their 
occurrence) gave active consent to, and ‘encouraged’, the commission of the crime.10 In total 
five witnesses would testify to the occurrence of sexual violence in the communal offices, 
and the law’s influence in shaping the prosecution witnesses’ testimony is apparent in each 
                                                     
9 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001181, Akayesu – Transcript of 23/1/1997, 23/01/1997, 67-75. Here, I have selected 
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time. As such, it becomes apparent that law also determine how an account can be given, which will be 
discussed more in Chapter Four.  
10 For examples see, ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001175, Akayesu – Transcript of 09/1/1997, 09/01/1997; ICTR–96–
4, CONTRA001187, Akayesu – Transcript of 28/1/1997, 28/01/1997, 102–3; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001178, 
Akayesu – Transcript of 14/1/1997, 14/01/1997, 92; and ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001180, Akayesu – Transcript 
of 22/1/1997, 22/01/1997, 39.  
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case. Witness OO was asked to clarify the nature of the attack against her in order to make it 
clearer that this constituted—within the prosecutions understanding—rape; and Witness NN 
was asked a question that appeared directed at establishing that the action had resulted in 
‘serious physical or mental harm’: 
Witness: When he finished, he stood up and he made me stand up and we 
continued to walk.  
[…] 
Prosecution: Okay, I have to ask you a difficult question. When you say he put his 
sex into mine, does that mean that he penetrated your vagina with his penis?  
Witness: Yes.11 
In another trial: 
 
Prosecution: After this event finished how were you feeling, emotionally?  
Witness NN: Normally when you shout it is because you are in pain.12 
 
In each of these examples the influence of the law in structuring the prosecution’s account is 
apparent.13 The example of Witness JJ also demonstrates another common feature of the 
prosecution’s questioning, which was its focus on specifics of the incident. If someone saw a 
crime, it was important to know where they were standing; if they overheard an accused say 
something, the distance away from where they stood was important. This all contributed to 
strengthening the credibility of the witness.14  
 
These provisions, along with Article 5 (which gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over ‘natural 
persons’ – as opposed to states or organisations) meant that the witness testimony was 
                                                     
11 CONTRA001224, Akayesu – Transcript of 27/10/1997, 27/10/1997, 23-4. 
12 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001227, Akayesu – Transcript of 3/11/1997, 03/11/1997, 24. See also Chapter Two, 
Supra Note 8, 74. 
13 For a similar example where the prosecution construct a legal narrative concerning direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide see: CONTRA001178, 122–3 
14 For examples see: CONTRA001180, 50; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001186, Akayesu – Transcript of 27/1/1997, 
27/01/1997, 96; and CONTRA001195, 16.  
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focused on the accused and their role in the violence. Reading the trial transcripts for the 
three cases discussed here gave the impression that the accused and their reach of influence 
acted almost as a spotlight that illuminated particular aspects of the violence. During Akayesu 
the occurrence of genocide within Taba’s neighbouring communes was, for the most part, an 
irrelevance within the prosecution’s account except when it was linked to Akayesu. Hence the 
spotlight shifted to Murambi commune on 19 April when Akayesu pursued Emphrem 
Karangwa (the Inspector of Police in Taba) and his brothers, who were subsequently 
murdered under Akayesu’s orders.15 When the accused was not present directly, it was only 
those sites where the accused’s responsibility and authority left a lingering presence that 
accounts of violence could be given. Hence, whilst most witnesses claimed that Bagambiki 
and Imanishimwe were not present during the massacre of refugees on the Gashirabwoba 
football field by soldiers, Imanishimwe’s authority over soldiers within the region and 
Bagambiki’s prior presence and promise to send soldiers (who arrived only to kill the 
refugees) meant that witnesses were permitted also to present their evidence concerning that 
episode of violence:16 
Witness: During the attacks [at the football field] we saw a vehicle arrive and in 
that vehicle, was the director of the Shagasha Tea Factory, who was called Callixte 
Nsabimana […] accompanied by Emmanuel Bagambiki. They arrived where we 
were and asked us to explain what our situation was.  
We told them that we had problems, that for four days we had not eaten or drank 
anything. They promised that they were going to send soldiers to protect us in that 
area. 
Prosecution: I’d like you to be more specific and tell Their Lordships who of the 
two addressed you or if both of them, that is Nsabimana and Bagambiki addressed 
you? 
                                                     
15 See testimonies from Witness S (ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001197, Akayesu – Transcript of 5/2/1997, 
05/02/1997), Witness Q (ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001190, Akayesu – Transcript of 4/2/1997, 04/02/1997, 1–81) 
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Witness: We were talking to Bagambiki.17 
 
Where the seniority of the accused led to accusations of their involvement in the planning and 
execution of the genocide at a national level, or where the mobilisation of JCE as the mode of 
participation attached them to a large collective of perpetrators, then narratives of violence 
across whole regions and swaths of the country were possible, but only because of the reach 
of the accused’s authority.18 Whilst these links showed the collaborative network of 
perpetrators responsible for the occurrence of violence, and in many instances seemingly 
pushed back against the notion of individual responsibility, these accounts remained legally 
relevant because of the accused’s contribution and affiliation to a particular group. What was 
noticeable in Gatete in this respect was that despite charging Gatete as a member of a JCE, 
and also providing information about the other members of that JCE, the prosecution seemed 
reluctant (especially when compared to the defence’s narrative) to allocate responsibility for 
the violence to other members of the JCE, instead focusing more explicitly on Gatete’s role.19  
 
The court’s statute also limited the prosecution’s narratives geographically and temporally. 
Geographically, whilst the court’s jurisdiction appeared to give the prosecution the scope to 
examine the regional nature of the violence (and indeed, as will be recalled from Chapter 
One, it was implicitly tasked to do so) the prosecution interpreted its mandate more narrowly 
and did not charge any of the defendants for crimes that were committed outside of Rwanda. 
                                                     
17 TRA000122/01, 35–6. More direct evidence of their participation was established through the accomplice 
witness testimony of Witness LAI, but this was ultimately rejected by the court. See ICTR–99–46, 
TRA000254/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/01/2001, 24/01/2001, 1–49. 
18 See for instance the findings in Government 1 about wide spread occurrence of violence (including sexual 
violence) in regions far from the accused. ICTR–98–44–4803/1, 201–58. See also, Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste 
Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61 (hereafter ICTR–00–61), TRA005506/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 
02/11/2009, 02/11/2009, 46. 
19 ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018674, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 02/03/2010, 02/03/2010, 59; TRA005145/1, 
Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 10/3/2010, 10/3/2010, 49–57; ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018748, Gatete, 
Redacted Transcript of 11/3/2010, 11/03/2010, 24; ICTR–00–61, TRA005157/1, Gatete, Redacted Transcript of 
22/3/2010, 22/03/2010, 11–4; and TRA005506/2, 42–3. 
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Its account therefore became narrowly focused on the violence in Rwanda as an isolated 
violent episode, to a greater extent than was required. The temporal jurisdiction, however, 
appeared to pose difficulties for the prosecution when attempting to establish the accused’s 
responsibility for the crimes committed during 1994, as it was clear that much of the planning 
occurred prior to the commencement of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, which only began on 1 
January 1994.20 Adhering to this jurisdiction would have meant, for instance, that the OTP 
would not have been allowed to submit most editions of the Kangura newspaper—often seen 
as crucial to spreading ethnic hatred in the 1990s—as evidence against its editor Hassan 
Ngeze during the Media Trial, because all but two issues were published prior to 1994.21 
Similarly, the time limit would have prevented the prosecution from presenting evidence of 
Ntagerura’s, Bagambiki’s and Gatete’s role in preparing the terrain for genocide. 
  
Significantly, however, the prosecution did submit evidence relating to events occurring prior 
to 1 January 1994. Despite the defence’s frequent objection to this (as they claimed that the 
evidence was impermissible because it sat outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction) the judges, 
on the whole, sided with the prosecution, meaning that the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction 
was partially stretched.22 As such, the prosecution in Cyangugu was allowed to offer 
                                                     
20 As will be recalled, a fear that the temporal jurisdiction would negatively affect the prosecution had 
contributed towards Rwanda’s decision to vote against the creation of the Tribunal, despite winning a partial 
concession with this matter. S/PV.3453, 3453rd Meeting, 08/11/1994, 14. 
21 ICTR–99–52–1323/1, 39; and Jean–Marie Biju–Duval, ‘“Hate Media”—Crimes against Humanity and 
Genocide: Opportunities Missed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, in Thompson, The Media 
and the Rwandan Genocide, 346–7. 
22 This was particularly heavily litigated during Gatete. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0025, Gatete – Defence 
Preliminary Motions, Under Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 12/04/2003, 5; ICTR–00–61, 
ICTR–00–61–0088, Gatete – Defence Motion Raising Defects in the Prosecution Pre–Trial Brief of 19 August 
2009, 30/09/2009; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0100, Gatete, Decision on Defence Motion Raising Defects in 
the Prosecution Pre–Trial Brief of 19 August 2009, 02/10/2009; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0188, Gatete, 
Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Delineation of the Defence Case, 26/03/2010; 
ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–010, Gatete, Motion on Admissibility of Allegations Outside the Temporal 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 15/10/2009; ICTR–99–46, TRA000750/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 06/06/2001, 06/06/2001, 82–6; A/59/183–S/2004/601, Report of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for 
101 
 
evidence of Ntagerura’s and Bagambiki’s presence at a series of rallies in 1993, which were 
used to stir up hatred against the Tutsis, and they were also allowed to consider Ntagerura’s 
role in training the Interahamwe during 1993.23 This was not, however, a blanket provision, 
and these rulings attached limits to pre–1994 evidence.24 Indeed, pre–1994 evidence was only 
permissible when the evidence went to establish: conspiracy;25 a component of a crime where 
all the elements were also present in 1994;26 or a historical context that either made the 
accused’s behaviour or the violence in 1994 more intelligible.27 As a result, the prosecution’s 
account very much remained focused on events that occurred in 1994. If anything, the 
requirement that pre–1994 evidence had to be attached to events in 1994, heightened the 
courts’ focus on 1994 and the sense of the teleological inevitability of the genocide.  
 
This section has set out the way in which the law helped to determine the prosecution’s 
accounts of the violence in Rwanda by framing and shaping the content of witnesses’ 
testimonies in terms of the types of stories that they were to tell. This was true even in those 
instances where the prosecution was seeking to push back against the boundaries imposed by 
the statute—such as concerning the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction—as the testimony was 
still perceived by the prosecution to be legally relevant. This was not, then, a repeat of 
Eichmann where the witnesses would be given centre stage to tell their account of what 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 
31 December 1994, 27/07/2004, 10–1; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000438/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 21/02/2001, 21/02/2001, 9. 
23 ICTR–99–46, TRA000124/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 10/10/2000, 
10/10/2000, 63; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000131/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
21/11/2000, 21/11/2000, 22–44. 
24 The level of sufficiency of this window depended to a large extent on the type of perpetrator being tried. For 
Akayesu, a relatively low level bourgmestre with seemingly no role in the preparation of the genocide, the 
narrow window of the tribunal’s jurisdiction was adequate to tell the story of Akayesu’s criminality. Here, the 
genocide for Akayesu began with the assassination of President Habyarimana, and ended with Akayesu’s retreat 
into Zaire. ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0003, Akayesu – Indictment, 13/02/1996, 1. 
25 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0029, Gatete – Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion, 29/03/2004, 3. 
26 Ibid., 3; ICTR–00–61–010, 5; and S/2004/601, 10–1. 
27 ICTR–00–61–0029, 3.  
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happened, regardless of the legal relevance. Rather, to be permitted to speak within the court 
the prosecution’s witnesses had to contribute legally to the case at hand.  
 
James Arguin, the former head of Appeals at the Tribunal, noted that there were instances 
when not enough control was exerted on the witnesses. This meant that on occasion the 
witness testimony, as constructed in court, was vague, confused and lacked sufficient 
specificity, which limited its legal value and opened it to attacks by the defence.28 What is 
particularly interesting here, however, is both the sense that witnesses were on occasion seen 
as being given ‘too much’ space in order to testify—discussed in the following chapter—but 
also that the witnesses’ testimony was at its most powerful within the courtroom, having the 
greatest chance of being accepted as a legal truth, when it was presented in a particular, 
legally intelligible way. What this suggests is that where possible the prosecution enhanced 
the legal focus of the witnesses’ testimony and hence rendered archival records deeply 
imprinted by the law. The following section will continue this line of thought and enquire as 
to how law also worked to shape how the actors that populated the prosecution’s accounts 
within the archive were presented. 
 
 
                                                     
28 Head of Appeals – ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (Arusha, Tanzania: June, 2015). ‘When testifying, 
witnesses cannot simply present their account of the events unimpeded by counsel or the judges. For example, 
witnesses may want to jump from introductory questions about who they are or where they were straight to 
describing the details of the sexual violence. Prosecution counsel must explain that it is necessary for the 
evidence to be presented in a logical way and, thus, witnesses must wait for questions to be asked. If witnesses 
jump ahead, their testimony may be cut off and their account might be difficult for the judges to follow’. OTP 
ICTR, ‘Prosecution of Sexual Violence: Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual 
Violence Crimes in Post–Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the Office of the Prosecutor for the 







Particular understandings of how perpetrators acted underpinned the prosecution’s 
presentation of the accused, who in each of the cases here were presented as being 
purposeful, conscious, intelligent, and power hungry actors. The generalisability of the 
defendants’ personalities and characteristics was, however, masked on the surface by what 
appeared to be very specific descriptions of each of the accused, their role in the violence, 
and their motivations for participating in the genocide. 
  
During Akayesu, for instance, the prosecution’s narrative structure initially captured the 
political nature of Akayesu’s actions in a plotline that bore resemblance to Arendt’s notion of 
the banality of evil.29 Akayesu was not, the prosecution emphasised, an ideological zealot nor 
a rabidly racist figure whose participation in the genocide made sense due to some form of 
inner evil. He was, rather, a politician: a rational thinker that craved power. This meant that 
Akayesu resisted the violence against the Tutsis when it politically benefitted him, as a 
member of the main opposition party (the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain, MDR), to 
do so.30 When, however, it suited him politically to support the genocide he became a willing 
genocidaire. The turning point, the prosecution argued, was a meeting held by the ‘interim 
government’31 in Gitarama on 18 April 1994, where the interim government called for unity 
                                                     
29 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (see Intro., n. 18).  
30 CONTRA001180, 75–76; and ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001193, Akayesu – Transcript of 18/2/1997, 
18/02/1997, 59–73. 
31 The ‘interim government’ was the name given for government that took charge in Rwanda after 




between the various parties in order to pursue the genocidal policy that could ensure that they 
could all retain power.32 Akayesu’s choice here was either to participate in the violence 
(having spent two weeks defending his commune from external attacks) or face political 
ostracisation. Akayesu chose to retain his power and authority and became a willing 
participant in the genocide. This framework also helped to increase the credibility of some of 
the witnesses’ evidence as it, for instance, offered an explanation of why Akayesu spent a 
number of days in crazed pursuit of prominent figures (such as Emphrem Karangwa) all over 
the Gitarama region.33 This was, the prosecution explained—drawing on their account of 
Akayesu’s personality—because they had challenged Akayesu’s authority, and so to secure 
his political authority within the commune, and also to take ownership over the violence (and 
the political capital that came with this), he had to pursue and kill them.34  
 
During Cyangugu the emphasis was slightly different, as the defendants appeared to be more 
pre–disposed to participating in the genocide than Akayesu had been. Each was presented as 
a person closely linked to the Akazu (roughly translated as ‘the President’s House’), who had 
advanced in their careers by supporting those in power and their intentions to commit 
genocide. Bagambiki was préfet of Kigali–Rural during the orchestrated violence against the 
Tutsis in the Bugesera region in 1992, and he was promoted to the position of préfet of 
Cyangugu because of his continued loyalty to the regime.35 The prosecution presented 
Ntagerura as a figure who maintained a sustained hostility towards the APA, blocked the 
introduction of the transitional government, and was hostile towards all opposition parties, 
                                                     
32 ICTR–96–4, Akayesu, Audio Recording: Interview of Jean Paul Akayesu in Zambia, 10/04/1996, Tape I, Side 
A; and CONTRA001175, 36–40. 
33 CONTRA001198, 42–118; CONTRA001197, 5–57; CONTRA001180, 21–64 and 143–56; and ICTR–96–4, 
ICTR–96–4–0459/1, Akayesu – Judgement, 02/09/1998, 97–106.  
34 CONTRA001175, 42–5; CONTRA001198, 97–100; and CONTRA001193, 61–70. 




because these processes would mean that he and his Akazu friends would have to relinquish 
power. 36 For Imanishimwe, whilst he had no prior track record of hostility towards the Tutsis 
before his alleged training of the Interahamwe in 1993, he also craved power and authority, 
was close to the Akazu, and even had General Nsabimana—a key person in the genocide—as 
a military ‘godfather’.37 He, like Akayesu, would do anything for more authority.  
 
I found similar stories of power and authority in the prosecution’s construction of Gatete as a 
criminal—albeit tinged more strongly with an inner willingness to commit violence.38 Indeed, 
as the trials went on, it became clear that underneath the seemingly specific accounts of the 
accused’s characters lay the same understandings of what type of person these accused were 
and what motivated them to participate in the violence. The prosecution presented each of 
these as being intelligent persons, conscious and rational actors, in positions of responsibility 
who had the ability to decide between right and wrong.39 However, instead of ‘doing the right 
thing’, they chose to commit violence in order to retain authority and power, and worse, they 
                                                     
36 ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46–0130, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – Ntagerura et al – The Prosecutor’s Pre–Trial 
Brief, 03/07/2000, 5; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000207/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
18/09/2000, 18/09/2000, 43–5, 48–50, and 54–8. 
37 TRA000207/01, 55–7. 
38 What was also notable about the prosecution’s case against Gatete is that, unlike the other cases examined 
here, there was the least attempt by the prosecution to tell some thicker narrative about Gatete that made his 
actions make sense. This was, in part, because of the need to quicken the pace of the trials, which meant that, as 
will be discussed more shortly, the prosecution was more concerned with the discrete presentation of evidence. 
They were also, no doubt, aided at this stage by the fact that Judges had already sat on a number of cases and so 
were more familiar with details of the genocide. Tellingly, the prosecution’s opening and closing statements 
(where much of this detail was normally provided) during Gatete, and unlike those in Cyangugu or Gatete, did 
not even occupy a whole trial day session. ICTR–00–61, TRA001643/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 
20/10/2009, 20/10/2009; and ICTR–00–61, TRA005592, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 08/11/2010, 
08/11/2010.  
39 The tribunal prosecuted two different types of persons: those in senior positions of authority, and those who 
had committed particularly egregious acts of violence—people such as Yussuf Munyakazi. Even these latter 
types of defendants, however, were still presented as knowing, purposeful and conscious individuals, even if 
there was a greater sense of the accused’s ‘inner evil’. During the Munyakazi opening statement the prosecution 
both said that Munyakazi was ‘a villain; the devil who stripped his victims of everything it meant to be human’, 
but also that he ‘was not a stranger to the criminal enterprise and that he executed its objectives with great 
efficiency, in person and in concert with other members of the criminal enterprise with whom he shared the 
intent to commit genocide and extermination’. ICTR (Press Release), ‘Trial of Yussuf Munyakazi Starts’, 
22/04/2000, (see Internet Materials list). 
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utilised their position of authority in order to mobilise others to commit acts of violence.40 
During Akayesu’s sentencing hearing the prosecution argued: 
Akayesu consciously chose to participate in the systematic killings that followed in 
Taba. He publicly incited people to kill in Taba. He also ordered the killing of a 
number of persons some of whom were killed in his presence and he participated in 
the killings. He also cautioned and supported through his presence and acts, the rape 
of many women at the bureau communal. (Emphasis added.)41 
 
This plot line was further emphasised during Akayesu when the prosecution presented 
evidence of another bourgmestre from Akayesu’s region who did manage to resist the 
violence throughout the genocide.42 With this the prosecution made it clear that Akayesu did 
not participate in the violence out of some form of coercion, or because the context meant he 
could do nothing else (the narrative framework adopted by his defence), but that it was a 
clear choice of Akayesu to do so.43 
 
The roots of these narratives lie with the law’s enlightenment–driven understanding of 
individuals as conscious and rational actors. The accused’s ability to choose to act, along with 
the calculations that they made about how their interests were best served (additionally using 
their intelligence to manipulate those around them), meant that they demonstrated that they 
were the conscious and rational actors that law required to find them guilty of wrong doing. 
This is central to the very possibility of criminal justice and also the righteousness of 
                                                     
40 ‘The other side of Akayesu is the side of him as an individual. ‘We see him and we saw him in court as an 
articulate man, an intelligent man, a good public speaker. He is also a politician. He knows how to view and 
weigh the political scene. He's able to make the right political decision, at least that's what he believes, until the 
decision he made on the 18th of April 1994.’ ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001235, Akayesu – Transcript of 
19/03/1998, 19/03/1998, 20 59 and 63; ICTR–99–46, TRA002053/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 11/08/2003, 11/08/2003, 2; and ICTR–96–4–0003, 2–3. 
41 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001233, Akayesu – Transcript of 28/09/1998 – Sentencing Hearing, 28/09/1998, 15. 
42 CONTRA001187, 6–113. 
43  When discussing Akayesu’s actions during the closing statements the prosecution stated: ‘[A]nd what came 
to my mind was just one word in particular, one concept, and that was the word "betrayal."’ CONTRA001235, 
15. See also TRA002053/1, 2; and TRA005592, 11. 
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punishing wrong–doers. As Hegel argued, the intentional actor is so central to criminal law 
that the act of punishment also becomes the perpetrator’s choice: 
Punishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of his own will. The violation of 
right has been proclaimed by the criminal as his own right. His crime is the negation 
of right. Punishment is the negation of this negation, and consequently an 
affirmation of right, solicited and forced upon the criminal by himself.44 
 
This way of viewing the world not only affected how the accused were understood, but it also 
determined how the violence itself was presented, having, as such, a significant impact on the 
archive. Violence within these narratives was never the result of chance. Rather, the violence 
was always the result of careful planning, instigation, an organised attack, intentional deceit, 
or knowing carelessness:45 behind each attack there was always an individual that could be 
found responsible.46 In Gatete the prosecution argued: 
Forensic enquiry and the judgments of this Tribunal in the aftermath of this 
slaughter have established that what occurred in Rwanda cannot be simply wished 
away as the kind of spontaneous communal bloodletting that often goes with a 
violent transition of power, but that it was a genocide of the Tutsi organised at the 
highest levels of state which relied for its efficient execution on the local 
administration, political party functionaries, all supported by government troops, 
party militia and ordinary Hutu peasants mobilised for that purpose.47 
 
The prosecution’s description of the defendants as rational conscious actors, along with the 
spotlight–style gaze on the accused, had a number of additional consequences for the 
prosecution’s accounts. First, in a curious turn, the extent of the focus on the accused, and the 
emphasis on their responsibility and authority, rendered other perpetrators passive in the face 
of the accused’s orders and instructions—unable to think or to say no to the calls to 
                                                     
44 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, quoted on https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/02/18.htm (last 
accessed 25/05/2017). 
45During the Gatete closing arguments, for instance, the prosecution also argued that part of Gatete’s guilt came 
from his ‘managerial like’ organisation and overseeing of the violence in Byumba and Murambi. TRA005592, 
10. 
46 The importance of the accused’s intentions was further heightened at the Tribunal due to the additional 
‘intent’ requirement attached to the crimes contained within the court’s statute, such as the ‘special intent’ 
required for genocide or, similarly, the need to establish that a crime against humanity was committed as part of 
a broader systematic attack. 
47 TRA001643/1, 2. 
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violence.48 During the prosecution’s closing arguments in Akayesu, for instance, they argued: 
‘Everything that happened in Taba [was] due to Jean–Paul Akayesu’.49 Indeed, crimes were 
committed in Taba because ordinary persons ‘were incited […]. They went out and 
committed genocide based on encouragement from Jean-Paul Akayesu’.50 Other perpetrators 
were only significant because the accused in some way influenced their capacity to act, or 
created the conditions whereby they could act. The prosecution, for example, emphasised 
that, prior to the rape of Witness OO by a number of Interahamwe, Akayesu had said: ‘take 
them’.51 The emphasis here was such that the perpetrators of the violence became victims: 
[Akayesu] used innocent people to commit crimes, the motive of which they were 
perhaps not fully aware of or were afraid to disobey him […]. Akayesu had choices. 
He rather became a willing, indeed an enthusiastic participant in the killing and the 
persecution of Tutsis by choice. Therefore, his responsibility is very severe. 
(Emphasis added.)52 
 
Second, the need to heighten the accused’s responsibility and to find them individually 
responsible for the commission of a crime—even when prosecuting under more collective 
modes of liability—meant that the context within which the accused acted was only drawn 
upon when this enhanced the responsibility of the accused rather than diminished it. This 
often limited the legal value of providing an understanding of the wider context to the 
charges. Therefore, whilst emphasising the accused’s responsibility, the prosecution could 
not also focus on the chaos brought about by the invasion of the RPF, the widespread socio–
economic insecurity that significantly affected Rwanda in the build–up to the violence—and 
                                                     
48 I think that this also offered the court a simple way of understanding how the violence in Rwanda spread so 
quickly. It is easier to imagine the violence as being the result of some intelligent and manipulative individuals 
than it is to consider the more complex social dynamics at play that led ordinary people to participate in the 
genocide. Something similar happened with the Tribunal’s emphasis on the importance of the media as a tool 
for preparing the ground for the genocide, despite the lack of evidence that this was effective at preparing the 
ground for the violence, see Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda (London, 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 135–50.  
49 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001232, Akayesu – Transcript of 13/3/1998, 13/03/1998. See also Prosecutor v. 
Augustin Bizimungu, Augustin Ndindiliyimana, François–Xavier Nzuwonemeye and Innocent Sagahutu, Case 
No. ICTR–00–56, ICTR–00–56–1123/1, Judgement and Sentence, 17/05/2011, 454. 
50 CONTRA001235, 18 and 146.  
51 Ibid., 89; and ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 173–4. 
52 CONTRA001175, 58. 
109 
 
encouraged many to see the value of participating in the genocide—or that the accused may 
have been indoctrinated (like the masses) by an ideological campaign that rendered violence 
a legitimate mode of governance.53 It is telling that, whilst an accused was often believed to 
have created a condition of chaos in which others committed crimes against their will, their 
own actions are never understood as occurring within such conditions. This also meant that 
there was little to be gained by the prosecutors, and potentially much to lose, by turning to the 
wider, particularly regional and international political, contexts that enabled the violence to 
occur.  
 
To take one example: the international arms trade played a significant role in the Rwandan 
genocide, as it flooded the country with weapons, to the point where you could buy a grenade 
for the same price as a beer.54 These weapons played a key role legally in establishing the 
guilt of the defendants. In Gatete, for instance, the prosecution argued that his delivery of 
grenades at Mukarange parish was not only evidence of Gatete’s participation in the violence, 
but also, in the absence of more direct evidence, that he had planned the massacre (hence 
incurring a more severe form of liability).55 Yet how he came to acquire these weapons and 
who supplied them—i.e., the explicit link to the international arms trade—was insignificant 
to the prosecution’s case.56 Other similar broader narratives that could not find a place within 
the prosecution’s legally focused account included the role of France in arming and training 
                                                     
53 Hintjens, ‘Genocide in Rwanda’ (see Chap. One. n. 14), 254–8; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become 
Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 195–
6; and Straus, Order of Genocide, 128–40. 
54 Nelson Alusala, ‘The Arming of Rwanda and the Genocide’, African Security Studies 13:2 (2004), 138; and 
Stephan Goose and Frank Smyth, ‘Arming Genocide in Rwanda, the High Cost of Small Arms Transfers’, 
Foreign Affairs 73:5 (1994), 86 and 93. 
55 TRA005592, 13–14.  
56 This would only have been otherwise, presumably, if the accused had personally brought weapons into the 
country, which might have highlighted their part in planning for the genocide. 
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the genocidaires in the build–up to the violence, which also worked contrary to the attempts 
to heighten the accused’s responsibility and agency.57  
 
This particular decontextualising had the additional consequence of emphasising the lack of 
involvement of international actors in the violence itself as the genocide became the 
responsibility of a handful of Rwandese elite. This in turn enabled the international 
community to become the bystander to the violence once more, the innocent impartial 
onlooker that observed, but did not play any greater role in the genocide. This imagining 
appeared to influence the prosecution’s decision to draw on members of the international 
community to act as ‘background’ witnesses, who were to provide ‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’ 
evidence of the occurrence of violence nationwide.58 What was odd about several of these 
testimonies was that the witnesses were in fact poorly positioned to assist the court in 
understanding what happened due to their lack of knowledge about both the history of 
Rwanda and the intricacies of what happened in 1994.59 These actors’ unsuitability for this 
role further points to the fact that they were called for the purpose of acting out the ‘neutral’ 




The statute also played a significant role in defining how victims were constructed within the 
courtroom. This was because each of the three crimes in the statute (as a result of a 
                                                     
57 TRA000434/2, 75 and 778; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001272/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 17/05/2002, 17/05/2002, 55 
58 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001185, Akayesu – Transcript of 17/1/1997, 17/01/1997, 49. 
59 One instance of this was their inability to identify who the attackers were and what political faction they came 
from. Ibid., 143–4 and 200–14. 
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combination of the actus reus and in chapeau element) came with an additional stipulation as 
to the type of victim targeted by the particular act of violence.60 As Campbell has noted, 
victims in international law are defined by their membership in a broader group who are seen 
as being the primary target of the crime rather than the individual.61 This fundamentally 
altered both who the prosecution acknowledged as a victim, but also, and crucially, why its 
account of the violence, constructed through the witnesses (often victims), and deposited 
within the archive, appeared as it did. 
  
To be a victim of a crime against humanity, the individual had to have been targeted as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a group on political, national, ethnic, religious, 
or racial grounds.62 This was, for the most part, established by demonstrating the breadth of 
the violence at a national level committed against the Tutsis as an ethnic group and moderate 
Hutus as a political group. By drawing links between this and the violence presented within 
the case, the prosecution was able to argue that what occurred within the locality was not 
mindless violence, but was part of a broader strategy to eliminate or target a particular group. 
To this end, as discussed previously, ‘bystander’ witnesses—international actors in Rwanda 
during the genocide—provided evidence about the violence in different regions of the 
country. As the prosecution argued during Akayesu: 
Your Honors, the isolated attacks or the isolated crimes that were alleged Akayesu 
had performed or committed, by themselves, alone, would not constitute crimes 
against humanity […]. Akayesu’s isolated acts become crimes against humanity 
only when they are part of the systematic and widespread attack that has been taking 
place during the temporary jurisdiction that this Court has.63  
 
                                                     
60 Articles 2-4 of ICTR Statute.  
61 Kirsten Campbell, ‘Victims and Perpetrators of International Crimes: The Problem of the ‘Legal Person’, 
International Humanitarian Legal Studies 2:2 (2011), 340–5. 
62 Article 3 of ICTR Statute. 
63 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001184, Akayesu – Transcript of 16/1/1997, 16/01/1997, 49. 
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For it to be a war crime, the victim had to be a civilian or a prisoner of war, and the act of 
violence had to be committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict.64 As such, 
it was in the prosecution’s legal interests to establish the non–combatant status of the victims 
of the crimes where possible.65 When asking Witness S about the murder of Karangwa’s 
brothers, the prosecution asked: 
Prosecution: Do you know how they were dressed; were they in, I guess, normal 
civilian clothes or some sort of military uniform? 
Witness: Yes. They were wearing civilian clothes.  
Prosecution: And were they carrying any weapons, guns or anything like that? 
Witness: Are you talking about Ephrem’s brothers?  
Prosecution: Yes? 
Witness: They had no arms—no weapons.66 
 
In the majority of incidents, however, the very fact that attacks took place at sites of refuge—
one of the most common sites of violence during the genocide—seemed sufficient to remove 
any doubt that the victims were non–combatants. The very site of the killing seemed to 
ensure that those attacked were seen as innocent victims, as this contributed towards 
establishing the actor’s innocent and largely passive nature, which was a key characteristic of 
victimhood that developed within this discourse in contrast with the purposeful perpetrator. 
This emphasis on the victims’ passivity was something that perhaps was an inevitable result 
of the court’s focus on the acts of violence committed against them: acts of violence that 
were also frequently underpinned by a huge imbalance of power. But there were also 
moments when the witnesses’ inability to act was emphasised to heighten their victim status: 
Prosecution: When you were being taken to the house, were you being taken -- was 
this voluntary, or were you being taken by force?  
                                                     
64 Article 4 of ICTR Statute. 
65 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001182, Akayesu – Transcript of 24/1/1997, 24/01/1997, 12; ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001222, Akayesu – Transcript of 23/10/1997, 23/10/1997, 7 and 34. 
66 CONTRA001197, 14. See also TRA000254/2, 12; and ICTR–00–61, TRA005158/1, Gatete – Redacted 
Transcript of 17/03/2010, 17/03/2010, 49.  
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Witness: They dragged us by force.67 
 
The discourse’s discomfort with more active victims was seen when the judges had to 
exonerate refugees that did fight back against the attackers. During the Nizeyimana 
judgement the judges, for example, argued: [T]he defensive efforts against attacks on the 
primarily displaced Tutsis at the parish [did not turn] them into combatants.68 
 
The most important framing of victimhood within the prosecution’s accounts of violence, 
however, came as a result of the provisions of the Genocide Convention, which underpinned 
the court's legal definition of genocide, as the charge that the prosecution focused on most. 
For genocide, as noted, in addition to establishing that the accused was responsible for the 
commission of a crime, the prosecution had to establish that they also possessed the 
necessary special intent to commit the crime so as to destroy, in whole or in part, a group 
protected by the Genocide Convention. Whilst the shared similarities between the Hutu and 
Tutsis meant that the Tutsis did not easily match any of the four protected groups, the 
prosecution argued in their opening statement at Akayesu that the Tutsis were an ‘ethnic’ 
group.69 As such any act of violence that was committed against them, with the intent that the 
Tutsis, as a group, would be destroyed as a result, would, the prosecution argued, establish 
the genocidal nature of the crime.  
 
This meant that the prosecution repeatedly focused in on the ethnicity of the victims being 
attacked throughout the violence. When Witness K testified to the murder of refugees at the 
Taba communal office, the prosecution followed up by asking: ‘Do you know whether or not 
                                                     
67 CONTRA001222, 70. 
68 Prosecutor v. Ildéphonse Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR–00–55, ICTR–00–55C–0536/1, Judgement and 
Sentence, 19/06/2012, 437.  
69 CONTRA001175, 67.  
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these people were Hutu or Tutsi?’70 The centrality of the witnesses’ ethnicity to the 
prosecution’s strategy was such that even when a witness attempted to resist answering the 
question they were forced to comply: 
Prosecution: How old are you?  
Witness: I'm 30 years old.  
Prosecution: What's your ethnic group?  
Witness: I am Rwandan.  
Prosecution: How were you considered in 1994?  
Witness: In 1994 I was Tutsi. But today in Rwanda there is no distinction between 
the ethnic groups; so, I am Rwandan.71 
 
Similarly, after this witness had already resisted the prosecution’s question once, the 
prosecution asked: 
Prosecution: Are you Hutu, Tutsi or another—from another ethnic group?  
Witness: It's not going to be—it's difficult because every time when I'm asked a 
question about my ethnic group I always ask myself why is someone asking that 
question, given the fact that for a long time this kind of question always frightened 
Rwandans. Nowadays this issue no longer exists in our country, so this question 
seems to be a difficult one with regard to my security. I would like to know why are 
you asking me this question?72 
 
Due to the witness’s reluctance to answer the question, the court went into closed session in 
order to protect the witness from the consequences of divulging this information.73  
 
                                                     
70 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001176, Akayesu – Transcript of 10/1/1997, 10/01/1997, 55 and 60; CONTRA001222, 
21 and 24; CONTRA001195, 117; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001224, Akayesu – Transcript of 27/10/1997, 
27/10/1997, 13; CONTRA001227, 17; ICTR–99–46, TRA000218/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 25/10/2000, 25/10/2000, 57; TRA000750/01, 4–57; TRA000122/01, 12; and ICTR–00–61, 
TRA005491/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 03/11/2009, 03/11/2009, 84.  
71 ICTR–99–46, TRA000443/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 02/05/2001, 
02/05/2001, 4.  





As time went on, the ethnocentricity of the prosecution’s and the Tribunal’s understanding of 
violence increased. When a witness answered ‘Tutsi’ to the question ‘what is your ethnicity?’ 
it became clear that it was almost certainly going to be a ‘victim’s’ testimony, and if they 
responded ‘Hutu’ it would be a ‘perpetrator’s’ testimony.74 The strength of this association is 
seen with this following exchange:  
Prosecution: Do you know why they were killed? Or maybe let me rephrase the 
question. What was the ethnic group of the victims, of those three victims that 
night?  
Witness: They were Tutsi.75 
 
Here, the prosecution realised that their original question would be objected to, because it 
would produce a speculative answer from the witness, and so reformulated the question in 
order to extract an answer that would make sense within the Tribunal’s ethnocentric 
discourse of victimhood. Indeed, whilst other victims (Hutu, but never Twa to my 
knowledge)76 could enter the courtroom under different charges, such as crimes against 
humanity or war crimes, during Gatete (which was one of the Tribunal’s last trials) the 
prosecution only focused on Tutsi victims; in the pre–trial brief and the supporting statements, 
there was no mention of Hutu victims.77  
 
                                                     
74 Even as someone who attempted to critically engage with these transcripts, due to the regularity with which 
these ethnic identities became associated with either victimhood or perpetratorhood, I too begin pre–judging the 
testimony before they had even begun. 
75 ICTR–99–46, TRA000251/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 18/01/2001, 
18/01/2001, 81. 
76 Regardless, as Hutu’s could not be recognised as victims of the genocide, this meant they were always 
considered less significant victims within this discourse, which held genocide to be the ‘crime of crimes’. This 
was even more so for victims of crimes perpetrators by the RPF. As Goldstone stated: ‘The RPF crimes were 
revenge crimes. It is absolutely accepted that these crimes did not amount to genocide. On a scale of one to ten, 
the genocide was a ten. Those who aided and abetted were eights and nines. The crimes committed by the RPF, 
however, would have been at fours and fives if accepted.’ ‘Moving Forward: A Reflection on Current Issues 
Facing International Criminal Justice with Richard Goldstone’, Human Rights Brief 21:2 (2014), 34. 
77 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0079, Gatete – Prosecutor's Pre–Trial Brief (Pursuant to Rule 73bis (B) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence), 21/07/2009, 21 and 36. 
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Whilst the focus on the ethnicity of the victims went some way towards establishing the 
special intent required to find the accused guilty of genocide (demonstrating as it did that 
victims had clearly been singled out during the violence), two other methods were drawn on 
to demonstrate the accused’s intent. The first was, as discussed above, demonstrating the 
accused’s tendency towards discriminating against Tutsis prior to the genocide.78 Whilst 
legally incapable of leading towards a guilty verdict on its own (as the court ruled that 
evidence of the defendants’ preponderance towards criminality lacked probative value), it 
produced a narrative where the accused’s future discriminatory and genocidal practices made 
sense. The second was producing evidence of the accused’s own public declarations against 
the Tutsis, especially where this included implicit or explicit calls for their destruction and 
where possible their incitement of others to attack the Tutsis.79  
Prosecution: Madam Witness, Mr. Gatete had said to -- why they had not got rid of 
the dirt. Who did you understand him to mean by ‘the dirt’?  
Witness: The dirt meant the Tutsi80 
 
Evidence of this could be subtler, and during Cyangugu the prosecution was at pains to 
emphasise Ntagerura’s and Bagambiki’s support for an anti–Tutsi message that had been 
delivered at a meeting they had participated in: 
Prosecution: Did you specifically notice whether Ntagerura was applauding and 
smiling? 
Witness: Yes, he did applaud.  
Prosecution: Did you specifically notice whether Bagambiki was applauding and 
smiling?  
Witness: Yes. All the people that I named were applauding.81 
                                                     
78 ICTR–99–46–0130, 5; TRA000207/01, 43–5, 48–50, and 54–8; TRA001774/1, 60–99; and CONTRA001176, 
20–3. 
79 CONTRA001180, 61–2; and CONTRA001186, 49–53. 
80 TRA005506/2, 78. See also ICTR–00–61, TRA005459, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 05/11/2009, 
05/11/2009, 24. 
81 TRA000131/1, 99. 
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It must be stressed that there was nothing inevitable about this link between Tutsis as an 
ethnic group and victimhood. Whilst it is certainly true that the Tutsis were the main target of 
the genocide, it is also the case that thousands of Hutus were killed alongside them in the 
same act of violence as a result of the same logic. The genocide should be understood 
fundamentally as a political act which, whilst pursued at a local level for a variety of different 
reasons, was designed and executed so as to ensure that a small political clique could retain 
political control of the country, something that the APA and multiparty democracy 
threatened.82 The nature of the Genocide Convention, and its failure to protect political 
groups (due to the Soviet Union’s fear during its drafting that this might lead to accusations 
that they had committed genocide) prevented victims of the genocide from maintaining a 
political identity. Thus, whilst the accused’s reasons for participating in the violence in the 
first place were substantially political, the violence itself remained largely apolitical within 
these accounts. The victims were killed as Tutsis not as political threats to the status quo, not 
as suspected affiliates with the invading RPF forces, not as a group that would, in order to 
gain political power, commit genocide against the Hutus if necessary, and not as economic 
beneficiaries of the colonial past—accounts that circulated throughout Rwanda in the build–
up to the genocide. The ethnicisation (and depoliticisation) of the violence flattened all of this 
out. The prosecution’s understanding here was seen most clearly in the way they explained 
their interpretation of crimes against humanity in Akayesu, where they argued that the 
widespread attack occurred against Hutus and Tutsis on political and ethnic grounds.83 Even, 
then, when there was a provision to portray the Tutsis as political victims, the prosecution 
                                                     
82 René Lemarchand, ‘The 1994 Rwanda Genocide’, in The Genocide Studies Reader, ed. Samuel Totten et al. 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 484; Hintjens, ‘Genocide in Rwanda’, 247–8 and 261; Gérard Prunier, The 
Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide (London: Hurst & Company,1995), 159–64; Lee Fujii, Killing Neighbours: 
Webs of Violence in Rwanda (London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 5, 46, 50, 76–7 and 89; Straus, Order of 
Genocide, 128–40. 
83 CONTRA001175, 45. 
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continued to present them in ethnic terms.84 To do otherwise would have complicated their 
genocide narrative, as would, no doubt, have been the case if they had highlighted more Hutu 
victims of these massacres.85  
 
This allocation of victimhood to Tutsis alone was made more problematic by the flipside of 
this; Hutus as a group became increasingly associated with perpetratorhood, with the 
prosecution also emphasising the ethnic component of the attackers.86 An example of this 
understanding of perpetratorhood can be seen in this exchange during Gatete where the court 
required clarification for why a Hutu might have felt victimised: 
 
Madam President: And why were you afraid? In view of your ethnicity?  
Witness: Madam President, I would like to point out to you that the killings were 
not committed by all the Hutus. Hutus who refused to kill people were characterised 
as accomplices, and they could very easily be killed for that.87 
 
With the addition of the inevitable compliance of the masses with the calls to participate in 
the violence, noted above, all Hutus within these accounts seemingly became always already 
perpetrators of violence—complicit in the crime by default. As with the association between 
Tutsis and an ethnic category, this flattened out the meaning and symbolism of the violence 
during the genocide. This rendered the violence as an inter–ethnic conflict rather than 
something that took on different forms at different moments in different localities. When 
Witness JJ described the attackers without being prompted, she noted that they were ‘our 
                                                     
84 The prosecution also argued that one of the reasons that Akayesu didn’t participate in the killing in the first 
weeks was because he was unsure if it ‘was it a political thing, or […] ethnic’ CONTRA001235, 39. 
85 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001183, Akayesu – Transcript of 15/1/1997, 15/01/1997.  
86 For an example of this see TRA000218/1, 62 and 71; and TRA005145/1, 64.  
87 ICTR–00–61, TRA005507/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 10/11/2009, 10/11/2009, 32. 
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neighbors’.88 It was only after the intervention of the prosecution that this became reframed 
in ethnic terms.  
Prosecution: These people who destroyed your home and ate your livestock, your 
neighbors, do you know whether or not they were Hutu or Tutsis? 
 
Witness: They were Hutus.89  
 
This section has demonstrated the way in which the law framed the prosecution’s account in 
particular ways as it sought to establish the defendant’s guilt. This resulted in accounts which 
were legally constrained—temporally, geographically, and substantively—and which 
revolved around the actions of the accused. They were also driven by a particular 
understanding of perpetrators as conscious and knowing actors, and produced particular 
images of the victims, as largely passive figures within these episodes. This also showed how 
the legal provisions under the Genocide Convention resulted in a heightened sense of the 
ethnic nature of the violence. As such, this points to one of the first ways that some of the 
goals and priorities of the court came into tension with each other as the prosecution’s 
account produced a deeply problematic split between the Tutsis as the always already victims 
and Hutus as the always already perpetrators. The law’s framing of genocide and its 
Manichean division of actors into innocent victims and guilty perpetrators and the 
prosecution’s repeated emphasis on the identities of those that participated in the violence 
jointly concealed the fluidity and political (and therefore contestable) nature of these 
identities and rendered them fixed and inevitable.90 In this very important way, then, the 
account as produced within the archive works contrary to the goal of reconciliation, as there 
seems within this way of understanding little chance of bringing together two sides that are 
                                                     
88 CONTRA001222, 20.  
89 Ibid., 21. 
90 Ruti Teitel, ‘The Universal and the Particular in International Criminal Justice’, Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review, 30:285 (1998), 288; and Brown and Ni Aolain, ‘Through the Looking Glass’ (see Intro., n. 85).  
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depicted as always, and inevitably, opposed to each other.91 This sense of an ingrained 
victimhood is also often politically mobilised to violent ends. This much was shown in the 
build–up to the genocide when the Hutu extremists constructed a strong collective memory of 
the Hutus’ past status as victims under the Tutsis’ monarchical rule to legitimise the genocide 
against them.92 
 
Politicising the Prosecution?  
 
So far, this chapter has explored the prosecution’s construction of its account of violence by 
considering the legal elements that had to be met in order to establish the defendants’ guilt. 
This section will augment this argument, by examining the extent to which other factors 
outside of the legal interests of the case came to influence the way in which the prosecution 
constructed their accounts of violence contained in the archive. This questions the idea that 
courtrooms are hermetically sealed spaces and that law can be separated from politics. In 
doing so I will focus on two issues: the influence of gendered and patriarchal discourses on 
the prosecution’s accounts; and the prosecution’s understanding of the strategic function of 
the court, and the extent to which it pursued extra–judicial goals whilst securing convictions 
against the accused.  
 
Gender Politics at the Tribunal 
 
                                                     
91 See also Humphrey, ‘International Intervention’ (see Intro., n. 21), 502. 
92 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killer, 189–96. 
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Gendered discourses penetrated the prosecution’s accounts of violence to give them a distinct 
appearance. The gendered nature of international criminal justice, as discussed in the 
Introduction, has been emphasised by scholars, such as MacKinnon, Walsh, and Campbell.93 
Each has shown the ways in which gendered discourses come to shape the practises of 
international courts and how evidence is treated and assessed, showing that systematically 
gender–based crimes are under–investigated, and when prosecuted are subjected to higher 
standards of proof.94 These patterns were clearly evident at the ICTR as the OTP treated 
gender–based violence as a crime of secondary importance.95  
 
The OTP’s problem in this respect finds its roots in the initial investigations, which set the 
tone for how they were to handle incidents of sexual violence throughout its history. 
Investigators ignored these crimes from the outset, with a former member of the Tribunal 
noting that ‘Many of the investigators said, “Well, we can’t be concerned about some women 
who got raped. We can’t divert resources to investigate those crimes. We had a genocide 
down here […].”’96 Elsewhere it has been noted that, even when enquiries into these types of 
crimes were made, they were done without taking into consideration the particular sensitivity, 
and heightened trauma, that came with these crimes.97 Whilst this did partially improve with 
the creation of a sexual violence investigation unit in 1998, discussed in the following 
chapter, the failure to explore sexual violence crimes sufficiently in the initial instance put the 
                                                     
93 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (see Into., n. 85). 
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OTP on its back foot, from which it never seemed to recover.98 This problematic approach, 
moreover, continued throughout the Tribunal’s history and these crimes both remained 
insufficiently investigated and were also poorly incorporated into the prosecution’s case 
strategy.99  
 
An example of this failure is the prosecution’s handling of sexual violence evidence during 
Cyangugu. The initial indictment did not contain any specific reference to sexual violence 
charges.100 The first suggestion that the prosecution intended to present evidence that related 
to sexual violence came on 2 December 1999 when the prosecution submitted an amended 
indictment that specifically contained sexual violence charges.101 However, this was then 
withdrawn two months later, and with this the specific references to sexual violence were 
seemingly removed from the case.102 The situation became murkier still as both the 
prosecution’s pre–trial brief and opening statement in Cyangugu specifically noted the 
intention to prosecute the accused for sexual violence crimes, specifically linked to the charge 
lodged against Bagambiki and Imanishimwe in the indictment relating to their participation in 
                                                     
98 E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission Alternative 
Approaches and Ways and Means within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of 
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Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy Addendum Report of the Mission to Rwanda on the 
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dominated by men. Appeals Judge (2016). 
100 ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0224, Ntagerura – Amended Indictment, 29/01/1998; and Prosecutor v. 
Emmanuel Bagambiki et al., Case No. ICTR–97–36 (hereafter ICTR–97–36), ICTR–97–36–0071, Bagambiki – 
Imanishimwe – Indictment – Redacted, 09/10/1997, 7. 
101 ICTR–96–10A–0224, 4–5. 
102 ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46–0046, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – Ntagerura et al – Notice of the Prosecutor to 
Withdraw All Pending Motion, 14/02/2000. 
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the abduction and killing of refugees from the Karamapaka stadium.103 The matter came to 
ahead when Witness LBH started testifying to the occurrence of sexual violence at the 
Karamapaka stadium but was stopped by a defence objection that they had not been made 
aware of the prosecution’s intention to press charges on this matter, noting the absence of 
sexual violence in the indictment. The prosecution’s argument that the pre–trial brief, 
opening statement, and the amended indictment (even though it was withdrawn) had put the 
defendants on notice was ultimately rejected by the judges, and the prosecution were 
subsequently prohibited from presenting evidence concerning sexual violence.104 Following 
this an amicus curie was submitted that called for the prosecution to amend their indictment 
so as to include sexual violence charges, but this was rejected by both the judges and the 
prosecution and as such sexual violence was to remain absent from the prosecution’s account 
of violence in Cyangugu.105  
  
Part of the reason that the prosecution did not follow through with the amended indictment 
was the result of a decision within the OTP to avoid amending the indictment unless 
absolutely necessary so as not to slow down the trials.106 However, in this instance it should 
have been clear that the prosecution was going to face difficulty with pursuing sexual 
violence charges under the explicit accusation that Bagambiki and Imanishimwe had 
abducted and killed refugees from Karamapaka. At best this shows the prosecution chancing 
their luck and hoping to get away with something that they should have at least expected they 
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wouldn’t. However, their treatment of other evidence of sexual violence crimes, as previously 
discussed, suggests that this is simply another incident when the prosecution appeared to be 
indifferent to gender–based violence.  
 
This approach, along with other factors discussed in Chapter Five, accounts for the OTP’s 
incredibly poor conviction rate for these crimes, which saw only twelve convictions survive 
the appeals stage.107 This is despite the common estimate that up to 250,000 women were 
sexually assaulted during the genocide, which means it would reasonable to expect that, 
given their senior positions in the genocide, far more of the ICTR’s accused should have been 
held to account for this type of crime.108 This failure sits uncomfortably with the OTP’s 
celebration of their achievements in tackling sexual violence crimes, particularly its 
contribution to sexual violence jurisprudence, which has led it to produce a handbook for the 
prosecution of sexual violence, aimed at assisting other jurisdiction improve their practice in 
relation to these crimes.109  
 
Gendered discourses also came to influence the prosecution’s account of violence in other 
ways, specifically in contributing towards defining the characteristics of both perpetrators and 
victims during the genocide. The gendered nature of the victims was highlighted as the 
prosecution sought to emphasise the ‘feminine’ identities of those attacked. This seemingly 
demonstrated their passivity, innocence, and non–combatant status, which rendered them 
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illegitimate targets of violence.110 As such, attacks perpetrated against women, children, and 
the elderly were also, where possible, emphasised within the prosecution’s accounts, as 
witnesses were asked questions such as: ‘Do you know whether women and children were 
killed in Taba province?’111 During Cyangugu Judge Ostrovsky asked a witness: 
And please, tell me. You attended several cabinet meetings, starting from 16th 
April. During those cabinet meetings, was there ever a discussion of extermination 
of women, elderly persons, children; that is, civilian population. And you referred 
to the term ‘the Tutsi of within’. That would include the civilian population; i.e., 
women, children and elderly persons. (Emphasis added.)112  
 
The gendered nature of the targets of the violence would suffice to show that violence was 
committed against people that were in no way actively involved in the conflict and who could 
therefore be considered victims (as opposed to legitimate causalities of war).113   
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Council on 21 January 1992, 17/06/1992, 23. Establishing the gender of those targeted also seemed to establish 
that these attacks were more severe and seemingly more clearly established the perpetrator’s intent. The 
rationality here appeared to be that if perpetrators—who were always seen as masculine figures—had attacked a 
woman or child then this could not have been an accident, but had to have been preplanned, or that it 
demonstrated their particular extreme desire for the act of violence to have taken place. 
112  ICTR–99–46, TRA001277/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 28/05/2002, 
28/05/2002, 80.  
113 The tension in this association between childhood and victimhood at the Tribunal was particularly strained 
by the fact the Interahamwe were effectively a ‘youth’ militia (even if this changed somewhat after the genocide 
began). Within this discourse, children’s’ participation in the violence, through groups like the Interahamwe, 
was also presented as being against their will, which allowed them to remain as recognisable victims. See 
E/CN.4/1997/61, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the 
World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. René Degni–Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S–3/1 of 25 May 1994, 20/01/1997, 9 and 32. 
126 
 
Gender also played, less subtly, a role in defining perpetratorhood. With very few exceptions 
(namely the prosecution of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko), women only featured in the narratives 
constructed by the prosecution as victims of the violence, never as the perpetrators. Whilst 
some might object to this argument and say that men were responsible for the vast majority of 
the ‘actual’ violence that occurred in Rwanda, this would only be because, like the 
courtroom, their gaze fell onto the final transaction of violence rather than the context that 
enabled it to occur. Moreover, there was the possibility of introducing more evidence of the 
‘direct’ participation of women in the violence in Rwanda, as was found by the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women:  
The genocide in Rwanda was sadly characterized by a new phenomenon which has 
not been observed in any armed conflict in history, namely the massive 
involvement of women as perpetrators of the violence. Survivors testify that not 
only did women take part in the general violence and fighting during the conflict, 
but were also actively involved in committing violence against other women, 
including acts of sexual violence.114 
 
The absence of the role that women played in the violence (with not one witness even 
presenting evidence of women performing a supporting or aiding role to the violence) only 
fed back to reaffirm the gendered understanding of victimhood.  
 
Prosecution Strategy and Strategic Function 
 
The final element that I want to explore is to what extent the prosecution used the trials in 
pursuit of other, extra-judicial goals115 and how this influenced the way they constructed their 
cases (and hence produced records for the archive). There were signs that, at various points in 
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115 This refers to any goal that is not purely concerned with securing a verdict against the accused. As will be 




its history, the OTP was concerned with doing more than simply establishing the criminality 
of the accused.116 Particularly during the early years of the prosecution, under the guidance of 
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone, the OTP appeared to pursue a strategy that attempted to 
establish the guilt and responsibility of the accused, whilst simultaneously also seeking to 
consciously expand and develop international law (beyond the legal needs of the case at 
hand) and to produce a just account of the violence.117  
 
It was clear that the prosecution tried to influence the state of the jurisprudence to ensure that 
it was left in a more developed state than when found, and that this aspect of its purpose (and 
legacy) increased in importance over time.118 This included contributing to developments in 
the Tribunal’s jurisprudence so that: rape could be considered an act of genocide; superior 
responsibility could apply to non-military structures—in either government or civilian 
organisations; and, along with the ICTY, joint criminal enterprise (JCE) could be used as a  
mode of participation.119 As such the prosecution worked within and pushed beyond the 
boundaries of the statute to redefine what those boundaries, highlighting the dynamic and 
performative nature of law.120  
                                                     
116 This is, of course, not to deny that the prosecution of suspected genocidaires remained throughout the 
prosecution’s, and Tribunal’s, main purpose. Indeed, it was suggested to me, as discuss shortly, that the 
concentration on this at the Tribunal’s outset negatively affected some aspects of the archive itself, as the sheer 
focus on this meant that little thought was put into how best to preserve the records of the Tribunal’s activities 
beyond the trial records. This meant that some administrative records, along with some of the OTP’s own 
records (not controlled by the Registry) from the Tribunal’s early years, were not well organised or maintained. 
A lack of concern with this broader archive threatened its very existence as these ‘less significant’ records were 
for many years left in shipping containers rotting away. Member of ICTR Archives Unit – (Arusha, Tanzania: 
June, 2015); and Senior Information and Evidence Section Officer – ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (Arusha, 
Tanzania: June, 2015). 
117 Goldstone, ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace–making’ (see Intro., n. 4). 
118 Head of Appeals (2015). 
119 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR–96–13, Judgement and Sentence, 27/01/2000 (see Other ICTR 
Documents list), 49; ICTR–98–44–4803/1, 02/02/2012, 261–272; Walsh, ‘Gendering International Justice’, 40. 
120 For a good discussion of this see: Danner, ‘Guilty Associations’, 75–169; and A/60/229–S/2005/534, Report 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other 




Several examples from the Akayesu appeals also demonstrate this. On appeal the prosecution 
alleged that the trial chamber’s definition of crimes against humanity had wrongly added the 
condition that a perpetrator had to have acted with discriminatory intent.121 They argued that 
the law could be read to imply that, while the attack overall had to be motivated by 
discriminatory intent (i.e., it had to target a specific group), unlike with genocide the accused 
did not personally need to possess discriminatory intent. During the same appeal, the 
prosecution also argued that the trial chamber had erred in law by declaring that for non–
military personnel to be found guilty of war crimes they had to have held a position in 
government that led to an obligation to have supported the war effort (referred to as the 
‘government test’).122 They further argued that the trial chamber had needlessly, and wrongly, 
decided that for an act to be found as ‘instigation’, it had to be both ‘direct’ and ‘public’.123 
More significantly, the prosecution called for the appeals chamber to interpret the provisions 
of the statute to allow for the appeals chamber to rule directly on legal errors which had no 
bearing on the outcome of the case (prohibited under Article 24 of the Statute) —an 
argument accepted by the judges.124  
 
The motivations behind improving the jurisprudence were manifold. Partly, this reflected a 
concern that the jurisprudence was negatively affecting the OTP’s prosecutions elsewhere. In 
the Akayesu appeal, the OTP noted that whilst the imposition of the ‘government test’ had not 
negatively impacted on the findings made in Akayesu, it had during Kayishema and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring 
States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 15/08/2005, 11.  
121 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA000049, Akayesu – Transcript of 1/11/2000 – Appeals Hearing, 01/11/2000, 223–4. 
122 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA000050, Akayesu – Transcript of 2/11/2000 – Appeals Hearing, 02/11/2000, 22; and 
ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0868/1, Akayesu – Appeal Judgement, 01/06/2001, 129–34. 
123 ICTR–96–4–0868/1, 141–4.  
124 CONTRA000049, 41; and Ibid., 27–8 and 236–7.  
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Ruzindana, Musema, and Rutaganda.125 These challenges were also advanced in order to 
ensure that the law developed in a way that meant it could adequately capture the violence in 
Rwanda, so as to show the accused’s responsibility for the crimes committed.126 This was 
perhaps most clearly the case with the development of JCE, which, whilst only very 
tenuously based on customary international law, allowed the prosecution to capture the 
accused’s responsibility in those instances when they were more removed from the direct 
perpetration of violence than more traditional legal modes of participation allowed.127 As will 
become more important later on, this also represented, as Martinez and Danner argued, the 
intervention of ‘human rights methodologies’ into the courtroom, whereby more expansive 
interpretations of the law were deemed permissible when compared with the more restrictive 
approach usually adopted in criminal law.128 Finally, there was a sense of pursuing this types 
of interventions for reasons beyond the legal interests of the prosecution at the Tribunal but, 
as James Arguin put, where there was a ‘public interest’ to do so, where the jurisprudence 
was ‘just wrong as a matter of public policy’.129 Whilst this is, as argued below, a legitimate 
legal goal, there is also clearly a ‘extra-judicial’ element here as the OTP became concerned 
with the jurisprudence might impact on the world outside the court-room.  
 
Second, the prosecution particularly under Goldstone, appeared to use trials didactically, as 
sites of law, history, and reconciliation.130 For instance, the initial indictment policy was 
specifically designed to capture the history of the genocide, illustrating the full extent of the 
                                                     
125 CONTRA000050, 22. 
126 Ibid., 22–7.   
127 Carla Del Ponte, ‘Investigation and Prosecution of Large–Scale Crimes at the International Level’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 4 (2006), 540 and 552. 
128 Danner ‘Guilty Associations’, 132–7. 
129 This was in reference to the appeals launched against Ngirabatware for the trial chamber’s ruling that he was 
not responsible for the crimes committed by subordinates prior to taking up his post. This was despite that 
Ngirabatware knew about these crimes after he assumed control, and still failed to punish those responsible. 
Head of Appeals (2015). 
130 The prominent role that history would play at the trials was clear at Akayesu, as the prosecutor opened the 
case with a presentation on the history of Rwanda. Supra note 117, 485–504. 
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genocide, both in terms of the types of perpetrators that were responsible, but also the 
geographical reach of the violence. This concern led the OTP to indict a wide range of 
accused including: government ministers, bourgmestres, préfets, priests, business–persons, 
journalists, singers, doctors, military personnel, gendarmes, local militiamen, conselliers, and 
other local persons of significance.131 Each of Rwanda’s seven prefectures were covered and 
a broad spread of crimes in each secured within the indictments. These indictments also 
captured the coordination between different types of actors, the movement of genocide—as 
minsters were sent back to their home regions to oversee the genocide, or where bands of 
zealot genocidaires moved between communes in order to kick–start the violence—and the 
local dynamics of the violence. The three trials analysed here capture these elements. In 
Akayesu the focus was on his local ownership of the killing as he pursued those that opposed 
his power within the commune; in Cyangugu Ntagerura represented the government minister 
sent back to his locality to oversee the violence, cooperating with military leaders 
(Imanishimwe) and local authorities (Bagambiki); and Gatete was the zealot who travelled 
around his area (having also returned from his position in government) leading a group of 
Interahamwe and ensuring that the genocide happened with a startling pace.132  
 
This is not to say that this resulted in a tension between the prosecution’s legal and extra-
judicial goals. There was nothing incompatible with the legal needs of the court and the 
attempt to capture the full extent of the violence. Moreover, drawing on these broader 
historical narratives frequently enhanced the prosecution’s cases. As argued, these narratives 
helped both to link the crimes occurring within the locality to the national level violence and 
demonstrated the interlinked nature of the violence, which established both the accused’s 
                                                     
131 Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide (see Intro, n. 75), 84; and TRA001643/1, 2. 
132 ICTR–96–4, Akayesu, Audio Recording: Interview of Jean Paul Akayesu in Zambia, 10/04/1996, Tape I, 
Side A; CONTRA001175, 36–40; ICTR–99–46–0130, 5; and TRA000207/01, 43–5, 48–50, and 54–8. 
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individual responsibility for the crimes committed and their role within the broader genocidal 
plan. The compatibility here of these goals was also seen in the way in which the prosecution 
attempted to construct ‘thick narratives’ around each of the accused in order to deepen the 
sense of their guilt (despite the commonality between the accounts that existed beneath the 
surface). In these instances, then, the prosecution’s multiple goals and priorities appeared to 
overlap. 
 
Other evidence exists to support this notion that the prosecution pursued extra–judicial 
commitments alongside their legal ones. First, they often appeared to pursue charges that 
were not, strictly speaking, required to prove an accused’s guilt. In several instances, for 
instance, the prosecution’s pursuit of pre–1994 evidence cannot be explained by legal 
necessity alone. Even with the example above concerning Ngeze during the Media Trial, 
whilst adhering strictly to the temporal limits would have erased the role of his Kangura 
newspaper, there was more than enough evidence of his ‘direct’ participation in the violence 
in 1994 as one of the leaders of the CDR to have held him to account.133 Rather, at least part 
of the concern here appeared to be with capturing the full breadth of the accused’s 
responsibility and role in the violence and to present an accurate picture of what they had 
done.134 This argument was also explicitly used when the prosecution pushed for concurrent 
sentences, which whilst not elongating the accused’s prison term, more accurately captured 
the accused’s criminality and their role in the violence.135  
 
                                                     
133 ICTR–99–52–1323/1, 83–117 and 257–85 
134 Several interviewees noted how the early indictments contained a much wider range of charges, some of 
which were seen as being excessive (which was also viewed as being counterproductive to the legal goals of the 
case). Deputy Appeals Chief (2015).; and Senior ICTR Appeals Attorney 2 – (Arusha, Tanzania: June, 2015). 
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Finally, it was apparent that during the early trials the prosecution were concerned with how 
their actions could impact the regions affected by the violence being prosecuted. Robert 
Prosper, the lead prosecutor during Akayesu, for instance, decided to deliver the Akayesu 
verdict to Taba personally, to make sure that the population knew what had happened and 
understood why the outcome was as it was.136 This, combined with the above, shows that the 
ICTR seemingly marked a departure from the more reductionist approach taken by the 
Nuremberg prosecutors.137 
 
Over time, however, the prosecution’s approach seemed to change. In Gatete, whilst the 
prosecution had initially pursued charges relating to Gatete’s (very substantial) crimes 
committed pre–1994,138 a considerable number of these allegations were removed from the 
indictment when the prosecution amended it prior to the trial, and the prosecution then opted 
not to lead any substantive evidence of pre–1994 events during the trial.139 This was despite 
the prosecution having successfully rebutted the defence’s attempts to exclude evidence 
pertaining to pre–1994 crimes.140 Indeed, the prosecution appeared to prosecute the Gatete 
trial in a manner that was driven by a concern with making it as quick and efficient as 
possible, rather than with ensuring that it produced a holistic account of the violence.141 As 
                                                     
136 Victor Peskin, ‘Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme’, Journal of 
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137 See Intro., n. 15. 
138 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0166/1, Gatete – the Pre–Defence Brief of Jean–Baptiste Gatete, 29/01/2010, 8.  
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indictment, 03/07/2009, 7; and ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0074/1, Gatete – the Prosecutor's Submission 
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discussed in Chapter Six, this was part of what was a more general shift in the prosecution’s 
priorities over time, which saw the prosecution become increasingly concerned with 
questions of efficiency and economy in a way that also influenced their trial strategy.  
 
This also effected how the prosecution used the witnesses during the trials, as over time they 
were offered less scope within which to testify and were used in an increasingly more 
‘utilitarian’ manner. Compared with Akayesu, in Gatete the witnesses were asked shorter and 
more targeted questions during the trial, and the prosecution, along with the judges and the 
defence, exerted more control over the proceedings.142 Gone were the broader questions, 
featured during Akayesu, that probed the witnesses’ backgrounds and their experiences in the 
lead up to the violence; instead, questions immediately directed the witness to the crimes 
charged to the accused in the indictment.143 The prosecution even interjected during their own 
witnesses’ testimony in order to bring it back to order. During Gatete, even after what appears 
to be a relatively succinct answer the prosecution reminded witness BBJ to be as quick and 
succinct in their response as possible.  
Prosecution: And do you know whether Jean–Baptiste Gatete knew you?  
Witness BBJ: Yes, he knows me. He knows me very well.  
Prosecution:  Right. Now, back to April 1994, subsequent to the death of President 
Habyarimana on the 6th of April, did you ever see Gatete thereafter?  
Witness: I saw Gatete in Nyagasambu that was in the month of May at 9 p.m. It was 
at night.  
Prosecution: Witness, just try and be brief in your answers and if I need explanation 
I will ask follow up questions. And the question was: Whether or not you saw 
Gatete in the month of April subsequent to the death of President Habyarimana? 
And all I wanted was a yes or no.  
Witness: Yes.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Complying with the Decision on Defence Motion Concerning Defects in the Amended indictment Dated 3 July 
2009, 07/07/2009. 
142 A particularly good example of this new style of questioning can be seen in the examination-in-chief of 
Witness BBJ during Gatete. TRA005459, 14–30. See also the description of Gatete in the Appendix. 
143 See the testimony of Witness NN as an example of this. CONTRA001227. 
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Prosecution: Now, the next question is: Do you recall how many times you saw 
Gatete in the month of April 1994 after the 6th of April?  
Witness: I saw him six times.  
Prosecution: Thank you, Witness.144 
 
Whilst, throughout, the core function of the prosecution was to secure verdicts against the 
accused, over time the additional ‘goals’ that had been added now appeared to fall by the 
wayside.145 Towards the end of the Tribunal there did seem to be an awareness of the 
shortcomings of this narrow focus on the law and a number of projects were developed, 
including the GSP, mentioned in the Introduction, to try to broaden the focus once more. 
However, these ventures appeared to be driven by individual members of the OTP rather than 
something that concerned the institution as a whole. Indeed, a lack of institutional support has 
meant that the GSP remains incomplete, and it now, with the close of the Tribunal, seems 
hard to see how or if this will ever be brought to its conclusion. Overall, as time went on, the 
OTP was simply not focused on broader ‘extrajudicial’ outputs.146 As a former member of the 
OTP noted, as their strategy became more focused, they stopped trying to construct ‘fluffy 
histories’.147 As such, it is very clear that over time the prosecution moved away from a 
broader understanding of its role and purpose and became more narrowly fixated on the legal 
matters at hand.148 What is also clear is that in doing so the prosecution changed both the 
accounts of violence that it was producing, as these arguably became ‘thinner’ and more 
direct, and also the function and purpose behind these accounts as these become more overtly 
legal documents.  
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This chapter has demonstrated that numerous factors came to shape the way in which the 
prosecution constructed their accounts of violence. Whilst, as the first section demonstrated, 
law played a significant role, as it defined the parameters within which the prosecution could 
construct their cases and also influenced the way in which it described the actors that 
populated these narratives, law alone is insufficient to explain this process. Rather, as was 
demonstrated in the second section, non–legal discourses—such as gender—and the 
prosecution’s extra-judicial goals all came to influence which accounts of violence were 
constructed. Combined, what these begins to show is the effects of what I have termed ‘the 
conditions of truth’, the conditions that, in line with Foucault’s idea of the archive and 
archaeology, must be met by a statement within the courtroom for it to possibly be accepted 
as a truth and allowed to contribute towards the archive. What was also important here was 
the way in which gender and ethnicity came to ultimately influence the legal understanding 
of the crimes that had taken place and acted as markers that demonstrated that a crime had 
occurred, showing the way in which the relationship between different strands of discourses 
working within the apparatus came to shape the conditions of truth.  
 
This chapter has also demonstrated the compatibility, at moments, of the prosecution’s legal 
and extra-judicial goals, such as presenting a broader narrative of the violence in Rwanda. It 
should be noted, however, that the prosecution’s concern with ‘doing more’ than producing a 
judgement in these early years was not necessarily replicated across all of the Tribunal’s 
actors. Whilst the defences’ and judges’ approach will be dealt with in the subsequent 
chapters, of note here was the position adopted in the registry, which, in contrast to the 
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prosecution’s concern with producing a broad account of violence, seemed defined by a lack 
of consideration of the extra-judicial value of the archive. The registry throughout these early 
years was focused so intensively on supporting the trials legally, that little thought went into 
considering how these (historically significant) records produced during the trials were to be 
stored for posterity.149 This meant there was no archival management policy in place for the 
first decade of the Tribunal’s existence, 150 which left the records for many of the early trials 
in disarray. This has had a lasting effect on the accessibility of certain records within the 
archive  where it remains difficult to access fall case files in many instances. This, I believe, 
reflects a lack of clarity within the Tribunal as a whole during the early years as to what its 
purpose and function was, as discussed in Chapter One, and indeed what it could and should 
achieve. 
 
Overtime, moreover, further tensions appeared to emerge between the different goals and 
priorities of the prosecution. For instance, the legal and historical needs of the prosecution 
seemed to overlap in the early years, while towards the end of the Tribunal they appeared to 
come into tension with each other: but why? Why was it that the prosecution shifted its 
priorities over time? There was also the sense that the witnesses’ narratives were highly 
framed and that this was, in fact, required in order for them to powerfully contribute towards 
the courts legal findings. The question is, however, did this mean that the interests of the 
witnesses and of the prosecution converged? Or did the way in which the prosecution framed 
these accounts mean—as scholars like Dembour and Haslem suggest—that witnesses were 
prevented from telling stories that they might otherwise have told? To what extent, then, did 
                                                     




the prosecution and witnesses co-construct the archive together? The following chapters 
address these questions.  
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This chapter focuses on the role that prosecution witnesses played during each of the three 
featured trials. It builds on the findings of the Chapter Two, which showed how the 
prosecution attempted to lead the witnesses in particular ways to tell particular stories, 
looking more closely at how the witnesses responded to, worked with, and resisted the 
prosecutions attempts to cajole and constrain their accounts. In doing so it re–examines the 
idea of witness passivity during these processes. 
 
The chapter traces the witnesses’ interactions with the prosecution over the course of the trial. 
It begins by looking at the investigation stage and the role played by witnesses in 
constructing the prosecution’s framework before turning to the trial stage. This journey 
shows that the frameworks that emerged during each trial were actively constructed, and 
contested, by the witnesses. In fact, even during the trials, the witnesses had a role in 
(re)shaping not only the content and meaning of the trial’s narratives of violence, but also 
how the court approached evidence. The chapter also explores the RPF’s influence on the 
archive, particularly through their interventions that appeared motivated by a desire to protect 
the interests of victims, which captures another (albeit indirect) way that those that suffered 
as a result of the genocide influenced how the archive was constructed. As such, this chapter 
explores the extent to which the archive was constructed in the image of the witnesses and the 




Witnesses and the Courtroom 
 
Investigations and Indictments 
 
Scholars, such as Dembour, Haslem, and Franke, contend that during a trial the prosecution 
force particular narratives on the witnesses.1 However, this sits in tension with the important 
role played by witnesses in establishing those narrative frameworks in the first place. As 
Eltringham suggests, there is a need to consider the pre–trial function of the witnesses in 
generating the type of narrative structures considered in the previous chapter and in turn to 
see that witnesses’ in–trial testimony was essentially a re–performance of a script that had 
been (to greater or lesser extents) co–produced.2 It was first and foremost through the voices 
of the witnesses that the prosecution constructed their cases against the accused and witnesses 
played an important role in identifying what happened in each locality and who was 
responsible.3 These initial acts of testimony affected not only how individual trial narratives 
were constructed, but also shaped the prosecution’s understanding of the violence overall.4 
This became apparent during Cyangugu when the prosecution questioned one of their 
investigators:   
Prosecution: Now, can you tell this Court any common denominator you have 
established in the course of your inquiries as an investigator with the OTP? 
 
Witness [OTP investigator]: It gradually, perhaps, it goes to the background here, 
when we originally started doing investigations in various areas, we focused on 
geographical locations. So a team would go to Cyangugu, a team would go to 
Kibuye, a team may go to Butare, Gisenyi and so on. And those teams would simply 
                                                     
1 McEvoy and McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice’ (see Chap. One, n. 46). 
2 Eltringham, ‘We Are Not a Truth–commission’ (see Intro., n. 28), 65–7. 
3 Senior Investigator – ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (Arusha, Tanzania: June, 2015). 
4 Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR–96–10 (hereafter ICTR–96–10), ICTR–96–10A–0272, 
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take statements from witnesses, from victims and survivors as to what happened. It 
gradually emerged that there was, there was a pattern in the sense that you had a 
connection, as we have here, between the Government member, Mr. Ntagerura, and 
between the prefet, Mr. Bagambiki, between the military commander [...]. And 
[subsequent to follow–up investigations and], obviously, once our legal advisers had 
a chance to see these various connections, [this led to the] kind of situation, as we 
have now, where various people were indicted together.5 
 
This model of genocide governance, whereby national was connected to local and the various 
organs of state were brought together, became the prosecution’s framework that was 
deployed at each trial, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
This relationship between the witnesses and the OTP in the co–construction of a trial’s 
narratives was also evidenced in the apparent ‘script’ that was performed during the trials. 
This was most clearly seen in the counsels’ interjections when a witness skipped ahead of a 
crucial aspect of their account, essentially directing them to ‘get their lines right’ and tell the 
full story:  
Witness: […] after he told me that people began to be killed here in this courtyard. 
Prosecution: Before we get to the killing, after he said this to you did Akayesu call 
for Etienne? 
Witness: Yes. He called that person.6 
 
This is not, however, to claim that the witnesses’ influence within the initial investigations 
was boundless. As Campbell has argued, the potential of a witness’s testimony was always 
already limited by the legal frameworks at play and the need for these testimonies to speak of 
a crime that was recognised as such by the Tribunal under its mandate.7 The investigators, 
then, did not enter these encounters blindly, but were influenced by prosecution strategies 
                                                     
5 Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR–99–46 (hereafter ICTR–99–46), TRA000209, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 20/09/2000, 20/09/2000, 94–6.  
6 Prosecutor v. Jean–Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR–96–4 (hereafter ICTR–96–4), CONTRA001176, Akayesu – 
Transcript of 10/1/1997, 10/01/1997, 51. For another example see, ICTR–99–46, TRA000131/1, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 21/11/2000, 21/11/2000, 99. 
7 Campbell, ‘The Laws of Memory’ (see Intro., n. 33), 251–3. 
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that were structured by the Tribunal’s statute and also by information about the violence that 
had been provided by reports from the UN—such as those by the Expert Commission and the 
Special Rapporteur—Human Rights organisations, and the RPF.8 Combined, this gave the 
investigators an indication of what had occurred and what type of evidence they should be 
looking for, and consequently it also excluded some evidence from the outset.9 For instance, 
the temporal jurisdiction meant that there were to be no investigations into (and therefore no 
accounts of) the RPF’s violations of international law in Rwanda that occurred after 1994.  
 
Evidence of the effects of these constraints became particularly apparent at moments during 
the trials when the prosecution defended their witnesses against the defence’s accusations that 
their in–court testimony was different from that contained in their witness statement. 
Witnesses often responded that they had not been asked questions about certain matters by 
the investigators but were using the opportunity of a court appearance to add to their 
account.10 During Cyangugu, in order to protect against these allegations, the prosecution 
called one of their investigators as a witness. The investigator explained that whereas Witness 
LAM had mentioned Bagambiki during the trial, he would not have done so during the initial 
investigations:  
In this case it is notable that the witness statement was taken in 1997 when the 
Prosecutor was investigating military involvement in the genocide in Cyangugu, and 
it was taken before Bagambiki was arrested.11 
 
                                                     
8 S/1994/1125, Preliminary Report of the independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with 
Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 04/10/1994, 9–17; E/CN.4/1995/7, Question of the Violation of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other 
Dependent Countries and Territories: Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. R. 
Degni–Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 of Commission 
Resolution E/CN.4/S–3/1 of 25 May 1994, 28/06/1994, 7–8; S/PV.3400, 3400th Meeting, 01/07/1994, 4–6, and 
8–10; and Senior Investigator (2015). 
9 Appeals Attorney 2 (2015). 
10 ICTR–99–46, TRA000217/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/10/2000, 
24/10/2000, 16 and 38; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000438/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript 
of 21/02/2001, 21/02/2001, 44. 
11 ICTR–99–46, TRA000409/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 07/05/2001, 
07/05/2001, 56.  
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On one occasion the defence even called a prosecution investigator as a witness in order to 
put questions about a shift in a prosecution witness’s testimony. Similarly, the investigator 
responded:  
 
I found a name which suggested to me -- and this was LAB. And I thought if I 
spoke to him -- I had gone actually to find out about what had happened at the 
stadium. And so my intention was to find prisoners in the prison, talk to them and 
see whether there was any good information I could get about the stadium. So, 
before I left Kigali, I had this name at the back of my mind and, therefore, I wanted 
to just find out. So, I --when I was sure I had gotten this person, I began to talk with 
him and to check whether I could get anything about what I wanted. But I realised 
that this person, LAB, was only talking about events of the factory which I was not 




This clearly demonstrates that the investigations limited what a witness would testify to and, 
moreover, that a witness’s testimony would change as the prosecution’s investigation 
strategy changed.13  
 
Another important issue in this respect was the general quality of the initial investigations.14 
Investigations were often poorly conducted with insufficient awareness of the: crimes that 
had been committed; cultural specificity or the historical background of Rwanda; applicable 
law; nor with the sensitivity that was warranted.15 As has been noted, this undoubtedly 
                                                     
12  ICTR–99–46, TRA001616/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 26/03/2002, 
26/03/2002, 18–9.  
13 This encounter is also referring to a subsequent investigation phase where the Tribunal shifted from 
investigating the crimes regionally in order to focus on institutions and then particular individuals. As this 
suggests, over time the space within which the witnesses could influence the investigations decreased. Senior 
Investigator (2015). 
14 Deputy Appeals Chief (2015). 
15 E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission Alternative 
Approaches and Ways and Means within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy Addendum Report of the Mission to Rwanda on the 
Issues of Violence Against Women in Situations of Armed Conflict, 04/02/1998, 12–8; and A/51/789, Financing 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring 
States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report of the Secretary–General on the Activities of the 
office of internal Oversight Services, 06/02/1997, 2–3 and 17–20. ‘In addition, legal officers assigned to the 
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affected the quality of some of the pre-trial statements, at least in terms of the legal value of 
these statements.16  
 
From the perspective of the archive, however, it is difficult to assess how this impacted on the 
witnesses’ ability to determine what information was produced due to the inaccessible nature 
of the witnesses’ pre–trial statements. On the one hand it seems that the insensitivity of the 
prosecution’s approach might have made witnesses feel uncomfortable in disclosing 
information to the investigators, and this was certainly true of witnesses testifying to the 
occurrence of sexual violence once the Tribunal took steps to investigate this crime.17 This 
approach also meant that some witnesses refused to cooperate with the OTP.18 A witness 
from Cyangugu noted their anger at the investigation team’s behaviour as they approached 
them whilst they were burying the dead: ‘We were preparing to bury our loved ones, and [the 
investigators] were taking photographs without showing any respect for the dead. We finally 
showed them how furious we were.’19 On the other hand the investigators’ inexperience 
might have afforded the witnesses greater space to influence the process. Indeed, when these 
investigations are criticised it is often because they produced evidence that lacked the rigour 
and specificity required to easily defend their credibility in court.20 Whilst legally of less 
value, from the perspective of the archive it would appear as though there were at least some 
                                                                                                                                                                     
investigation teams, with one exception, had little or no experience in criminal investigations; yet they were 
charged with the task of advising the investigators on how to proceed to collect sufficient evidence, as well as 
drafting and defending the indictments. This process has been corrected by the current Prosecutor. A rigorous 
review process for all indictments in both Tribunals is now in effect.’ (p. 18). It needs to be born in mind that 
this was three years after the investigations had begun. Senior Appeals Attorney (2015). See also Appeals 
Attorney – ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (Arusha, Tanzania: June, 2015); Appeals Attorney 2 (2015); Head of 
Appeals (2015); and Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (2015). 
16 Head of Appeals (2015); Senior Appeals Attorney (2015). 
17 African Rights and Redress, Survivors and Post–Genocide Justice in Rwanda: Their Experiences, 
Perspectives and Hopes (November 2008), (see Internet Materials list), 64. This is not to blame the witnesses. 
These types of comments often get too close to suggesting that this was the witnesses’ fault for not saying what 
happened. This is, rather, to criticise, once again, the investigation’s failure to approach this in a way that 
enabled the witnesses to testify to the crimes they suffered in full.  
18 Senior Appeals Attorney (2015). 
19 Supra note 17, 58. Another witness from Cyangugu specifically noted the poor quality of the investigations 
and the lack of faith this meant they had on the Tribunal. (p. 64 and p. 67). 
20 Senior Appeals Attorney (2015); Appeals Attorney 2 (2015); and Head of Appeals (2015). 
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instances when witnesses were given too much scope to tell their stories and therefore to 
determine the content of the archive.21 Moreover, as will be explored more below, where 
investigations limited the scope of testimony prior to the trial, this did not mean that the 
witnesses could not expand upon this when on the witness stand. Consequently, it is 
important to retain the notion of co–construction, with the witnesses working within the rules 
of the apparatus in order to produce the narrative frameworks that governed the trials. 
 
Two important examples further demonstrate the witnesses’ significant role in influencing the 
OTP’s investigation strategy and therefore what frameworks were operating within the trials. 
The first was the influence of two witnesses in Akayesu who brought the widespread and 
systematic nature of rape during the genocide to the Tribunal’s attention, which, along with 
pressure from external actors, resulted in the creation of a special sexual violence 
investigative unit and a new investigative policy that (at least on the surface) meant that 
sexual violence crimes could become integrated into the OTP’s cases.22 Second, changes 
within Rwanda at around the turn of the century, including the advent of Gacaca and the 
increased pace of domestic trials, meant that perpetrators became increasingly willing to act 
as prosecution witnesses at the ICTR because they had already been legally processed 
domestically and so no longer faced the danger of potentially incriminating themselves whilst 
testifying to crimes they had participated in. This also resulted in a shift in the prosecution’s 
investigation strategy as they began to rely on ‘insider’ or ‘accomplice’ witnesses, rather than 
victim witnesses, which fundamentally altered what types of accounts were created, and from 
which vantage point these were told, as the episodes of violence would now be narrated from 
                                                     
21 Head of Appeals (2015); and Deputy Appeals Chief (2015). 
22 E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1, 12–3; ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0272, Ntagerura – Prosecutor Request for Leave 
to File an Amended Indictment, 02/12/1999, 12; and A/53/429, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 
1994, 23/09/1998, 9–10. 
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the position of the attackers.23 This additionally meant that the prosecution could connect the 
leaders and organisers of the genocide to the acts of violence committed on the ground,24 
which also resulted in an increased use of superior responsibility (6(3)) charges at the 
ICTR.25 
 
As such, whilst witnesses played within the rules of the courtroom, they nonetheless played a 
significant role in the pre–trial process, where they influenced both which frameworks drawn 
on at each trial and the OTP’s strategy as a whole. Whilst this already brings the idea of 
witness passivity into doubt, even stronger evidence of the witnesses’ agency materialised 
during the trial stage itself. 
 
Contesting the Framework 
 
Trials are often presented as processes that silence witnesses, due to a clash of interests 
between the witnesses desire to tell their story and the courts need for a legal story.26 This 
sentiment was also expressed to me in a number of the interviews I conducted, where there 
was a sense that in some instances there was a tension between the court’s and witnesses’ 
                                                     
23 Senior Investigator (2015). Other external factors that affected the investigations included the ongoing 
conflict in Zaire which meant that some regions were considered too dangerous for investigations to occur. 
ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0006, Ntagerura – Request for Extension of Detention, 18/06/1996, 6; ICTR–97–
36, ICTR–97–36–00189, Bagambiki – Audio Recording of 08/09/97 – AM, 08/09/1997; and ICTR–99–46, 
TRA000434/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 14/02/2001, 14/02/2001, 30. 
24 A similar impact was seen with Kambanda’s and Serushago’s guilty plea testimony, which provided firm 
evidence of the existence of a conspiracy. ICTR–99–46–0001, Prosecutor’s Motion for Joinder of the Accused 
(Ntagerura, ICTR–96–10A–T0, Bagambiki ICTR–97–36–T, Imanishimwe ICTR–97–36–I, and Munyakazi 
ICTR–97–36–I), 02/04/1999, 3. 
25 Senior Investigator (2015). The potential impact of this on the prosecution’s trial strategy was seen in the 
changes that the prosecution made to its witness list in Cyangugu. When the trial began in 2001, of 41 witnesses 
called only ten had been included in the initial witness list submitted in 1997. Tellingly, the majority of those 
called during the trial were ‘insider witnesses’ who had not been accessible during the initial investigations. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002960, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 06/02/2006 – Appeals 
Hearing, 06/02/2006, 73–4. 
26 Dixon and Tenove, ‘International Criminal Justice’ (see Intro., n. 43). 
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needs.27 Whilst I am not discounting the importance of this (as will be discussed shortly), 
when analysing the trial transcripts, it became apparent—particularly with the Akayesu 
transcripts—that, even after the trials began, the witnesses remained able to contest and 
expand the trial frameworks produced in the build–up to the trials. For example, during 
Akayesu, whilst testifying to other crimes contained within the indictment, two witnesses, 
Witness J and Witness H, testified to the occurrence of rape within the Taba commune. 
Witness J testified that her six–year–old child had been raped, whilst Witness H testified how 
she herself had been raped.28 These narratives sat uneasily within the courtroom at this point 
of the trial due to absence of sexual violence charges in the indictment. This meant that the 
defence had not been pre–warned of the witnesses’ incriminating testimony, which 
consequently undermined their right to a fair trial. However, the testimony along with an 
amicus curie from a human rights organisation, and the presence of Judge Pillay on the 
bench—a particularly attentive judge to these issues29—led the prosecution to introduce six 
new counts relating to sexual violence in an amended indictment.30 The judges, despite the 
fact that the prosecution’s case had effectively come to a close, accepted this new indictment 
and as a result a further five witnesses were called to testify, and the chambers consequently 
found that rape had occurred in Taba, and that it was part of the genocide.31  
 
The ramifications of this went beyond the trial itself as it opened up a cleared pathway for 
sexual violence charges to be included in other cases and for other witnesses to testify to its 
                                                     
27 Member of the ICTR Victim and Witness Support Section – (Arusha, Tanzania: June, 2015); and Senior 
Reviser – ICTR Registry (Arusha, Tanzania: June, 2015). 
28 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001186, Akayesu – Transcript of 27/1/1997, 27/01/1997, 101–2; and ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001195, Akayesu – Transcript of 6/3/1997, 06/03/1997, 106–7. 
29 Appeals Judge (2016). 
30 ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0183, Akayesu – Amicus Brief Respecting Amendment of the Indictment and 
Supplementation of the Evidence to Ensure the Prosecution of Rape and Other Sexual Violence within the 
Competence of the Tribunal, 28/05/1997; Moore, ‘the Story a UN Court Didn’t want Three Rape Survivors to 
Tell’; and ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001212, Akayesu – Transcript of 17/6/1997 – Motion, 17/06/1997, 8–12. 
31  Estelle Dehon (discussant), ICTR Legacy Symposium.   
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occurrence. As noted above, soon after Witness H’s and Witness J’s testimonies, a special 
investigation unit tasked solely with investigating sexual violence crimes was created.32 It 
must be stressed, however, that this testimony still maintained a legal quality and value. Even 
here the shift was only possible because Witnesses J and H captured an incident that was 
recognisable as a crime and could then be linked to the accused. It was notable that one of the 
prosecution’s explanations for why these charges were not brought about earlier was that they 
did not (until Witnesses H’s and J’s testimony) have sufficient evidence to link the 
perpetration of sexual violence crimes to Akayesu.33 Again, then, the idea of co–construction 
becomes important. 
 
Further evidence of the witnesses’ ability to (re)shape the prosecution’s framework was seen 
in other instances when the witness testimony exceeded the boundaries of the indictment. 
This often occurred despite the defence’s attempts to prevent these accounts from entering 
the courtroom. The defence’s objections failed when the judges found that whilst the 
witnesses’ allegations did not directly speak to one of the charges in the indictment, they 
were related to it sufficiently not to endanger the defendants’ rights to a fair trial. For 
instance, on one occasion during Cyangugu when the defence attempted to exclude evidence 
about a weapons–drop that Bagambiki and Ntagerura participated in, the judges responded:  
Mr President: Mr. Henry [defence counsel for Ntagerura], isn't there a distinction 
between a situation where there is no charge in the indictment and facts to be led to 
establish that charge, as against a situation where there is a charge in the indictment, 
and then facts to be led to establish that charge’34 
 
And subsequently: 
                                                     
32Also, importantly, Witness J noted in her testimony that she was never asked about the rape of her daughter. 
CONTRA001186, 102; ICTR–96–10A–0272, 12; A/53/429; and E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1. 
33 Senior Investigator (2015). 




Mr President: In paragraph 13 of the indictment there is some reference to arms and 
ammunition being distributed. 
Granted that this is not in Cyangugu proper with regard to the facts, but as part of 
the process of continuing acts. And in those circumstances we will overrule the 
objection, and we’ll allow the evidence to be led.35 
 
Similarly, the defence during Cyangugu and Gatete also tried to exclude witnesses’ evidence 
on the grounds that it contained information that exceeded the parameters of their pre–trial 
statements and therefore violated the rights of the defendant. On a number of occasions, 
however, these contentions failed, and the judges allowed the evidence to be heard. When, for 
example, the defence objected repeatedly to the Witness NL’s unplanned testimony that he 
had witnessed a meeting in 1993, the judges responded variously: 
Mr President: I would like to recall that what your Chamber several times explained 
to the Defence; that is, a witness statement cannot contain everything, no rule of 
procedure obliges an investigation to make sure that the witness says everything, 




Mr President: In addition to that, we have Rule 89, General Provisions, which says 
that ‘The Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have some 
probative value’.37  
 
Significantly the judges not only ruled that evidence was permissible under the current 
jurisprudence, but also utilised the broader provisions of Rule 89(C)—that ‘a Chamber may 
admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value’—in order to bring the 
matter to a complete close, suggesting that the chambers’ were, at least at this point, disposed 
                                                     
35 Ibid., 18–9. For other examples of where evidence was led despite it being claimed by the defence that the 
acts were not explicitly contained within the indictment see: ICTR–99–46, TRA000750/01, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 06/06/2001, 06/06/2001, 79–85; TRA000404/01, 11/09/2001, 7–20; 
and ICTR–99–46, TRA000324/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 04/03/2002 – Motion, 
04/03/2002, 69–70. 
36 TRA000438/1, 27.  
37 Ibid., 31. In another particularly clear example of this a witness who was only scheduled to testify to an 
exhumation ended up testifying to a story about the extraction of his father from Karamapaka stadium at the 
orders of Bagambiki, noting that this was the last time that he had seen him before seeing his body exhumed.  
What is more, unlike the examples detailed below, this evidence was clearly led by the prosecution. ICTR–99–
46, TRA000533/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 14/05/2001, 14/05/2001, 69–73. 
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towards letting in as much of the witnesses’ evidence as possible.38 This also shows that there 
was an accepted untameable quality about witness testimony, which meant that more space 
had to be provided for witnesses to testify during the trial, and that witnesses were not to be 
restricted to the evidence provided during the investigations. This implicitly underlined a 
similar argument utilised by the prosecution in order to rebut the defences’ objection over this 
issue during Gatete: 
Prosecution: Madam President, Your Honours. My response is, this is information 
which has just come out in evidence. We did not—prior to today—know about this 
[...]. 
Judge Muthoga: Counsel for the Prosecution has said it is not something she 
planned to put to you so that she could give you notice. She didn't know it herself 
[…]. It has come spontaneously from the witness.39 
 
Even when the defence intervened again to argue that the testimony was ‘prejudicial’ the 
judges responded:  
Mr President: You can't stop the witness. You can't prevent the witness from giving 
answers. 
[…] 
Witness: I must say this. When I was interviewed, I did not provide these details. I 
answered the questions as they were put to me and as they are being put to me here 
before the Chamber.40 
 
As noted above, the courtroom could provide witnesses with the chance to tell aspects of their 
stories that they had previously been prevented from declaring. This was often the case 
because the investigative priorities, as discussed above, restrained what they were asked 
                                                     
38 See also Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61 (hereafter ICTR–00–61), ICTR–00–61, 
TRA001643/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 20/10/2009, 20/10/2009, 15–6. 
39 ICTR–00–61, TRA005458, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 22/10/2009, 22/10/2009, 39–40. ‘Mr President: 
Madam Poulain, the Court can't prevent the witness giving the answer. He cannot be restricted to answer the 
question in a particular way or not to answer in a particular way. This, again, is something which came from the 
witness. And as to the distribution of weapons and guns, it is in the –– it is an allegation against the Accused in 
the indictment. But, anyway, while we hear the evidence of this witness we will keep your objection in our 
minds.’ ICTR–00–61, TRA005461, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 13/11/2009, 13/11/2009, 15. See also, 
CONTRA018137, Gatete – Redacted Transcript 04/11/2009, 04/11/2009, 42; and ICTR–00–61, TRA005507/2, 
Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 10/11/2009, 10/11/2009, 56. 
40 TRA005458, 43. 
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about during pre–trial statements and also because time and resource constraints meant that 
these initial exchanges were often relatively brief. As such, what was a pre–trial statement 
that might only consist of a handful of notes (which might be either verbatim testimony or a 
summary of the statement) could turn into a lengthy testimony once the witness took to the 
stand. One former investigator noted an instance when a pre–trial statement of three pages 
became an in–court testimony that took up a whole trial session (about fifteen days).41 The 
ability for the witnesses to shape the contours of the court’s narrative did not stop, then, at the 





This section will look at how (and reasons why) witnesses also maintained a degree of 
control over the meaning of the violence within their testimony as they pushed back against 
both the apparatus’ construction of particular ideas about victimhood and perpetratorhood 
and its attempts to extract what was generalisable about their experience, which is something 
that Akhavan argues is fundamental to how law functions.42  
 
Within the witnesses’ testimonies, the narrative tropes of resistance and survival, for instance, 
pushed back against the notion of the inherent passivity of victimhood. This appears first of 
all in the accounts that documented the victims’ resistance against the attackers in those 
                                                     
41 Senior Investigator (2015). 
42 Akhavan, Reducing Genocide to Law (see Intro., n. 71), 174. 
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places they had sought refuge.43 This resistance was often only overcome after the local 
authorities intervened with reinforcements for attackers, as occurred in Mukarange Parish, 
Kibungo, when Gatete provided grenades to the attackers, and Nyange Parish, Kibuye, where 
local officials resorted to destroying the church completely with the refugees inside after they 
determined this was the only way to overcome the refugees’ resistance.44 Resistance came in 
other forms also: during Akayesu Witness N testified how she continued to withhold 
information about the location of Alexia (her daughter–in–law) despite Akayesu torturing 
her.45 Despite having been beaten on multiple times, Witness N told Akayesu, ‘if you 
continue hitting me with all the strength that it left in me I will bite you with my teeth.’46 
After this, Akayesu and the Interahamwe he was with stopped questioning her. These 
examples show that being a victim did not necessarily signify passivity. 
 
The second manner in which narratives of survival and resistance materialised was in the 
symbolism attached to the act of testifying itself. By giving a voice to the victimised groups 
these acts of testimony defied the attempt to wipe out all traces of that particular group.47 
Here, moreover, the witnesses’ testimony had the potential to produce the circumstances 
whereby an accused’s action was seen as criminal and therefore punishable, and as such 
afforded them a chance to invert the power dynamics of the violence. A particularly powerful 
example of this was when the witnesses’ testimony captured the accused’s voice, such as 
Witness JJ’s aforementioned evidence that Akayesu, having authorised the mass rape of 
                                                     
43 ICTR–99–46, TRA001796/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 23/10/2002, 
23/10/2002, 9–11; ICTR–99–46, TRA000122/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
09/10/2000, 09/10/2000, 13–34; and TRA005458, 46–8. 
44 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0240/1, Gatete – Judgement and Sentence, 31/03/2011, 4, 9 and 90; and 
Prosecutor v Grégoire Ndahimana, Case No. ICTR–01–68, Trial Judgement, 30/12/2001), 143–53.  
45 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001183, Akayesu – Transcript of 15/1/1997, 15/01/1997, 106–19.  
46 Ibid., 115–6. 
47 Felman, ‘Fire in the Archive’, 50–1. 
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women at the bureau communal, uttered the words, ‘Never ask me again what a Tutsi tastes 
like.’48 
 
The inversion of the genocide’s power dynamics was particularly apparent during Witness 
N’s testimony in Akayesu. Importantly at this point in the trial the judges permitted Akayesu 
to personally cross–examine the witnesses whilst they rendered a decision on his request to 
change defence counsel for a second time. Here, Witness N was in no doubt of Akayesu’s 
responsibility for her suffering: 
Mr President: As regards the death of these people, did you see this, did you witness 
their death, or did you hear that these people had been killed by Akayesu, or are you 
just deducing this based on the fact that they were taken away by Akayesu? There 
are three scenarios here. 
The Witness: Ask [Akayesu] where he took them. I maintain that he is the one who 
killed them. I will persist in saying that he is the one who killed them. I have not 
seen them since he took them away. (Emphasis added.)49 
 
This tension peaked when Akayesu cross–examined Witness N directly:  
Akayesu: You said that the only time Akayesu came to your house he killed and 
went back. Who did he kill? 
The Witness: You started by killing Ntereye, after that you killed his wife Alexia. In 
fact, you killed the entire Ntereye family on that same day. (Emphasis added.)50  
 
The witness’s accusations were incessant, and every time she mentioned a crime or violent 
act she stated that ‘you’ (i.e., Akayesu) was responsible for it.51 This also challenged the 
                                                     
48 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001222, Akayesu – Transcript of 23/10/1997, 23/10/1997, 77. Another particularly 
good example of this was Witness C’s testimony that he had heard Akayesu say, ‘I do not think that what we are 
doing is proper. We are going to have to pay for this blood that is being shed.’ TRA001178, Akayesu – 
Transcript of 14/1/1997, 14/01/1997, 154.  
 Prosecution: You confirm that you did not see Akayesu kill?  
Witness: That depends on what you call kill, because if Akayesu had wanted to, nobody would have 
been killed.  
Prosecution: Well, I am asking you a question. Please answer the question the Tribunal is asking. Did 
you see Akayesu kill a person with his own hands? I want to be clear on this?  
 Witness: No, he had killed by orders.  
ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001180, Akayesu – Transcript of 22/1/1997, 22/01/1997, 149. 
49 CONTRA001183, 132–3.  
50 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001184, Akayesu – Transcript of 16/1/1997, 16/01/1997, 4.  
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notion that the courts produced generalised accounts of violence that were abstracted to the 
point of irrelevance for the witnesses; the witness here was very much aware of who they felt 
was responsible for what they experienced within their locality.  
 
As this suggests, witnesses detailed specific episodes of violence that had fundamentally 
affected them and their lives, which defied any notion of a universal victim experience. For 
some of these witnesses the violence suffered and survived was worse than dying, or a 
disembodied moment of unimaginable trauma; for others, the inflicted injuries still affected 
their lives in the present; and for others still the final moments before a massacre were 
moments of religious reflection.52 It was even possible for the court to accept two distinct 
understandings of the same episode of violence by different witnesses. In the following 
examples witnesses variously described the refugees singing a death march as they were 
forced out of the church in order to be murdered as both a final act of resistance or of 
humiliation. 
The Interahamwe got us out of the church. They asked the refugees to get out of the 
church. Some refugees were saying that we should accept to be killed inside the 
church whereas others had accepted to go out in order to be killed outside the 
church. So we linked hands and went out of the church singing the song, ‘We Were 
Created to Go to Heaven’.53 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
51 See the whole of this exchange: Ibid., 4–52. Another example is:  
 Prosecution: And can you tell the Judges how you knew Jean–Baptiste Gatete?  
Witness: I know him. I know him in particular, because during the war of 1994, he attacked us and 
exterminated members of our families. He attacked us in the churches where we had sought refuge and 
in other places. Many people were killed. So those are the circumstances in which I know him. I know 
him as a result of his acts. 
ICTR–00–61, TRA005459, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 05/11/2009, 05/11/2009, 14. See also, 
CONTRA018137, 49; and TRA005507/2, 60. See also CONTRA001176, 54; and CONTRA001178, 154. 
52 ‘Prosecution: [W]hat was going through your mind, Witness?   
Witness: I cannot describe exactly what was going on in my mind. I thought I was going to die. But it 
was not just ordinary death, it was as if the hair was breaking loose on us. It was the end of the world to 
us. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA000218/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 25/10/2000, 25/10/2000, 
74. See also: CONTRA001183, 119; ICTR–00–61, TRA005158/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 17/03/2010, 
17/03/2010, 63; TRA001643/1, 23–4; and CONTRA001222, 59–62. 
53 ICTR–00–61, TRA005490/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 21/10/2009, 21/10/2009, 56.  
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In another trial: 
When I came back inside the church with my children, shortly thereafter, I believe 
it was around 10 a.m., I went near the altar, then I saw soldiers enter the church 
and people started going out. A soldier asked us to sing the funeral dirge which 
was titled ‘We were created to go to heaven.’ When we started singing that song, 
the soldiers made us get out of the church and brought us to the courtyard.54 
 
The witnesses’ ability to retain a sense of the meaning of the violence was also shown 
through the important role that the local context played within the witnesses’ description of 
what occurred, which again challenged the idea that these courts produced deontological 
accounts of violence that ignored the local specificity of the violence.55 One way that the 
local was brought into testimony was through witnesses declaring that they had known the 
attackers prior to the genocide, with the personal and intimate nature of the violence strongly 
emphasised. 
Prosecution: What was the composition of the attackers?  
 
Witness: We were being attacked by Hutus, people that we knew, people who 
were our neighbours with whom we had been living up till that point.56 
 
 
Witness NN, for example, spoke of how the person that raped her told her just before 
assaulting her that whilst she had rejected him before the war she now could not, which 
captured both the locally situated nature of the violence and also the centrality of patriarchal 
structures in enabling this violence to take place.57 In other instances prior encounters could 
lead to survival. During Gatete a witness recalled how, after regaining consciousness in a 
mass grave, an Interahamwe saw that she was alive, recognised her, and took her out of the 
pit to his home.58 Witness PP noted how the persons that came to kill her stopped when an 
Interahamwe, Rafiki, recognised her as someone that had been kind to him in the past 
                                                     
54 TRA005458, 5.   
55 Fink, ‘Deontological Retributivism’ (see Intro., n. 71). 
56  TRA000218/1, 62; CONTRA001222, 20; and ICTR–00–61, TRA005491/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 
03/11/2009, 03/11/2009, 16.  
57 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001227, Akayesu – Transcript of 3/11/1997, 03/11/1997, 20. 
58 TRA005458, 8. 
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because she had given him a sandwich.59 Nevertheless, Rafiki subsequently kept Witness NN 
captive for days on end during which time he repeatedly raped her.60  
 
As this also suggests, the witnesses’ testimony also presented different understandings of 
what it meant at to be a perpetrator during the genocide, as the above examples show that 
‘perpetrators’ could also be ‘saviours’ and ‘resisters’. This was especially the case after the 
prosecution turned to perpetrator witnesses in the early 2000s, which introduced the 
possibility that formerly concealed elements of the genocide (such as the planning of the 
violence) could come into view. This captured the myriad ways and reasons that people came 
to participate in the killing. There were acts of testimony that showed that witnesses 
participated out of a sense of obligation, noting the work–like nature of the violence,61 or that 
the violence was a service to the community.62 Elsewhere, witnesses described participating 
in the genocide as simply a way to make money.63 Other witnesses suggested that violence 
committed as part of the genocide became something that was legal; its extremity became the 
‘new normal’: 
Prosecution: Mr. Witness, I'm still interested in this meeting with Félicien, when he 
gives you instructions to kill. When he told you that, you knew that killing was a 
crime; right?  
 
Witness: I knew that killing was a crime, but after Habyarimana was killed, no one 
considered killing to be a crime. It is only later that I confessed to the crimes that I 
committed and asked for forgiveness. But at the beginning of the events, I did not 
consider killing to be a crime. 
 
Prosecution: And you considered that killing was not a crime because you were told 
by the authorities to go and kill.  
 
Witness: Yes. That is correct.  
                                                     
59 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001205, Akayesu – Transcript of 4/11/1997, 04/11/1997, 141.  
60 CONTRA001227, 46–7. 
61 See also, ICTR–00–61, TRA005152/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 08/03/2010, 08/03/2010, 64. 
62 During another testimony, a witness similarly noted the communal nature of the violence, as represented by 
the killing and eating of cows after participating in the violence. CONTRA001178, 107. 
63 ICTR–99–46, TRA000126/02, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 23/10/2000, 




Prosecution: So you considered that you were acting in compliance with the 
directions of the local authorities.  
 
Witness: Yes. That is correct, because that's what happened.  
 
Prosecution: And you wouldn't have killed, except for the fact that you were told.  
 
Witness: If I had not been—if I had not been given the orders to kill, I would not 
have killed anyone.’64 
 
This is not to say that this worked against the prosecution’s legal interests nor undermined 
the legal value of the testimony. The exchange above, which notes the authorities’ 
involvement, helped to establish the local authorities’ (such as Gatete) responsibility for the 
violence and as such advanced the prosecution’s case.65 This type of testimony could also 
counter the defence’s contention that a witness’s perpetrator status meant that their credibility 
should automatically be suspected as this helped to contextualise their reasons for 
participation, and so challenged the idea that they were sadistic killers that could not be 
trusted (a common line of argument pursued by the defence).66 The same was true for the 
victims’ narratives noted above, whereby as long as the legal criteria were also met there was 
nothing detrimental about these fuller accounts of the violence. In many respects this made 
the testimony more compelling and therefore increased its probative value. The most 
pertinent example of potential overlap here was, again, the symbolism attached to the 
witnesses capturing the accused words—such as ‘Never ask me again what a Tutsi tastes 
like’—and the legal role that this played in establishing the accused’s intent.  
 
 
                                                     
64 TRA005152/1, 85. 
65 Indeed, this type of thicker narrative nearly always seemed to serve an additional legal purpose.  
66 See for example, ICTR–99–46, TRA002063/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 





In addition to ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ witnesses, ‘expert’ witnesses also played a 
significant role in the ICTR’s trials.67 Expert witnesses influenced the trial process in two 
ways during the trials examined here. First, they provided evidence that helped the court 
understand what happened in Rwanda. Second, they influenced how the court should 
interpret the evidence being presented.68  
 
The best example of the first type of expert was Alison Des Forges, who featured 
prominently in almost all of the early trials as an expert witness and also helped advise the 
prosecution more generally on their strategy.69 She testified in Akayesu and her importance 
was evident by the fact that her testimony lasted for eight trial days (eight times as long as 
any other witness’s testimony) as she provided a history of Rwanda, beginning in the pre–
colonial era and continuing all the way through to the genocide itself.70 This was extremely 
detailed testimony, which at points was more like a lecture than an in-court act of testimony 
as Des Forges spoke almost completely uninterrupted for hours at a time. This testimony 
provided the main content for the judgement’s historical context section in Akayesu and most 
subsequent trials and was also key in the judge’s determination that what occurred in Rwanda 
was not a mindless outpouring of violence but, rather, genocide.71  
                                                     
67 For additional discussion of expert witnesses see Intro., n. 31. 
68 Eltringham, ‘Illuminating the broader context’, 350. 
69 Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor 2 (2015). 
70 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001199, Akayesu – Transcript of 11/2/1997, 11/02/1997; ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001200, Akayesu – Transcript of 12/2/1997, 12/02/1997; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001191, Akayesu – 
Transcript of 13/2/1997, 13/02/1997; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001192, Akayesu – Transcript of 14/2/1997, 
14/02/1997; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001193, Akayesu – Transcript of 18/2/1997, 18/02/1997; ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001209, Akayesu – Transcript of 22/5/1997, 22/05/1997; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001210, Akayesu – 
Transcript of 23/5/1997, 23/05/1997; and ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001211, Akayesu – Transcript of 24/5/1997, 
24/05/1997. 
71 ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0459/1, Akayesu – Judgement, 02/09/1998, 27–39. 
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More specifically, Des Forges also provided a framework through which Akayesu’s actions 
made sense, as her narrative of the history of Rwanda (especially its political history) was 
framed in a way that to a great extent overlapped with the prosecution’s explanation of how 
Akayesu came to be involved in the genocide. Des Forges’ detailed testimony captured the 
historic use of violence against Tutsis, as a means to secure local patronage, and the 
importance of the shifting political landscape in Rwanda to understand the genocide—both 
crucial in the prosecution’s account of Akayesu’s path to the genocide.72 In particular Des 
Forge highlighted the significance of the introduction of multiparty politics, the growth of the 
MDR party (Akayesu’s party) as the main opposition to the MRND, and the use of ethno–
nationalism by Hutu extremists as a tool to unify what was a fractured political landscape 
around a common cause: genocide against the Tutsi and the eradication of all dissident 
voices.73 This testimony explained why Akayesu, as a member of the opposition party, would 
resist the violence in the first weeks of the genocide (as previously discussed) and then 
become a willing participant when the interim government called, on 18 April, for a cross–
party alliance in order for all of those in positions of privilege to retain political power by 
executing a genocidal policy nationwide against all those that threatened the status quo. 
Through Des Forges the genocide in Taba became a microcosm of the genocide at a national 
level.74 
 
The second type of expert witness that featured in Akayesu was brought in to explain 
Rwandan culture, both to help with the courts understanding of the violence, but also to assist 
                                                     
72 CONTRA001200, 42–4. 
73 CONTRA001191, 24–8, 121–4 and 132–4; and CONTRA001193, 59–60 and 101–3. 
74 This type of testimony was also seen during Cyangugu, as Professor Guichaoua testified as an expert witness, 
he not only provided a similar framework through which the violence could be understood, but even more 
explicitly detailed the guilt of the accused. ICTR–99–46, TRA000543/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 19/09/2001, 19/09/2001, 47; ICTR–99–46, TRA000546/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et 
al – Redacted Transcript of 20/09/2001, 20/09/2001; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001774/1, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/09/2001, 24/09/2001. 
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the court with how it should interpret Rwandan witnesses’ testimony. The OTP thought this 
important in order to address a number of difficulties that the witnesses’ testimonies had 
created because of how the Rwandan witnesses responded to questions. Particularly 
problematic was the witnesses’ evasive style of answering and difficulties in ascertaining the 
source of the witnesses’ knowledge, as the witnesses often seemed to confuse what they had 
heard (i.e., hearsay evidence) and seen.75 As such, a Rwandese cultural and linguistic expert, 
Professor Mathias Ruzindana, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Rwanda, was 
called to explain some of these ‘idiosyncrasies’.76 His testimony explained that Rwandan’s 
often changed their way of speaking depending on who they were speaking to, and that the 
way in which the court proceeded was alien to many Rwandans and could lead to seemingly 
uncooperative responses by witnesses to the counsels’ questions.77 He also stated that, 
because Rwandan society was rooted in an oral culture, witnesses did not always distinguish 
between what they saw and heard. Whilst they could distinguish the difference, the court 
would need to ask specifically about the source of their information if they wished to be sure 
of this.78  
 
Ruzindana also helped the prosecution to overcome a number of difficulties it was 
experiencing in getting the witnesses to explain the meaning of certain key terms because of 
the complexity of Kinyarwanda (Rwanda’s national language). The most important words for 
the prosecution were: ‘Inyenzi’, ‘Inkotanyi’, and ‘Ibyisto’. The prosecution argued that by 
1994, as a result of propaganda and campaigns by the Hutu extremists, all of these words 
simply meant Tutsis. As a result, Akayesu’s instruction to hunt the Inkotanyi at the 
                                                     
75 Ruzindana (2015). 
76 See generally Ruzindana’s testimony on: ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001189, Akayesu – Transcript of 30/1/1997, 
30/01/1997, 105–165. See also ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001190, Akayesu – Transcript of 4/2/1997, 04/02/1997; 
and Del Ponte, 'Investigation’ (see Chap. Two, n. 127), 553. 
77 CONTRA001189, 164–71. 
78 Ibid., 172–6. 
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Gishyeshye meeting on the 19 April 1994 was, they argued, an incitement to kill the Tutsis.79 
The problem for the prosecution was that these words had multiple meanings: ‘Inkotanyi’ 
meant ‘Tutsis army’ or the RPF, ‘Ibyisto’ meant ‘accomplice’, and ‘Inyenzi’ meant 
‘cockroach’. The court struggled to get the definition of these words that they needed through 
fact witnesses alone:80   
Witness: Inyenzi is another name given to Inkotanyi 




Judge: But I wonder whether the name has some other meaning? 
Witness: I cannot give the explanation or meaning of Inyenzi because they did not 
explain what Inyenzi is.81 
 
As a result, in order for the court to know the ‘real meaning’ of these words, Ruzindana 
testified about the history of these words and explained how, by the 1990s, their predominant 
meaning was ‘the Tutsis’.82  
 
However, there was also an interesting tension in his testimony as in many respects he tried 
to offer a more complicated account than the prosecution sought. He maintained that whilst 
these words came to signify the Tutsis in 1994, this did not mean that these words had lost 
their prior meanings. As such both the context within which the statements were made and 
discovering how these were received and interpreted by an audience was central to 
understanding what these words meant when spoken. Therefore, when the prosecution 
pressed him to confirm that Akayesu’s incitements to hunt for Inkotanyi at Gishyeshye was 
akin to urging the population to commit genocide, Ruzindana responded that as an expert 
                                                     
79 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001175, Akayesu – Transcript of 09/1/1997, 09/01/1997. 
80 See also ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001179, Akayesu – Transcript of 21/1/1997, 21/01/1997, 40–1. 
81 CONTRA001176, 41–2. 
82 CONTRA001189, 107–61. 
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without being there or without more information it would impossible for him to say for sure 
what this utterance meant. The prosecution’s need for a more concrete answer led them to ask 
his opinion as a Rwandan not an expert, and he responded that he would have understood this 
as a call to genocide. Interestingly, when I interviewed Ruzindana in 2015, it seems that 
much of the nuance he was trying to introduce into the courts understanding was lost as the 
legal actors in Akayesu ultimately came to treat all of these terms (such as Inkotanyi, etc.) as 
references to the Tutsis regardless of context.83 Therefore, whilst Ruzindana’s testimony 
clearly had an influence on the court, it was perhaps not as he intended.  
 
This section has shown that, far from being passive actors in the process, witnesses played an 
active role in determining the way in which the trials proceeded and what accounts of 
violence were produced. This was true whether these testimonies were given by experts, 
perpetrators, or victims. These captured the specificity and personal nature of the violence 
and showed that Rwandans, both victims and perpetrators, significantly influenced the way in 
which the archive was constructed. This section has therefore shown that the archive should 
not be seen as a site which holds records purely of legal value. Rather, the archive also retains 
a rich source of information about the genocide due to both the witnesses’ testimony and the 
role they played in determining how the archive itself was structured. However, as the 
Ruzindana example reminds us (and whilst not detracting from the above argument) these 
acts were still significantly constrained by the prosecution’s needs and, as with Ruzindana, 
this could lead to distorted interpretations of the witnesses’ accounts. It is also important to 
remember, as was argued in the previous chapter, that to a great extent the types of testimony 
discussed here enhanced the prosecution’s legal case. This was true whether the depth of the 
testimony made the testimony appear more credible or whether allowing the witnesses to 
                                                     
83 Senior Reviser (2015). 
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open up pathways to investigate and prosecute new crimes (such as sexual violence) widened 
and strengthened the prosecution’s mandate and its legitimacy, as discussed further shortly. 
 
One additional way that those that endured the genocide came to indirectly influence the 
proceedings was through the RPF’s interventions at the Tribunal, which they claimed were 
motivated by protecting the victims’ rights. The final section of this chapter will look at these 
interventions and determine what motivated the RPF in these instances and how this 
influenced the accounts of violence produced within the archive. Were these interventions 
driven by a concern with victims’ needs, thus representing another way in which the archive 
reflected victims’ interests? Or was this tactic pursued for other reasons, bringing other 
factors into play? 
 
Rwanda and the ICTR 
 
From the outset, the Rwandan government’s influence over the ICTR was apparent. Although 
the Rwandan government ultimately opposed the creation of the Tribunal, it won a number of 
important concessions from the ICTR that would alter the framework within which the trials 
took place. In particular, as aforementioned, after the RPF government objected to the 
proposed temporal jurisdiction of 6 April 1994 to 17 July 1994, on the grounds that this 
would not adequately capture the planning of the genocide (thereby missing out a key part of 
the violence), the jurisdiction was extended to run from 1 January 1994 until 31 December 
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1994.84 This would, as was argued in the previous chapter, have important consequences for 
what accounts of violence would be created by the Tribunal.  
 
This pattern continued with the Rwanda government’s intervention during the ‘Barayagwiza 
affair’. In 1996, the Tribunal arrested Jean Bosco Barayagwiza in Cameroon for his 
contribution to the genocide as co–founder of the radio station RTLM and also a former head 
of the extremist party Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR). However, in 
November 1999 an appeals chamber ordered his release, having found that his rights had 
been irrevocably violated as a result of being detained for a year without being charged.85 
Barayagwiza was a significant figure within the genocide’s leadership, and the Tribunal’s 
decision was both legally and politically important, as this demonstrated that it would uphold 
the basic principles of the rule of law and the rights of the defendant regardless of the 
political significance of the accused. The decision caused outrage in Rwanda, as the RPF 
government argued that the Tribunal was insulting the victims of the genocide by releasing a 
key defendant on a technicality.86 In protest the Rwandan government withdrew all support 
for the Tribunal, which effectively brought the court to a standstill.87 Del Ponte, in a speech 
to the UNSC, barely hid the severity of the situation, nor the political necessity of the 
decision being overturned.  
[W]hether we like it or not, we must come to terms with the reality that our ability 
to continue our investigations depends on Rwanda [… Without this cooperation] we 
might as well open the doors to the prison. It is my hope that Jean Bosco 
Barayagwiza will not be the one to decide the fate of this tribunal.88 
                                                     
84 Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide (see Intro., n. 75), 32–33; Yacoubian, ‘The Efficacy of International Criminal 
Justice’ (see Chap. One, n. 91), 188; and S/PV.3453, 3453rd Meeting, 08/11/1994, 14.  
85 James Stewart, ‘NYU JILP Symposium: New Thoughts about Barayagwiza: Reactions to Policing 
International Prosecutors’, Opinion Juris, 05/04/2014, (see Internet Materials list). 
86 Christopher Wren, ‘UN Tribunal Wrong to Free Top Suspect, Rwanda Says’, New York Times, 12/11/1999. 
87 Peskin, International Justice (see Intro., n. 75), 179; ‘Warning over Rwandan Suspect’, BBC News, 
22/022000. (see Internet Materials) 




The prosecution appealed the decision and a different appeals panel ultimately decided to 
reverse the prior decision on the basis of ‘new evidence’ presented by the prosecution that 
showed Barayagwiza’s rights had not been infringed and ruled that, regardless, any 
infringement of the defendants’ rights should be dealt with at the sentencing stage of the 
trial.89 As Del Ponte’s speech made clear, and as has not really been disputed, the decision 
saw the Tribunal submit to the RPF’s pressure. This set the tone for the Rwandan 
government’s relationship with the Tribunal and showed that the RPF could heavily influence 
the way in which the prosecutions proceeded, shaping the accounts of violence contained 
within the archive. It turned out that in some respects Barayagwiza was to decide the fate of 
the Tribunal.90  
 
Importantly, the arguments mobilised by both Del Ponte and the RPF noted that the issue 
exceeded purely political interests. Both sides argued that overturning the decision to release 
Barayagwiza was in the interests of upholding the rights of the victims and their demand for 
                                                     
89 Stewart, ‘Barayagwiza’; S/2002/1375, Letter dated 16 December 2002 from the Secretary–General addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, 19/12/2002, 2; A/54/PV.48, 54th Session: 48th Plenary Meeting, 
08/11/1999, 24–27; A/55/269, Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda: Report of the Special Representative of 
the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, 04/08/2000, 36; and A/57/PV.36, 
57th Session: 36th Plenary Meeting, 28/10/2002, 14. Rwanda suspended cooperation another time when they 
were protesting against the employing of genocidaires, the treatment of witnesses during the hearings, and what 
they called the ‘revisionist’ voices coming from both the Chambers and the Defence councils. S/2002/1043, 
Letter dated 17 September 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, 19/09/2002, 117. 
90 The Rwandan government made it clear whenever they were dissatisfied with a decision rendered by the 
Tribunal, and the relationship was particularly stretched once more when the Rwandan government arrested 
Paul Erdingger, defence council at the ICTR, under the charge of genocide denial due to arguments he led 
during an ICTR trial when trying to defend his client. S/2011/317, Letter dated 12 May 2011 from the President 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security Council: Report 
on the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as of 12 May 2011), 
18/05/2011, 14. There was, moreover, other ways in which Rwanda influenced the record created by the 
Tribunal. This was both by withholding cooperation over certain requests (often made by the defence counsels) 
for access to certain documents. There was also evidence, as emerged during Cyangugu, that the government 
destroyed evidence in some instances. During Cyangugu, a defence investigator noted that the cells in the 
former military camp had been destroyed the day before they returned to take pictures of them as evidence to 
undermine the claims made by a number of the prosecution’s witnesses. No other buildings were similarly 
destroyed. ICTR–99–46, TRA001780/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 14/10/2002, 
14/10/2002, 16.  
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justice.91 In court, Del Ponte asked the judges: ‘Do you believe that three months' delay in the 
transfer of Barayagwiza, who risks a life sentence, is more serious than the hundreds of 
thousands of victims?’92 As this suggests, this move was seen as being very much in the 
interests of the victims. Indeed, whilst not enough is known about how Rwandan society 
generally, but the victim community specifically, reacted to the Tribunal, evidence suggests 
that the chamber’s decisions in cases like Barayagwiza, or when prosecution errors led to 
acquittals, as with Bagambiki and Ntagerura, did negatively affect the victims.93 Alexia, a 
witness to the massacre at Mibilizi, Cyangugu, noted: 
As a survivor of the genocide, I regard the release of Bagambiki as an expression 
of denial. It is to deny, in its totality, the genocide that took place throughout the 
prefecture. It also reinforces impunity. It seems to me that the ICTR exists to turn 
the knife in the wounds of survivors.94 
 
For Caritas, another survivor and former witness at the Tribunal, the news of Bagambiki’s 
release caused her to decide that she would no longer cooperate with the Tribunal and she 
refused to testify in other trials.95 To an extent, then, the RPF appeared to intervene on the 
side of the victims and so the ICTR’s decisions to bend to the RPF’s will in cases such as 
Barayagwiza reflected another indirect way that the victims influenced the way in which the 
Tribunal constructed their accounts of violence.  
 
The RPF’s most significant intervention, however, was a reaction to the OTP’s plans to 
produce a number of indictments against members of the RPF for the crimes they committed 
                                                     
91 BBC News, ‘Warning over Rwandan Suspect’.  
92 Ibid. 
93 Supra note 17, 56 and 64. There is, of course, limited value in speaking about ‘Rwandan society’. This is 
perhaps no more so then somewhere like here where for a potentially significant portion of the population the 
release of people like Bagambiki was likely well received. What becomes of interest then, as discussed more 
below, is which constituency is being mobilised when ‘Rwanda’ is referred to, and whose interests, within these 
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94 Ibid., 65. 
95 Ibid., 65–6. See also pp. 67–70. 
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whilst invading Rwanda, which saw thousands of victims (mainly Hutus) slaughtered. These 
charges were particularly pursued by Del Ponte, who sought to address the OTP’s previous 
neglect of RPF crimes in an attempt to avoid victor’s justice. However, in 2003, as Del Ponte 
was preparing to submit the first indictments for these cases, the RPF government responded 
by blocking all witnesses from travelling to Arusha to testify, which, once more, brought the 
Tribunal to a standstill.96 The RPF’s strategy was ultimately successful, and the indictments 
were shelved—later Del Ponte was also removed from her position as ICTR prosecutor.97  
 
As this shows, the Rwandan government actively shaped the way in which the Tribunal 
produced its accounts of the Rwandan genocide. The significance of these interventions, 
especially for the contents of the archive, should not be underestimated. These have not only 
resulted in the distinct absence of narratives (at least produced by the prosecution) 
concerning the RPF’s violence, but it also ensured that the role of Barayagwiza during the 
genocide is contained within the archive. As such, it appears that the archive was very much 
constructed, in part, as a result of the RPF’s interests, which at times appeared driven by a 
desire to protect the rights of the victims. However, a closer look at these issues demonstrates 
that the apparent divide between the Tribunal, on one side, and RPF, victim communities and 
the witnesses on the other was perhaps not as clear cut as this makes out.  
                                                     
96 CERD/C/SR.1212, International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Summary of Record of the 1212th Meeting, 26/03/1997, 3–4 and 7–8; and A/C.3/52/SR.34, Third Committee: 
Summary Record of the 34th Meeting, 17/02/1998, 4–5.  
97 Peskin, International Justice, 219–22; Supra note 86, 127. During interviews conducted in 2015, both James 
Arguin (former head of appeals) and another senior figure at the Tribunal offered an alternative explanation for 
this. They noted that these indictments were dropped as a result of the UNSC completion strategy which meant 
that they were to only prosecute the most serious crimes, which in this context meant genocide. Both argued the 
OTP had not abandoned the cases against the RPF but had, rather, transferred these to Rwanda for prosecution. 
However, the timings noted above, the removal of Del Ponte, the prior history of accepting the RPF’s demands, 
and the strong sense that this was an argument developed retrospectively to quell criticism against the Tribunal, 
make it appear that the prosecution’s political consideration trumped other concerns here. It is without a doubt 
that without the RPF’s intervention, Del Ponte would have submitted the indictments against the RPF for 
confirmation. Head of Appeals (2015); Senior Member of the ICTR Office of the Prosecutor 3 (2015) – 




First, it was unclear whether the RPF always had the interests of victims at heart when 
challenging the Tribunal. There was something deeply problematic about the RPF’s 
obstruction of the OTP’s investigations into RPF crimes. As Peskin has argued, the RPF’s 
interventions at the Tribunal seemed to be directed at securing its identity as the ultimate 
‘victim’, which it could then mobilise symbolically to pursue its interests at the Tribunal, 
domestically, and within the Great Lakes region more generally, and all without any 
condemnation from the international community.98 Indeed, the RPF’s interventions here, 
which also meant that the Tribunal acted as yet another site where Hutu victims were largely 
silenced, contributed to sense of the Hutus as the always already perpetrators, which helped 
legitimise the RPF’s use of coercive governance techniques that first targeted the Hutu 
population (before turning to all those seen to oppose the regime’s interests), and exonerated 
the RPF from confronting its past and present violence.99 This appeared, as such, to be 
                                                     
98 Peskin, International Justice, 154. It is telling, for instance, that at the UN Rwanda begin most speeches, 
especially where they were responding to criticism from other member states, by declaring that the international 
community had stood idly by whilst the genocide spread. Further evidence can be seen in these comments by 
Paul Kagame: ‘Any crimes committed by individuals within the RPA were investigated and punished. They [the 
ICTR] know that very well. […] How then does the ICTR attempt to place the RPA, who actually put an end to 
the genocide, at the same level as the genocidaires, the very perpetrators of the genocide? […] They [the 
international community] simply ran away from responsibility and left people to be killed in the thousands. […] 
So what moral authority do they have?’ E/CN.4/1998/SR.2, Fifty–Fourth Session: Summary Record of the 2nd 
Meeting, 19/03/1998, 6. See also A/C.3/51/SR.44, Third Committee: Summary Record of the 44th Meeting, 
19/11/1996, 9–10; and Zorbas, ‘Reconciliation’, 34. Moreover, after the direct intervention of the Rwandan 
government a number of Human Rights reports written about Rwanda in the late 1990s were edited to add in a 
statement recognising the suffering Rwanda endured, and the continued difficulties it had subsequently faced, as 
a result of the genocide, prior to discussing any current human rights violations. A/C.3/53/L.29/Rev.1, Situation 
of human rights in Rwanda: Draft Resolution, 19/11/1998. Ultimately, moreover, as a result of Rwanda’s 
protest about the UN’s intervention in its affairs, the UNHCR field office was forced to close.  A/53/367, 
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, 11/09/1998, 4–8. 
99 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in 
Post–genocide Rwanda’, African Affairs 110:438 (2011), 18 and 30–1; and Filip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, Ten 
Years on: from Genocide to Dictatorship’, African affairs 103:411 (2004), 103 and 199. Over time divisions 
within Rwanda under the RPF would become more complex still, as survivors and ‘returnees’ (both largely 
Tutsis) also became pitted against each other. In the end, loyalty or (perceived) opposition to the current regime 
remains the most significant division (much like under the Habyarimana’s rule, and then the interim 
government’s rule during the genocide). Eugenia Zorbas, ‘Reconciliation in Post–genocide Rwanda’, African 
Journal of Legal Studies 1:1 (2004), 40–7 and 186–93. 
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directed at solidifying the RPF’s grip on power in Rwanda,100  rather than of concern with 
those that had suffered in 1994.  
 
Second, whilst on the surface victims’ responses to decisions like Barayagwiza suggested an 
instance of two different ideas of justice colliding,101 underneath, this is perhaps more a case 
of discrepancy between the possibilities of justice and its actual execution. The case of 
Barayagwiza generated the negative sentiment it did not because of anything inherent within 
the law but because it was poorly handled by the prosecution (the same is true for the 
acquittals of Bagambiki and Ntagerura). Indeed, what was also notable from Redress’s 
interviews with those that testified at the Tribunal was the level of hope and expectation that 
came with testifying, with one witness noting that it made them feel ‘lighter’ inside to know 
that the crime committed against them was now being dealt with legally.102 This could also be 
true for ‘perpetrator’ witnesses, as a number of these stated that they were testifying in order 
to address their guilty conscience, and in hope of receiving forgiveness.103 That this failed in 
some instances does not exclude the possibility that, under certain conditions, the desires of 
the witnesses and the needs of the court could coincide, as the above analysis also showed.  
 
 
                                                     
100 Zorbas, ‘Reconciliation’, 40–4. 
101 There is also some difficulty in speaking about ‘victim communities’, and as Zorbas shows, overtime this 
group became increasingly fractured, as, for instance, ‘returnees’ began to occupy a more privileged position 
against those more directly effected by the violence in 1994. Ibid. 
102 Supra note 17, 66 and 68. Moreover, during an interview with François–Xavier Nsanzuwera, he noted that 
what made him happiest and most confident that the Tribunal had a positive impact on Rwanda (he himself is 
Rwandan) was that many of the witnesses (some of which he had known for a long time) continued to agree to 
assist the OTP with their investigations. Senior Appeals Attorney (2015). 
103  For example: ICTR–99–46, TRA000751/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 





This chapter has demonstrated the complex relationship that existed between the witnesses, 
the prosecution, and the Tribunal more generally. This first of all showed the ways in which 
the witnesses influenced the prosecution’s approach to the proceedings during both the 
investigations and the trials. Witnesses ‘co-produced’ each of the trial’s frameworks, 
contested these frameworks, contributed towards a shift in the way in which evidence was 
treated, and maintained a degree ‘ownership’ over the meaning of the genocide in the face of 
law’s tendency to generalise. With this, then, the witnesses worked within, but also reshaped, 
the ‘conditions of truth’ set out at the end of the previous chapter. This theme appeared on the 
surface to continue in the final section of the chapter as the RPF, claiming to represent the 
victims of the genocide, continued to influence the way in which the trials proceeded, as 
demonstrated by the Barayagwiza affair.  
 
This also, then, points to another analytical concept that can help to explain why the archive 
exists as it does, which is the ‘processes of truth’. Indeed, this analysis has shown that it is 
not only important to consider the aesthetic quality of the statements (and the rules that 
determine their content) but also the means, methods and techniques through which these 
statements were produced and the different stages through which the archive was created. As 
this chapter has shown, what roles are afforded to different actors during the process and the 
relationship between the actors are particularly important here. For as is clear, whilst 
witnesses actively contributed towards the production of the archive, the way in which they 
interacted with the Tribunal’s legal actors had an important bearing on which records were 




However, underneath this notion of the power of those that suffered during the genocide to 
influence the Tribunal and its archive lies a slightly different story. As the final section 
suggested, for instance, the RPF’s motivations for intervening in the Tribunal arguably did 
not always have the interests of Rwandan society at heart, as appeared also true of the 
Tribunal’s decision to acquiesce to the RPF’s demands.104 These types of decisions start to 
introduce doubt about the extent to which the court was driven by a desire to address the 
needs of those who had suffered during the violence that it was tasked to address. This was 
also pointed to when, as discussed in the first part of the chapter, it became clear that the 
prosecution benefited both legally and politically from those acts described above that 
seemingly captured examples of the witnesses’ agency. The witnesses’ more detailed 
testimony of their experiences of violence also, for instance, offered evidence that was of 
significant legal value to the prosecution. Moreover, as has been stressed throughout, 
acknowledging the importance of the witnesses’ role is not the same as saying that they had 
free reign over the trials. As will become clear in in subsequent chapters, these encounters 
between the witnesses and the court often highlighted tensions among the interests and needs 
of the different actors of the courtroom.105 The questions that need to be asked, then, are: 
when did the court succeed in functioning as a site that served multiple stakeholders 
simultaneously? When did (as with the dropping of the RPF’s indictments) different interests 
come into tension? Where there was a tension, how was this resolved? And what does this 
mean for whose archive? 
                                                     
104 The effects of this fracturing of Rwandan society into different groups with competing interests also 
demonstrates a more general issue with the use of these courts has as sites of transitional justice and 
peacebuilding. For as becomes clear here, these processes are seemingly inherently divisive as they amplify 
difference within post-atrocity communities and render transition as a zero-sum game where one community 
must win out over another. 






This, moreover, remains only a partial picture of the way in which the archive was 
constructed. What was the role of the defence and the chambers throughout this process and 
how did they bring to bear their own interests here? How did they influence the trial process 
and the archive and to what extent were their interests at odds with the witnesses and 
prosecution? Where these were at odds, whose interests prevailed and what mark did this 









The last two chapters considered how the prosecution and their witnesses constructed 
accounts of violence, and why their accounts were constructed so, drawing attention to what 
has been described here as the ‘conditions’ and ‘processes’ of truth. This chapter turns to the 
defence and looks at the different types of narrative it produced, and what other strategies it 
employed, as they tried to secure acquittals for the defendant, and the effects this had on the 
archive. This is an under researched area, with very few accounts given of what it means to 
defend a genocide case.1 This not only reinforces a tendency to see the prosecution as 
representing the ‘good’ and the defence defending the ‘bad’, but undermines the key role of 
defence teams in shaping each of the trial’s account of violence. Overall, this chapter 
considers the extent to which, and in what ways, the defence contributed towards producing a 
particular understanding of violence within the records deposited within the archive.  
 
During each of the trials, the defence, with very few exceptions, did not contest whether the 
particular crimes that the prosecution focused on occurred. Rather, the defence drew on a 
series of narrative structures that altered the emphasis of these accounts, particularly 
concerning who (if anyone) was responsible for the violence. The first section of the chapter 
                                                     




will consider each of these narrative structures in turn, which can be categorised as: a) 
character based arguments that also emphasised that the accused ‘did what they could’; b) a 
chaos and diminished responsibility argument; and, c) the construction of counter–histories. 
These served two functions. First, and most importantly, each of these narratives were driven 
by the attempt to introduce ‘reasonable doubt’ into the minds of the judges about the validity 
of the prosecution’s case. In this sense, just as the prosecution’s witnesses were forced to 
testify through the specific frameworks, the defence witnesses’ testimonies were similarly 
moulded to fit within these various structures as they were used in pursuit of legal ends. As 
will be explored below, however, the court also provided space whereby counter–hegemonic 
narratives were produced, particularly concerning both the international nature of the 
violence and the RPF (absent in the prosecution’s account).  
 
The second part of this chapter looks at the other methods drawn on by the defence as they 
intervened in the court process to undermine the prosecution’s case. First, I will consider how 
cross–examination was used, and how this also compared to the prosecution’s reliance on this 
method. Second, I will look at how the defence actively contested the very basis of the 








Constructing Narratives of Innocence 
 
‘Did What He Could’ 
 
The first narrative framework employed by the defence was one that focused on the accused’s 
lack of intent, which also, pushing beyond this, argued that the accused ‘did what he could’ to 
stop the genocide. In pursuit of this, the defence emphasised the accused’s lack of animosity 
towards the Tutsis, suggesting by extension their inability to have been involved with the 
planning or execution of the genocide. During each trial, witnesses came forward to declare 
that the defendants had never treated Tutsis unfairly, nor made any anti–Tutsi statements.2 
Their disposition in this regard was particularly emphasised by showing that the defendant 
had relatives or, even better, spouses, who were Tutsis,3 and that where they could they tried 
to save Tutsis during the ensuing violence.4 In a similar vein, the defence also emphasised the 
peace–loving nature of the accused,5 and, in Ntagerura’s case, their support of multiparty 
politics and the Arusha Peace Accords (APA), with numerous witnesses testifying to 
                                                     
2 For examples see: Prosecutor v. Jean–Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001207, Akayesu – 
Transcript of 17/11/1997, 17/11/1997, 17; Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR–99–46 (hereafter 
ICTR–99–46), TRA000525/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 19/03/2002, 19/03/2002, 
7; and ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0240/1, Gatete – Judgement and Sentence, 31/03/2011, 40. 
3 ICTR–99–46, TRA000528/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 11/03/2002, 11/03/2002, 
28; and TRA000525/1, 4. 
4 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001238, Akayesu – Transcript of 26/03/1998, 26/03/1998, 47; ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001214, Akayesu – Transcript of 19/11/1997, 19/11/1997, 35–36; See also, ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001217, Akayesu – Transcript of 9/2/1998, 09/02/1998, 69; ICTR–99–46, TRA001998/1, [Cyangugu] 
– Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 05/02/2003, 05/02/2003, 21 and 24; ICTR–99–46, TRA002000/1, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 11/02/2003, 11/02/2003, 26–7. These narratives also 
emphasised, more generally, that the defendants’ characters were such that the violence that they were being 
accused of was incompatible with how they were as people.  
Mr. Jean–Paul Akayesu, everybody talked about his integrity. He is a good father. I think that 
Mr. Jean–Paul Akayesu is not a person who will come and say, "Go rape Tutsi women and 
then don't come and tell me or ask me how does a Tutsi woman taste. Mr. Akayesu is a family 
head. I saw his wife. I saw his five children. And it is with pride that today I am ensuring his 
defence. I say so with conviction because Mr. Jean–Paul Akayesu is not capable of 
committing such crimes. CONTRA001238, 57–8 
5  ICTR–99–46, TRA000527/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 13/03/2002, 
13/03/2002, 22–5; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001602/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
27/03/2002, 27/03/2002, 11. 
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Ntagerura’s role in implementing the APA and then negotiating a ceasefire with the RPF.6 
The defence also distanced the defendants from the political elite, replacing the prosecution’s 
accounts of the accused’s nepotistic relationship with the Akazu, for narratives that 
emphasised their clients’ professional suitability for their high–powered roles.7 Wherever 
possible, the accused’s lack of authority and agency was emphasised as they were rendered 
servants of the state rather than power hungry despots.8  
 
These narratives also fed into the defence’s argument that the defendants ‘did what they 
could’ to stop the violence during the genocide. During Akayesu, for instance, the defence 
told of how, for two weeks, Akayesu had warded off those trying to start the genocide within 
                                                     
6 ICTR–99–46, TRA001610/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 21/03/2002, 21/03/2002, 
25–6 and 54. In a particularly ‘hammy’ response by Ntagerura, which demonstrated his support for the APA, he 
stated:  
Yes, the fundamental law did not prohibit political meetings or rallies during the period you 
just referred to. I should underscore that when talking about the fundamental law what I 
understand by this is the Arusha Peace Accords which were signed on the 4th of August 1992 
plus the constitution which had been adopted on the l0th of June 1991. ICTR–99–46, 
TRA001291/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 17/07/2002, 
17/07/2002, 71. 
In a similar vein, although less prominent, was Gatete’s narrative of his pre–1994 work. In effect, the defence 
argued here that Gatete was not the sort of person that could participate in the planning and execution of a 
genocide in his region when he had spent so many decades tending to its needs and ensuring that it was peaceful 
and prosperous.  Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61 (hereafter ICTR–00–61), 
CONTRA018674, Gatete, Redacted Transcript of 02/03/2010, 02/03/2010, 10; ICTR–00–61, TRA005148/1, 
Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 03/03/2010, 03/03/2010, 19; and ICTR–00–61, TRA005152/1, Gatete – 
Redacted Transcript of 08/03/2010, 08/03/2010, 60.   
7 ICTR–99–46, TRA002063/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 13/08/2003, 13/08/2003, 
20–2; ICTR–99–46, TRA001292/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 18/07/2002, 
18/07/2002, 69; Cyangugu, Redacted Transcript, TRA002090/2, 26/03/2003, 63; and ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001231, Akayesu – Transcript of 12/3/1998, 12/03/1998, 21. 
8 The defence also constructed narratives that emphasised the accused’s law–abiding nature to assist with the 
argument that the events as alleged by the prosecution’s witnesses were an impossibility. Ntagerura testified 
that:  
Well, Counsel, I should say, first of all, the MRND had members who were Tutsi and as a 
minister of the MRND –– a minister from the MRND, it would –– it was unacceptable before 
the militants of my own party to say these words, and there would have been consequences 
from my own party. The same consequences would have come from the other political parties 
as well, because, as I said yesterday, the press –– the media were there. This was a public 
meeting. As I saw what you had read, it was a public meeting. The press could have used this 
information and had a responsibility to do so. TRA001292/2, 85. 
See also TRA001292/2, 12 and 97; ICTR–99–46, TRA001851/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 20/01/2003, 20/01/2003, 47 and 49; ICTR–99–46, TRA001271/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 16/05/2002, 16/05/2002, 22–7; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001276/2, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 22/05/2002, 22/05/2002, 17. 
176 
 
Taba, organising security patrols and public meetings, and utilising the communal police 
force to do so.9 As the defence argued:  
Defence: Now, if Akayesu was preventing the killings in Taba that means that he 
was not against the Tutsi?  
Witness: He was not against the Tutsi. Thank you.10  
 
Even when Akayesu was overcome by ‘outside forces’, and could no longer resist the 
violence en masse, he nonetheless continued to save those Tutsis he could.11  
 
Bagambiki’s defence utilised this narrative structure with particular intensity, emphasising 
his efforts to stop the violence wherever he could, and this played a key role in his acquittal.12 
So whilst the prosecution had argued that Bagambiki had moved the refugees from Cyangugu 
Parish to Kamarampaka stadium to make killing them easier, Bagambiki argued that the 
refugees were moved in order to ensure their protection.13 The openness of the Church 
compound made it difficult, the defence argued, to protect the refugees with the handful of 
gendarmes that Bagambiki had at his disposal, whereas the enclosed stadium would make this 
far easier and would offer much better sanitary conditions. Similar narratives were presented 
about each of the massacre sites where Bagambiki was implicated: at Nyamasheke Parish he 
                                                     
9 The Akayesu defence asked one prosecution witness: ‘So, then, if Akayesu did, he did then try to prevent the 
massacres during this period, so that would mean that ideologically speaking, he was not against the Tutsi?’ 
ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001180, Akayesu – Transcript of 22/1/1997, 22/01/1997, 85. See also, CONTRA001214, 
33–6. 
10 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001186, Akayesu – Transcript of 27/1/1997, 27/01/1997, 59. 
11 For example, see CONTRA001217, 69–70. 
12 ICTR–99–46–0599/1, Trial Judgement – the Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura Emmanuel Bagambiki Samuel 
Imanishimwe, 25/02/2004, 235. 
13  ICTR–99–46, TRA001920/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 01/04/2003, 
01/04/2003, 55. A similar argument was mobilised by Imanishimwe. ICTR–99–46, TRA000435/2, [Cyangugu] 
– Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 15/02/2001, 15/02/2001, 14; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000438/1, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 21/02/2001, 21/02/2001, 59–61. 
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had sent gendarmes and personally intervened to turn away a group of attackers14; at Mibilizi 
Parish he had sent his sous–préfet to stop a pending massacre;15 and at Shangi, after he found 
out about an attack, he sanctioned a bourgmestre who had been involved.16 Unlike the 
prosecution’s assertion that these actions were evidence of Bagambiki’s responsibility (since 
each of these interventions coincided with the worst massacres at each site), Bagambiki 
argued that this showed that he had done what he could.17 
 
This narrative was reinforced through an example of his successful intervention in the chaos 
that had enveloped Cyangugu in the wake of Martin Bucyana’s death—the former head of the 
CDR—in February 1993.18 At that time Bagambiki convened security meetings and 
conducted ‘pacification tours’ and successfully reintroduced peace and security within the 
region.19 Bagambiki used exactly the same tactics during the genocide to reintroduce peace 
and security within Cyangugu: he held three prefecture security council (PSC) meetings 
within the first two weeks of the genocide, which included one enlarged PSC where local 
persons of importance (such as the clergy) were called in to assist, and held pacification 
meetings, including one with President Sindikubwabo and Ntagerura.20 However, unlike in 
1993, during the genocide these actions failed. These narratives not only showed 
                                                     
14  ICTR–99–46, TRA001909/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/02/2003, 
24/02/2003, 15–6; ICTR–99–46, TRA001910/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
25/02/2003, 25/02/2003, 12–3; and TRA001920/1, 26–7. 
15  ICTR–99–46, TRA001915/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/03/2003, 
24/03/2003, 24–6.  
16  TRA001909/1, 15–6; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001918/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript 
of 27/03/2003, 27/03/2003, 22. 
17 See section on the Gihundwe School for another example of his intervention. TRA000434/2, 129–30. Many 
of these narratives were mimicked by Imanishimwe during the trial. However, the main exception here was that 
Imanishimwe’s defence only seemed to half–heartedly go in for this narrative and rather tried, instead, to argue 
that it was not his responsibility to intervene to prevent the massacres —discussed more below.  
18  ICTR–99–46, TRA001919/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 31/03/2003, 
31/03/2003, 4–6. 
19  ICTR–99–46, TRA002001/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 13/02/2003, 
13/02/2003, 11–5. 
20 TRA001918/1, 33–5. 
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Bagambiki’s propensity towards peace, rather than violence, but also showed that when he 
was in a position to—when the context allowed—he could have a positive impact in 
maintaining peace and security, an argument that was ultimately accepted by the court. 21 
 
In fact, Bagambiki’s willingness to stop the genocide as emphasised in his defence meant that 
he himself was attacked during the violence, which rendered Bagambiki a victim—a 
narrative also mirrored in Akayesu.22 A second ‘victimisation’ presented within this narrative 
was that Bagambiki was forced to stand helplessly by (having done what he could) and watch 
the massacres of his constituents.23 Bagambiki testified:  
I do regret that I was not able to save all of those I would have liked to save, and I 
ask for forgiveness and understanding from those who were disappointed by my 
                                                     
21 Ibid., 31–5 Interestingly, one of these proposals was: ‘to incite citizens to continue to track the enemy, 
regardless of where he is hiding and wherever he is hiding weapons without, however, threatening or 
mistreating innocent persons.’ (p. 34). The failure of the prosecution to capitalise on the defence’s acceptance 
that these types of instructions were issued—which were clearly active calls for the population to participate in 
the violence—is also an important issue here. The ‘did what he could’ narrative was, moreover, accepted by 
Judge Ostrovsky in his dissenting opinion. He said,  
I am aware of the deplorable conditions at Cyangugu Cathedral and Kamarampaka Stadium. I 
am also aware that Prefect Bagambiki, sub–Prefect Munyagabe [sic], and the gendarmes 
provided, at times, only minimal protection for the refugees. However, I bear in mind the 
chaotic situation prevailing in the prefecture and throughout the country […]. I am not 
convinced that Bagambiki, with the resources available to him, could do more for the 
protection of refugees in Cyangugu prefecture. ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 235. 
22 TRA001919/1, 5–6. A similar narrative was told during Akayesu. ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001208, Akayesu – 
Transcript of 18/11/1997, 18/11/1997, 34–5. 
23 TRA002001/1, 6; ICTR–99–46, TRA002001/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
13/02/2003, 13/02/2003, 11–2.  
It's true that there's no human initiative that can be perfect, but I did what I could. I do not 
regret staying because if I had fled, as Guichaoua suggests, I would not be here today. I would 
be a free man in terms of my movement, but I would have to face another tribunal, another 
judge, and the judge of my conscience who would tell me that I abandoned people who were 
in danger, that I did not try to do what I could to save them. I would be in another prison, in 
the prison of remorse. ICTR–99–46, TRA001921/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 02/04/2003, 02/04/2003, 19 –20.   
I would like to seize this opportunity to ask my fellow citizens who survived the Rwandan 
tragedy, whatever their tribe, their creed or religion, especially those of Cyangugu, to 
understand me and forgive me. I ask for forgiveness for those who hoped that I could 
automatically stop the massacres, and that in so doing save them or their loved ones, but who 
instead watched sadly, powerlessly, as I displayed my limits in the face of this blind violence. 
I ask for forgiveness for those who watched in pain for the coming of assistance. I ask for 
forgiveness for my family and all those who were under my roof, who, with me, spent long 
days of worry and endless nights sharing my concerns and my failures in the face of the scope 
of the disaster. ICTR–99–46, TRA002962, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 07/02/2006 – Appeals Hearing, 07/02/2006, 47.  
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lack of power, by the fact that I was not able to save everyone. It was my dearest 
hope, my wish. I did what I could and I spared no effort. And I want to thank those 
who helped me, who assisted me with their advice, who helped me by 
accompanying me during the pacification campaign, who helped me by intervening 
where I sent them to intervene, and those who helped me with their prayers.  
I thank my family. We spent some very difficult times together, nights that were 
endless, sleepless nights. Our life was in danger and they comforted me; they 
encouraged me; they supported me. I thank my wife and my children because they 
were at my side during these difficult times. It was a nightmare for everyone, for 
them and for me. (Emphasis added.)24  
 
Overall, this narrative framework worked to challenge the idea that the accused had, or could 
have, participated in any violence. More specifically they worked to undermine the 
prosecution’s claims that the accused possessed the necessary intent to be found responsible 
for committing acts of genocide.  
 
Chaos and Diminished Responsibility 
 
The example concerning Bagambiki above is also evidence of another key narrative trope 
presented by the defence: the chaotic nature of the violence in 1994 drastically limited how 
defendants could act. In that example, it was not Bagambiki’s actions but rather the context of 
1994 that meant he could not stop the genocide. Akayesu’s defence also utilised this type of 
narrative to explain why the violence began in Taba even though Akayesu had successfully 
prevented it for two weeks. Akayesu argued that his actions had been successful when the 
context allowed this—when the violence had been at a manageable level and the population 
remained loyal to him.25 After 18 April 1994, however, he was overwhelmed by forces from 
                                                     
24 TRA001921/1, 20.  
25  Akayesu, with the assistance of other persons, struggled against the Interahamwe and then the 
reinforcement became unfavourable to Akayesu and they were overwhelmed by the 
Interahamwe. This witness continues that the killings became widespread between the 23rd 
and the 24th of April in Taba, because Taba was the only commune that had been spared thus 
far from the killings. CONTRA001238, 23.   
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outside the commune and he was no longer able to resist.26 In fact, like Bagambiki, Akayesu 
becomes a victim of circumstance as the chaos around him, and the Interahamwes’ rise to 
power, rendered him powerless. 
 
This sense of forces coming from ‘outside’ strongly featured in Cyangugu and Gatete in a 
second strand of the chaos argument: the violence was not orderly or the result of careful and 
meticulous planning, but was spontaneous and chaotic, and had been triggered by the RPF’s 
invasion of Rwanda. A defence witness in Cyangugu claimed: 
Well, in this country where disorder was rife, where there was fighting everywhere, 
where the RPF was advancing, where infiltrators were being hunted down, people 
running helter–skelter, dying of accidents, people killed at roadblocks, Bagambiki 
saved as many people as he could. If Mr. Karegyesa [chief prosecutor] had been in 
that country, would he have been able to do more? (Emphasis added.)27 
 
This suggested that against this outpouring there was little that the defendants could have 
done to re–introduce peace within the region.28  
Defence: Witness, can you tell this Court whether between the 9th of April 1994 
and the 12th of April 1994 -- the date when the government fled -- whether the said 
government was in a position to take any governmental -- plausible governmental 
action? 
Witness: It was impossible for the simple reason that this government was under 
siege. It was at war. And we realised that as soon as it was installed, the first thing it 
did was to prepare its flight, and under those circumstance, this flight did not mean 
that this government was making progress.29 
 
                                                     
26 ICTR–96–4, Akayesu, Audio Recording: Interview of Jean Paul Akayesu in Zambia, 10/04/1996, Tape I, Side 
A; CONTRA001180, 14–5; CONTRA001207, 31–2; see also CONTRA001208, 34–35; CONTRA001214, 19–
20 and 43–4; and CONTRA001217, 50–3. 
27  ICTR–99–46, TRA002003/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 18/02/2003, 
18/02/2003, 33.  
28 ICTR–99–46, TRA001293/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 22/07/2002, 
22/07/2002, 102; ICTR–00–61, TRA005147/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 09/03/2010, 09/03/2010, 60; 
ICTR–00–61–0240/1, 73; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000546/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 20/09/2001, 20/09/2001, 37, 41 and 44. 




This narrative was very closely associated with Lucien Hounkpatin’s expert testimony for the 
defence in Cyangugu, which attempted to reduce any grounds for seeing even the faint 
possibility for individual criminal responsibility within the context of the violence in 
Rwanda.30 This expert testimony—which the prosecution unsuccessfully tried to bar from the 
courtroom—alleged that no one was responsible for the genocide which was (drawing on 
‘ethno-psychiatry’—a discipline strongly linked with colonialism) claimed to be the result of 
the ‘collective insanity’ that resulted from the death of the father of the nation, 
Habyarimana.31 
  
The Cyangugu defence took the chaos narrative even further. They argued that, after the 
Rwandan army (FAR) had successfully defeated the RPF in a conventional war in 1992, the 
RPF turned instead to guerrilla tactics.32 In particular, it was alleged that the RPF recruited 
young Tutsis who were trained in Uganda before being sent back to Rwanda where they were 
directed to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage.33 These acts of violence rendered places 
like Cyangugu as effective ‘passive war fronts’, producing considerable tension within the 
region in the build-up to the genocide as the population became increasingly suspicious of 
each other.34 This meant that when the President’s plane was shot down, the built–up tension 
                                                     
30 ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46–0460, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – Ntagerura et al – Prosecutor's Motion for the 
Exclusion of the Proposed Expert Report and Evidence of Lucien Hounkpatin, 03/07/2002, 2–3. 
31 Ibid., 2; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001286/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 08/07/2002 
– Motion, 08/07/2002, 25 and 36. 
32 TRA001851/2, 24–5; ICTR–99–46, TRA001618/02, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
02/10/2002, 02/10/2002, 80–1; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001619/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 03/10/2002, 03/10/2002, 38–40. 
33TRA000527/2, 75; ICTR–99–46, TRA001288/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
11/07/2002, 11/07/2002, 32–3 and 46; ICTR–99–46, TRA001800/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 04/11/2002, 04/11/2002, 32; ICTR–99–46, TRA001907, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 21/01/2003, 21/01/2003, 5–10; and ICTR–99–46, TRA002002/2, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 17/02/2003, 17/02/2003, 5–6. 
34  TRA001907, 8.  
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spilled over into acts of violence.35 This argument also rendered some of the Tutsis within the 
region as ‘legitimate’ targets of the violence. This, for instance, implied that Bagambiki and 
Imanishimwe had been correct in their decision to remove from Karamapaka stadium 
seventeen persons (later killed) suspected of working with the RPF.36 In some cases the 
narrative went even further and suggested that some Tutsis brought the violence upon 
themselves as they attacked Hutus, committed acts of terrorism, and exacerbated tensions as 
they celebrated the death of President Habyarimana or the arrival of the RPF.37  
 
The majority of these narratives worked to limit the accused’s responsibility for the violence 
during the genocide. Similar arguments about absent responsibility were presented by the 
defendants as they argued that their positions within the civil or military administrations did 
not carry anything like the power or authority that the prosecution alleged, which also 
lessened the possibility of their successful interventions in 1994. Both Bagambiki and 
Akayesu in this respect argued that their authority had diminished since the advent of 
multiparty democracy as they were no longer considered the direct representative of the 
president within the commune or prefecture; similarly, for Ntagerura this meant that the 
MRND—his party—was no longer the biggest within the region.38 Both Ntagerura and 
Bagambiki also argued that Simon Nteiryayo, the MRND chairman for the prefecture, was 
the most powerful member of the MRND in the region in an attempt to paint themselves in a 
                                                     
35 TRA002000/1, 14; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001912/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
11/03/2003, 11/03/2003, 39. 
36 TRA001920/1, 25. 
37 Ibid., 52–3; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001795/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
22/10/2002, 22/10/2002, 48; TRA001618/02, 1. See also ICTR–99–46, TRA001796/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura 
et al – Redacted Transcript of 23/10/2002, 23/10/2002, 40; and TRA001909/1, 10–1. 
38 ICTR–99–46, TRA000437/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 20/02/2001, 
20/02/2001, 35; TRA002063/1, 23–6; TRA001907, 9; TRA001918/1, 2–4; CONTRA001207, 12–7; 
CONTRA001231, 7–34; and TRA000525/1, 32–3. 
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less authoritative light.39 With these changes, they all contended that it became far harder to 
ensure the respect and loyalty of the population who as a result increasingly disobeyed their 
orders.40 
 
The most persistent of these narratives came from Imanishimwe.41 He argued that despite the 
prosecution’s claims, not only was he not closely tied with the Akazu and did not have 
Colonel Nsabimana as his military ‘godfather’, but that he was not even in charge of an 
important camp. Wounded in 1991, he was kept away from the front line and the top posts in 
the military until he was transferred to Cyangugu—an insignificant station, far away from the 
front line, that was staffed by the war–wounded and otherwise immobile persons, like him, 
who were not capable of serving the military in the war with the RPF.42 One witness testified 
as follows: 
Defence: You name Captain Kazabavaho, Second Lieutenant Dusenguremyi, and 
Lieutenant Samuel Imanishimwe as being commanders of the Karambo camps […]. 
Was there anything special, peculiar about these three officers? 
Witness: The three officers had many common characteristics and characteristics that 
were peculiar to them. In fact, the Cyangugu camp mainly comprised soldiers who 
had been wounded at the front. And if my memory serves me right, I think Captain 
Kazabavaho had scars on his face and also on -- near his ribs. As concerns 
Dusenguremyi, he was one–eyed, he could only see with one eye. And as regards 
Samuel, he had sustained or suffered an accident during which a mine exploded as he 
passed by, and this made him suffer complications in his lower leg.43  
 
                                                     
39 TRA001277/2, 69–70; and ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46, TRA001274/2 [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 20/05/2002, 20/05/2002, 94–6. 
40 TRA002000/1, 12–6. The main narrative during Gatete in this regard was to allege that Gatete was not one of 
the ringleaders of the genocide in the Murambi commune, as evidenced by the frequency with which witnesses 
mentioned other personalities in the region. TRA005152/1, 40; ICTR–00–61, TRA005145/1, Gatete – Redacted 
Transcript of 10/3/2010, 10/3/2010, 54; ICTR–00–61, TRA005153/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 
16/03/2010, 16/03/2010, 42, 61 and 64–6; and ICTR–00–61, TRA005157/1, Gatete, Redacted Transcript of 
22/3/2010, 22/3/2010, 53. 
41 See all of his own testimony. TRA001851/2. 
42 ICTR–99–46, TRA001615/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 25/03/2002, 
25/03/2002, 30–3; and TRA001618/02, 77–9. See also ICTR–99–46, TRA001782/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura 
et al – Redacted Transcript of 16/10/2002, 16/10/2002, 28; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001799/1 [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 30/10/2002, 30/10/2002, 12–7. 
43 TRA001619/2, 39–40. 
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Cyangugu camp was, then, far from being the place where Imanishimwe could effectively 
orchestrate genocide. It was further argued that Imanishimwe was not even the most senior 
(and therefore powerful) member of the security forces in Cyangugu as the Gendarme 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bavugamenshi, had a superior rank. It was also 
Bavugamenshi, not Imanishimwe, who was responsible for order and security, with 
Imanishimwe additionally claiming that he had no responsibility or authority for the 




The defence also constructed ‘counter–histories’, which offered competing understandings of 
the past to try to undermine the prosecution’s account of how and why the violence occurred. 
Two types of these counter–histories were presented during the trials: one of the conflict as a 
whole and the other of violence within the localities, which were similar to the prosecution’s 
but with minor, but key, alterations that exonerated the accused. 
 
The latter type of counter–history was particularly used by Gatete’s defence, who overall 
drew on a slightly different strategy when compared to the other trials, which was to argue at 
a more basic level that he didn’t do it and that he wasn’t there. The defence did not deny the 
occurrence of violence, but simply denied that it had anything to do with Gatete, who was 
never at any of the locations where the violence allegedly occurred. Gatete’s defence re–
constructed the prosecution’s narratives to a very detailed level, including the build–up to the 
                                                     
44 TRA001618/02, 76; TRA001796/1, 37; TRA001851/2, 33–6 and 48–53; TRA001907, 28; and ICTR–99–46, 
TRA001781/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 15/10/2002, 15/10/2002, 2–3. 
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violence, the violence itself, and who were the leaders of the particular attacks, but simply 
removed Gatete from the picture altogether. This was the case for their accounts of the 
violence at both Mukarange and Kiziguro parish, where the overlap with the prosecution’s 
account was most striking.45 Similar counter–histories were also constructed during Akayesu, 
and in Cyangugu, as can be seen in the narratives noted above about Bagambiki’s attempted 
intervention at the various massacre sites.46 However, rather than whether or not the accused 
was present at a site, these accounts worked to challenge the prosecution’s interpretation of 
the meaning of their presence.47  
 
The second type of counter–history used tied in with the chaos argument above, offering a 
different account of the overall violence in Rwanda, which placed the RPF as the sole 
aggressor. Throughout this history, the Hutus were peace–loving democrats and the Tutsis 
(thinly disguised as the RPF) were war–mongering despots. This placed the Tutsis, not the 
Hutus, as being responsible for the worst period of undemocratic rule of the country during 
the Tutsi monarchy, where the Hutus were rendered as second–class citizens—despite their 
majority status. As such, the Hutu Revolution in 1959 was presented as a democratic 
                                                     
45 Mukarange: ICTR–00–61, TRA005158/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 17/03/2010, 17/03/2010, 11; 
TRA005157/1, 12–21. Kiziguro: TRA005145/1, 39–49; ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018748, Gatete, Redacted 
Transcript of 11/3/2010, 11/03/2010, 24; and ICTR–00–61, TRA005154/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 
15/03/2010, 15/03/2010, 70–2. See also TRA005147/1, 54 and 73.  
46 A good example of these types of narratives in Akayesu was the attempt to explain why Akayesu had been 
present in a neighbouring commune, where the prosecution alleged that he was searching for Emphrem 
Karangwa in order to kill him. Akayesu responded that he had gone there to find some more material so that he 
could make some additional police uniforms for some new recruits. CONTRA001231, 88–90. An example from 
Imanishimwe’s case would be the acceptance that soldiers committed acts of violence, but these were simply 
some minor disciplinary offenses, not the systematic rounding up and killings of Tutsis. ICTR–99–46, 
TRA001993/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 22/01/2003, 22/01/2003, 14. 
47  One particularly successful counter–history here was Bagambiki’s account of the extraction of the refugees 
from the Kamarampaka stadium, noted above. Here, whilst acknowledging the risk involved, he responded that 
his actions were driven both out of legitimate concern, but also because if he did not act on the suspicion that 
there were RPF persons within the stadium then the militia waiting outside would have massacred all the 
refugees.  TRA001920/1, 25–8; TRA001781/1, 27; and TRA001800/1, 29–30. Following the extraction, in 
opposition to the prosecution’s narrative where Bagambiki and Imanishimwe supervised the killing of these 
refugees, the defence alleged that whilst they were not present the militia waiting outside the stadium captured 
and killed the refugees. TRA001781/1, 28. 
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revolution against a small clique trying to cling to power. Even then, the 40 years of a single 
party authoritarian state were presented as being ‘democratic’ because they were ruled by the 
majority of the population (the Hutu) and the quota system, which ensured that the Hutus 
retained the majority of the most influential positions within the country, was presented as 
fair and just.48 Habyarimana’s second republic was, the defence argued, a period when 
tolerance was a cornerstone of the country’s politics.49 As one of the defence’s witnesses 
claimed: 
Well, Counsel, I would say that with the advent of the second republic President 
Habyarimana contributed to better understanding amongst Rwandans. The goals that 
were sought after, the goals sought by his policy which were peace, unity, 
development, were achieved for all Rwandans: Hutus, Tutsis and Twa. All 
Rwandans lived in symbiosis in -- and where true development was taking place.50 
 
 
The defence, however, claimed that the RPF (Tutsis), who were an international force 
supported by the Ugandan military and government, were unwilling to accept reintegration by 
democratic means and were hell–bent on regaining power and re-establishing minority rule. 51 
This drive for power at all costs produced a counter–cycle of violence to the prosecution’s: in 
the build-up to 1994, each time the Rwandan government secured some semblance of peace 
the RPF re–commenced hostilities, and each time they did chaos and violence descended 
upon Rwanda due to spontaneous outpourings by normal Rwandans.52 One witness during 
Cyangugu recalled:  
So, in summary, it wasn't something that was planned, thought out, supported by the 
authorities and particularly by the government, but, rather, this was violence that 
broke out each time there were attacks by the RPF, especially in 1991 -- January 
1991 when there was the attack at Ruhengeri; and on the 8th of February as well 
1993, when there was a massive RPF attack; and lastly in June, July 1992 when the 
                                                     
48 TRA001293/2, 50–1. 
49 Ibid., 50–51; and TRA002003/1, 2. 
50 TRA002002/2, 64. 
51  TRA001851/2, 19; TRA001610/2, 26–7; TRA001618/02, 78–9; and TRA001293/2, 46 and 48. 
52 ICTR–99–46, TRA000130/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 20/11/2000, 
20/11/2000, 22–3; TRA001610/2, 38–9, 67–8, and 77; TRA002003/1, 5–6; and TRA001912/1, 33.   
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RPF attacked -- and, if you will -- occupied about nearly the whole préfecture of 
Byumba53 
 
This was the cycle of violence that ultimately led to the chaos and outpouring of emotion in 
1994, noted above.54 More than this, it was the RPF and not the interim government, the 
defence claimed, that were responsible for the perpetration of systematic violence, which also 
continued after they took power. 55 This narrative was particularly emphasised by Gatete’s 
defence, where it also became more personal as defence witnesses repeatedly noted the death 
of several of Gatete’s family at the hands of the RPF.56 
 
These narrative frameworks challenged the prosecution’s case head on, providing an 
alternative account that shifted the entire explanation for the violence in an attempt to 
introduce doubt over the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. Additionally, the broader 
counter–history played a role in supporting the chaos argument, which worked to diminish 
the responsibility of the accused. These accounts also sought to undermine the legitimacy of 
the prosecution as a whole. This was because the prosecution had explicitly charged the 
accused under Article 3 of the statute, the ‘additional protocol 2’ of the Geneva Convention, a 
provision that explicitly only covered conflicts of a ‘non–international’ nature.57 If the 
defence could establish the international nature of the conflict, by focusing on the role of 
countries like Uganda, then this would effectively render the prosecution’s war crimes charge 
obsolete. 
                                                     
 53 TRA001293/2, 105.  
54 TRA000130/01, 22–3. 
55 TRA001293/2, 111; ICTR–99–46, TRA001621/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
08/10/2002, 08/10/2002, 40–1; and TRA002003/1, 5–6. 
56 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0081, Gatete – Defence Response to Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of 
Facts of Common Knowledge, 07/08/2009, 5; CONTRA018748, 11; ICTR–00–61, TRA005150/1, Gatete – 
Redacted Transcript of 04/03/2010, 04/03/2010, 30; TRA005148/1, 62, 63 and 68; and ICTR–00–61, 
TRA005507/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 10/11/2009, 10/11/2009, 79. 




The Conditions of Truth  
 
When explaining why these narrative frameworks appeared as they did, then a number of the 
factors that fell under the rubric of the ‘conditions of truth’ in Chapter Two reappear. As with 
the prosecution, law’s imprint was firmly left on these accounts. This was most clearly seen 
in the first subsection where the defences’ narrative structures, and hence the witnesses’ 
testimony, attempted to produce accounts that specifically tried to undermine the 
prosecution’s allegations that the accused possessed the necessary special intent to be found 
guilty of genocide.58  
 
These narratives also, like the prosecution’s, emphasised a particular association between 
levels of agency and perpetratorhood and victimhood. Whilst the prosecution throughout their 
accounts constructed an understanding of the accused as hyper–conscious and rational 
perpetrators seeking power at all costs, and with this attributing a considerable amount of 
agency to them, the chaos argument discussed above removed any sense of agency; the 
accused were simply unable to act any differently and therefore could not be punished. 
Tellingly, these narratives drew on the same discursive understanding of violence that 
featured in the UN’s discussions during the genocide (discussed in Chapter One), which, like 
here, led to the belief that it was impossible to ‘do something’ in order to stop the violence. 
Similarly, within some of these narratives—particularly concerning Bagambiki and 
Akayesu—the defendant’s lack of agency rendered them ‘victims’ of the violence as they 
                                                     
58 The same principle underpinned the defences’ attempts to prove that both Tutsis and Hutus were the targets of 
violence, because if this were the case then it would at least weaken the prosecution’s claim that what occurred 
was genocide. See for example, TRA002001/1, 22–3; and TRA002003/1, 58. 
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were incapable of influencing the events that happened to them. Finally, as was discussed in 
the chaos section, the defence presented the Tutsis within Cyangugu as potential threats due 
to the acts of terrorism and sabotage for which they were allegedly responsible. This 
attributed agency to these actors, which both legitimised certain forms of violence against 
them and prevented them from being seen as victims. Therefore, these accounts, like the 
prosecution, were constructed in a way that served legal ends, because of the law’s way of 
accounting for the social world. 
 
However, these accounts, like those of the prosecution, also had a value beyond the law. The 
courtroom provided a space for witnesses, as argued, where counter–hegemonic narratives of 
violence could be heard.59 As at other war crimes trials, such as Zundel in Canada, at points 
these offered a problematic interpretation of the violence (such as that the Tutsis had 
deserved or brought the violence upon themselves).60 But at other points these offered a 
moment whereby acts of violence, and complicit partners in that violence, could be 
highlighted where they would otherwise have been ignored. This captured the violence that 
was inflicted by the RPF and the role of international actors, such as Uganda, in contributing 
to the violence. There was the sense, moreover, that the defence deliberately constructed 
some of these narratives in order to make the record reflect a fuller history of the violence in 
Rwanda. During Akayesu the defence argued: 
This trial, above all, is an opportunity for us to be heard, or for you to be heard, 
rather, for us to hear the protests of our conscience and to bear testimony to history, 
because history is always incomplete without the testimony of the vanquished.61 
 
                                                     
59 Simpson, Law, War and Crime (see Into., n. 18), 90–4. 
60 Douglas, Memory of Judgement (see Intro., n. 11), 226–57.  
61 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001236, Akayesu – Transcript of 23/3/1998, 23/03/1998, 8.  
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In a similar way to which the prosecution’s witnesses were able at moments to reclaim an 
understanding of the genocide, the defence witnesses were also able to challenge the 
hegemonic account of violence being produced at the Tribunal, and in Rwanda, where the 




Beyond offering alternative explanations about the violence in Rwanda, the defence also 
attacked the prosecution’s case in two other ways. The first was in cross–examining the 
witnesses in an attempt to undermine their credibility, which would mean that their testimony 
could not contribute towards establishing the accused’s guilt. The second was by attempting 
to challenge the very basis of the prosecution’s case as it was being constructed, in order to 




The defence drew on a variety of different tactics during cross–examination to undermine the 
credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses, including: pressing the witnesses over any change 
in their evidence between their in–court testimony and their pre–trial statement (perhaps the 
most commonly used tactic);62 trying to pull out even the smallest contradictions in their 
                                                     
62 For some examples see: ICTR–99–46, TRA000122/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript 
of 09/10/2000, 09/10/2000, 87; ICTR–99–46, TRA000251/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 18/01/2001, 18/01/2001, 73; ICTR–99–46, TRA000434/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 14/02/2001, 14/02/2001, 110; ICTR–00–61, TRA005490/2, Gatete – Redacted 
Transcript of 21/10/2009, 21/10/2009, 27–8; ICTR–00–61, TRA005491/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 
03/11/2009, 03/11/2009, 17–21; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001179, Akayesu – Transcript of 21/1/1997, 
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evidence to suggest that the witness was lying;63 and questioning the plausibility of a 
witness’s narrative.64 The latter technique often appeared to draw on the extreme nature of 
genocide, and witnessing genocide, in order to imply that what the witness had claimed to 
have experienced could not possibly have been true. The following exchange is from 
Akayesu: 
Defence: How much time did you spend at the bureau communal?  
Witness: Approximately two weeks.  
Defence: Before seeking refuge at the bureau communal you knew that people were 
being killed there and why did you go there in spite of that?  
Witness: I sought refuge there because I knew that people who were going there 
were killed by bullets. I didn't want to be killed by machetes and clubs.  
Defence: So you had a preference to be killed by bullet?  
Witness: I preferred to be killed by bullet because I thought that it was more painful 
to be killed by clubs and hoes.65 
 
During cross–examination witnesses were also targeted en masse as the defence argued that 
‘syndicates’ (often accused of being led by survivor organisations like Ibuka) had forced the 
witnesses to lie.66 In Gatete this narrative took on a slightly different form as the defence 
                                                                                                                                                                     
21/01/1997, 100–2; and ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001198, Akayesu – Transcript of 6/2/1997, 06/02/1997, 220–60. 
In one particularly damning instance the witness was asked to read out one of their pre–trial statements and they 
changed it in order to match their in–court testimony. ICTR–00–61, TRA005537/2, Gatete – Redacted 
Transcript of 12/11/2009, 12/11/2009, 78. 
63 ICTR–00–61, TRA001643/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 20/10/2009, 20/10/2009, 44–5; ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA001197, Akayesu – Transcript of 5/2/1997, 05/02/1997, 98–9; and CONTRA001190, 107–9. 
Sometimes this tactic made it seem almost as though the defence were trying to create contradictions just to 
annoy the witnesses. For this see the prosecution’s re–examination of Witness S, CONTRA001197, 116–61; 
and Senior Reviser  (2015). 
64 ICTR–99–46, TRA000252/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 22/01/2001, 
22/01/2001, 7–8; ICTR–99–46, TRA000443/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
02/05/2001, 02/05/2001, 75–6; ICTR–99–46, TRA000540, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 13/09/2001, 13/09/2001, 23–4; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001182, Akayesu – Transcript of 
24/1/1997, 24/01/1997, 51–3; and ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001222, Akayesu – Transcript of 23/10/1997, 
23/10/1997, 7. 
65 CONTRA001222, 7–8. See also ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001223, Akayesu – Transcript of 24/10/1997, 
24/10/1997, 3; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001224, Akayesu – Transcript of 27/10/1997, 27/10/1997, 53; ICTR–96–
4, CONTRA001226, Akayesu – Transcript of 31/10/1997, 31/10/1997, 4; ICTR–99–46, TRA000217/1, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/10/2000, 24/10/2000, 39; ICTR–99–46, 
TRA000253/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 23/01/2001, 23/01/2001, 60; and 
TRA000434/2, 109.  
66 CONTRA001238, 1–17; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001218, Akayesu – Redacted Transcript, 10/2/1998, 79–81; 
CONTRA001218, Akayesu – Audio Recording: Interview of Jean Paul Akayesu in Zambia, 10/04/1996, Tape I, 
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argued that the witnesses had testified as a result of a defamation campaign that had been 
orchestrated against Gatete before the genocide had begun, which made the witnesses 
susceptible to malicious rumours of Gatete’s involvement in the genocide later on.67  
 
‘Perpetrator’ witnesses were particularly stringently cross–examined, and even more so when 
they had participated in a crime charged within the indictments. These witnesses were 
attacked at both a generic level, which targeted the credibility of all perpetrator witnesses, 
and at a more individualised level. In the following cross–examination, the defence tried to 
establish that the prosecution’s witness lacked credibility due to the level of their 
involvement in the genocide, which meant they were both of dubious character and that they 
had a vested interest in implicating others: 
Defence: Witness LAI, during your testimony here before the Court you said that in 
1994 you were so powerful that just by looking at a Tutsi, the Tutsi could die. My 
question witness LAI is the following, did you participate in killings in Bisesero?  
Witness: Yes, Counsel. 
Defence: Did you also participate in the killings in Mimbilizi?  
Witness: Yes.  
Defence: Did you participate in the killings in Kamembe?  
Witness: Yes, I was in Kamembe but I was looking for the Tutsi and accomplices. 
Some of them even died. We wanted to provide protection to the government which 
had taken refuge there.  
Defence: Thank you, Witness LAI. Did you participate in the killings in Shangi?  
Witness: Yes, Counsel.  
Defence: Did you also participate in the killings in Gishoma commune?  
Witness: Yes, Counsel […]. 
Defence… Witness LAI, how many people did you kill or how many people did 
you contribute to killing?  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Side A; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001283/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 03/07/2002 – 
Motion, 03/07/2002, 65. 
67 TRA001643/1, 7–8. 
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Witness: I killed many. I do not know the exact number. At this juncture I think it is 
time for me to ask for pardon for what I did. I did a lot of harm, that is all I can 
say.68 
[….] 
Defence: Did you denounce the accomplices with whom you committed your 
crimes in 1994? The questions is very simple?  
Witness: Yes.  
Defence: How many accomplices did you denounce?  
Witness: In my file, it's 125 persons that I mentioned. 
Defence: Is it correct Witness LAI that before you made your confession you met 
with a person from the Prosecutor's office who told you that your confession would 
lead to a lighter sentence?  
Witness: No, nobody told me that. I made my confession before the authorities from 
my own initiative. It was my conscience which told me to do that. I believe that I 
had to ask for forgiveness before God, before the Rwandan people and before the 
international community.69 
 
During the closing arguments at Cyangugu the defence effectively called for the judges to 
throw out all perpetrator evidence, claiming that these were morally dubious characters that 
were displacing their responsibility onto others, noting additionally that it was not a 
coincidence that not a single victim (i.e., a trustworthy witness) had directly implicated the 
accused.70  
 
Although the centrality of the cross–examination within the overall trial strategy appeared 
more significant for the defence than the prosecution (the defence, after all, only had to 
introduce reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s case), the prosecution also drew on these 
techniques when cross–examining the defence’s witnesses. The prosecution, however, used 
two additional tactics that sought to question the value of a witness’s testimony. The first 
challenged the usefulness of negative testimony—that something did not happen or that the 
                                                     
68 ICTR–99–46, TRA000751/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 25/09/2001, 
25/09/2001, 23–4. 
69 TRA000751/01, 32–3. 
70 TRA002063/1, 27–30. 
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accused was not at a particular massacre—as they argued that it was impossible for one 
witness to see everything that had occurred. This was particularly prominent in Gatete.71 In 
closing the prosecution argued: 
You listened to 27 witnesses for the Defence. Most of them came to tell you that 
they didn't see the Accused; they didn't hear him; and they don't know where he was 
at the time of the crimes. It's a distinctive feature of this case that not one of the 
Defence witnesses ever said where the Accused actually was during the crimes.72  
 
The second aspect (and one used with surprising regularity) was to not cross–examine the 
witness at all.73 This seemingly either implied a witnesses’ irrelevance for the case or that 
their own testimony had undermined itself to the extent that the prosecution’s work was 
already done.  
 
As the Tribunal progressed changes both outside and inside of the Tribunal affected how 
cross–examination proceeded. In particular, this process was influenced by Gacaca records 
being made available to the parties, which offered both new information about particular 
incidents and provided additional witness statements that had been made by ICTR witnesses 
at Gacaca hearings.74 This offered a chance for both prosecution and defence (although this 
was particularly drawn on by the defence) to further undermine the witnesses’ testimony 
during cross–examination by showing that a witnesses had provided accounts at Gacaca 
which conflicted with their ICTR testimony.75 This change resulted from the Rwandan 
government’s increased cooperation with the Tribunal and also a decision in Nchamihigo 
where the judges ruled that the prosecution had an affirmative duty to aid the defence in 
                                                     
71 For examples see: TRA005150/1, 56. CONTRA018674, 35; TRA005152/1, 79; and TRA005154/1, 101. 
72 ICTR–00–61, TRA005592, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 08/11/2010, 08/11/2010, 2.   
73 For an example see: TRA002000/1, 26. 
74 For example, see: TRA005592, 52–3. 
75 ICTR–00–61, TRA005458, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 22/10/2009, 22/10/2009, 33; TRA005507/2, 87; 
and TRA005152/1, 21–2.  
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acquiring Gacaca records.76 These changes influenced the way in which the accounts of 
violence were produced during the trials. First, these new records could, as suggested above, 
result in a witness’s credibility being undermined.77 Second, these also affected which 
witnesses were called to testify. During Seromba, for instance, the prosecution dropped its 
‘star witness’, the bulldozer driver who demolished the Nyange Church, after reading ten of 
his prior Gacaca records.78  
 
The tactics employed during cross–examination, particularly by the defence, also appeared to 
have a secondary purpose of trying to unnerve and frustrate the witness in order to make them 
react in a manner that suggested they lacked credibility. This particularly brought the tensions 
between the Tribunal’s interests into stark relief. Attempts to unnerve the witnesses 
drastically contrasted with the way in which the Tribunal was supposed to, in part at least, 
function as a site for victims. Several ICTR witnesses interviewed by Redress noted the 
negative effects that the cross–examination had on them, stating that this at times made them 
feel like they were the ones being accused of committing genocide.79 Indeed, the defences’ 
main priority was, understandably, defending their clients’ interests and as a consequence 
there was little that was off limits when they tried to undermine the witnesses’ credibility. As 
Jenia Turner noted, whilst some of the defence counsels saw that trials could achieve extra–
                                                     
76 ICTR–00–61–0131, Gatete – Motion for Disclosure of Rwandan Judicial Records Pursuant to Rule 66 (A) (ii) 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 02/11/2009, 3. There is also evidence of the effects of this during 
Gatete where the prosecution was requested to assist the defence in obtaining the most recent Gacaca records – 
although this was always presented as a ‘voluntary’ action rather than a direct order by the court.  ICTR–00–61, 
TRA005505/2, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 14/10/2009, 14/10/2009, 3–5. 
77 ICTR–00–61–0240/1, 48–9 and 85. 
78 George Townsend, ‘Use of Domestic Court Records’, ICTR Legacy Symposium. 
79 Redress, Survivors and Post–Genocide Justice in Rwanda, 57. Some witnesses clearly also felt that the 
examination–in–chief was an intimidating event. In this following extract, Judge Aspegren had to intervene in 
order to try to get the witness to cooperate with the prosecution:  
Justice Aspegren: Do you understand that you, yourself, are not accused? You are not suspected of any 
crimes? 
Witness: Well, I don’t know of any crime that I can be accused of. ICTR–96–4, TRA001178, Akayesu 
– Transcript of 14/1/1997, 14/01/1997, 162. 
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judicial aims, such as constructing a history about the violence, they also said that they would 
without question do what they had to in order to defend their client, even if this meant 
questioning witnesses in a way that might re–traumatise them.80 One defence lawyer said: 
‘You can’t think of whether you’re going to hurt that person’s feelings; you should represent 
your client in the best way.’81 At points this put the legal and extra–judicial goals of the court 
in direct opposition to each other as the chance of the court acting as a site of healing, 
reflection and/or catharsis were undermined by the pursuit of legal goals. This led to some 
particularly distasteful and deeply insensitive comments. One particularly serious example of 
this came in the Akayesu closing when the defence argued in reference to Witness J’s 
testimony concerning the rape of her six–year–old child:  
Now, we are wondering, we are saying here, the defence, that the fantasy of this 
witness may be of interest to psychologists and not justice and not legal lawyers, 
and this is why we are saying that we need to look at Mr. Akayesu and that we need 
to remove him from this kind of testimony.82 
 
Attempts were made, however, to try to protect witnesses from some of the negative effects 
of cross-examination. Both the prosecution and the defence were often brought to heel if their 
questions seemed to be insensitive to what the witnesses had been through, as the notion of 
the victims’ rights came to play a role in determining how the court constructed its 
narratives.83 During one cross–examination, the prosecution requested the bench to intervene:  
My Lords, I'm seeking protection for the witness from Counsel because we must 
recall the witness is being asked to recall or recount very tragic events in his 
lifetime, and as such be protected from cross–examination that doesn't seem to lead 
us anywhere […].84  
                                                     
80 Turner, ‘Defense Perspectives’ (see Intro., n. 36), 567–9. 
81 Ibid., 569. 
82 CONTRA001238. 
83  ICTR–99–46, TRA001785/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 01/10/2002, 
01/10/2002, 73. For an example of where this ruling leads to a restriction on the cross–examination see: 
TRA001785/, 75. TRA000252/2, 94; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001183, Akayesu – Transcript of 15/1/1997, 
15/01/1997, 140; CONTRA001186, 142; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000129/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 26/10/2000, 26/10/2000, 81–2. 
84 ICTR–99–46, TRA000124/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 10/10/2000, 
10/10/2000, 31 and 36. See also, ICTR–99–46, TRA001922/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
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The same was also true of perpetrator witnesses. Here, interventions tried to prevent the 
counsels from asking questions that could potentially produce evidence that could incriminate 
the witness in future proceedings against them.85 The defence counsels and judges appeared 
to, in particular, be willing to intervene when the witness on the stand was an ICTR defendant 
and it was feared that the cross–examination was in danger of producing incriminating 
evidence that might be used against the witness at their own trial, hence undermining their 
right to a fair trial.86 This shows that the rights of the various actors in the courtroom 
influenced how the trials progressed and also how the court’s account of violence was to 
unfold, as this limited the ways in which the defence and prosecution could manipulate the 
witnesses’ testimony. It was these types of rules—which concern themselves with far more 
than the veracity of a statement—that give legal archives like the ICTR’s their distinct 
quality.  
 
However, it was far from clear that these interventions were motivated, first and foremost, by 
a concern for the witnesses’ wellbeing. For underneath these interventions was also a legal 
aim to limit potentially damaging testimony from entering the courtroom. The defence, then, 
were keen to stop the prosecution’s wide–ranging enquiries into the perpetrator witnesses 
background, because this could reduce their credibility and potentially also introduce 
additional incriminating evidence. Moreover, as the above also demonstrated, these measures 
were largely insufficient and there was clearly a sense that there was a limit to which the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Transcript of 03/04/2003, 03/04/2003, 11. This did not succeed in eradicating insensitive questioning at the 
Tribunal. ‘Witness LCF, can you tell this Court what justifies the fantasy of dressing [your father’s dead body], 
which is already clothed, with another pair of shorts?’ ICTR–99–46, TRA000399/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et 
al – Redacted Transcript of 21/05/2001, 21/05/2001, 15.  
85 TRA001619/2, 25–27; ICTR–99–46, TRA000873/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
18/03/2002, 18/03/2002, 40–65.  
86  ICTR–99–46, TRA001620/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 07/10/2002, 
07/10/2002, 25–9. This was also true when the prosecution cross–examined the defendants in their own trial. 
See cross–examination of Ntagerura: TRA001785/1, 75. See also TRA002003/1, 6 and 53. 
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witness’s needs could be taken into consideration. As Judge Aspegren reminded one witness 
who had refused to cooperate with the defence: 
Please, I would like to make a point of clarification. Can you tell the witness that she 
is obliged to respond to all the questions put to her. She should not forget that she has 
taken the oath to tell truth, only the truth, and nothing but the truth and we have, up to 
this time, respected her age. She probably is still under the shock of what she saw, 
what she witnessed. We are very patient. But we do not want her to abuse this, either. 
Please listen. We respect her age, but it is not polite for her to question the Tribunal 
and the lawyers. The defence counsel has a right to put questions to her. It is her duty 
to answer the questions. She has to have the patience and respond to questions put to 
her. I hope I'm not going to have to warn her once again. This will be the last time.87 
 
This, along with the defence’s acknowledgement that their tactics could undermine the 
integrity of the witnesses, suggests that there was an acceptance of the potential 
incompatibility of the court’s and witnesses’ needs.88 Importantly, when these were in tension 
the court’s priorities were to override the witnesses’.89 
 
Contesting the Parameters of the Case 
 
                                                     
87 CONTRA001183, 143. 
88 This was also captured in a number of interviews I conducted where there was almost a resigned acceptance 
that there was, to a degree, an incompatibility with the witnesses and Tribunals needs and expectations. Member 
of the ICTR Victim and Witness Support (2015), (Arusha, Tanzania: June); and Senior Investigator (2015). 
89 This was even apparent in this following statement by Judge Khan, which expressed his concern and support 
for the witness and their wellbeing:  
Mr President: Are you feeling better now?  
The Witness: Yes, I feel well now.  
Mr President: Let me take this opportunity to convey the Court's concern –– not concern, the 
Court's sympathy with the position you find yourself in. – Regrettably, some of the things you 
will be asked are not nice to remember. They're not –– they're bad memories. They are things 
that you went through which are better forgotten. But we are looking for something, which is 
elusive, called the truth. And in the search for the truth we ask everybody to make a sacrifice, 
including you, to make the sacrifice to live through situations that were very bad and to 
recollect bad memories.  
So, do not feel bad or distressed when counsel seeks to ask you to recount, because if you 
don't recount and you –– of all the people in this room, it is only you who was there. So you 
are the only one who knows what the truth is. And if you don't tell us we will never get to it.  
So, please understand our position and understand the position of counsel as she asks you 
questions. After she has finished, another counsel on this side will also ask you questions. 
And in the asking of questions, they are trying to look for the truth, which is important 
because without it we cannot get justice. And our job here is to do justice.  
ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018137, Gatete – Redacted Transcript 04/11/2009, 04/11/2009, 45. 
199 
 
The defence deployed two other tactics during the cases under examination. The first was a 
pre-emptive attack against the witnesses’ testimony where they proactively intervened to 
limit the prosecution witnesses’ testimony from being given at all. This was very much, then, 
the defence trying to prevent records from being added to the archive. The second technique 
used was challenging the very validity and legality of the prosecution’s case either in whole 
or in part.  
 
First, the defence would, where possible, intervene to stop witness testimony when they 
deemed that they had not been put on notice of the allegations being led. For example, as 
noted in Chapter Three, during Cyangugu, the defence intervened as Witness LBH began to 
tell the court how on a number of occasions Interahamwe, under the supervision of 
Bagambiki and Imanishimwe, took women from Kamarampaka stadium and raped them:90  
Mr So’o [Defence counsel for Imanishimwe]: Mr President, Your Honour. The 
Defence is rather worried that these matters of rapes are put on record because the 
rapes do not appear in the indictment served on us. So we feel rather concerned 
that they are being included in the record […].91 
 
As aforementioned, the prosecution argued in response that the crime had been charged in the 
indictment because the defendants had been accused of committing genocide at the 
Kamarampaka stadium, and that the Akayesu trial had previously established that rape could 
be an act of genocide. This, alongside their opening statement that had explicitly stated that 
Bagambiki was responsible for rape within Cyangugu (and the withdrawn amended 
indictment) had, the prosecution argued, put the defendants on notice for this charge.92 The 
                                                     
90 ICTR–99–46, CONTRA002340, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 13/02/2001, 
13/02/2001, 88–90. 
91 Ibid., 89. 
92 During the opening statement the Prosecution stated: ‘Many witnesses will say that they saw him committing 
or allowing other individuals to commit other acts of violence against Tutsis especially against women, Tutsi 
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judges rejected this argument, stating that rape was a distinct material act that the prosecution 
had to plead in the indictment, and this testimony was consequently erased from the trial’s 
record.93 During the trial, after another witness referred to sexual violence, the defence 
requested that the judges remove the reference from the record. Consequently, the transcript 
for that session read: 
Witness: There were also a few Interahamwe who lived in that house, the 
Interahamwe who I mentioned whom [sic] came to select people. There were also 
girls who were brought into that building by gendarmes. The gendarmes would 
select them from among the refugees from the camp [DELETED TEXT].94  
 
The Judges removed any doubt about the irrelevance of sexual violence when they ruled: 
Just before we start I just wanted to make one issue very clear. Near the end of the 
proceedings yesterday, Mr. So'o pointed out to us that the witness, in giving 
evidence, had made some reference to the word ‘rape’, and he had asked us to have 
it expunged from the record. Of course, it would have meant going back after many 
hours of testimony to determine where that word appeared, and at the time I 
indicated that we would not pay any attention to that. But just to have it quite clear: 
What is meant is that there is no charge of rape before the Court. The Court is, 
therefore, not going to pay any attention to that word. We are not going to allow it 
to influence us in any way in arriving at our decision. So, we just want it to be 
clearly understood. We are not going to be influenced by that word being on [...] the 
record. Because we are not taking that into account, and we are not going to be 
influenced by it in any way. I just want the record to clearly indicate that.95 
 
The defence also directly contested the validity of the prosecutions’ cases either in whole or 
in part. This often happened during the pre–trial stage, where the defence lodged preliminary 
motions that challenged prosecution’s indictments, which frequently resulted in the judges 
ordering the prosecution to amend the indictment in order to add greater specificity and detail 
into the charges and set out the material facts with greater clarity. This affected each of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
women who were every day kidnapped so that they would be raped.’ ICTR–99–46, TRA000207/01, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 18/09/2000, 18/09/2000, 53. 
93 ICTR–99–46, TRA000433/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 14/02/2001 – Decision, 
14/02/2001, 11–3. 
94 ICTR–99–46, TRA000436/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 19/02/2001, 
19/02/2001, 25. 
95 TRA000437/2, 1–2. 
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trials highlighted here, and with these changes the boundaries that were to be imposed on the 
witnesses’ testimonies became more tightly drawn.96 In Ntagerura’s case, for instance, this 
meant that the prosecution was forced to add greater specificity as to who it was that 
Ntagerura allegedly conspired with and also the dates and locations of the criminal acts 
Ntagerura was charged with. Here the judges argued that the prosecution’s claim that an 
event, for instance, happened between 1 January and 31 July 1994 was (unsurprisingly) 
insufficiently precise.97 This, as will be shown in the following chapter, could have a 
significant impact on outcome of a case and therefore on the final account of violence 
produced at each trial.  
  
Finally, the defence also retrospectively challenged the prosecution’s case prior to 
commencing their own under Rule 98 bis. This provided the defence with an opportunity 
after the prosecution’s case had closed to argue that due to the deficiencies of the 
prosecution’s evidence that, for certain aspects of the indictment, they had no case to answer. 
For example, in Cyangugu, Imanishimwe’s defence lodged a Rule 98 bis motion that argued 
there was no case to answer for the conspiracy charge because the prosecution had failed to 
produce any evidence of when the conspirators (the three accused in the case) had met and 
                                                     
96 ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0028, Akayesu – Inter–Office Memo Transmitting a Brief in Response to a 
Preliminary Motion, 04/09/1996; ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0531, Akayesu – Decision on the Preliminary 
Motion Submitted by the Prosecutor for Protective Measures for the Witnesses, 27/09/1996; ICTR–96–4, 
ICTR–96–4–0160, Akayesu – Decision on the Preliminary Motions Presented by the Prosecution and the 
Defence, 17/02/1997; ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0072, Ntagerura – Brief in Response to the Preliminary 
Motions, 29/07/1997; ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0208, Ntagerura –  Decision on the Preliminary Motion 
Filed by the Defence Based on Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 28/11/1997; Prosecutor v. Emmanuel 
Bagambiki, Case No. ICTR–97–36 (hereafter ICTR–97–36), ICTR–97–36–0039/1, Imanishimwe Preliminary 
Motions, 28/01/1998; ICTR–97–36–0043, Preliminary Motions, 18/02/1998; ICTR–97–36, ICTR–97–36–0048, 
The Prosecutor's Brief in Reply to the Defence Preliminary Motions on Behalf of Samuel Imanishimwe, 
24/03/1998; ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46–0072, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – Ntagerura et al – The Prosecutor's 
Preliminary Pre–Trial Brief, 24/05/2000; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0025, Gatete – Defence Preliminary 
Motions, Under Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 12/04/2003; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–
0022, Gatete – Prosecutor's Response to the Defense Preliminary Motion Challenging Defects in the form of the 
indictment Pursuant to Rule 72, 09/05/2003; and ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0029, Gatete, Decision on 
Defence Preliminary Motion, 29/03/2004. 
97 ICTR–96–10A–0208, 6–7. 
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agreed to the conspiracy.98 Despite the defence’s reliance on a needlessly conservative 
understanding of what constituted conspiracy in law, this challenge was successful, the 
judges entered an acquittal for that charge, and Imanishimwe’s defence was relived of its 
obligation of defending this element of the case.99 Whilst, as Chapter Three demonstrated, 
these interventions were not always successful, this shows the ability of the defence to 
influence the contents of the archive and, once again, the importance of law in shaping the 
ICTR’s archive.100  
 
A Failure in Defence? 
 
                                                     
98 This continued a long running battle between the defence and prosecution over this issue. ICTR–97–36–0043, 
4; and ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46–0015, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – Ntagerura et al – Reply of the Accused 
Ntagerura Andre to the Prosecutor's Motion for the Joinder of his Trial with that of the Accused Samuel 
Imanishimwe, 05/07/1999, 6. 
99 ICTR–99–46, TRA000552/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 06/03/2002– Oral 
Hearing on the Motion of Imanishimwe for Acquittal on Conspiracy Count, 06/03/2002, 37–9, 42–3 and 50–60. 
This was despite the judges, during the joinder hearing, accepting the prosecution’s more fluid understanding of 
what constituted conspiracy.  
The Trial Chamber is of the opinion that to establish the existence of a conspiracy, it is not 
necessary for the Prosecution to prove that the accused all acted together and at the same 
time. It is sufficient to establish that the accused had a common purpose or design, that they 
planned to carry out that purpose or design and that they executed that plan. ICTR–99–46, 
ICTR–99–46–0018, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – Ntagerura et al – Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Motion for Joinder, 11/10/1999, 10.  
Interestingly—and again showing the importance of law in framing the court’s narrative—Ntagerura also 
challenged the prosecution at this stage, but not explicitly on the same grounds as in Imanishimwe. They instead 
argued that there were no charges to answer if the judges excluded evidence from the record that related to acts 
by Ntagerura not charged in the indictment. The judges ruled that they could not exclude evidence from the 
record at that stage and so the motion failed. ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46–0429, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – 
Ntagerura et al – Prosecutor's Response to the Motion for Exclusion of Evidence Pursuant to Rules 5, 95 and 98 
Bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Filed by the Defence for Andre Ntagerura, 04/03/2002, 1–2; and 
ICTR–99–46, TRA000521/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 05/03/2002 – Motion, 
05/03/2002, 5. 
100 The final example also demonstrated the significance of the law’s particular epistemology. For the judges in 
Cyangugu opted for a particularly conservative interpretation of what constituted a conspiracy that depended on 
an understanding of the social world that saw events (here conspiracy) as being neatly ascribable to individuals, 
and their need to understand the accused’s responsibility through a lens that arguably overly stated the ability of 
individuals to act consciously and with autonomy and agency. As the prosecution, I think rightly, argued, the 
nature of conspiracy, especially during genocide, is much more fluid than this understanding allows for. 
Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Bagambiki et al, Case No. ICTR–97–36 (hereafter ICTR–97–36), ICTR–97–36–0150, 
Bagambiki – Imanishimwe – Munyakazi – Decision on the Defence Motion for the Separation of Crimes and 
Trials, 01/10/1998, 4–5; TRA000552/2, 8; and ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–00350, Ntagerura – Audio 
Recording of 11.08.1999 – AM, 11/08/1999. 
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A final issue that needs to be briefly touched upon here is the impact of the varying quality of 
the defence counsels on the trials. All of these tactics deployed by the defence, as with the 
prosecution, depended on the quality of the defence counsels. With the defence acting as 
essentially a check against the prosecution’s power, if the quality of the defence was in doubt 
then so was the legitimacy of the trial as a whole and the ‘authenticity’ of the records 
contained within the archive. 
 
The defence counsels, particularly in the early years of the Tribunal, were plagued with 
allegations of poor practice, ineffectiveness and corruption. During Akayesu, the defence 
counsel lacked both strategy and control, and also demonstrated poor cross–examination style 
as they seemed to simply ask random and sporadic questions in the hope that the witness 
would snap. These problems were particularly apparent during Akayesu’s own testimony, 
which at one point rambled on for nearly 89 pages without any interruption, only to be 
brought to order after the judges intervened:101 ‘Now I would like to know whether Counsel 
Tiangaye has specific questions to ask. I do not want us to continue the monologue. I want us 
to have a dialogue.’102 Moreover, during the closing arguments, Tribunal staff found the 
defence counsel—who had failed to show up at the trial—drunk in a bar, and it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Akayesu complained about the quality of his defence during the trial and 
requested a change of counsel; this also featured as a key, although unsuccessful, aspect of 
his appeal (submitted by a new counsel).103  
 
                                                     
101 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001231, Akayesu – Transcript of 12/3/1998, 12/03/1998, 64–153. 
102 Ibid., 153. 
103 Senior Legal Office – ICTR Chambers (Copenhagen, Denmark: June, 2016); and ICTR–96–4, 
CONTRA000049, Akayesu – Transcript of 1/11/2000 – Appeals Hearing, 01/11/2000, 26–56 and 120. 
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These issues spread beyond Akayesu, with similar signs of incompetence seen with 
Imanishimwe’s defence. UN reports on these issues also found that ‘fee–splitting’ between 
defence counsels and their clients, along with the Tribunal’s pay–regime (that paid defence 
counsel per day rather than per case), had produced excessive lawyering (often in the form of 
pointless motions) and slow trials, showing with particular clarity how these practices 
impacted on the trials.104 In response, a new pay regime was introduced that paid counsels by 
the trial, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) was amended in 2000 to give the 
chambers powers to sanction counsels for ‘frivolous’ motions.105 However, questions over 
the defence counsels continued to arise and were not helped by revelations that some defence 
teams had employed suspected genocidaires as investigators.106 This happened in Cyangugu 
where it emerged that the Imanishimwe’s defence had employed a suspect indicted by the 
                                                     
104 A/55/759, Financing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory 
of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report of the office of internal Oversight 
Services on the investigation into Possible Fee–Splitting Arrangements between Defence Counsel and indigent 
Detainees at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 01/02/2001, 8–13; and A/56/853, Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991: Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Comprehensive 
report on the results of the implementation of the recommendations of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of 
the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 04/03/2002, 2 and 6. Indeed, some counsels made a small fortune 
working at the Tribunal, with it being rumoured that one particular defence team held a party at a bar in Arusha 
to celebrate breaking the $1million mark. 
105 A/60/229–S/2005/534, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in 
the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 15/08/2005, 16; and A/56/853, 
6; A/55/435–S/2000/927, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in 
the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 02/10/2000, 13; and A/55/759, 
13. 
106 For instance, it was discovered that the co–counsel for Kabiligi had forged their Paris Bar certificate and was 
not actually a qualified lawyer.  ‘A Settling of Bad Accounts’ (see Internet Materials). 
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Tribunal, Siméon Nchamihigo, who was directly connected to the charges led in 
Cyangugu.107  
 
This is not to say that all defence counsels suffered from issues of incompetence. The general 
feeling at the Tribunal was that over time the quality of the defence improved, as lawyers 
with greater experience were attracted, such as Peter Robinson, who did a huge amount both 
for the reputation of the defence at the ICTR but also for ensuring that trials were being 
conducted as fairly as possible.108 Moreover, some responsibility for these issues falls 
elsewhere, as the defence were, for instance, hugely under–resourced (especially compared 
with their ICTY counterparts) in the early years.109 However, the quality of the defence (as it 
was for Akayesu and Imanishimwe) could have serious consequences for the outcome of the 




This chapter has examined the tactics used, and the accounts of violence produced, by the 
defence—why these existed as they did, and what effect this had on the archive. This has 
further shown the importance of legal and non–legal discourses in shaping the archive in 
particular ways, which were encapsulated here with the concept of the ‘conditions of truth’, 
as also discussed in Chapter Two. As I have shown, these conditions played a central part in 
                                                     
107  ICTR–99–46, TRA000396/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 23/05/2001, 
23/05/2001, 1–8. 
108 Defence Counsel – ICTR and ICTY (Interview via Skype: February, 2016). 
109 CONTRA001226, 10; ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0065, Akayesu – Defense Request for Expedited Amendment 
of the Directive on Assignment of Defense Counsel so that Mr. Akayesu can Enjoy the Same Rights, Privileges 




determining why the records of the archive were constructed as they were. This has also 
further demonstrated relevance of the concept of the ‘processes of truth’, as it has shown the 
importance of processes like cross–examination, and again the different roles of different 
actors, when exploring how and why the archive exists as it does. This was clearly seen here 
through the effect that the ‘rules of encounter’ between the legal actors and witnesses (which 
included protecting the rights of the victims and perpetrators) had on which accounts of 
violence were to be produced and archived. As is beginning to become clear it is these factors 
that give the archive its particular quality.  
 
To what extent, however, does this suggest that the defence left their mark on the archive? 
Does this show that, as is so often alleged, the accounts produced at these trials focused on 
the defendant, producing ‘perpetrator centric’ narratives (often seen as being the primary 
reason why victims were silenced within these spaces)? Indeed, as has been suggested over 
the last three chapters, the accounts produced during the trial stage did appear to focus on, 
and revolve around, the accused and their actions. However, I would argue that the strength 
of the ‘conditions of truth’ meant that, whilst focused on the accused, the specificity of the 
defendant and their experiences of the violence often struggled to come through during the 
trials. What I found particularly striking in my analysis of these trials was the sheer level of 
commonality that existed between each of the defences’ accounts and representations of the 
accused, which suggests that the nuances of each of the defendant’s characters and roles in 
the violence was to a certain extent lost, and that this was true of both the defence’s and the 
prosecution’s depiction of the accused. Paradoxically, then, the defendant was simultaneously 
central to the records produced, yet also de–centred within them. I would go further and 
argue that within the records of the archive there is a greater level of specificity concerning 




Several other factors further demonstrate this decentring of the defendants. As the 
Barayagwiza affair demonstrated, the accused was often missing from the forefront of the 
Tribunal’s concerns, something that was also demonstrated by the Tribunal’s failure to ensure 
that the defendants were adequately represented, the length of the pre–trial detention of many 
of the accused (Gatete’s lasting for over seven years) and the duration of many of these trials 
(Butare, for instance, lasted for nearly 19 years). The complexity and novelty of these 
proceedings certainly accounts for much of this, as does the need (as claimed in 
Barayagwiza) to consider the rights of the victims. However, if nothing else this shows that 
for better or worse the defendant and their rights were not at the very heart of the Tribunal’s 
concern. There is no better demonstration of this than the treatment of those ICTR defendants 
that have been either acquitted or released. Currently, there are eleven of these detained in a 
safe house in Arusha because the Tribunal cannot find anywhere to relocate them.110 Despite 
being found either innocent or having served their sentence, the defendants are subjected to 
indefinite imprisonment. With such treatment, and such a clear violation of their human 
rights, it seems hard to maintain the idea that these processes are, essentially, perpetrator–
centric.  
 
As was suggested above, however, the moment of judgement needs to be considered before 
any conclusions as to the archive can be made. How did the defence narratives and tactics 
influence the judges, what role did the witnesses’ testimony and the prosecution’s 
frameworks play in this? How did the judges intervene elsewhere in the trial process to 
impose their authority? To what extent does the archive belong to them? These questions will 
be the focus of the next chapter.  
                                                     
110 ‘Former Rwandan Convicts Stranded’, The Citizen, (see Internet Materials list). 
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Chapter Five: The Moment of 




The judgements are, in many respects, the most significant type of record in the archive. They 
represent the climax of each of the trials and capture the Tribunal’s final account of 
violence—each trial’s truth. Their importance was further amplified as they represented one 
of the rare moments when the attention of the outside world turned (albeit still only partially) 
to the Tribunal. As Elizabeth Jones from The Times noted, these provided ‘the moment of 
truth when we [could] find out what actually went on and who was responsible’.1 Rather than 
the hours and hours of witness testimony that led up to this moment, it was this final account 
that permeated into the outside world. This chapter will examine what characteristics defined 
the accounts of violence rendered in the judgements and why this was the case. As the 
moment when the judges exerted the most control over the archive, did this represent their 
account of the violence, or did the witnesses, as during the trial, intervene and shape the way 
in which this unfolded? What is of particular interest here is the extent to which the 
conditions and processes of truth governed this process, and, as such, the way in which the 
court interpreted or translated—returning to James White’s idea—the witnesses’ experiences 
within the judgement, and what were the consequences of this for the archive.2 There were 
also, of course, two different judgements rendered in each trial, one for the trial of first 
                                                     
1 ‘Can Journalism Kill?’, The Times, 27 October 2000. 
2 See Intro., n. 35. 
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instance and a second for the appeals. How do these two judgements, and their accounts of 
violence, compare? This chapter will, however, begin, by looking at how the interactions 
between the judges and the other agents in the court played out prior to the judgement. To 
what extent did the judges’ hold over the archive begin before they rendered judgement and 
what factors account for why the judges acted as they did? This chapter, then, explores the 
archive from the judges’ perspective, assessing their contribution to its creation.  
 
Overseeing the Trial 
 
When overseeing the trials at the ICTR, the judges performed two key roles. First, the judges 
intervened in the trials to determine the scope of the prosecution’s or defence’s case. Second, 
they ensured that the various actors in the courtroom were performing their roles as the court 
expected.  
 
Determining the Scope of the Evidence 
 
Within the courtroom, it was the judges who ultimately had the power to decide what 
evidence could be presented, and hence played a significant role in determining which 
accounts of violence entered the archive during the trials. This was seen in Chapter Three, 
where, for instance, it ultimately fell to the judges to determine whether or not a witness was 
permitted to testify to certain events based on their perceived relevance to the case at hand. In 
each of those examples the judges ultimately sided with the prosecution, and permitted the 
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witnesses to give their account of violence, even when, as the defence claimed, the testimony 
seemed to exceed the parameters of the case. 3   
 
However, in other instances the judges’ decisions worked to, and in some instances 
drastically, reduce the scope of the trials as they prevented evidence from being heard. This 
was seen, for example, in Cyangugu with the judges’ rulings over the relevance of the 
defence’s attempts to introduce evidence of the non–international nature of the conflict, 
which, as was discussed in the previous chapter, formed an important part of the defences’ 
strategy.4 Here, the judges prohibited the defence from producing evidence of this, noting 
that Tribunal’s statue and the UNSC (by only providing for the prosecution of war crimes 
under the ‘additional protocols 2’) had clearly determined that the violence constituted a non–
international armed conflict.5   In Gatete, the judges made this point even more firmly and 
took judicial notice of this ‘notorious fact of common knowledge’ in order to make it 
absolutely clear that there was no room in the court (or the archive) for this line of argument.6  
 
The importance of taking judicial notice, however, went far beyond the immediate trial and, 
hence, made a particularly substantial impact on the archive, as this, essentially, rendered this 
finding ‘set in stone’. For this meant that the fact in question was considered to be of such 
                                                     
3 See Chap. Three, notes 34-40. 
4 See Chap. Four, n. 51. 
5 The judges argued: ‘The Security Council has said it is an internal conflict and not international. It goes further 
than us taking judicial notice. The Security Council, itself, has said that this conflict was an internal conflict and 
not international. So, we don't have to go and adjudicate that.’ Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46 (hereafter ICTR–99–46), TRA001278/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
29/05/2002, 29/05/2002, 129.  
6 Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0086/1, Gatete – Decision on 





notoriety that no reasonable person could dispute its validity.7 As such, the prosecution could 
rely on these rulings in future trials rather than re–establish these ‘notorious facts’ through 
new evidence. One other example of judicial notice will be considered here to demonstrate 
the significant impact that these types of rulings had on the scope of the trials at the ICTR and 
ultimately the contents of the archive.  
 
During Karemera et al the prosecution submitted a request that the court take judicial notice 
of several facts related to the violence in Rwanda, including that a genocide against the Tutsis 
had taken place. The defence, however, successfully challenged this and the trial chamber 
ruled that such judicial notice would violate the defendants’ right to be presumed innocent as 
it would relieve the prosecution of their legal responsibility of establishing that genocide had 
occurred in Rwanda.8 The prosecution subsequently submitted an interlocutory appeal against 
the decision, and the appeals chamber ruled in favour of the prosecution and took judicial 
notice of the genocide. The appeals judges argued that, contrary to the trial chamber’s 
decision, the judicial notice simply removed the prosecution’s obligation to prove that there 
was a genocide against the Tutsis at a national level, meaning that the prosecution still had to 
prove that the accused’s acts were part of that genocide.9 The judges even went as far as to 
argue that ‘[t]he fact of the Rwandan genocide is a part of world history, a fact as certain as 
another, a classic instance of a ‘fact of common knowledge’ (emphasis added).10  
 
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
8 Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera, Matthieu Ngirumpatse and Joseph Nzirorera (Government 1), Case No. 
ICTR–98–44, (hereafter ICTR–98–44), ICTR–98–44–2076/1, [Government 1] – Karemera et al – Decision on 
Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice, 09/11/2005, 4–5.  
9 ICTR–98–44, ICTR–98–44–2411/1, [Government 1] – Karemera et al – Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 16/06/2006, 13–5. 
10 Ibid., 14. 
212 
 
This was a decision of immense symbolic significance, and it arguably fulfilled one of the 
Tribunal’s extra–judicial goals, which had been to offer a serious challenge to revisionism—
no reasonable person could now deny that what happened in Rwanda constituted genocide. In 
terms of the archive, beyond its symbolic importance, this meant that from then on, the trials 
did not need to offer wider contextual evidence of the occurrence of genocide, but could, as 
will be discussed more below, focus more narrowly on the accused’s responsibility for the 
violence within their locality. This, then, essentially limited, or perhaps streamlined, what 
evidence was required in future trials.  
 
Whilst the judges’ impact on the archive here can be seen as rooted in their application of the 
law, there were a number of instances whereby the judges’ decision to exclude evidence 
appeared more politicised. This can be seen with the judge’s rulings over the permissibility of 
sexual violence evidence, which once more demonstrated the significance of gendered and 
patriarchal discourses within the courtroom. I will draw on one example from Gatete to 
explicate this.  
 
During Gatete, witness BAT testified to her first sighting of Gatete during the genocide at a 
local commercial centre: 
Prosecution: Madam Witness, you said a few moments ago that you heard a vehicle 
and that you saw Jean–Baptiste Gatete. You said you realised they had not come to 
protect you. What made you say that? 
Witness: I said that Gatete had not come to protect us, because after coming out of 
his vehicle, we heard whistles and Gatete asked the people who were there to kill 
Tutsis and rape young Tutsi girls and women before killing them. It is for this 
reason that I thought he had not come to protect us, but, rather, to ask the killers to 
kill us.11  
                                                     
11 Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61 (hereafter ICTR–00–61), TRA005537/2, Gatete – 




The defence, however, objected on the grounds that the witness had not mentioned the order 
in their pre-trial statement. The prosecution tacitly admitted that this particular order was not 
included within the witnesses’ statement, but contended that the: 
what this witness is testifying to are mere elaborations and details and that the thrust 
of the evidence, the core of the evidence, the essential part of the evidence is all 
there in the statement.12  
 
The judges sided with the defence, as they argued that the witness statement only mentioned 
that the witness saw Gatete at the commercial centre, not that she had heard any orders.13 As 
such, this aspect of the testimony was removed from the court’s narrative, and whilst the 
witness was subsequently ‘allowed’ to continue and testify to the successive rapes that she 
suffered (because of this order) no legal link was provided between the acts she suffered and 
Gatete. This decision becomes troubling when the charges against Gatete are considered. The 
indictment against Gatete made it very clear that Gatete was being accused of ordering 
Interahamwe to commit acts of sexual violence and that BAT was one of the victims that 
resulted from this order. Paragraph 18 of the indictment read: 
[…] Jean-Baptise GATETE, with Murambi bourgmestre Jean de Dieu Mwanga, 
transported a convoy of armed Interahamwe to Akarambo cellule where GATETE 
ordered the Interahamwe to burn, loot and pillage Tutsi homes and to rape and kill 
civilian Tutsi.) […]. Then on or about 8 April 1994, BAT was raped by two 
Interahamwe, the son of NYAMUGARA and KAREMER. The Interahamwe raped 
and killed Tutsis as a result of the actions of Jean-Baptiste GATETE. (Emphasis 
added.)14 
 
Not only, then, did the statement contain a reference to this order tacitly, but the indictment, 
with unusual specificity, directly charged Gatete with ordering the rape, noted the victim 
along with the location and date of that rape AND the names of the perpetrators, declaring in 
no uncertain terms: ‘The Interahamwe raped and killed Tutsis as a result of the actions of 
                                                     
12 Ibid., 7–8.  
13 Ibid., 10. 
14 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0036/1, Gatete – Amended indictment, ICTR–00–61, 10/05/2005, 5–6. 
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Jean-Baptiste GATETE.’ What appeared to be going on here, once again, was that the 
Tribunal placed more severe standards upon evidence pertaining to sexual violence. With 
this, gendered and patriarchal discourses influenced the way in which the accounts of 
violence were constructed, and challenged, within the courtroom and hence left an indelible 
mark on the archive.  
 
These examples show that the judges significantly shaped the archive during the trial phase 
by determining what evidence was needed and relevant for the case at hand. The latter two 
examples also point to the tense, and at points problematic, relationship that the Tribunal had 
with its extra–judicial goals. The decision concerning the judicial notice of the genocide, for 
instance, represented both an incredibly significant symbolic act, but also a shift in the courts 
practice as it began to concern itself solely with the legal matters at hand. This, as will be 
discussed shortly, affected how witnesses were treated as they were increasingly used in a 
utilitarian fashion within the courtroom. The second example points to the problematic 
politics that the Tribunal became embroiled in as it reproduced and legitimised discourses 
that rendered violence committed against women of secondary importance to the apparatus, 
something that was to feature in the judgements also.   
 
Controlling Participation  
 
The Judges also intervened proactively throughout the trials to ensure that each participant 
(whether legal counsel or the witnesses) acted in an appropriate matter, in line with what the 
court expected of them. During Cyangugu, for example, the judges intervened during 
Imanishimwe’s re–examination of a witness to remonstrate: 
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Mr President: I don't see where it takes us when you frame the question that way 
because he can't -- he does not understand it, and I don't understand it either because 
I don't see why the question is put in that form […].  
Don't bother to go into such detail […].15 
 
And later on: 
Mr President: I have a problem. You are simply reading -- re–taking him through 
measurements that he gave in cross–examination. What is the purpose? Just to repeat 
what he said in cross–examination? Because that's all it is […]. Where does this take 
us? It doesn’t take us anywhere […].16 
 
Similarly, when Witness PCF seemed to be answering in a roundabout manner, the judges 
intervened with an order:  
Mr President: Just remind him that I’d indicated to him he should try and answer the 
questions in a direct manner and not give long, drawn out answers.  
Witness: Mr President, the way I’m answer [sic] the questions is the best way I 
know how to answer the questions that are being put to me. Thank you, Mr 
President. 
Mr President: If he is asked when he got married, that’s a straightforward answer. If 
he is married, he says when he got married; if he’s not, he says so. He doesn’t need 
to give any long, draw out answers. Just tell him that […].17 
 
What was also notable was that the judges became more interventionist as the Tribunal went 
on. The judges during Gatete, for instance, were far more interventionist than during either 
Cyangugu or Akayesu (and Cyangugu judges were more interventionist than during 
Akayesu).18 It was also possible to see how the nature of the interventions changed over 
                                                     
15 ICTR–99–46, TRA001621/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 08/10/2002, 
08/10/2002, 4–5. 
16 TRA001621/2, 6. 
17 ICTR–99–46, TRA001795/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 22/10/2002, 
22/10/2002, 24. 
18 A/54/634, Financing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory 
of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a 
Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 22/11/1999, 29. See the testimony of Witness NN from 
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time.19 Whilst during Akayesu the judges’ interventions appeared to be focused on extracting 
as much information as possible—in order to assist their understanding of the violence—
during Gatete the judges’ questioning was far more combative. 20 In fact, at some points the 
Gatete bench questioned the witnesses to the extent that it blurred the line between the judges 
on the one hand, and the prosecution and defence on the other.21 During Gatete this type of 
intervention by the judges was common: 
Judge Muthoga: Yes. I'm asking you -- look this side, Mr. Witness. I'm asking you 
to tell me, did you actually look out to see if Mr. Gatete was there or not, amongst 
those 50 of you?  
The Witness: As I was getting ready to strike him with a hammer, I had the time to 
look around me to see the people who were present or those who were not present. 
Gatete was not there.  
Judge Muthoga: So Gatete is one of the people you expected to be there but was not 
there?  
The Witness: No. I wasn't expecting it. I am speaking in my capacity as a participant 
at that attack. And I am taking into account the other assailants who were with me. I 
am also speaking in my capacity as an eyewitness to these events who is willing to 
speak the truth. I am, therefore, repeating that I did not see Gatete at that scene.22 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Akayesu (Prosecutor v. Jean–Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR–96–4 (hereafter ICTR–96–4), CONTRA001227, 
Akayesu – Transcript of 3/11/1997, 03/11/1997); Witness PCI (ICTR–99–46, TRA001797/1, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/10/2002, 24/10/2002); and Witness LA54 (ICTR–00–61, 
TRA005152/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 08/03/2010, 08/03/2010). 
19 Again, I do not wish to overstate this shift and to imply that at some point the legal matters of the case were 
not the most important thing about the trials. Rather this is to suggest a shift in emphasis and the extent to which 
goals in addition to the legal determination of guilt were either added to, or removed from, the strategic function 
of the court. Even in Akayesu, then, a legal officer in chambers noted that he had to curb the history section of 
the judgement (rejecting a 70 page version) noting that they weren’t writing a history book (despite that I think 
this statement downplays the extent to which the Akayesu judgement was seen as historically significant within 
the chambers). Senior Legal Office – ICTR Chambers (Copenhagen, Denmark: June, 2016). 
20 For example, towards the end of the testimony of Witness Cox, the judges asked the witness whether they had 
heard anything on the radio when they had been in Rwanda, and what their impression was of its importance. 
This had not featured in any of the examination–in–chief but, rather, marked the judges’ attempts to understand 
what happened. Similar exchanges could be seen with the judges trying to get to know about who the 
Interahamwe were – who was a member of these groups, what role did they play in the violence and how this 
changed over time. ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001185, Akayesu – Transcript of 17/1/1997, 17/01/1997, 219–223.  
21 For an example of this see ICTR–00–61, TRA005145/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 10/3/2010, 
10/3/2010, 5; and ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018748, Gatete, Redacted Transcript of 11/3/2010, 11/03/2010, 34.  
22 TRA005152/1, 76. A similarly odd approach taken by the Judges during this witness’s testimony was:  
Madam President: And with respect to that attack, you told us that there were a lot of people who 
attended; they came from all over; and that you could not remember all of their names because it 
happened a long time ago; right? 
The Witness: Yes. That is correct. I cannot remember all names, but I do remember some names.  
Madam President: And still you remember that Mr. Gatete ate –– drank –– drank beer in February 1993 
when he visited the bar. Ibid., 74. 
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These interventions were particularly intrusive during the defence’s case and this, 
unsurprisingly, led to a degree of friction between the defence and the judges. After the 
judges intervened once more, Gatete’s defence argued: 
Ms Poulain: And it is an open question which requires eventually a long answer. I'm 
very sorry, President, but it's our evidence.  
Madam President: No. They are -- not necessary -- detailed answer. We don't need 
all these details. If he's a good administrator, say he's a good administrator, if he 
wants it to be said that he was a good leader and administrator and good -- a good 
leader or authority in the commune. But he should not go on giving us each and 
everything.  
Ms Poulain: Well, I think it gives more weight to the evidence than a simple 
affirmation. I am sorry. (Emphasis added.)23 
 
Over time, moreover, and with even greater consequence for the archive, the judges also 
started to order the counsels to reduce the number of witnesses they were planning to call, so 
as to speed up the trials, when they thought that these were excessive to the case at hand.24 
During Cyangugu the President of the court pleaded with the defence to reduce the witness 
lists:25 
Judge Ostrovsky is looking at the list in which you are drowning us with witnesses, 
and we don't wish to be drowned. So take us seriously about reducing this list 
substantially, substantially. (Emphasis added).26  
 
The judges, in some instances, even went as far as to suggest which of the witnesses should 
be dropped.27  
                                                     
23 ICTR–00–61, TRA005147/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 09/03/2010, 09/03/2010, 50.   
24 ICTR–99–46, TRA001998/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 05/02/2003, 
05/02/2003, 44. See also ICTR–99–46, ICTR–99–46–0183, [Cyangugu] – Bagambiki – Ntagerura et al – 
Compliance with Trial Chamber III Order of 23/08/2000 (Attached Shortened List of Witnesses), 18/09/2000; 
and ICTR–99–46–0488, Proposed Reduction in the List of Defence Witnesses in the Cyangugu Case, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46–T, 30/04/2002.  
25 ICTR–99–46, TRA000526/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 12/03/2002, 
12/03/2002, 104–5. 
26 ICTR–99–46, TRA001601/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 28/03/2002, 
28/03/2002, 7. 





Finally, the judges became increasingly willing to uphold the defences’ objections to the 
witnesses’ testimony when it was feared that, due to a lack of notice, allowing the evidence to 
enter the court might undermine the defendant’s right to a fair trial.28 This marked a change 
in practice from the early trials at the Tribunal which seemed to try to allow as much 
evidence as possible into the courtroom and to determine the extent to which this challenged 
the defendants’ rights at the judgement stage.29 Rather, as time passed the relevance threshold 
was more tightly and rigorously enforced. 
 
Overall, there was a sense that the judge’s priorities and that the way in which the Tribunal 
pursued the trials shifted as the Tribunal progressed. This change was also acknowledged in 
the judicial notice decision mentioned above where the judges noted: 
During its early history, it was valuable for the purpose of the historical record for 
Trial Chambers to gather evidence documenting the overall course of the genocide 
and to enter findings of fact on the basis of that evidence […]. At this stage, the 
tribunal need not demand further documentation […].30 
 
The role of documentation had, it seemed, come to an end and now the focus was to turn 
increasingly just to the legal matters at hand, which, as argued above, was also reflected in 
the legal actors more probing questions and the judges’ overall more stringent control over 
the proceedings.  
 
                                                     
28 Defence Counsel (2016); and Head of Appeals (2015). 
29 Deputy Appeals Chief (2015). Wilkinson noted that you could argue that this meant that the Tribunal did not 
produce as full an account as it possibly could, but noted that what they were interested in was ‘truth with 
fairness’.  
30 ICTR–98–44–2411/1, 14. Whilst some allowances must be made for the different approaches adopted 
between different chambers, the consistency with which changes were identified here, and the broader context 
within which these changes took place – discussed more below – suggest that there was a significant change in 
the practice of trial judges at the ICTR. See Byrne, ‘The New Public Prosecutor’ (see Intro., n. 87), 247. 
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Prior to the judgement, it was clear that the judges played a significant role in determining 
what would enter the archive and in what form. Significantly, in each of the examples 
discussed in this section, the end result of those interventions was that the records deposited 
in the archive were to become more streamlined, as evidence was constrained or outright 
excluded. This is, at this point, not to necessarily criticise this process whereby the court’s 
gaze became more focused, but for now simply to set out how and why the trials changed 
over time as they did. For as will become clearer over the coming chapters, these changes did 
align with a reorientation about who it was that these trials were working for and, as can 
already be gleamed, what they were supposed to achieve. The influence of the judges during 
the trial phase was, however, only the tip of the iceberg. As the next section will demonstrate, 
the judge’s control over what entered the archive and in what form only increased as they 




The trial judgements at the ICTR consisted of two main sections. The first was the courts 
‘factual findings’, which set out the factual truth about what had happened, and, second, the 
‘legal findings’, presented the court’s final legal verdict for the case. Each of these will be 
considered in turn here. In exploring the factual findings I will first consider what criteria 
affected the judges’ determination of the validity of the witnesses’ accounts, followed by an 
examination of the rules that governed the judges’ imaginings of the role played by different 
actors during the violence. The second section, relating to the legal findings, will show how 
the legal framework and non–legal discourses, or the ‘conditions of truth’, shaped the trial’s 
final account of the violence. What becomes apparent here is that as the judgements 
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progressed, as they moved closer to their final legal account of what occurred, each trial’s 
narratives became even further determined by the ‘conditions of truth’, noted in the previous 
chapters, a process which I will show continued into the appeals stage of each trial. These 
sections also highlight the continuing complexity of relationship between the witnesses and 
the legal actors of the courtroom, in this case the judges, as the witnesses appeared to 
influence the way in which the judges constructed the judgements whilst simultaneously 
being pushed to the periphery of the process once more.  
 
Determining the ‘Facts’ 
 
The chamber’s decisions over whether or not to accept a witness’s testimony as both valid 
and able to contribute towards a trial’s factual account of the violence were driven by two 
main factors. The first was its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. This was determined 
by the judges’ assessment of how ‘convincing’ a witness’s performance was, shaped by 
particular imaginings of how a credible witness would testify. This was based on a witness’s 
ability to tell a story that was: internally coherent; told in a clear and orderly way, with as 
little emotion as was possible; and aligned with other accounts of the events given by other 
witnesses. It was, furthermore, important that the witness answered any questions during the 
cross–examination directly and quickly.31 The judges’ assessment was also influenced by 
decisions over the different levels of reliability of different types of witness and about the 
different possible contributions that they were permitted to make to the court’s final ‘truth’. 
Some of these factors that particularly affected the trials’ outcomes were: the prioritisation of 
                                                     
31 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001183, Akayesu – Transcript of 15/1/1997, 15/01/1997; ICTR–99–46, TRA001288/2, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 11/07/2002, 11/07/2002, 79–80. Head of Appeals 
(2015); ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0459/1, Akayesu – Judgement, 02/09/1998, 36; ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 27, 30, 
34, and 84; and ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0240/1, Gatete – Judgement and Sentence, 31/03/2011, 103.  
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witnesses that had seen a crime, over those that had heard about it; a general scepticism of 
perpetrator witnesses; and the decision that expert witness testimony was not permitted to 
contribute directly to a court’s final decision regarding the accused’s guilt.32  
 
These rules particularly affected the prosecution during Cyangugu where they led the court to 
reject all direct evidence of Bagambiki’s and Ntagerura’s participation in the violence.33 
Perhaps particularly significant here was that Professor Guichaoua’s expert testimony was 
not allowed to contribute towards the factual findings against the accused. This meant that the 
judges were ‘forced’ to overlook the only evidence that demonstrated that Bagambiki’s and 
Ntagerura’s ‘pacification meetings’—something that both defendants accepted occurred—
were part of the organisation of the genocide rather than attempts to introduce peace into the 
region (as Bagambiki and Ntagerura claimed).34 These rules also meant that the judges 
rejected the key elements in the prosecution’s overall framework, which had demonstrated 
the accused’s propensity towards committing acts of violence, their history of discriminating 
against the Tutsis, and their genocidal intent.35 The failure of this framework, along with the 
Tribunal’s high threshold of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—meant that the Chamber 
                                                     
32 ICTR-99-46-0609/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Prosecutor’s Notice of Appeal, 25/03/2004; ICTR–99–
46–0599/1, 31 and 47. See also Supra note 31, and references below, particularly fn. 33. 
33 ICTR–99–46, TRA001616/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 26/03/2002, 
26/03/2002, 39; ICTR–99–46, TRA002002/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
17/02/2003, 17/02/2003, 24–5; ICTR–99–46, TRA002053/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 11/08/2003, 11/08/2003, 8; ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 42, 44 and 47. It also seems as though its lack of 
inclusion in the indictment meant that whilst the 1992 Bugesera massacre featured within the trial’s narrative, it 
was not mentioned at all in the judgement. ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 45–7; ICTR–99–46, TRA001774/1, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/09/2001, 24/09/2001, 54–61, and 197; and ICTR–
99–46–0599/1, 27. The rulings on the value of perpetrator testimony particularly effected the judges’ decision 
over Bagambiki’s and Ntagerura’s participation in a weapons drop, which had only been (for obvious reasons) 
witnessed by perpetrators. ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 34.  
34 Bagambiki admitted that the message of the meeting was ‘to incite citizens to continue to track the enemy, 
regardless of where he is hiding and wherever he is hiding weapons without, however, threatening or 
mistreating innocent persons.’ Within the discourses circulating within Rwanda during the genocide, and the 
equation of the Tutsis with the enemy, then this was a clear directive to continue the genocide. ICTR–99–46, 
TRA001918/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 27/03/2003, 27/03/2003, 34–6. This is 
also despite that, as Eltringham notes, the distinction between ‘fact’ witnesses and ‘experts’ is not as neat as the 
court would have it. Eltringham, ‘Illuminating the broader context’, 349.  
35 Supra note 32 and 33. 
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also rejected all circumstantial evidence relating to the accused’s participation in the 
genocide, which contributed to Ntagerura’s and Bagambiki’s acquittals.36 What is more, it 
was apparent that this created room for the majority of the chamber to accept the defence’s 
‘did what they could’ narrative, which led to the majority’s decision to acquit Bagambiki for 
his responsibility for the murder of the refugees that he extracted from Karamapaka and the 
murder of refugees at the Gashirabwoba football field.37  
 
These decisions seemed yet again to indicate the imbalance of power between the legal 
agents and the witnesses, as it appeared that the witnesses’ testimony was ripped out of 
context and judged against a set of rules that the witnesses had no hand in making. There 
were a number of ways, however, that it was possible to see again how the witnesses’ 
testimony forced the court to reframe the way in which the evidence was approached at the 
Tribunal.  
 
An interesting phenomenon at the ICTR in this respect was the way in which the judges tried 
to make ‘allowances’ for the cultural specificity of the witnesses’ backgrounds and their 
                                                     
36 The most striking instances of this were the Kamarampaka Stadium and the Gashirabwoba massacre, which 
marked the second time that Bagambiki was present just before a massacre, and where he personally removed 
persons that were then killed. ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 117–9.  
37 ICTR–99–46–0599/1, Trial Judgement – the Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura Emmanuel Bagambiki Samuel 
Imanishimwe, 25/02/2004 – Judge Ostrovsky Dissenting Opinion, para 16–7. One particularly odd finding here, 
which I believe demonstrates the success of the defence’s ‘did what he could’ narrative was the judges’ rejection 
of Bagambiki’s responsibility for a massacre at Kadosomwa. The judges accepted Witness LAW’s account that 
Bagambiki had been called to the site by soldiers, that he had effectively told the refugees to commit suicide, 
and accused them of being related to the RPF. They also accepted that after he left the group the soldiers he was 
with shot into the air and the refugees were subsequently killed by Interahamwe who had been hiding nearby. 
However, the judges found that there was insufficient evidence to hold Bagambiki responsible for this. ICTR–
99–46–0599/1, 160; ICTR–99–46, TRA000441/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
28/02/2001, 28/02/2001, 81–97. There were numerous other instances where the judges accepted evidence that 
pointed to Bagambiki’s and Ntagerura’s role in the genocide, but did not use it to establish their guilt. For 
evidence of Bagambiki’s and Ntagerura’s association with leading genocidaires: ICTR–99–46, TRA001291/2, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 17/07/2002, 17/07/2002, 86; and ICTR–99–46, 
TRA001293/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 22/07/2002, 22/07/2002, 44. For 
Bagambiki’s role in other abductions from the Stadium: ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 78–9 and 89. For Bagambiki’s 
role in the searches for accomplices in Kamembe town: ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 86–7, 96 and 130–1. 
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traumatic experiences when judging their testimony.38 This was linked to a number of 
difficulties that the chamber and the prosecution encountered (as discussed in Chapter Three) 
due to the way the witnesses presented their evidence, which included: the witnesses’ 
difficulty in providing ‘accurate’ time and distance measurements; the tendency for 
witnesses’ testimony to evolve between their pre–trial statements and in–court testimony; 
witnesses’ frequently evasive style of answering questions in court; and difficulties in 
ascertaining the source of the witnesses’ knowledge.39 
 
Evidence of the court’s adaptation to these challenges was seen in the Akayesu judgement, 
where the judges explicitly drew on Dr Ruzindana’s expert testimony, discussed in Chapter 
Three, when setting out their approach to the witnesses’ testimonies. This had a considerable 
impact on how the judges evaluated the ‘truthfulness’ of the witnesses’ testimonies and how 
they constructed their accounts of violence.40 Having accepted Ruzindana’s explanation as to 
why witnesses did not always distinguish between what they had witnessed and what they 
had been told, the Judges stated that:  
According to the testimony of Dr. Ruzindana, it is a particular feature of the 
Rwandan culture that people are not always direct in answering questions, 
especially if the question is delicate. In such cases, the answers given will very often 
have to be ‘decoded’ in order to be understood correctly. This interpretation will 
rely on the context, the particular speech community, the identity of and the relation 
                                                     
38 ICTR President  – (Arusha, Tanzania: June, 2015). 
39 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001181, Akayesu – Transcript of 23/1/1997, 23/01/1997, 23–8. ICTR–99–46, 
TRA001796/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 23/10/2002, 23/10/2002, 23/10/2002, 
30–2. ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 131. See also ICTR–99–46, TRA001620/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – 
Redacted Transcript of 07/10/2002, 07/10/2002, 21–2 and 108; ICTR–00–61, TRA005507/2, Gatete – Redacted 
Transcript of 10/11/2009, 10/11/2009, 64 and 73; ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001182, Akayesu – Transcript of 
24/1/1997, 24/01/1997, 117–8; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001619/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 03/10/2002, 03/10/2002, 8.  
40 Indeed, I have not found any instances where a witness was deemed not to be credible solely on their inability 
to ‘accurately’ recall dates, times and distances. The only instances where this was the case was where 
subsequent site visits or measurements indicated that the witness could not have seen or heard what they 
claimed to be able to. ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 46. 
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between the orator and the listener, and the subject matter of the question. The 
Chamber noted this in the proceedings.41 
 
And went on to note that: 
cultural constraints were evident in [the witnesses] difficulty to be specific as to 
dates, times, distances and locations. The Chamber also noted the inexperience of 
witnesses with maps, film and graphic representations of localities, in the light of 
this understanding [sic], the Chamber did not draw any adverse conclusions 
regarding the credibility of witnesses based only on their reticence and their 
sometimes circuitous responses to questions.42 
 
Another issue was accounting for the changes between pre–trial and trial witness statements, 
which the defence regularly argued undermined the witnesses’ credibility.43 However, here 
the traumatic experience that these witnesses suffered was drawn on to determine how these 
shifts were interpreted, and whilst there were instances where witnesses were successfully 
challenged because of this, the judges in Akayesu set a clear marker for how this issue was to 
be dealt with: 
Many of the eye–witnesses who testified before the Chamber in this case have 
seen atrocities committed against their family members or close friends, and/or 
have themselves been the victims of such atrocities. The possible traumatism [sic] 
of these witnesses caused by their painful experience of violence during the 
conflict in Rwanda is a matter of particular concern to the Chamber. The 
recounting of this traumatic experience is likely to evoke memories of the fear and 
the pain once inflicted on the witness and thereby affect his or her ability fully or 
adequately to recount the sequence of events in a judicial context. The Chamber 
has considered the testimony of those witnesses in this light […]. Inconsistencies 
or imprecisions in the testimonies, accordingly, have been assessed in the light of 
this assumption, personal background and the atrocities they have experienced or 
have been subjected to (emphasis added).44 
 
Even more striking was the judges’ decision that whenever there were discrepancies between 
the pre–trial and trial statements, they would show greater favour to in–court testimony 
                                                     
41ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 76–7. 
42 Ibid., 77. 
43 For an example see: Ibid., 79.  
44 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 42. 
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because it had been cross–examined, and therefore more rigorously tested, even though more 
time had passed between testimony and event.45 
 
Overall, this significantly affected how the judges assessed the evidence produced at the 
ICTR, and meant that they at times overlooked relatively serious issues with the witnesses’ 
testimony.46 For example when Witness LAW stated that they could not personally identify 
Bagambiki in court as a result of the traumatic nature of their experience, the court still 
accepted that the witness had encountered Bagambiki during the genocide, as claimed during 
their trial testimony.47 At Akayesu, despite most of the prosecution’s witnesses testifying in a 
manner that might have reasonably led to their credibility being questioned, out of 34 
                                                     
45 Ibid., 41. There was, more generally, a relatively ‘progressive’ approach towards evidence at the Tribunal 
from the very outset. This meant, for instance, that hearsay evidence was permitted, and uncorroborated 
testimony was also allowed to form the basis of judicial decisions, unlike in most common–law systems (which 
formed the basis of the court’s rules). The rules clearly specified, moreover, that this was the case with sexual 
violence testimony, demonstrating, it appeared, a departure to from the deep scepticism that this type of 
testimony normally was subjected to in courts. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 96(i); Gideon 
Boas, ‘Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: the ICTY and the Principle of 
Flexibility’, Criminal Law Forum, 12:1 (2001), 51. See Intro., n. 86. The prosecution also drew on the level of 
trauma and destruction experienced throughout Rwanda as part of their justification for why their evidence 
perhaps did not meet the standards that would usually be expected, such as their inability often to name specific 
victims of the massacres. ICTR–99–46, TRA000446/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
09/05/2001, 09/05/2001, 82–83. See also: TRA002053/1, 2. What is also notable here is that the level of 
specificity expected of the prosecution altered depending on the magnitude of the violence. With crimes like 
murder the names of the victims and perpetrators, as well as the date, time and location of the crime were 
expected. With large scale massacres, however, less specificity was required.  ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–
00347, Ntagerura – Audio Recording: Defence Motion, 19/03/1999. 
46 The defence, in fact, considered this to be a serious issue and during Rutaganda the defence unsuccessfully 
lodged an appeal against the trial chamber’s decision to make ‘allowances’ for discrepancies in witness 
testimony due to the ‘cultural specificity’ of the witnesses. Stover, The Witnesses (see Intro., n. 55), 10. 
47 ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 160; TRA000441/1, 105. Further evidence that the Chamber took trauma into account 
with the types of narratives they accepted as true can be seen in the Gatete judgement: ‘The Defence reminded 
Witness BBM that his May 1998 statement referred to the attack commencing at about 11.00 a.m. and that the 
Interahamwe broke down the gate of the parish compound, while his testimony was that the attack began 
sometime between 9.00 and 11.00 a.m. and the Interahamwe climbed over the fence. Witness BBM explained 
that the events were harrowing and occurred a long time ago. Given their traumatic nature and the passage of 
time, the Chamber considers these variances immaterial.’ ICTR–00–61–0240/1, 78. This was not, however, 
always enough as the manner in which a narrative was told could meant that the judges did reject the credibility 
of a witness. ‘In addition, the Chamber found Witness AIK's evidence confusing and inconsistent. While the 
Chamber acknowledges the impact of trauma on a witness's memory, in this instance, these ambiguities raise 
further questions about his reliability. In sum, the Chamber finds Witness AIK's evidence insufficient to support 
findings beyond reasonable doubt.’ ICTR–00–61–0240/1, 51. 
226 
 
witnesses only one was deemed not to be credible.48 A particularly serious shift in testimony, 
which the judges nonetheless accepted as credible, occurred during Witness D’s (Emphrem 
Karangwa) testimony. Whilst Witness D’s pre–trial statement claimed that he had buried his 
brothers after they had been killed by Akayesu, during the trial he claimed that he hadn’t 
buried them.49 The judges, however, ruled that this shift could be explained by the traumatic 
experience that Witness D had suffered, and his testimony that Akayesu had killed his 
brothers was consequently accepted as true.50 This shows the significant effect that the judges 
‘allowances’ could have on the archive. 
 
The question, is, however, to what extent this demonstrated an essentially witness–orientated 
process? Two additional points should be made in this respect. First, when I interviewed Dr 
Ruzindana (who, after acting as an expert in several trials, became a senior reviser within the 
registry), he indicated that whilst the judges, and other members of the court, claimed to take 
the cultural specificity of Rwanda into account, this was done at a relatively superficial 
level.51 Overall there was a sense that a lack of sensitivity here remained an issue and that, on 
balance, Tribunal staff never really succeeded in sufficiently understanding Rwandese history 
                                                     
48 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, para 408. 
49 Ibid., 106. See also ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001198, Akayesu – Transcript of 6/2/1997, 06/02/1997, 171. 
50 These ‘issues’ appeared to feed into other courtroom practices as well. First, over time, even the manner in 
which the witnesses would be questioned on matters of distance and time changed, as witnesses, for instance, 
could be asked to demonstrate distance by using marker points within the courtroom (which would be 
subsequently measured). Senior Reviser (2015); Akayesu, 15/01/1997, 36–7; and Mathias Ruzindana, ‘The 
Challenges of Understanding Kinyarwanda Key Terms Used to Instigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’ in 
Propaganda, War Crimes Trials and International Law, ed. Predrag Dojcinovic (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 
150. Second, there also appeared to be a shift within the courtroom away from a focus on the more minute 
details of the crimes that had occurred, towards the broader, or perhaps cruder, accounts of the violence, even 
though the law concerns itself with exactly such precision. It therefore became possible for the court to accept as 
truths relatively vague facts, such as that a particular massacre occurred in, for example, ‘late April’.  Prosecutor 
v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al (Butare), Case No. ICTR–98–42, Trial Judgement, 24/06/2011, at: 
unictr.unmict.org (last accessed 15/07/2017), 512. See also ICTR–99–46, TRA000258/2, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 31/01/2001, 31/01/2001, 10–1.  
51 Senior Reviser (2015). There is an extent to which the uniqueness of international courts should not be over–
stated. As Deborah Wilkinson pointed out, these issues also effect municipal trials whereby lawyers frequently 
come from very different backgrounds to those that they are representing. Deputy Appeals Chief (2015). 
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and culture,52 a sentiment that was also expressed in the interviews I conducted with 
Rwandese staff at the Tribunal.53 Second, these changes also served a legal (and political) 
objective. There was a danger that, had the court not adapted in this manner, then so much of 
the evidence would have come into doubt that little of the record would have been left.54 
Without this, without the witnesses’ testimony, there would have been no substance in the 
cases at the ICTR, and so there was a sense that that adaptation was required for the trials to 
continue. Combined, this raises further questions as to extent that the trial process at the 
ICTR was ever witness—let alone victim—centred.  
 
The factual findings section of the judgements also saw the court’s accounts of violence 
reframed as a result of the court’s priorities and ways of seeing. Here, the judges produced 
particular understandings of what it meant to be a victim or perpetrator during the genocide 
and how the violence unfolded in Rwanda. These accounts positioned the accused as the most 
important actor in the violence and, like the prosecution, produced accounts of the violence 
that heightened sense of the accused’s agency, their conscious and rational nature, and 
simultaneously diminished the agency of those around them.55 A particularly extreme 
example of this was from the ‘Media Trial’ whereby the heightened responsibility of the 
accused, and their control over the country’s key media outlets, produced a sense that there 
would not have been any violence whatsoever without them.56 The judges stated:  
                                                     
52 Appeals Judge (2016).  
53 Senior Appeals Attorney (2015). 
54 However, again, Arguin stated similar considerations would likely be made for similar crimes in municipal 
jurisdictions. Head of Appeals (2015). President Joensen also noted that they only made these allowances to the 
extent that the case required. ICTR President (2015). 
55 Similarly, in accounts where the accused was found to have participated in a crime, the only other perpetrators 
that significantly entered the trial’s narrative were those that had the accused had allowed or encouraged to act. 
For instance, in Akayesu, the judges rule that: ‘The statements thus made by Akayesu at that gathering 
immediately led to widespread killings of Tutsi in Taba’. ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 173.  
56 See, for example Gatete’s role in the Kiziguro and Mukarange massacres. ICTR–00–61–0240/1, 87 and 104. 
See also ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 161–91. 
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The power of the media to create and destroy fundamental human values comes 
with great responsibility. Those who control such media are accountable for its 
consequences [...]. Without a firearm, machete or any physical weapon, you 
caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. (Emphasis added.)57 
 
This focus also meant that the factual findings exaggerated the extent of the victims’ passivity 
during the violence. In the factual findings section in Akayesu, for example, the judges 
described Witness N’s (here referred to a ‘Victim Y’) encounter with Akayesu, as detailed in 
Chapter Three, as follows: 
Mugenzi took [Victim Y] by the arm to the door and hit her on the head with the 
barrel of his rifle. Victim Y was then forcibly taken to the Accused, who ordered her 
to lie down. In the presence of the Accused, Victim Y was beaten by the communal 
police officer Mugenzi who stepped on her neck, pushed the butt of his rifle into her 
neck, and stomped on her, threatened to kill her if she failed to provide the 
information he sought.58 
 
Whilst this, to an extent, retained the sense of the witnesses’ power, as Witness N’s evidence 
contributed here towards establishing the accused’s guilt, as will be recalled from Chapter 
Three, this account contrasts with meaning and emphasis of Witness N’s testimony, which 
captured both her sense of agency and purpose in defying Akayesu by refusing to give up the 
location of Alexia. As this suggests, within the judgement, the witness’s testimony becomes 
translated into law’s idiom, which could result in a shift in the meaning of the violence and in 
what it meant to experience and witness that violence. This process, however, became even 
more exaggerated in the court’s legal findings.  
 
 
                                                     
57 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, et al, Case No. ICTR–99–52, ICTR–99–52–1323/1, Judgement and 
Sentence, 03/12/2003, 317. 
58 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 166–7. 
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Determining the Law 
  
Within the legal findings of the judgement, the witnesses’ testimonies and experiences were 
translated to fit within the legal framework of the trial to an even greater extent.59 This was 
first seen in the role that the indictments played in determining what was, and what was not, 
permitted to contribute to the court’s final legal findings concerning the accused’s guilt. At 
this moment, the judges removed any evidence that fell outside of the indictment if it was 
determined that the lack of notice in the indictment of these charges had undermined the 
defence’s ability to prepare an adequate defence.60 During Akayesu, the way in which the 
indictment was framed meant that the judges refused to make any legal findings on any 
instance of sexual violence where Akayesu was not present, which excluded a considerable 
amount of evidence from the court’s final consideration.61 This also meant that Witness J’s 
testimony about the sexual assault of her six–year–old child—the testimony that, in part, led 
to the amended indictment—was ignored in the court’s final account and it was not permitted 
to contribute towards establishing Akayesu’s guilt.62 This was despite the court making 
factual findings regarding these crimes.63 As such, this example demonstrates how the court’s 
account became increasingly more restricted as the judgement progressed. As the judgement 
                                                     
59 The whole of the legal findings in Akayesu evidence this, but it is particularly apparent in the court’s final 
decision over his guilt for ‘Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide’. ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 268–269. 
60 It must also be remembered that many of the narratives constructed during the trial find no place within the 
judgement. For instance, during Cyangugu, all the evidence regarding the tension within the community – and 
the claims of RPF infiltration – produced during the trial were completely absent from the judgement. ICTR–
99–46–0599/1. For an example of where this appeared during the trial see TRA001998/1, 7. 
60 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 184. 
61 The judges ruled that the indictment failed to properly charge Akayesu under Article 6(3) of the statute–
superior responsibility, and so argued that they could only find Akayesu guilty of sexual violence crimes when 
he was present or had clearly instigated their commission. ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 168–170. Other narratives were 
also rejected in the final judgement, such as the repeated sexual assaults suffered by Witness NN at her home 
with her sister (Witness JJ) in front of her mother. CONTRA001227, 3/11/1997, 16–48. It must also be 
remembered that many of the narratives constructed during the trial find no place within the final judgement at 
all. For instance, during Cyangugu, all the evidence regarding the tension within the community – and the 
claims of RPF infiltration – produced during the trial were completely absent from the judgement. ICTR–99–
46–0599/1. For an example of where these narratives appear during the trial see TRA001998/1, 7. 
62 ICTR–96–4, CONTRA001186, Akayesu – Transcript of 27/1/1997, 27/01/1997, 101–2. 
63 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 184. 
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turned from factual findings to legal findings, even more of the evidence heard during the 
trial was discarded.  
 
Again, however, the legal findings contained evidence that pointed to the witnesses’ ability to 
shape the law. A good example of this was the witnesses influence on the judges, particularly 
‘progressive’, definition of sexual violence in Akayesu. It was as a result of the witnesses’ 
testimony that the judges found that rape could not ‘be captured in a mechanical description 
of objects and body parts’ and instead found that it was ‘a physical invasion of a sexual 
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive’.64 This definition 
allowed for the incorporation of acts not typically seen as constituting sexual violence, as 
captured by Witness KK’s testimony of how she had seen Interahamwe ‘thrusting a piece of 
wood into the sexual organ of a woman as she lay dying’ and by Witness PP’s testimony that 
detailed Akayesu’s order for ‘the Interahamwe to undress a student and force her to do 
gymnastics naked in the public courtyard of the bureau community, in front of crowds’.65 
Drawing on the witnesses’ experiences they also, in a particularly important ruling, 
determined that the environment surrounding these crimes was such that a lack of consent 
should be presumed.66 These testimonies were also drawn on by the judges to make the 
landmark ruling that the rape could be considered an act of genocide.67 With this, again, there 
is evidence of law shaping itself around the violence—around the witnesses’ experiences.  
 
                                                     
64 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 240–1, 274–6. See also S/2015/884, Letter Dated 17 November 2015 From the President 
of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed to The President of The Security Council: Report 
on The Completion of The Mandate of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as at 15 November 
2015, 17/11/2015, 7 and 16. 
65 They drew here on the broader notion of torture to support this definition as an act intended cause 
‘intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person’. ICTR–
96–4–0459/1, 275. 
66 Ibid., 275. 
67 Ibid., 282 and 290. 
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Similar shifts in the jurisprudence were also seen in Chapter Two, such as with the evolution 
of JCE jurisprudence. However, as argued there and above, the drive behind these shifts 
extended beyond a consideration of the witnesses’ experiences, but was motivated by both 
the desire to expand the jurisprudence (as a valuable act in and of itself) and because of the 
law’s need to adapt in order so that it could maintain its authority and control as a legitimate 
response to a particular ‘problem’. Pressure to do so both originated from within the 
apparatus, as it sought (as all apparatus’ do)68 to expand its sphere of influence over the 
objects and subjects that fell within its purview.69 But this was also the result of ‘political’ 
pressure for the court to adapt in this manner. It is, for instance, important when 
understanding the Akayesu decision concerning rape to note the pressure for the court to 
recognise this type of crime, from both outside the courtroom (from human rights groups) 
and inside the courtroom (principally from Judge Pillay).70 The need to adapt in this manner 
was, however, most clearly seen in the more than dubious decision in the Akayesu judgement 
that argued that the Tutsis were a protected group under the Genocide Convention, despite 
not being easily defined as either an ethnic or racial group. The judges circumvented the issue 
by arguing that the intention of the drafters of the UNGC had been to protect all stable and 
permanent groups (despite that religious and national groups were clearly not ‘permanent’ 
identities).71 Without adapting in this manner, the law would have been incapable of 
capturing the ‘crime of crimes’—genocide (exactly what it was set up to do)—and its 
authority and legitimacy would have come into doubt.  
                                                     
68 See also, Hagan and Levi, ‘Crimes of War’ (see Intro., n. 86), 1504. 
69 Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ (see Intro., n. 113), 195. 
70 There is also the importance here again of the idea of the introduction of ‘human rights methodologies’ as 
argued by Danner, ‘Guilty Associations’ (see Chap. Two, n. 8) 103–20, 132–9 and 145–6.  
71 The difficulty here came from the: extent to which both groups shared a cultural, religious and linguistic 
heritage; fluidity, at various points in history, of the division between Hutus and Tutsis; the lack of distinct 
physical or ‘hereditary’ traits; and the level of inter-marriage between the groups. Most of this problem, 
however, came from the judges’ conservative reading of ethnicity and race, which were looking for ‘objective’ 
markers of these identities that could prove their fixed and permanent existence. ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 209–210 




As such, whilst acknowledging the role played by the witnesses in this process, I am cautious 
about presenting this as a process that was orientated around the needs of those that suffered 
during the genocide, even when the decisions rendered appeared, on the surface, to reflect 
‘progressive’ rulings that were pursued in the interests of the affected community. Rather, on 
balance, it seems that the judges constructed these judgements in order to reflect their legal, 
and to an extent political, interests. A number of other factors from the legal findings of the 
judgements will offer support for this position. 
 
First, the manner in which the judges assessed sexual violence testimony more generally 
needs to be considered, which demonstrates the overall negative effects of how the judges 
interpreted this type of evidence, which was something that became more heightened as the 
trials went on. In a number of the court’s findings there was, again, a sense that sexual 
violence evidence was treated differently from evidence relating to other forms of violence.72 
It appeared as though during the judgements the judges continued to apply a different—and 
higher—standard of proof when assessing evidence of sexual violence crimes.73 
 
Several decisions at trial level evidence this, including those made during Kajelijeli and 
Nizeyimana.74 However, in order to demonstrate the impact that this could have on a trial’s 
                                                     
72 Other evidence that this was treated with indifference can be found in the fact that not a single guilty plea 
contained a sexual violence charge. This is despite the fact a number of the initial indictments against these 
defendants contained charges concerning sexual violence. OTP ICTR, ‘Prosecution of Sexual Violence’, 
Appendix B. 
73 MacKinnon, ‘Sexual Violence’ (see Intro., n. 93), 214–5.  
74 Ibid., 214–5. Judge Ramaroson’s dissenting decision in Kajelijeli captured their dissatisfaction with the 
majority’s decision. ‘In conclusion, and in the light of the foregoing, there is substantial, specific and 
corroborative evidence to sustain the allegation that Kajelijeli committed the crime with which he is charged, 
and that, consequently, he is responsible for the rapes perpetrated on women’. (Emphasis added). Prosecutor v. 
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outcome, I will discuss a decision from Rukundo that, whilst coming from an appeal 
judgement, is indicative of how this type of evidence was treated.75 In the Rukundo 
judgement, Rukundo, a military chaplain in FAR, was found guilty of genocide, in part, for 
sexually assaulting Witness CCH. The chamber found that at Kabgayi Parish:  
Rukundo forced sexual contact with [Witness CCH] by opening the zipper of his 
trousers, trying to remove her skirt, forcefully lying on top of her and caressing and 
rubbing himself against her until he ejaculated and lost his erection. [The sexual 
nature of his actions can be discerned from] Rukundo’s actions and words, such as 
telling her that if she made love with him he would never forget her […].76  
 
The chamber also found that the assault had been coercive and caused serious mental harm 
and that Rukundo possessed the necessarily special intent.77 The appeals chamber, however, 
found that the trial chamber had been wrong to find Rukundo guilty of committing genocide 
for this act: 
[T]he Appeals Chamber […] finds that no reasonable trier of fact could find that the 
only reasonable inference available from the evidence was that Rukundo possessed 
genocidal intent in relation to the sexual assault of Witness CCH […]. (Emphasis 
added.)78 
 
The reason the appeals chamber found this to be the case was because they rejected the trial 
chamber’s reliance on Rukundo’s utterance that he could not save Witness CCH because she 
was related to Inyenzi (a word strongly associated with the Tutsis during the genocide) to 
evidence Rukundo’s intent and instead accepted the defence’s argument that the assault was 
‘unplanned and spontaneous’.79 Bearing in mind also the extremely high threshold that must 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR–98–44, ICTR–98–44A–0320/1, Judgment and Sentence, 01/12/2003, 14. 
Head of Appeals (2015); Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (2015). 
75 This also came up in a number of my interviews. Deputy Appeals Chief (2015); Senior ICTR Appeals 
Attorney 2 (2015); and Head of Appeals (2015). 
76 Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Rukundo, Case No. ICTR–01–70, ICTR–01–70–0393, Judgement and Sentence, 
27/2/2009, 115. 
77 Ibid., 117–8 and 172. 
78 Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Rukundo, Case No. ICTR–01–70, ICTR–01–70–0400/1, Appeals Judgement, 
20/10/2010, 76. 
79 Ibid., 76. 
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be attained for an appeal chamber to overturn a trial chamber’s decision (they must determine 
that no reasonable trier could have found this to be the true), it requires a significant leap of 
faith to believe that this would have been overturned if this had been any other act of 
violence.80 Rather, there was the underlying suggestion that this act could have been 
perpetrated out of some form of inner lust; a natural desire that men have, which cannot be 
controlled, and so should not be punished, which was, in part, further evidenced by the 
judge’s acceptance that this was—and despite his utterances—a ‘spontaneous’ act.81 Because 
Rukundo had only been charged with genocide for his assault of Witness CCH—which the 
court accepted as fact—he was acquitted of all criminal wrong–doing in this instance. This 
type of treatment of sexual violence evidence, along with the OTP’s approach, is, I believe, 
largely to blame for the Tribunal’s poor record in prosecuting sexual violence crimes.82  
 
There was, moreover, a series of problematic normative assumptions that underpinned the 
judges’ reasoning as to why sexual violence could be considered an act of genocide. Some of 
these reinforced the centrality of patriarchy within society, as the women’s role was seen as 
maintaining the male’s lineage, and rape was seen as an attempt ‘to reduce the “purity” of the 
Tutsi race’.83 No matter which lens—whether genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes—was used, moreover, the crime was always seen as being committed against a wider 
                                                     
80 MacKinnon, ‘Sexual Violence’, 215. 
81 See also Beth Van Schaack, ‘Engendering Genocide: the Akayesu Case before the ICTR’, (Santa Clara Law, 
2008), 12–3 and 23.  
82 A former member of the appeals office in the OTP referred to this decision as ‘a bit barmy’. Appeals Attorney 
2 (2015); and Head of Appeals (2015). Wilkinson noted that her impression was that there were (and are) a lot 
of people that didn’t take sexual violence seriously and continued to think it’s just the case of some women 
trying to get other men into trouble, and stated, ‘That’s how I would explain Rukundo’. Deputy Appeals Chief 
(2015). See also MacKinnon, ‘Sexual Violence’, 214–5; and S/2015/884, 15.  
83 This was due to the fact that one of the reasons why rape could be seen as genocide was because in a 
patriarchal society like Rwanda where the ethnicity of an offspring is decided by the father’s ethnicity, then 
when a Hutu man rapes a Tutsi women this is seen as an attempt to produce offspring not of the ethnicity of the 
Tutsi woman’s partner. ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 176; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0068/1, Gatete – Decision on 
Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 17/11/2008, 10; and Dixon, ‘Rape as a Crime in 
International Humanitarian Law’, 704–5. 
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group, rather than against a woman (or, for that matter, women).84 This decentring of women 
as the primary target of these crimes supports MacKinnon’s suggestion that ‘[w]hat happens 
to women is either too particular to be universal or too universal to be particular, meaning 
either too human to be female or too female to be human’.85 As MacKinnon also argues, the 
designation of the wider group as the target of the violence, detached the violence that 
women experienced in war from that which they experienced in ‘peace’ and allowed it to be 
considered an aberration (just an unfortunate by–product of war) that in no way was related 
to the patriarchal structure of society. Rather, as MacKinnon argues, the violence perpetrated 
in war should be seen as a continuation of the violence that women suffer in peace.86   
 
These accounts were only made worse by the apparatus’ production of victimhood, which 
remained strongly gendered as women—along with children—became the ultimate symbol of 
victimhood and therefore passivity.87 This was despite the fact that both groups played a 
central role in how the genocide unfolded, as previously discussed.88 As such, when the 
                                                     
84 Campbell, ‘Victims’ (see Chap. Two, n. 61), 345. For a similar critique see Walsh, ‘Gendering International 
Justice’ (see Intro., n. 92), 31–65. 
85 MacKinnon, ‘Crimes of War’ (see Intro., n. 93), 60.  
86 MacKinnon, ‘Crimes of War’, 60–6. 
87 A/52/568, Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance of the United 
Nations, including Special Economic Assistance: Special Economic Assistance to individual Countries Or 
Regions: International Assistance to Rwanda for the Reintegration of Returning Refugees, the Restoration of 
total Peace, Reconstruction and Socio– Economic Development: Report of the Secretary–General, 05/11/1997, 
4; S/PV.3968, 3968th Meeting, 21/01/1999, 3. ‘International humanitarian law enshrines the norm that needy 
civilians, and in particular women and children, have the right to receive humanitarian assistance’ (p. 9). This, 
again, matched the discursive imaginings expressed in discussions surrounding the Tribunal. See E 
E/CN.4/1997/61, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the 
World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. René Degni–Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S–3/1 of 25 May 1994, 20/01/1997, 8. ‘At 
the same time, the heightened vulnerability of minorities, women, children, prisoners and detainees, displaced 
persons, refugees and others, which is evident in all conflict and post–conflict situations, brings an element of 
urgency to the imperative of restoration of the rule of law.’ What is particularly interesting about this comment 
is that each of the identities here that are treated as vulnerable are temporary ones, with the sole exception of 
women and children. S/2004/616, the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post–Conflict 
Societies: Report of the Secretary–General, 23/08/2004, 3. 
88 E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission Alternative 
Approaches and Ways and Means within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of 
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inevitable passivity of women within these narratives was combined with the notions of 
patriarchy that underpinned some of these legal definitions, then women were rendered as 
being reliant on those structures and power relations, which made the violence against them a 
possibility in the first place, for their security, thus reproducing the vitality and legitimacy of 
these structures and power relations.89  
 
If anything, these problems seemed to become more acute with time, as seen with how the 
court’s jurisprudence on sexual violence developed. Whilst Akayesu ruled that consent was 
an irrelevance for crimes that fell within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the Gacumbitsi 
appeals judgement (2006) (confirming the trial chamber’s 2004 ruling) found that a victim’s 
lack of consent, and the perpetrators knowledge that this consent was absent were legally 
relevant and had to be established by the prosecution.90 With this, the progressive rulings of 
the early years were replaced with more conservative and potentially harmful jurisprudence. 
This pattern could be seen elsewhere, particularly concerning the jurisprudence dealing with 
command and collective responsibility, which became a particularly contentious issue when 
Judge Harhoff was dismissed from the Appeals Chamber.  
 
Judge Harhoff was effectively dismissed after a private letter he had written was leaked. This 
revealed his concerns that the appeals chamber (under the influence of President Meron—
head of the appeals court) was attempting to restrict the applicability of collective modes of 
participation—JCE and superior responsibility—after being pressured by outside forces to do 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy Addendum Report of the Mission to Rwanda on the 
Issues of Violence Against Women in Situations of Armed Conflict, 04/02/1998. 
89 Franke, ‘Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice’ (see Intro., n. 48), 823–5; and Dixon, ‘Rape as a Crime in 
International Humanitarian Law’, 704–5. 
90 Patricia Sellers, ‘The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights as Means 
of Interpretation’ (see Internet Materials), 23–3. 
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so.91 It was thought that this pressure was exerted because there was a fear amongst certain 
nations (namely the US and Israel) that the current jurisprudence might overly restrict 
military operations during conflict, as it might make it easier to hold military commanders 
and heads of state responsible for criminal acts committed by subordinates.92 This 
demonstrated the political, and—to borrow from Kennedy—ideological nature of 
adjudication, whether this is from a more conventional ‘realpolitik’ perspective or by 
pointing to international criminal justice’s role in managing violence within the international 
system (rather than seeking to eradicate it). Indeed, as President Meron stated, the purpose of 
international humanitarian law is to ‘diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements 
permit’ (emphasis added).93 This, along with the rulings on sexual violence discussed above, 
resonates with the concerns raised by Edkins and Dauphinee, as set out in the introduction, 
about the role played by law in perpetuating the legitimacy of certain forms of violence 
within the international system.94 
 
Martinez and Danner also noted these shifts in the jurisprudence. Interestingly, they argued 
that the initially more expansive provision for these modes of responsibility (which found 
little support in the jurisprudence) represented, as previously mentioned, the intrusion of 
Human Rights style methodologies into the judicial decision making process, where 
expansive interpretations of the law were permissible in order to ensure that the rights and 
interests of victims were adequately protected.95 As such, Martinez and Danner placed less 
                                                     
91 The letter can be found here: http://www.bt.dk/sites/default/files–dk/node–files/511/6/6511917–letter–
english.pdf (last accessed 18/08/2017). 
92 One of my interviewees explicitly rejected Harhoff’s claims, stating that whilst he did not discount that 
personnel preference influenced decision making (i.e. that a particular judge may not like command 
responsibility) this was not enough evidence to show that they were ‘under orders’. Senior ICTR Appeals 
Attorney 2 (2015). 
93 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, American Journal of International Law 
94:2 (2000), 243. See also p. 241. 
94 Dauphinee, ‘War Crimes and the Ruin of Law’ (see Intro., n. 86). 
95Danner, and Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations’, 103–20, 132–9 and 145–6. 
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emphasis on the role of external states in pressuring the court to shift the jurisprudence in this 
way (although this is acknowledged) than they did arguing that this move rebalanced the 
proceedings to favour the defendant.96 Either way, however, what this suggests is that, as 
with the issue of consent, over time what began as ‘progressive’ jurisprudence with JCE and 
command responsibility became increasingly more conservative in nature, and that the law 
developed in a manner that ran against the interests of the (potential future) victims.97  
 
What is more, at points within these final decisions it became, again, apparent that these 
accounts pulled away from the witnesses’ experiences and, as such, mark further evidence of 
White’s idea of ‘justice as translation’.98 For instance, whilst some of the witnesses’ 
testimony concerning sexual violence demonstrated how patriarchal structures within 
Rwandan society created the terrain whereby this violence could take place (as was seen 
particularly with Witness NN’s testimony, discussed in Chapter Three), as argued above, the 
courts’ legal description saw that it was, in fact, these structures that had been harmed as a 
result of the violence.99 This issue of ‘translation’ was seen elsewhere within the legal 
findings sections of the judgement as the meaning of the violence was increasingly 
reinterpreted as the law’s understanding of violence took hold. For instance, in the court’s 
final account, due to the court’s legal understanding of genocide, as previously discussed, all 
Hutus were prevented becoming victims of the genocide as the genocide was seen as being 
directed solely against the Tutsis simply because of their ethnicity.100 This understanding of 
                                                     
96 Ibid., 96–102 and 189. 
97 Beatrice Bonafé, ‘Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility’, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 5:3 (2007), 604–12. 
98 See Intro., n. 35. 
99 Dixon, ‘Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law’, 704–5. 
100 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 173–174.  
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genocide contributed towards the construction of an ethnocentric understanding of the 
violence, and of victimhood and perpetratorhood.101  
 
The Tribunal’s account of violence was thus increasingly decontextualised, and the 
specificity of these individual acts of violence become subordinated to the judges’ interest in 
what was generalisable about them and how they related to the law. The locally situated, 
personal experiences of violence that had featured in the witness’s testimonies became 
valuable only to the extent that they evidenced the various components required to establish 
that a particular crime occurred. 102 As a result, it becomes apparent that not only did the court 
project particular imaginings of violence, but that these could also sit at odds with the 
witnesses’ narratives that the court relied upon.  
 
This sense of the problematic nature of some of these translations, along with the way in 
which this side–lined the position of the victim, come together in one final finding here. As 
has been argued throughout, not just anyone could be a victim or perpetrator within the 
courtroom. Particularly within the judgements it became apparent, however, that these 
categories co–constituted each other; to be recognisable as a ‘victim that mattered’ an actor 
had to be attacked or harmed by a ‘perpetrator that mattered’. A victim only became so in a 
legal sense if they had been the target of a crime contained within the courts statute, which 
had been charged within the indictment and executed by someone that was a recognisable 
                                                     
101 See, for instance, the discussion here about Akayesu’s intent and the effect that this had on the narrative 
constructed by the court. Ibid., 176–7. See also the depoliticising of the judges’ account of Akayesu’s 
participation in the genocide. Ibid., 54–5. What is additionally interesting here is that again the judges in finding 
Akayesu guilty of genocide conflated the local and the national level of the violence in Rwanda as necessarily 
being the same as a result of ‘targeting the Tutsis’. This was despite no evidence being provided to demonstrate 
that there was a link, and that the judges had previously found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the 
Murambi meeting on 18 April 1994 was used to encourage resisting bourgmestres (like Akayesu) to participate 
in the genocide– the only connection linking Taba to the national plan. It was, then, simply enough that Tutsis 
were targeted. ICTR–96–4–0459/1, 176.  
102 Ibid., 179. 
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perpetrator who was also connected to the accused. What also became clear was that the 
description of violence within the court’s account was not determined by how the victim 
experienced the crime, but rather by how the perpetrator’s actions and intentions were 
interpreted. Hence if a perpetrator committed an act of violence, but was believed to not 
possess genocidal intent, then the victim would not be seen as a victim of the genocide no 
matter how the witness experienced or understood the violence. This, as such, questions the 
extent to which a court could ever be considered a ‘victim–centred’ space.  
 
To take one example of this. During Cyangugu, one of the key sites of violence was the 
Cyangugu military camp where Imanishimwe was the commander. Abducted Tutsis were 
taken to the camp where they were kept in cells and then taken out on a regular basis and shot 
under Imanishimwe’s orders. The court accepted all of this, but found that, because the 
soldiers had referred to the Tutsis as Inkotanyi, they were killed because they were genuinely 
suspected of being members of the RPF.103 It is irrelevant here whether or not the perpetrators 
really did see these people as members of the RPF. What is important is that whether or not 
this act was seen as genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime was dependent on the 
perpetrator’s perspective of the violence and not the victim’s experience.104  
 
This chapter has shown how over the course of the judgement the legal (and sometimes 
political) concerns of the courtroom took precedence over all others, as the legal actors of the 
court gained greater hold over the accounts of violence. Watching an appeals process in 
                                                     
103 ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 109 and 182–4. 




person105 made it clear just how much the content and meaning of the violence slipped into 
irrelevance at that stage.106 This was due to the fact that at this point the focus became almost 
solely fixated on the ‘rules of the game’. For, to launch an appeal, the two criteria that had to 
be met were for an alleged error of fact or law to have occurred in the trial judgement, which 
had further led to a miscarriage of justice. Even with claims of errors of fact, due to the 
standard of error being that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the trial chamber’s 
conclusion, the aim became to show that the processes through which the court made their 
findings were at fault, for instance by showing that the trial judges had not properly 
considered the credibility of a witness.107 It was not, then, about embellishing the story of the 
violence told during the trial, but rather querying the manner and processes through which it 
had been told. Here, then, the language through which the violence was discussed shifted 
almost completely to being focused on the law itself, and the deontological nature of the law 




This chapter has explored the construction of the archive from the judges’ perspective. It has 
first shown the importance again of the concepts of the ‘conditions’ and ‘processes’ of truth, 
as legal and non–legal discourses (perhaps most particularly gender) came to shape the 
judges final account of violence, and how these records were also produced as a result of the 
different roles ascribed to different actors, and the processes the court went through, when 
                                                     
105 I sat in on the appeals hearings for Butare. Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Joseph Ndayambaje, 
Sylvain Nsabimana, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, and Alphonse Nteziryayo (Butare), Case No. ICTR-98-42. 
106  ICTR–99–46, TRA002960, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 06/02/2006 – Appeals 
Hearing, 06/02/2006, 5. 
107 For an example of this see the Prosecution’s arguments on appeal about the piecemeal approach of the court 
in Cyangugu. ICTR–99–46–1735/2, Cyangugu – Appeal Judgement, 07/07/2006, 57. See also ICTR–96–4, 
ICTR–96–4–0868/1, Akayesu – Appeal Judgement, 01/06/200, 70. 
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constructing its final ‘truth’. It demonstrated, as mirrored in the preceding chapters, the 
complex nature of the relationships between the witnesses and the legal actors of the court in 
this process. First it showed how the judges adapted both the jurisprudence of the court and 
the way in which the court approached the evidence to the witnesses’ testimony and ways of 
testifying—meaning that the witnesses appeared to leave a strong mark on the judgements 
and the archives. 
 
However, again there was the suggestion that the idea of witness empowerment needs to be 
tempered. First, the moments where the judges appeared to offer greater scope for the 
witnesses to influence the trial process were also those moments when it in many ways 
benefited the judges, and the Tribunal more generally, to do so. As was argued, this enabled 
the law to remain relevant as it expanded and evolved so that it could continue to capture the 
violence. This was particularly clearly demonstrated by the dubious finding that the Tutsis, as 
a ‘stable and permeant group’, were protected by the Genocide Convention. This is not to say 
that the needs of others were never met or taken into consideration. There were undoubtedly 
moments (for instance, with the judicial notice and some of the initial rulings concerning 
sexual violence) where the Tribunal reflected the needs and interests of the post–genocide 
Rwandan society (and also the ‘international community’ more generally). However, as will 
be further explored in the following chapter, overall this chapter has suggested that these 
wider interests were predominantly taken into consideration, or allowed to affect the process, 
when they aligned with the needs of the legal actors within the courtroom.  
 
This might not be of such importance (maybe the tangential benefits would be enough) if it 
weren’t for the negative consequences of this approach. In this respect, the chapter showed 
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that the judgements not only produced accounts that often did not match with the witnesses’ 
own testimony, but also resulted in politicised accounts (and ultimately a politicised archive). 
This was seen in the effects of gendered and patriarchal discourses on the legal outcomes of 
these trials, along with the more obtuse political interventions from the outside, both of which 
affected the direction that the jurisprudence progressed in. This only reinforced the manner in 
which the ICTR appeared, at points, to be have worked against the interests and needs of 
exactly the constituencies that they were created to help. 
 
A final question remains to be addressed here. Throughout this dissertation, I have noted a 
shift in the way in which different actors approached the trials and the impact that this had on 
the archive. As yet, however, I have not explored why this was the case. The final chapter 
will address this question, and in doing so it will also set out the way in which the courts 
strategic function changed over time. With this, moreover, we return full circle to start of the 
dissertation as I explore how it was that the archive came to be seen almost solely for its legal 




Chapter Six: The Politics of 




During the early years of the Tribunal, the prosecution and judges pursued the trials in a way 
that tried to, in addition to securing verdicts against the accused, achieve several extra–
judicial goals, such as producing an accurate account of the violence that properly reflected 
the extent of the genocide. As has been shown, over the course of the Tribunal’s history, 
however, these concerns appeared to be replaced by a more explicit and narrow focus on the 
trials as sites of law and nothing more. This resulted in more focused and streamlined 
procedures, with the legal actors showing a greater desire to intervene and control the 
proceedings. Whilst this arguably had a positive impact on the trial practice from a legal 
perspective, a consequence was that witnesses were increasingly treated in a utilitarian 
fashion, as what was of legal value was extracted with little thought given to much else. This 
affected both the types of records produced for the archive (thinner and more heavily framed 
by law) and also how they were constructed—increasingly with less input from the witnesses. 
The question is, why did this change occur? This will be examined in this chapter in two 
parts. The first looks at the way in which over time both substantive and procedural law 
became more settled as the novelty of enacting international criminal law wore off. This 
meant that it became possible for the legal actors to exert greater control over the proceedings 
so that they increasingly mimicked what might be considered a more typical criminal trial 
(when compared with municipal law). The second looks at the effects of the interventions of 
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external actors, particularly the UNSC, in influencing the way the Tribunal functioned. This 
therefore also examines how external actors (as discussed in Chapters Three and Five) 
worked to shape the archive so that it came to reflect their interests. The final section of this 
chapter revisits the issues addressed at the start of the dissertation, as I consider the effects of 




When the Tribunal opened in 1996 with the Akayesu trial, the legal actors had little to draw 
on in terms of substantive and procedural legal precedent. For this, they were almost 
completely restricted to the jurisprudence created as a result of the Nuremberg trials, the 
ICTY’s RPE, which formed the basis of the ICTR’s RPE, and relevant domestic law. Many 
aspects of the Tribunal’s statute were described and explored for the first time within the first 
judgements, producing, in some cases, completely new legal definitions.1 It was clear that in 
certain instances the Tribunal was in fact creating substantive law. Whilst these decisions on 
occasion drew on municipal jurisprudence, they were performative acts of law–making: by 
declaring the law to be a certain way it became so. This could be seen in judicial decisions, 
as discussed in previous chapters, concerning rape as an act of genocide and the introduction 
of JCE.2  
 
                                                     
1 ICTR President (2015). 
2 The performativity of the law was, of course, never acknowledged by the court. In concealing this the judges, 
on occasion, presented some very spurious arguments, such as ‘the Appeals Chamber wishes to clarify that 
when it interprets certain provisions of the Statute or the Rules, it is merely identifying what the proper 
interpretation of that provision has always been, even though it was not previously expressed that way’. ICTR–
99–46–1735/2, 42. See also Sanford Levinson, ‘The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion’, in Law’s Stories, ed. 
Peter Brooks et al. (London: Yale University Press, 1996), 188–90; and Frederic Mégret, ‘International 
Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field’ (see Intro., n. 88). 
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Over time, however, the law became more settled. Its appearance as a timeless set of rules 
was particularly strengthened through the constant reinforcement that ‘the law was as it was’ 
through the citation (in increasing frequency as the trials went on) of prior rulings as 
‘precedent’.3 This offered support for the judges’ particular interpretation of what constituted 
a crime, as set out in the statute and then developed through subsequent rulings, and gave the 
appearance that their interpretation was a declaration of a simple truth of what the law really 
was. It was possible to see the ‘ripple effects’ of declarations of what the law was as they 
provided a framework through which other episodes of violence could be interpreted. For 
instance, Akayesu’s finding that rape could constitute an act of genocide opened up the 
possibility that other trials could introduce sexual violence evidence, in the knowledge that it 
now could be accepted as an act of genocide.4 As the law settled, this increasingly 
‘predetermined’ how evidence needed to be presented in order to be accepted as 
representative of a crime. Indeed, two things were notable when comparing the Akayesu 
(1998) and the Gatete (2011) trials. Firstly, in the Akayesu closing and judgement greater 
attention was paid to interpretations of law—interpretations that relied on the witnesses’ 
narratives in order to justify them—in comparison to Gatete. This suggested that significant 
areas of law had become accepted as the legal interpretations of these crimes by the end of 
the Tribunal.5 Second, as suggested in Chapters Two and Five, in Gatete the witnesses were 
questioned in a far more direct manner, as greater control was exerted over the proceedings 
                                                     
3 Senior Appeals Attorney (2015); and Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field’. 
4 Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR–99–46 (hereafter ICTR–99–46), TRA000434/2, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 14/02/2001, 14/02/2001, 13. 
5 See Prosecutor v. Jean–Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR–96–4 (hereafter ICTR–96–4), CONTRA001236, 
Akayesu – Transcript of 23/3/1998, 23/03/1998, 6–46; ICTR–96–4–0459/1, Akayesu – Judgement, 02/09/1998, 
123–159. Indeed, it is notable that there is no discernible discrete reference to interpretations of the law in the 
Gatete closing. Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61 (hereafter ICTR–00–61), 
TRA005592, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 08/11/2010, 08/11/2010. Similarly, whilst the Akayesu judgement 
had a separate section for ‘The Law' running for 36 pages, there was no similar section in Gatete and ‘what the 
law was’ was dispensed within in a relatively concise fashion by drawing heavily on previous key rulings.  
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by prosecution, defence and the judges, when compared to Akayesu.6 This suggests that since 
the legal agents knew what was needed to establish that a crime had occurred, they could ask 
more direct questions of the witnesses.7 This again meant that the witnesses’ role changed as 
they became limited in their ability to determine the content of the court’s accounts.  
 
This ripple effect was similarly present within the Tribunal’s procedural decisions. These 
changed over time in order to provide the legal agents, but particularly the judges, with 
greater influence over how the trials were conducted. A key shift in this respect was the 
judge’s intervention over the prosecution’s indictment policy, as was seen in their rulings 
during Cyangugu. 
 
The prosecution encountered numerous problems with their indictment from the outset of 
Cyangugu, as it was challenged in each of the defendants’ preliminary motions, on the 
grounds that it was so vague that the defendants could not even detect what was being 
charged.8 The defendants argued that some of the prosecution’s charges were incompatible 
with each other and that with others, most notably conspiracy, the prosecution had failed to 
present sufficient material facts to establish a prima facie case against the accused.9 
                                                     
6 A particularly good example of this new style of questioning can be seen in the examination–in–chief of 
Witness BBJ during Gatete. ICTR–00–61, TRA005459, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 05/11/2009, 
05/11/2009, 14–30.  
7 Here it was striking that, compared with Akayesu, the prosecution in Gatete wasted no time and during their 
examinations and jumped straight to asking questions concerning the allegations in the indictment. For an 
example see Ibid., 14–30. 
8 Prosecutor v. Andre Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR–96–10 (hereafter ICTR–96–10), ICTR–96–10A–0194, 
Ntagerura – Preliminary Motion (Defects in the Indictment), 21/04/1997, 5–11; and Prosecutor v. Emmanuel 
Bagambiki et al., Case No. ICTR–97–36 (hereafter ICTR–97–36), ICTR–97–36–00195, Bagambiki – Audio 
Recording of 25/03/98 – AM, 25/03/1998. Rule 40 bis extended the amount of time the prosecution had to 
submit their indictment by a further 30 days. This could be relied upon no more than three times for any 
indictment.  
9 That is, even if all of the facts, as set out, were proven correct, then there would still be insufficient evidence to 




Imanishimwe’s defence stated that, from what they could work out, Imanishimwe was 
‘accused of living in Cyangugu’,10 and Ntagerura’s defence went as far as to suggest that the 
indictment amounted to ‘enormous…diarrhoea…’.11  
 
Most of these motions were successful and the judges ordered the prosecution to amend the 
indictments to make both the charging and the statement of facts clearer.12 The prosecution to 
a large extent complied with these orders, despite various attempts to side–step their 
obligations.13 This issue, however, reached a climax in the judgement. As the very first issue 
addressed by the court, the judges effectively ruled that the prosecution’s entire indictment 
was impermissibly vague, to the extent that it was impossible to be cured through post–
indictment disclosure.14 This ruling carried with it a warning to the prosecution concerning 
their indictment policy: from then on, the chamber would have zero tolerance for the 
prosecution’s indictment strategy, which at that point relied on vague indictments that could 
be altered as a result of new evidence found either through on–going investigations or the 
                                                     
10 ICTR–97–36–00195, 25/03/1998. 
11 ICTR–99–46–01002, Ntagerura – Audio Recording of 10/08/99 – AM, 10/10/1999. 
12 ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0208, Ntagerura – Decision on the Preliminary Motion Filed by the Defence 
Based on Defects in the Form of the Indictment, 28/11/1997, 6–7; ICTR–97–36, ICTR–97–36–0062, 
Imanishimwe – Bagambiki – Munyakazi – Decision on the Defence Motion Regarding Defects in the Form of 
the Indictment, 24/09/1998, 4; and ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0224, Ntagerura – Amended Indictment, 
29/01/1998. 
13 ICTR–99–46, TRA002066/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 12/08/2003, 
12/08/2003, 8–11; ICTR–99–46, TRA000521/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
05/03/2002 – Motion, 05/03/2002, 86, 113–4, 140, 148; and ICTR–99–46, TRA000552/2, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 06/03/2002– Oral Hearing on the Motion of Imanishimwe for 
Acquittal on Conspiracy Count, 06/03/2002. The matter appeared on a number of other occasions: during the 
hearing for the prosecution’s motion to join the two indictments, where the defence unsuccessfully argued that 
the prosecution had failed to submit an amended indictment as ordered by the court; and again, at the end of the 
prosecution’s case where Imanishimwe’s defence successfully argued that they did not have a case to answer 
over the conspiracy charge. ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0215, Ntagerura – Prosecutor's Motion to Order 
Interpretation of Decision No. ICTR–96–10a–I of 11/28/1997, 29/12/1997. 
14 ICTR–99–46–0599/1, Trial Judgement – the Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura Emmanuel Bagambiki Samuel 
Imanishimwe, 25/02/2004, 15–20; and ICTR–99–46–1735/2, 21, 25 and 41. This, then, supported the defences’ 
position adopted in their closing briefs.  ICTR–99–46, TRA002063/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 13/08/2003, 13/08/2003, 7–15; and TRA002066/1, 13–7. 
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witnesses’ in–court testimony.15 Judge Dolenc, in his separate but concurring opinion, took 
this argument even further, finding that the prosecution’s conduct was so problematic that the 
whole of the indictment should have been thrown out and the case along with it.16 As such, 
the judges made it clear that the indictment policy had to change so that the defence could be 
adequately warned of the charges they faced.  
 
Indeed, several factors suggest that it was, to a certain extent, the prosecution’s conscious 
decision to proceed under a vague indictment in Cyangugu.17 First, whilst the prosecution 
clearly submitted the indictment in a hurry, as it was filed under Rule 40 bis, the additional 
information contained within the indictment’s supporting document that was not included in 
the main indictment showed that more information could have been provided.18 Second, the 
prosecution submitted an amended indictment in December 1999, in clear acknowledgement 
of the defects in the current indictment, but subsequently withdrew it.19 Part of the decision 
not to amend was motivated by an OTP policy that meant the prosecution should only alter an 
indictment where absolutely necessary to ensure that the trials proceeded at apace. 20 
However, at the very least the prosecution tested their luck and hoped that the judges would 
allow for the additional evidence and information, that the prosecution knew they had, to 
                                                     
15 ICTR–99–46–0599/1, 18–20 
16 Judge Schomburg made a similarly strong statement on appeal, arguing that the whole of the Ntagerura 
indictment should also be thrown out. ICTR–99–46–1735/2, Cyangugu – Appeal Judgement, 07/07/2006, 131. 
17 Whilst not referring to Cyangugu directly, a senior trial attorney noted that this appeared to be the indictment 
strategy used in early trials. Appeals Attorney 2 (2015); and Deputy Appeals Chief (2015). 
18 ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10–0212, Ntagerura – Decision – Confirmation of the Indictment, 10/08/1996; 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002960, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 06/02/2006 – Appeals 
Hearing, 06/02/2006, 73–4. A/54/634, Financing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report of the 
Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 22/11/1999, 55–7; and ICTR–96–
10, ICTR–96–10A–0014, Ntagerura – Indictment – Supporting Material – Supporting Documentation, 
09/08/1996. 
19 ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0272, Ntagerura – Prosecutor Request for Leave to File an Amended 
Indictment, 02/12/1999, 4–5. 
20 Head of Appeals (2015). 
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enter the courtroom. It seems unlikely that they would have proceeded with the original 
indictment had they expected the judges to react so adversely to the indictment in the 
judgement. 
 
This warning, along with similar decisions rendered in Semanza, formed part of a broader 
strategy, which began in the late 1990s and saw the judges gain greater control over the way 
the trials proceeded, in order to quicken their pace.21 This was, moreover, largely successful 
and as a result of these interventions, along with others discussed below, the prosecution’s 
indictments came to reflect the practice advocated by the Cyangugu judges.22 Not only did 
they move towards using far more exacting and narrowly focused indictments, but they also 
introduced an indictment committee tasked with ensuring that the indictments were 
watertight, reflected the current jurisprudence, and that the evidence to be led in court 
matched the charges in the indictment.23  
 
                                                     
21 ICTR–99–46, TRA002962, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 07/02/2006 – Appeals 
Hearing, 07/02/2006, 6–7. This message was, moreover, reinforced by the Cyangugu Appeals Chamber, which 
overturned the trial chambers finding that Imanishimwe was responsible for genocide, because they found that, 
once again, the prosecution had failed to properly plead this allegation in the indictment.  
The Appeals Chamber wishes to express its concern regarding the Prosecution's approach in 
the present case. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the indictment is the primary accusatory 
instrument and must plead the Prosecution case with sufficient detail. Although the Appeals 
Chamber allows that defects in an indictment may be "remedied" under certain 
circumstances, it emphasizes that this should be limited to exceptional cases. In the present 
case, the Appeals Chamber is disturbed by the extent to which the Prosecution seeks to rely 
on this exception. Even if the Prosecution had succeeded in arguing that the defects in the 
indictments were remedied in each individual instance, the Appeals Chamber would still 
have to consider whether the overall effect of the numerous defects would not have 
rendered the trial unfair in itself. ICTR–99–46, TRA003809/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et 
al – Redacted Transcript of 07/07/2006 – Appeals Judgement, 07/07/2006, 13 and 37. 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR–97–20, ICTR–97–20–0779/1, Judgement and Sentence, 
15/05/2003, 17; and Appeals Attorney 2 (2015). 
22 Head of Appeals (2015); and Nina Tavakoli, ‘Notice of Charges’, ICTR Legacy Event. 
23 Appeals Attorney 2 (2015). 
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An additional consequence of these changes was that there was yet a further shift in power 
away from the witnesses and towards the legal agents. This new stance moved away from the 
prosecution’s initial indictment practice, which allowed the witnesses to take a far greater 
role with how the indictments and trials were to be formulated, and early trial practice, which 
had afforded the witnesses a certain amount of space to influence the prosecution’s account 
during the trial phase. Rather, witnesses were increasingly used in a more utilitarian manner. 
This was also reflected in the increasingly interventionist approach adopted by the court’s 
legal agents, which worked to limit and interrupt the witnesses’ testimonies, as the court’s 
concern became far more oriented towards producing orderly and efficient trials.24 
 
In addition to the effects of the law becoming more ‘settled’, this shift in trial practice was 
driven by a change in Tribunal personnel. At the Tribunal’s legacy conference, it was widely 
accepted that there was a step–change in the ‘professionalisation’ and also efficiency of the 
trials as the result of the appointment of Hassan Jallow as prosecutor and Erik Møse as 
President, in 2003, and Adam Dieng as registrar in 2001.25 These three actors focused their 
energies on the professionalisation of the Tribunal and the pursuit of more efficient trials. 
Some of the key changes to trial practice that they introduced in pursuit of this included the 
                                                     
24 Deputy Appeals Chief (2015); Head of Appeals (2015); and Defence Counsel (2016). Byrne conversely 
argues that whilst the substantive jurisprudence became more settled over the course of both ad hoc tribunals, 
there was greater ambiguity, and therefore flexibility, in how procedural rules were applied. However, four 
points can be made here. First, the trials Byrne analysed fall between 2000-2002, which is prior to the key shifts 
in practice identified here. Second, Byrne’s findings presumes, rather than set outs, both that conflicts exist 
between actors of different legal backgrounds and that they directly affect the way a trial unfolds. Third, even if 
there was by the end of the ICTR still ambiguity around certain procedural issues, this does not disrupt the 
findings here that in key areas there was a shift towards great judicial control, such as with the indictments 
where the judges increasingly demanded greater specificity and clarity. Finally, overall it is clear that trial 
practice developed in a way directed at achieving quicker trials, something that Byrne too acknowledges.  
Byrne, ‘The New Public Prosecutor’ (see Intro., n. 89), 248-303; S/2010/574, Letter dated 12 November 2010 
from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security 
Council: Report on the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as of 1 
November 2010), 05/11/2010, 8–9. 
25 ICTR Legacy Symposium – 20 Years of Challenging Impunity, Arusha, 06/11/2014–07/11/2014. Mégret also 
identifies a similar shift in personnel (and a correlative effect on trial practice) as there was a shift from actors 
with a background in international law, to those with a back ground in criminal law. Mégret, ‘International 
Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field’ (see Internet Materials). 
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creation of trial committees—with representatives from the trial chambers, prosecution teams 
and the registry—which were convened to ensure that the trials were on track. Informal use 
of status conferences, where issues between the defence and the prosecution could be settled 
without resorting to more time–consuming litigation, were also introduced.26 Similar changes 
were seen in each of the organs of the Tribunal, and unifying this was a concerted attempt to 
produce more efficient and streamlined proceedings, and seemingly also to place greater 
power in the hands of the judges to enable them to control how the proceedings functioned. 
This also resulted in a shift towards courtroom practices more rooted in civil law, which was 
also seen in the judges’ continued revisions of the RPE.27  
 
However, in addition to the shifts in practice that appeared motivated by the desire to enhance 
the legal quality of the trials, there was another and more significant driving force behind 
these changes. This was the way in which the UNSC intervened in the Tribunal to enforce 
changes in how trials were approached. This will be considered in the following section as I 
consider the way in which these interventions resulted in the ‘politicisation’ of the trial 
process. What is meant here by this is that political considerations, rather than purely legal 




There was a marked shift in the relationship of the ICTR and ICTY with other UN organs 
(particularly the UNSC) during the Tribunals’ first decade. As Chapter One set out, the 
                                                     
26 S/2003/946, Letter dated 3 October 2003 from the Secretary–General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council: Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 06/10/2003, 15; and 
S/PV.4999, 4999th Meeting, 29/06/2004, 12. 
27 ICTR President (2015). 
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Tribunals were initially seen as a new tool of international peace and security, made perhaps 
particularly attractive as they seemed like a more ‘economic’ response, in terms of both 
financial and political capital, when compared to other more interventionist strategies (such 
as military action).28 This good will towards the tribunals—and particularly the ICTR—was, 
however, relatively short lived, as the trials proved to be very costly, slow and inefficient.29 
 
A series of other reputational issues, along with ingrained interdepartmental wrangling for 
control over the Tribunal, led a number of UN organs (particularly the UNSC, UNGA and the 
Fifth Committee—the sub–section of the UN charged with overseeing the finances of UN 
operations) to intervene and to bring about change in the Tribunal’s practices.30 
Consequently, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, numerous reports into the Tribunal’s 
practices were published, the most substantial of which came as a result of the Fifth 
Committee’s interventions through the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).31 
These reports focused on how the Tribunal could be better managed, with a view to 
                                                     
28 S/PV.3377, 3377th Meeting, 16/05/1994, 19; and E/1994/SR.8, Provisional Summary Record of the 8th 
Meeting, 14/06/1994, 4; and A/C.5/48/SR.57, Fifth Committee: Summary Record of the 57th Meeting: Financing 
of the United Nations Observer Mission Rwanda, 29/03/1994, 2–3; S/1995/134, Report of the Secretary–
General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 13/02/1995, 4. 
29 Whilst this seemed to peak at the turn of the millennium, the concern expressed by member states over the 
progress being made by the Tribunal goes back to as early as 1996. A/51/PV.78, 51st Session, 78th Plenary 
Meeting, 10/12/1996, 18; UNSC, 4429th Meeting, S/PV.4429, 27/11/2001, 7; S/PV.5453, 5453rd Meeting, 
07/06/2006, 23; S/PV.5697, 5697th Meeting, 18/06/2007, 22–3 and 28; and S/PV.7192, 7192nd Meeting, 
05/06/2014. Byrne, ‘The New Public Prosecutor’, 263-5. 
30 Indeed, one interviewee informed me that during these early years the relationship between the Registry and 
the chambers and OTP was particularly fraught as they each vied for control over the Tribunal. The relationship 
even deteriorated to the extent that there was a genuine fear amongst members of the chambers that the registrar 
might actively try to sabotage the progress of the trials so as to be able to accuse the Chambers of being 
incompetent. Senior Legal Office (2016). See also, Appeals Judge (2016). 
31 A/51/789, Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory 
of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report of the Secretary–General on the 
Activities of the office of internal Oversight Services, 06/02/1997; and A/C.5/57/L.35, Financing of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States 
between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 04/12/2002; A/RES/53/213, Resolution 53/213, 10/02/1999; 
A/C.5/51/SR.39 Fifth Committee: 51st Session: Summary Record of the 39th Meeting, 11/12/1996; A/54/634; and 
A/53/659, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, 11/11/1998, 10–1. 
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economising the Tribunal’s practices in terms of both time and resources.32 Indeed, as will be 
explored below, concern about the economics of justice came to dominate the Tribunal and 
influenced the ways in which justice was ultimately delivered and, moreover, what justice 
meant.  
 
These reports’ findings were highly critical and made a series of recommendations about how 
the practices and structure of the institution could be improved.33 One of the earliest OIOS 
reports resulted in the re–organisation of the registry, and also demanded the resignation of 
the registrar and deputy registrar after the investigators found high levels of corruption and 
incompetence within the registry.34 However, when this failed to resolve the continuing 
dispute between the Registrar and the President as to who, ultimately, was the head of the 
Tribunal, a report by the ‘Expert Group’ for the International Tribunals declared that the 
president was the effective head of the Tribunal and in charge of all matters relating to the 
court’s legal and political duties, with the registrar solely in change of the administrative 
aspects of the court.35  
                                                     
32 A/54/634, 9.  
33  See the report: A/51/789. A/56/853, Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991: Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in 
the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Comprehensive report on the 
results of the implementation of the recommendations of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective 
Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 04/03/2002, 2 and 6. 
34 A/52/582–S/1997/868, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in 
the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 13/11/1997, 2–3 and 15–6; and 
A/53/PV.47, 53rd Session: 47th Plenary Meeting, 28/10/1998, 5–12. 
35 A/54/PV.48, 54th Session: 48th Plenary Meeting, 08/11/1999, 15; A/54/634, 60, 74–8; It was suggested that 
the President would oversee the duties of the registrar, without, however, the registrar being an official 
subordinate of the President. A/51/7/Add.8, Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 




Many of these interventions were justified and, whilst arguably one of the major reasons the 
Tribunal struggled in the early years was due to lack of sufficient funding and the difficulty 
of the task at hand, these did help to tackle serious issues such as corruption and conflicts 
between the Tribunal’s organs.36 It was notable, however, that these reports also made 
suggestions about how the Tribunal should go about prosecuting the crimes falling within its 
jurisdiction. For instance, they suggested that the judges needed to exert greater control over 
the trials to shorten the procedures and to make the trials more efficient.37 The reports also 
called for an end to ‘excessive lawyering’ and suggested that the OTP should cut down the 
scope of the charges being pursued and begin focusing solely on the more senior persons 
responsible for the violence in Rwanda, leaving lesser criminals to other jurisdictions, and 
that they should make greater use of plea agreements and judicial notice (the effects of which 
were discussed in the previous chapter).38 There were also suggestions that specifically called 
for the Tribunal to change its approach to witness testimony. These included calls for the 
judges to exert more control over how witnesses were examined, to ensure a reduction in the 
number of witnesses called, and for greater use to be made of Rule 92 bis, which allowed 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Ninth 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, 29/05/1997, 15–6. To some 
extent, it appeared that inner wrangling continued to be a feature of the ICTR even after this. Head of Appeals 
(2015); and Appeals Judge (2016). 
36 Many of my interviewees noted the extent of the challenge of creating a court from scratch in Tanzania and 
the impact that this had on the trials. Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (2015); Head of Appeals 
(2015); Anonymous 2 (2016); and ICTR President (2015). 
37 A/54/634, 18–38; S/2004/616, the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post–Conflict 
Societies: Report of the Secretary–General, 23/08/2004, 15; and S/PV.4429, 27/11/2001, 8. Byrne, ‘The New 
Public Prosecutor’ (see Intro., n. 88), 265. 
38 A/56/853, 2 and 11; and A/54/634, 28–30. Again, we have the prioritising of speed and efficiency over other 
potential goals that could be pursued by the Tribunal. Pleas, for instance, produce a particularly narrow output, 
since most of the cases and alleged crimes are discarded in order to get a confession. Whilst securing a verdict 
(adding again to the Tribunal’s statistics) it can perhaps be seen as contributing less to some of the other extra–
judicial goals, such as producing history or aiding reconciliation. Also of interest here is that the vast majority of 
the guilty pleas come in after the creation of the completion strategy. S/2015/884, Letter Dated 17 November 
2015 From the President of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed to The President of The 
Security Council: Report on The Completion of The Mandate of The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda as at 15 November 2015, 17/11/2015, 15. 
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written statements to be submitted in substitute of in–court testimony.39 One report produced 
in 1999 and co–written by Hassan Jallow before he became the ICTR’s prosecutor, stated: 
Some [witness answers] seem to be evoked by vague, multiple or compound 
questions and the relative infrequency of objections to them. There appears to be a 
disposition to tolerate this procedure, particularly in the case of testimony by 
victims, the thought being that allowing them to tell their stories in their own way 
has a salutary cathartic psychological benefit. In addition, some judges may be 
needlessly sensitive to the potential for criticism if they intervene actively to 
exercise greater control over the proceedings. (Emphasis added.)40 
 
These reports coincided with the period in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the judges’ 
approach to the trials shifted in order to gain greater control over how these proceeded. At 
this point, as noted above, the judges, with greater energy, began to curb both the number of 
witnesses and the length of their testimony during trials.41 Whilst some of the changes, as 
noted previously, were also motivated by legal concerns, the language that underpinned these 
decisions demonstrated the significance of the UNSC’s pressure.42 This focused on the need 
to economise judicial time, in order to make the trials more judicially efficient, and also to 
make the trials financially less costly.43 One of the justifications for ordering the witness lists 
to be shortened stated:44 
It's no point us having witnesses that are not advancing the issues very much. 
Great expense is involved in bringing these witnesses to the tribunal. Our budget 
has been seriously cut and so the issue of economy has to be taken into 
consideration as well. We can't just bring witnesses here for the sake of bringing 
                                                     
39 S/2003/946, 11; and A/56/853, 4 and 10. 
40 A/54/634, 29. 
41 S/PV.4429, 27/11/2001, 8; and Anonymous 2 (2016). 
42 ICTR–99–46–0183, 18/9/2000; ICTR–99–46–0488, Proposed Reduction in the List of Defence Witnesses in 
the Cyangugu Case, Case No. ICTR–99–46–T, 30/04/2002; ICTR–99–46, TRA001998/1, [Cyangugu] – 
Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 05/02/2003, 05/02/2003, 44; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001601/2, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 28/03/2002, 28/03/2002, 7. 
43 ICTR–99–46, TRA000526/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 12/03/2002, 
12/03/2002, 104–5. Indeed, the extent to which judicial time was prioritised was seen when one of the witnesses 
was brought to the courtroom without any shoes or socks on in order for the court session to start on time. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001915/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 24/03/2003, 24/03/2003, 
2. 
44 It was noted, moreover, that the push towards cutting down witness lists was in tension with the desire of the 
witnesses to have their moment in court. ICTR President (2015). Arguin also noted that one of the reasons why 
the OTP choose the witnesses they did (and also did not diversify the pool of witnesses they drew upon as much 
as they might of) was because of a desire to keep costs low. Head of Appeals (2015). 
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them. They have to be contributing materially to the issues that have to be 
considered. (Emphasis added.)45  
 
This provides clear evidence of how political influence from outside the Tribunal contributed 
to determining how defendants were being prosecuted.46 
 
This ‘efficiency drive’ accelerated when, in 2002, an increasingly dissatisfied UNSC told the 
Tribunal that, along with the ICTY, they needed to formulate a ‘completion strategy’ that 
would ensure that the Tribunals would conclude their work as quickly as possible.47 The 
strategy was finalised in 2003, and this dictated that the prosecution were to finish all 
investigations by 2004, with trials in the first instance concluded by 2008 and appeals by 
2010.48 One of the first changes introduced in search of these goals was the creation of 
separate Prosecutor posts for the ICTR and the ICTY. Hassan Jallow, who, as the above 
statement suggests, was already intent on making the OTP’s approach more efficient, and 
                                                     
45 TRA001601/2, 7. 
46 The drive to quicken the pace of trials also resulted in changes to the RPE. .S/2003/946, 12 and 14. Some of 
these changes were very substantial and included, for instance, the decision in 1998 to merge both the 
judgement and sentence into one procedure, eradicating the sentencing hearing. A/53/429, Report of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States 
between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 23/09/1998, 4. Other similar rule amendments used in order to 
speed up the trial process include: reducing the time limits from 60 to 30 days with pre–trial motions; allowing 
the defence to use external language translations; allowing the confirming judge to sit on the trial; President 
being allowed to order the creation of directives to better regulate the trial; and, importantly, the power of the 
judges to impose sanctions for ‘frivolous’ motions. A/54/315–S/1999/943, Report of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 
1994, 07/09/1999, 5; ICTR–99–46, TRA000207/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
18/09/2000, 18/09/2000, 102; A/58/140–S/2003/707, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such 
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 
11/07/2003, 3. This logic was, moreover, utilised by the prosecution in order to argue for the joinder during 
Cyangugu. ICTR–99–46–0001, Prosecutor’s Motion for Joinder of the Accused (Ntagerura, ICTR–96–10A–T0, 
Bagambiki ICTR–97–36–T, Imanishimwe ICTR–97–36–I, and Munyakazi ICTR–97–36–I), 02/04/1999, 24. 
47 A/C.5/57/L.35. 
48 S/RES/1503, Resolution 1503, 28/08/2003, 2.  
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changing the role of the witnesses in the trials, was appointed as prosecutor at the ICTR.49 
The prosecution subsequently created a new OTP policy that would streamline their 
prosecutions along the lines suggested in these reports.50 This policy change was central to 
the shift in trial practice between Akayesu and Gatete as discussed in Chapter Two, including 
the very clear reduction of the scope of the Gatete indictment over time.51 
 
There was an additional consequence of this shift in priority, however, which was to increase 
the court’s focus on crimes committed against the Tutsis, and hence reinforce the 
ethnocentric nature of the Tribunal’s account. This was for two reasons. First, this focus on 
only the most ‘serious’ charges also meant that it became ‘reasonable’ to only focus on 
genocide charges, which helped to justify the OTP’s decision not to prosecute the RPF for 
their (‘less serious’) crimes against humanity.52 Second, driven by a concern with efficiency, 
this new strategy also focused on episodes of violence that could result in multiple charges 
against the defendants (for instance both genocide and crimes against humanity).53 As only 
Tutsi victims could stand as signifiers of all three types of crime contained within the courts 
statute, this strategy further contributed to an understanding of the Tutsi as the victim of the 
                                                     
49 A/54/634, 9; and S/RES/1503, 2. 
50 Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (2015); S/2003/946, 6 and 18; S/PV.4999, 18–9. At this 
point in the OTP’s history the number of estimated new indictees fell from 136 to 26. A/57/PV.36, 57th Session: 
36th Plenary Meeting, 28/10/2002, 15. 
51 Senior Investigator (2015); ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0025, Gatete – Defence Preliminary Motions, Under 
Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 12/04/2003, 5; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0022, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Response to the Defense Preliminary Motion Challenging Defects in the form of the indictment 
Pursuant to Rule 72, 09/05/2003, 5; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0029, Gatete, Decision on Defence 
Preliminary Motion, 29/03/2004, 3; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0069, Gatete, Motion: Preliminary Motion, 
22/05/2009. 6; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0073, Gatete – Decision on Defence Motion Concerning Defects in 
the Amended indictment, 03/07/2009, 7; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0074/1, Gatete – the Prosecutor's 
Submission Complying with the Decision on Defence Motion Concerning Defects in the Amended indictment 
Dated 3 July 2009, 07/07/2009; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0079, Gatete – Prosecutor's Pre–Trial Brief 
(Pursuant to Rule 73bis (B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), 21/07/2009, 21 and 36; ICTR–00–61, 
ICTR–00–61–0036/1, Gatete – Amended indictment, ICTR–00–61, 10/05/2005; ICTR–00–61–0074/1; and 
ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0100, Gatete, Decision on Defence Motion Raising Defects in the Prosecution Pre–
Trial Brief of 19 August 2009, 02/10/2009. See also the description of Gatete in the Appendix. 
52 Head of Appeals (2015); Senior Member of the ICTR Office of the Prosecutor 3 (2015); and S/RES/1503, 2. 
See also S/2003/946, 6 and 18. 
53 S/PV.4999, 18–19. 
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genocide. The effects were seen in the Gatete example noted above whereby the 
prosecution’s case was focused completely on acts of violence committed against Tutsis.54 
   
The efficiency drive had other effects as well. It contributed to a shift away from using trials 
as vehicles through which histories of the violence in Rwanda were consciously constructed, 
as appeared to be the case with some earlier trials.55 The final case to clearly do this was 
Karemera et al (which began in 2004), where Don Webster, a senior trial attorney for the 
prosecution, saw that the trial’s focus on defendants in key positions within the overall 
conspiracy offered an opportunity to tell a broad narrative (a sort of mega–history) about the 
violence in Rwanda as a whole.56 This resulted in two major outcomes. The first was, as 
discussed previously, that the trial saw the appeals chamber take judicial notice of the 
genocide, which meant it was no longer legally necessary to present a wider picture of the 
genocide at a national level at subsequent trials. Second, this attempt at a mega–history 
resulted in an enormous amount of disclosure (as this increased what might be considered 
relevant ‘exculpatory’ evidence), which produced a cumbersome trial and placed the OTP 
under considerable strain, at a point where the OTP was trying to improve its trial 
efficiency.57 This meant that the goal of consciously producing history came into conflict 
with the goal of efficient trials, and Karemera marked the last trial to focus on producing 
‘fluffy history’, as a former member of the Tribunal put it.58  
It is also possible to see that these new metrics of success based on efficiency influenced how 
the Tribunal projected its achievements to the outside world and the manner in which the 
                                                     
54 ICTR–00–61–0079, 21 and 36. 
55 Head of Appeals (2015); ‘Judgement Day’, Washington Post; Gaynor, ‘Uneasy Partners’ (see Intro., n. 31), 
1259–63; Goldstone, ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace–making’ (see Intro., n. 4); Akhavan, ‘Justice and 
Reconciliation’ (see Chap. One, n. 82), 340–1; and Alvarez, ‘Akayesu’ (see Intro., n. 12), 36.  
56 Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (2015). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid; and Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor 2 (2015). 
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Tribunal reported on their progress to the UN.59 As Eltringham also notes, these reports (and 
increasingly over time) relied heavily on quantitatively driven assessments based on metrics 
of speed and efficiency, to show what had been achieved.60 For example, in the Tribunal’s 
2010 report to the UNSC the Tribunal mobilised a series of graphs to show that the speed of 
trials of first instance had risen dramatically.61 There was, however, very little focus on other 
ways in which success could be measured, such as by using more qualitatively based 
assessments of the experiences of trial witnesses or the quality of the written judgements.  
 
Over time, it seemed as though the efficiency and economy of the trials was what came to 
define the court’s approach to ‘justice’. A number of actors actively contested and 
                                                     
59 A/58/140–S/2003/707, 11/07/2003, 2. This can also be seen in the emphasis that Judge Møse placed on the 
improvements to trial procedures based on the increased speed of the prosecutions.  
Single–accused cases are, of course, much more complicated at the international level than 
at the national level. But at the ICTR we now have considerable experience in handling 
them in an efficient way. Recent examples are the Niyitegeka, Gacumbitsi, Ndindabahizi 
and Muhimana trials, where the prosecution presented its evidence in four weeks, followed 
by a similar period for the defence after a break. The number of days required to hear all 
witnesses in single–accused cases has steadily decreased, as mentioned in paragraph 21 of 
our [completion strategy]. The fastest was the Ndindabahizi trial, where all witnesses, both 
prosecution and defence witnesses, were heard in 27 trial days. Additional time is then 
required for the parties to present their written and oral submissions and for the Chamber to 
write its Judgement. S/PV.4999, 12. 
60 Eltringham, ‘When We Walk Out’ (see Intro., n. 94), 550; A/60/229–S/2005/534, Report of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 
31 December 1994, 15/08/2005, 2; S/2006/951, Letter dated 30 November 2006 from the President of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States 
between 1 January and 31 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council: Completion 
strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 08/12/2006, 4; S/2015/884, 5–11. For example, 
During the reporting period, two trial judgements were delivered in the Nzabonimana and 
Nizeyimana cases. Nizeyimana was one of the fastest trials for its size, further showing that 
efforts to improve efficiency in recent years have had a positive impact, especially in single 
accused trials. One appeal judgement was delivered in the Gatete case in October 2012, 
marking the completion as projected of four appeal judgements concerning four persons in 
2012.S/PV/6880, 6800th Meeting, 05/12/2012, 8.  
61 S/2010/574, 8–9; and S/2011/317, Letter dated 12 May 2011 from the President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security Council: Report on the Completion Strategy of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as of 12 May 2011), 18/05/2011, 8. Indeed, the focus on 
improving the efficiency of the trials continued right up until the end of the Tribunal’s existence. In pursuit of 
this, the Tribunal employed two external consultants in October and November 2008 in order to try to continue 
to improve efficiency of the prosecutions. S/2008/726, Letter Dated 21 November 2008 From the President of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed to the President of the Security Council: Report on 
the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 21/11/2008, 10.  
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condemned this approach for fear that this was having a negative effect on the trials. Peter 
Robinson in Karemera et al, for example, submitted a motion that called for President Byron 
(the presiding judge in the case) to be barred from deciding on a motion as he feared that his 
obligation to the completion strategy and efficiency would influence his decision in the 
matter at hand to the detriment of the rights of the accused.62 Judge Hunt, whilst participating 
in an interlocutory appeal in Butare, argued that the Tribunal’s focus on efficiency had 
overridden all other considerations, including the rights of the defendant, which in that 
instance led him to submitted a dissenting opinion.63 Similarly, at the closing of the Tribunal 
the New Zealand delegate to the UNSC noted, with regret, that ‘[a] budget–driven mentality 
seems to have distorted the conversation about the role and performance of the Tribunals.’64 
These were, however, very much dissident voices, and by the end of the Tribunal’s existence 
each of the organs seemed committed to the pursuit of lean and efficient justice. 
 
This trajectory continued as the UN created the Residual Mechanism (MICT) to complete the 
remaining work of the International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) after they closed down.65 
Whilst the MICT is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the underlying rationale behind its 
creation and mandate highlights further the argument developed in this chapter. Throughout 
the UNSC focused on keeping the costs of the MICT as low as possible and on emphasising 
the need for efficiency. The centrality of these concepts to the project was such that they also 
shaped the very design of the MICT’s new building, which was supposed to capture the 
                                                     
62 Defence Counsel (2016). 
63 The appeal challenged trial chamber’s decision that a trial could continue with a replacement judge without 
rehearing evidence. Whilst the majority upheld the trial chambers ruling, Judge Hunt, in dissenting, argued that 
this violated the rights of the accused. Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42, ICTR-98-42-
A15bis, Decision in the Matter of Proceedings under Rule 15bis(D) – Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt, 
24/09/2003; and S/PV.7574, 25. 
64 S/PV.7574, 7574th Meeting, 09/12/2015, 26. 
65 It was decided that the MICT should be created after it became clear that the ICTs were not going to meet 
their expected completion strategy closure targets. S/PV.6041, 6041st Meeting, 12/12/2008, 13. 
262 
 
‘lean’ and ‘efficient’, and importantly temporary, nature of the MICT.66 These changes were 
also reflected in the MICT’s statute, where the prosecution was no longer permitted to submit 
indictments against new suspects and was restricted in who could be prosecuted (only ‘the 
most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for the crimes’).67 Moreover, the 
judges here were given the right to refer cases to a different jurisdiction if they felt it not to be 
in the interests of the Tribunal to pursue them, even without the consent of the prosecution.68 
This marked an even greater shift in power to the judges.  
 
These changes had an important bearing on the way the trials were conducted, and also, as 
the example of Gatete above demonstrates, significantly influenced the types of stories that 
were told (increasingly fewer in number, with more specific and focused content) and who 
was going to tell them (ideally by as few witnesses as possible). Combined with the 
legalisation of the process, discussed previously, there were again signs that the witnesses 
and their stories, along with the Tribunal’s extra–judicial goals, were increasingly neglected 
as the legal agents of the court pushed for more efficient and economic trials. This also 
indicates that, over the course of the Tribunal’s existence, changes to its strategic function 
resulted in shifts in its very conception of what constituted ‘justice’ and, indeed, who and 
what the Tribunal was for. The final section of this chapter will continue to explore this shift 
in the strategic function of the Tribunal. 
An Evolving Strategic Function  
 
                                                     
66 A/69/734, Financing of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: Construction of A New 
Facility for the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Arusha Branch, 19/01/2015, 4.  
67 S/RES/1966, Resolution 1966, 22/12/2010, 6.  
68 S/RES/1966, 8. 
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So far, this dissertation has focused on how the competing (and evolving) priorities of 
different actors influenced how the trials unfolded within the courtroom. I have shown that 
whilst on the surface the witnesses appeared to play a central role in the proceedings, 
underneath their interests were rarely the driving force behind how the trials were 
approached, and that this only became less so with time. This final section explores this 
further by assessing a number of other measures pursued by the ICTR that impacted on the 
witnesses, and Rwandan society more generally, in order to further determine who the 
Tribunal’s energies were directed at assisting. In doing so, this further explores the argument 
developed here that, over time the Tribunal’s strategic function evolved to become more 
narrowly focused on solely administering the law. I will draw on three examples of the 
Tribunal’s approach here: developing judicial capacity in Rwanda; witnesses; and its legacy.  
 
One of the Tribunal’s claimed successes in relation to helping Rwanda overcome the 
genocide was its contribution to the rebuilding of the Rwandan judicial system. It was, 
however, not until the 2003 completion strategy took effect that the Tribunal began to pay 
attention to this task. At this point it became apparent that if the Tribunal were to finish all 
trials before 2010 they would have to transfer some of the confirmed indictments to other 
jurisdictions, which resulted in the decision to introduce Rule 11 bis to the RPE, which made 
this possible.69 The remaining problem, however, was that only the Rwandan government 
showed any interest in receiving these cases, and they did not meet the internationally set trial 
standards necessary to do so under Rule 11 bis. Therefore, the Tribunal embarked on a policy 
to improve trial conditions and punishment regimes in Rwanda, which led to a number of 
                                                     
69 S/2008/726, 13–14. Whilst this rule change was considered as early as 1999 in one of the expert reports 
commissioned in order to improve the Tribunal’s ‘efficiency’, it was not enacted until June 2002. A/54/634; 
OTP, Changes to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 42. 
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changes to Rwanda’s judicial system, including the eradication of the death sentence.70 In 
2011 a trial chamber finally agreed to transfer the Uwikindi indictment to the Rwandan 
authorities.71  
 
A closer look at this process, however, shows that the attempts at reform were directed at the 
specific cases transferred by the ICTR, rather than an overall reform of Rwanda’s judicial 
system.72 As such, it was sufficient for Rule 11 bis transfers that punishments such as solitary 
confinement were outlawed under a Rwandan statute governing transferred cases, despite still 
being used in other domestic trials.73 Indeed, the ICTR was transferring case dockets to 
Rwanda, which facilitated prosecutions there, long before the Uwikindi decision.74 As such, it 
appears that this policy was only pursued to the extent that it enabled the Tribunal to meet the 
goals of the completion strategy, rather than out of a concern for the state of the Rwandan 
judiciary. 
 
A similar dynamic was also seen with the Tribunal’s treatment of Rwandan witnesses. This 
went beyond what has so far been discussed—where in court the witnesses were increasingly 
pushed to the periphery of the Tribunal’s concerns—and extended to how the court imagined 
                                                     
70 A/60/229–S/2005/534, 14; S/2006/951, 10; S/PV.5697, 9. It, moreover, only really seemed to receive 
sufficient attention from 2006 onwards. S/PV.6041, 28. 
71 See Prosecutor v. Jean Uwikindi, Case No. ICTR–01–75, ICTR–01–75–AR11bis, Uwikindi – Decision on 
Ukikindi’s Appeal Against the Referral of His Case to Rwanda and Related Motions, 16/12/2011.  
72 S/PV.6041, 27–8; TRA001915/1, 7; ICTR–99–46, TRA001916/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 25/03/2003, 25/03/2003, 2–3. Some, moreover, doubt whether this was successfully at all, viewing 
the decision to transfer under Rule 11 bis as a political necessity. Iain Edwards (discussant), ICTR Legacy 
Symposium. I am not claiming that there were not individuals within the Tribunal that did have this concern; I 
have no doubt that many went beyond what was required of them and genuinely were focused on improving the 
conditions in Rwanda. However, what this section is exploring is what the Tribunal as a whole was trying to 
achieve and what its strategic function was. 
73Erik Møse, ‘The ICTR's Completion Strategy: Challenges and Possible Solutions’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 6:4 (2008), 5 and 7; A/68/PV.33, 68th Session: 33rd Plenary Meeting, 14/10/2013, 3–4; and Iain 
Edwards, 07/11/2014. See for instance ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0068/1, Gatete – Decision on Prosecutor's 
Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 17/11/2008. 
74 Møse, ‘ICTR's Completion Strategy’, 5 and 7; and A/68/PV.33, 3–4. 
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their obligation to the witnesses and to the apparent dissonance between the Tribunal’s and 
the witnesses’ priorities more generally. During Gatete, for instance, a witness was denied the 
opportunity of presenting a letter concerning the state of their detention in Rwanda to the 
registry, because this was not seen as a matter that fell within the Tribunal’s ‘competence’.75 
In 1998 the OIOS even blocked the registrar from further exploring possible ways that the 
Tribunal could help victims through the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) (a separate budget to 
the Tribunal’s main budget, which was financed by voluntary state contributions),76 and in 
2000 the judges actively decided not to expand the Tribunal’s mandate to include victim 
compensation.77 The secondary importance of the witnesses’ needs (without whom there 
would have been no tribunal) was also demonstrated through the witnesses’ post–testimony 
care. Not only did the Tribunal fail to follow–up with witnesses about their experiences of 
testifying at the Tribunal (so as to be able to ensure that the witnesses needs were met to the 
greatest extent possible), but post–testimony medical and psychological care were only 
introduced after a number of years (the ICTR’s Kigali Health Clinic was opened in 2004) as 
an attempt to quell criticism being directed at the Tribunal, from the Rwandan government in 
particular, for the fact that defendants were living in better conditions, with better care, than 
the victims78—an issue that was never really resolved.79 That this was not a central aspect of 
                                                     
75 TRA001916/1, 2–3. 
76 The Tribunal was actively prohibited from using the main budget to fund outreach programmes. Senior 
Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (2015). 
77 A/52/784, Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory 
of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report of the Secretary–General on the 
activities of the office of internal Oversight Services, 06/02/1998, 14; S/2000/11989, Letter from President 
Pillay to the President of the United Nations Security Council, 15/12/2000, 1 and 5; and S/PV.4229, 4229th 
Meeting, 21/11/2000, 6; and Anonymous 2 (2016). A former senior figure within the OTP also noted that in this 
respect the Tribunal was a ‘victim’ of the statute they were given. Anonymous 2 (2016). 
78 Victim and Witness Support (2015); Peskin, International Justice (see Intro., n. 75), 199–207; A/55/512, 
Financing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report by the Secretary General, 23/10/2000, 
3; A/51/789, 18; /PV.6678, 6678th Meeting, 07/12/2011, 7; and A/54/315–S/1999/943, Report of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
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the Tribunal’s purpose was seen by the fact that this had to be paid for out of the VTF, rather 
than the Tribunal’s main budget, which additionally meant that these schemes were more 
vulnerable as they relied on the ‘generosity’ of other states.80 The dependence on this meant 
that in 2011, due to a lack of funds, the health clinic faced closure.81   
 
Even worse, however, was the danger that testifying brought for some witnesses, as a number 
of ICTR witnesses were either killed or intimidated as a result of being linked to the 
Tribunal.82 During Akayesu alone 20 potential witnesses linked to the case were killed due to 
their association with the Tribunal.83 When Witness J from Akayesu returned to Taba, ‘[S]he 
found that people had left stones and pepper under her door with a note, “You are also a 
killer, because you accuse others” […] and was subsequently] chased out of her rented 
house.’84 Most worrying of all is that the Tribunal claimed (and continues to claim) that no 
witness was ever killed due to being associated with the Tribunal, something that was in fact 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States 
Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 07/09/1999. 
79 Elizabeth Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbour’s House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda (New York: 
Picador, 2001), 379. In some instances, for example, perpetrators of rape were being treated for Aids and HIV 
whilst those that had been raped were neglected. S/PV.7192, 14.  
80 S/PV.6678, 6678th Meeting, 07/12/2011, 7.  
81 Ibid. 
82 A/54/PV.48, 63. See also Nicola Palmer et al., ‘Testifying to Genocide: Victim and Witness Protection in 
Rwanda’ (see Internet Material list). Some of these murders were also linked to the defence counsel’s 
employing of former genocidaires. Redress, Survivors and Post–Genocide Justice in Rwanda, 59–63. 
83 Andrew Trotter, ‘Witness Intimidation in International Trials: Balancing the Need for Protection against the 
Rights of the Accused’, George Washington International Law Review 44 (2012), 133; and Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Rwanda’ (see Internet Material list). 
84 E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission Alternative 
Approaches and Ways and Means within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy Addendum Report of the Mission to Rwanda on the 
Issues of Violence Against Women in Situations of Armed Conflict, 04/02/1998, 9. 
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celebrated in the speech delivered at the ICTR’s legacy conference dinner 2014.85 Tellingly, 
as Richard Goldstone—Prosecutor at the time of Akayesu—noted: 
During my time as Chief Prosecutor of the [ICTR and ICTY], I used [to] tell people 
in my office that the first dead witness will likely be the last witness. When people 
fear for their lives or safety, you cannot expect them to come forward willingly and 
give evidence.86 
 
It seemed that denying what was otherwise common knowledge was required—despite its 
potential impact on the witnesses—so that the institution could survive.  
 
The Tribunal even seemingly struggled with some of the more basic protective measures 
offered to witnesses, such as the redaction of transcripts, which were intended to conceal the 
identity of the witnesses. These were both erratic and often offered limited protection, as in 
many cases it was possible, without much effort, to work out the identities of the witnesses 
and even what was concealed beneath some of the redacted phrases.87 These findings support 
the argument that the process was primarily focused on ensuring that the institution’s needs 
of maintaining a sufficient judicial output were met, as opposed to being, first and foremost, 
oriented around the needs of the witnesses. Indeed, these measures carried with them a level 
of superficiality, underpinned by a need to show that they were doing something to help. 
 
This approach was also reflected in the Tribunal’s other ‘outreach’ and ‘legacy’ policies. The 
terms ‘outreach’ and ‘legacy’ were only really introduced into the Tribunal’s vernacular 
                                                     
85 Appeals Judge (2016). 
86 Human Rights Brief, ‘Moving Forward’ (see Chap. Two, n. 76), 32.   
87 ICTR–99–46, TRA000131/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 21/11/2000, 
21/11/2000, 82 and 88; ICTR–99–46, TRA001909/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
24/02/2003, 24/02/2003, 37; and ICTR–99–46, TRA001921/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted 
Transcript of 02/04/2003, 02/04/2003, 30. 
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around the turn of the millennium, as criticism mounted, in part, over the Tribunal’s lack of 
relevance for Rwandans, and it was not until 1999 that an outreach department was created.88 
This marked the start of various outreach programmes, including the establishment of 
information centres in Rwanda to inform the population about the Tribunal’s work.89 Other 
similar educational policies followed, such as internships at the Tribunal for Rwandan 
students studying law and the production of radio broadcasts in Kinyarwanda about the 
activities of the Tribunal.90 Even these, however, did not appear to be a central concern for 
the Tribunal, but were mostly attempts to quell criticism about the Tribunal’s lack of 
impact.91 These were, moreover, directed at ‘informing’ rather than ‘engaging’ the Rwandan 
population and were also financed by the VTF, further illustrating the peripheral nature of 
their objectives.92 Over time, however, the focus moved ever further from the ‘local’, as the 
legacy and outreach work became more about ideas of ‘best practice’ and the Tribunal’s 
institutional memory than anything else.93 
 
The was highlighted most clearly by the focus of the Tribunal’s 2014 ‘Legacy Conference’.94 
During the conference most attention was given to the way in which the Tribunal had: 
                                                     
88 A/52/784, 14–15; A/55/512, 49; S/PV.4229, 7–8; S/PV.4429, 27/11/2001, 2; A/54/315–S/1999/943, 23; and 
A/54/PV.48, 8, 11 and 17. 
89 A/56/853, 12. 
90 S/2004/601, 15; and A/60/229–S/2005/534, 1 and 3. Perhaps particularly problematic was the Tribunal’s 
participation in genocide awareness raising in the ‘solidarity camps’, where people suspected of harbouring 
‘genocide ideology’ were sent for ‘re–education’. S/2013/310, Letter dated 23 May 2013 from the President of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security Council: Report on 
the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as at 10 May 2013), 23/05/2013, 
14. 
91 Indeed, the outreach programmes again seemed mainly focused on making Rwandans—and only in very 
small numbers—aware of the Tribunal’s work. These encounters appeared very much based on the Tribunal’s 
terms rather than as an engagement that took Rwanda’s needs and wants into full consideration.  
92 A/56/853, 12.  
93 Senior Member of ICTR Office of the Prosecutor (2015). 
94 S/2006/951, 27; and S/PV/6880, 12. The President of the ICTR noted:  
Lastly, as the sun sets on the Tribunal, I would like to raise the essential issue of the legacy 
that the Tribunals will leave for the future of international law. While some excellent projects 
have been carried out to preserve our work in the consciousness of the International 
community, it is our responsibility to collect and share the most important aspects of the work 
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produced increasingly more economic trials over the course of its existence; made a 
significant contribution to the international community by developing international legal 
jurisprudence and procedural best practice guidelines that could assist other jurisdictions to 
prosecute these crimes; and, importantly, demonstrated that international criminal justice 
could work.95 With the exception of the Tribunal’s efforts to rebuild Rwanda’s judicial 
capacity and rendering judicial notice, discussed previously, Rwanda and Rwandans were 
significantly absent from the conference’s discussions, as was any notion that the Tribunal 
had managed to construct an accurate history about the violence in Rwanda or assist with 
reconciliation: goals associated with the Tribunal in its early years.   
 
Each of these examples, and particularly the legacy conference, demonstrates just how far the 
Tribunal had moved from the initial hopes and aspirations of the Tribunal as discussed in 
Chapter One, which saw it as a site of historical exploration, reconciliation and post–conflict 
state–building.96 Indeed, as the above demonstrated, over time the Tribunal’s strategic 
function appeared to shift away from a focus on its extra–judicial contributions to Rwanda 
and towards a far more legalistic understanding of its purpose, which was also oriented far 
more towards the ‘international’ than the ‘local’. This is, however, not to say that no one 
within the Tribunal ever actively pursued these extra–judicial goals after this change was 
initiated. Examples of those that did can be seen with Don Webster’s pursuit of a mega–
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the Tribunal before it closes its doors forever. If resources are not allocated to preserve our 
legacy, we are in danger of losing the lessons learned by an institution that has helped to 
shape International law. As our last staff members leave, we lose our collective experience 
and memory. If that memory is not captured now, it will be very difficult to retrieve in the 
future. In December, we will be presenting a more comprehensive plan for legacy projects. 
We hope you will support them. A/66/PV.58, 3 
95 S/PV.4999, 142; S/2004/616, 14; A/57/PV.36, 16; S/PV.5697, 10–12; A/64/PV.16, 64th Session: 16th Plenary 
Meeting, 08/10/2009, 2; John Hocking, ‘MICT Role in Legacy of the ICTR’, ICTR Legacy Symposium; and 
A/57/PV.36, 16. What was notable here, moreover, was that the conference was almost structured to function as 
a defence against the main attacks normally levelled at the Tribunal, to do with the high costs, and slow pace, of 
the trials and it’s relatively the low conviction rate. 
96 Goldstone, ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace–making’ (see Intro., n. 4). 
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history in Karemera and James Arguin’s Genocide Story Project. However, as this section 
has demonstrated, I would argue that these very much ran against the grain of the Tribunal’s 




This chapter has explained why it was that the legal actors at the Tribunal, primarily the 
prosecution and judges, shifted in their approach to the trials over the lifespan of the 
Tribunal, as they moved from treating the trials as potential vehicles for extra–judicial goals 
(such as writing histories) towards a narrow focus on the legal output of the trial.97 This was 
the result of both legal actors within the courtroom working to gain greater control over the 
trials so that they more closely resembled ‘normal’ criminal trials and, more importantly, 
because of the interests of political actors, primarily from the UNSC, outside the courtroom. 
Combined, these led to an approach to the trials that seemed to have little concern other than 
producing as many judgements as quickly as possible. This additionally adds a third analytic 
category to the already established ‘conditions’ and ‘processes’ of truth: the ‘politics of 
truth’, which, by highlighting the impact of political interventions from ‘outside’ of the 
courtroom, helps to both establish why particular accounts of violence were created as they 
were, but also how the whole strategic function of the apparatus shifted overtime. 
 
With time, then, the trials increasingly came to reflect Agamben’s idea about the law and its 
relationship to justice: 
                                                     
97 See David Kaye, ‘Archiving Justice: Conceptualising the Archives of the United Nations International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Archival Science 14:3–4 (2014), 383–4. 
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As jurists well know, law is not directed toward the establishment of justice. Nor is 
it directed toward the verification of truth. Law is solely directed toward 
judgement, independent of truth and justice.98 
 
This approach to the trials was also mirrored in the way, as the final section demonstrated, 
that the Tribunal approached its obligations more generally to both the witnesses and 
Rwandan society as a whole. What this indicated is that it seemed increasingly that those that 
the Tribunal had been created to help were pushed to the periphery as each organ of the 
Tribunal began pursuing trials in a manner that reflected its institutional and political needs. 
It was only when the needs of the witnesses or different sections of Rwandan society aligned 
with these that the Tribunal could be seen to serve the witnesses and Rwandan society too, 
producing what might be considered moments of justice. As such, this is most certainly not to 
argue that there was no positive effect of these trials for those affected by the violence 
(although more research is needed into how the Tribunal effected this community, and how 
different sections of that community might have responded differently – i.e. those normally 
considered ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’), nor that there were not individuals at the Tribunal 
that attempted to go beyond the strategic function of the court to do what they could to assist 
Rwandan society overcome the genocide. However, what this does suggest is that when the 
interests of the legal and political actors clashed with those of the witnesses or different 
sections of Rwandan society more generally, or when changes in practice or the goals 
occurred, this was not because the process had suddenly become ‘victim’ or ‘witness’ 
centred, but because these changes enabled other goals (political or legal) to be pursued. To 
those that might argue ‘so what’, this has also shown that the failure to place those that 
suffered at the heart of the process has had negative consequences for that constituency.  
 
                                                     
98 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz (see Intro., n. 105), 18. 
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This also brings us full circle to the start of the dissertation and the question of whose 
archive. For it was this logic that ultimately led the UNSC to uphold its claim to have the 
right to decide on the location and function of the archive. This led to the decision that the 
archive contained records that were of a legal and institutional value, and as such that the 
archive should be housed in Arusha with the MICT in order to support its ongoing work, and 
not transferred to Rwanda.99 It is also telling that the archive really only became considered a 
significant aspect of the Tribunal’s legacy at the moment when the completion strategy was 
introduced.100 The institutional understanding of the legacy of the archive, then, reached 
consciousness at the moment when the Tribunal’s concern became about institutional 
survival and judicial output. It was, as such, perhaps at this moment that the fate of the 
archive was sealed. 
 
The trajectory set out in this chapter has, tellingly, continued at the ICC, despite the statute 
being specifically designed to integrate the needs of the victims and those directly affected by 
the violence.101 Pena’s and Carayon’s work on the role that victims play in ICC trials shows 
that, whilst a structure now exists for victims to stake a greater claim in the production of the 
court’s accounts, they still effectively remain side–lined. This is in part because of the 
difficulties that victims face in accessing the court, but importantly also because of how the 
judicial agents continue to control how the victims engage with the court process. It is 
significant that it is still the Prosecutor who decides which defendants to prosecute and for 
which crimes, and the judges determine who can be considered a ‘victim’. Indeed, in almost 
                                                     
99 Interestingly, one former archivist noted that another reason they suspected that the UN had been reluctant to 
hand over the archive to the RPF was because they feared that the RPF might tamper with this and change the 
historical record to even further reflect its interest. Interview with former ICTR archivist, (Arusha, Tanzania: 
June 2015). 
100 Member of ICTR Archives Unit (2015).  
101 Rosemary Byrne has also similarly argued that the ICC regime is based on ideas of ‘efficiency’. Byrne, ‘The 
New Public International Lawyer’, 245. 
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every instance the prosecution has rejected victim parties’ requests to amend an indictment or 
to add additional evidence into the trial.102 There appears to be a continuation of the clash that 
occurs between the prosecution’s strategy of efficient, focused, trials and the possibility of 
the court addressing the needs of the victims. In Lubanga for instance, the prosecution 
focused solely on the issue of child soldiers, despite requests from victim parties to introduce 
evidence of sexual violence and despite evidence of these crimes being inadvertently adduced 
during the trial.103 Moreover, Garbett’s work shows how, despite victim parties being given a 
greater scope to discuss what she describes as deeper and more personal truths during the 
trials at the ICC, these accounts form no part of the final judgement and are therefore 
silenced—a finding mirrored here.104 Combined, this suggests that there is a greater need to 
think about the mobilisation of these courts under the pretext that they assist, and work in the 
interests of, those that suffered directly as a result of the violence.  
                                                     
102 Marianna Pena and Gaelle Carayon, ‘Is the ICC Making the Most of Victim Participation?’, The Journal of 
Transitional Justice 7 (2013), 530. 
103 Ibid., 526 and 529–30. 





This dissertation set out to answer the question, whose archive? Throughout the dissertation I 
drew on the archive as both a theoretical framework, drawn from Foucault’s work, and also a 
site of empirical investigation. Utilising Foucault’s archaeological methodology, the thesis 
determined what was within the archive and why the archive’s records existed as they did, in 
order to answer the question of whose archive? This conclusion will address each of these 
stages in turn. First, the ideas of the ‘conditions’, ‘processes’ and ‘politics’ of truth identified 
throughout the empirical chapters explain why the content of the archive is as it is. Second, I 
will consider what this meant for which of the Tribunal’s stakeholders’ interests were 
reflected in the way in which the archive was constructed and put to use. As I have argued 
throughout, the main finding of this dissertation is that whilst potentially serving multiple 
constituencies at once, the needs of those who suffered as a result of the genocide were either 
consistently subsumed by the interests of the other stakeholders (and more so over time) or 
were simply ignored, and that this is reflected in both the form and content of the archive and 
how it was constructed. Finally, looking to the future, I will ask what these findings might 
mean for international criminal justice.  
 
Conditions, Processes and Politics of Truth 
 
As was argued in the introduction, not just any statement could be made within the ICTR’s 
courtrooms and, as with any archive, not just any record could be deposited within its 
archive. Rather, following Foucault’s archaeological methodology, a set of rules existed 
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which limited a priori what could be recorded. As such, one of the principal tasks of this 
dissertation was to show what rules determined what could and could not be said during the 
ICTR’s trials and, hence, find a place within the archive. Thus, the testimony of the witnesses 
(as the main source of evidence within each trial) became of central importance as I 
considered the rules that determined how and why it was that witnesses testified as they did. 
As became apparent over the course of the dissertation, three key concepts, namely the 
conditions, processes and politics of truths, explain this, and when taken together these offer 
a holistic account of why the archive is at is it.1  
 
First, as was argued particularly in Chapter Two, witness testimony, like all records 
submitted as evidence during the trials, had to relate to the crimes that the accused had 
allegedly committed; crimes were limited by the statute and, therefore, temporally, 
geographically and substantively restricted. I also described the importance of the interplay 
between the context in which the law functioned and the records produced. For instance, the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal was expanded to allow it to address the violence that occurred as 
a result of the refugee crisis and so as to capture the planning of the genocide, and this had a 
significant bearing on which records were produced.  
 
However, these conditions were not limited to the statute of the court, nor to the particular 
interpretations of different laws, but were evidenced in the court’s particular understandings 
of how different actors could act within the accounts constructed, which also fundamentally 
altered how the violence was to be understood. There was on the one hand the conscious, 
intelligent and intentional perpetrator who strove towards a particular goal. This resulted in 
                                                     
1 I would go further and argue that this analytical framework could be applied to any site that produces accounts 
about the past as one of its core functions in order to explain why these existed as they did. 
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the production of causal and linear narratives of orderly and organised violence, where the 
defendant could be held responsible for creating—but never functioning within—chaos. This 
was, in part, due to the statute’s stipulation that only individuals could be prosecuted, but it 
also ran deeper to the underlying needs of criminal law, where an accused’s ability to think 
and choose made it possible, and just, to hold them to account. 
 
Against this figure of the purposeful guilty perpetrator lay the helpless victim who was acted 
upon by perpetrators and was considered a purely ‘innocent’ (but also passive) figure 
throughout the violence. However, through the emphasis on the inability of ‘ordinary’ 
perpetrators to think and therefore act within the trials’ accounts, these actors also became 
passive as others directed and forced them to behave in particular ways. This, along with the 
influence of the legal provisions of the court, discussed below, additionally had the 
paradoxical effect of rendering the whole of the Hutu population incapable of resisting 
participating in the violence, therefore becoming always already perpetrators of the violence, 
but also—within this particular ontology of victimhood—victims as they had no control over 
their destiny.  
 
I further argued the victims and perpetrators were co–constituted—to be a ‘victim that 
mattered’, you had to be attacked by a ‘perpetrator that mattered’—and that, importantly, 
what crime was committed was determined by the perpetrator’s perspective of the violence, 
not the victim’s. Finally, in this respect, I also established that whether a witness was 
conceived as a victim or perpetrator would determine how their evidence was treated within 
the court, and how much scrutiny it was put under.  
277 
 
The third type of agent, more hidden than the victim or perpetrator, was that of the bystander. 
As was argued in Chapter Two, this actor was predominantly limited to international agents 
who could observe the violence from an impartial perspective because it was perceived that 
they were not entangled within its occurrence.  
 
As the allocation of international actors to the position of bystander suggests, these narratives 
were more than declarations of how these different actors would act, but it was also, and 
crucially, about how they could be identified. Victims and perpetrators as subject positions 
within the Tribunal’s account became both ethnocentric and also gendered in nature as the 
various discourses working within the apparatus influenced each other’s existence. The 
centrality of the court’s ethnocentric understanding of the violence was a consequence of the 
provisions of the Genocide Convention (which precluded finding that political groups could 
be victims of genocide), a shift in the prosecution’s priorities that resulted from the 
completion strategy (discussed below), and the interventions of the RPF, which meant, as 
aforementioned, that the Tribunal produced a narrative whereby all Hutus were always 
already perpetrators of violence, and against this all Tutsis were always already victims. 
These identities were also gendered as, for the main, it was men that were seen as the 
perpetrators, and women—along with other groups interpreted as being ‘weak’ and without 
agency, such as the elderly and children—that were seen as the victims. Importantly, these 
conditions cut across each of the legal actors of the courtroom and determined what particular 
accounts were produced by the prosecution, defence, and judges. 
 
As, however, the discussion of the ‘processes of truth’ in Chapters Three to Five showed, the 
witnesses were not completely passive within this process, as is the current consensus within 
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transitional justice studies.2 Rather, witnesses, in a number of important ways, had a 
significant impact on the archive: the witnesses contested and reshaped how the court 
understood the violence and also how it approached the evidence that was led. Important in 
this respect was Witness J’s and Witness H’s unplanned testimony that they had witnessed or 
had been raped themselves during Akayesu, which led the prosecution to amend their 
indictment to include allegations of sexual violence and ultimately resulted in the first legal 
finding that recognised that rape could constitute an act of genocide. This testimony was also 
partly responsible for the creation of the sexual violence investigation team, which meant that 
(theoretically at least) sexual violence charges were to be better integrated within the OTP’s 
case strategy. This (although not unproblematically) challenged the apparatus’ previous 
exclusion of women as subjects of no specific concern for international criminal justice. Also 
of significance here was the finding that witnesses managed to retain a degree of control as to 
the meaning of the violence documented within the records. Consequently, these records 
offer a far richer account of the violence than is often noted, as they captured the individual 
and local specificity of the trauma, often breached the temporal and geographical restrictions 
placed upon the narratives, and even blurred the binary of the victim/perpetrator.  
 
The importance of the witness, and the processes of truth, were also seen in the manner that 
the Tribunal was forced to make allowances for the witnesses’ testimony by considering 
(even if superficially) the cultural specificity of Rwanda, the fluidity of memory, and the 
impact of trauma (including the act of witnessing), and finally the way in which the 
agreement of ‘insider’ witnesses to cooperate with the Tribunal in the early 2000s altered not 
only who could be prosecuted, but also from which vantage point the accounts of violence 
would be told. As this shows, the complex interplay between the different actors of the 
                                                     
2 McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice’ (see Chap. Two, n., 1). 
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courtroom, and also the different stages and processes that the trials went through, needs to 
be considered when understanding why the archive exists as it does and, as will be discussed, 
whose archive.  
 
The dissertation has also shown, as captured in the concept of the ‘politics of truth’, that 
neither the Tribunal nor the archive existed as a hermetically sealed space, but that these 
were, rather, highly politicised sites. First, it is important to consider the manner in which the 
Tribunal participated in the reproduction of certain politically charged discourses. This 
included the reproduction of ethnocentric narratives, which excluded the voices of Hutu 
victims, and of gendered and patriarchal discourses that treated violence against women as 
being of secondary importance. The politics of the archive was similarly evident in the way in 
which the jurisprudence on consent, superior responsibility and JCE developed over time. 
This both reflected some of the dubious politics that the Tribunal became embroiled in, and 
the apparatus’ lack of concern for the needs of those most likely to need law’s protection.  
 
As the absence of records relating to sexual violence and Hutu victims demonstrates, the 
Tribunal’s records remain (as with all archives) incomplete. As I have argued throughout it is 
important read these absences for what they can tell us about the broader apparatus that the 
archive is part of. This is true of other absent records, and even those that are seemingly more 
benign, including the case files for the defence, and the prosecution’s and chamber’s 
archives, all of which are inaccessible to the public due their exclusion from the Tribunal’s 
central archive in the registry. Even some records that are present are only partially so, 
whether or not this is because of the incomplete case files kept by the registry (discussed in 
Chapter Two), or because transcripts are partially concealed due to redactions, and in camera 
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hearings. These too give us insight into the apparatus that archive sits within, and the politics 
of the surrounding landscape.  
 
The lack of the defence files, for instance, points to the absence of the defence as an official 
organ of the Tribunal (which perhaps also contributed to some of the poor defence practice at 
the Tribunal and the decentring of the defendant from the trials, as discussed in Chapter 
Four). The paucity of the redactions, discussed in Chapter Six, shines a light through the 
façade of the Tribunal’s concern for the witnesses, and the Chamber’s and Prosecution’s 
reluctance to hand over their documents to the registry reflects the continuation of 
competition for control of the Tribunal. The absences in the case files that should be there is 
particularly telling. For these, as discussed in Chapter Two, reflect a failure to initially realise 
the importance of the archive beyond its legal value. This both captures the reactive nature of 
the Tribunal during its early years, as at points it struggled to think strategically, and, as 
Chapter One argued, an uncertainty and lack of clarity about the possible value of the 
Tribunal. This almost chaotic beginning (perhaps unsurprising given the nature of the task at 
hand) is further demonstrated by the fact that whilst little thought was being put into 
maintaining the archive for the future, the prosecution were producing expansive and rich 
records of violence directed at capturing a broad account of the genocide.  
 
An additional manner in which the archive became politicised was seen in the way that the 
shifting political climate outside of the Tribunal determined how the Tribunal operated. For 
instance, as discussed in Chapter Six, the implementation of the completion strategy at the 
Tribunal (as directed by the UNSC), along with changes in the way that the legal actors 
approached the trials, meant that the Tribunal’s strategic function shifted as it became 
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increasingly concerned with producing efficient and economic trials. This meant that the 
witnesses and their needs, along with the Tribunal’s extra–judicial goals, were steadily 
pushed to the periphery of the Tribunal’s concern. This shift in the way that trials were 
pursued had the effect of altering both what records were contained in the archive (fewer and 
thinner) and how these were to be produced (relying on fewer witnesses). This consequently 
can be seen to have resulted in the production of even greater absences in the archives 
account of violence. Here too, then, absences within the archive offer an important insight 
into the practices and politics of the Tribunal. 
 
To further elaborate on why this shift occurred, I will return to the idea of international 
criminal justice as a field, as set out in the introduction. To recap: Dixon and Tenove, 
drawing on Bourdieu, argue that international criminal justice is made up of three 
overlapping global fields: diplomacy, criminal justice and human rights advocacy.3 Each of 
these groups of agents rely on different forms of authority,4 which are replicated in both their 
own field and within international criminal justice: delegated, legal, moral and expert.5 
Diplomatic agents rely largely on delegated authority; legal agents draw principally on legal 
and moral authority; human rights agents rely on moral authority; and all agents are able to 
draw on expert authority. Agents seek both to acquire authority and to alter the value 
attributed to each of these forms of authority within the field, which subsequently alters their 
position within the hierarchy that exists amongst these agents.6 Importantly, shifts in the 
                                                     
3 Dixon and Tenove, ‘International Criminal Justice’ (see Intro., n. 43), 1–2 and 20. 
4 This in Bourdieusian terms is akin to capital.  
5 Ibid., 11–2. 
6 Ibid., 13–4; and Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’ (see Intro., n. 122), 808. 
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attributed value of each of these authorities, as discussed below, alters the rules that govern 
how the field functions.7  
 
Over the course of the Tribunal’s existence there was a re–valuation of the different types of 
authority within the field.8 In the early years of the Tribunal, moral authority appeared to 
have the greatest value. This was due in part to the Tribunal’s ineffectiveness as a legal 
institution (limiting access to legal or expert authority), but also due to the rise of human 
rights and transitional justice discourses, both of which were victim–centred. These factors, 
when combined with the Tribunal’s dependence on victims as witnesses and the resulting 
idea that it had an obligation to construct a history for (and by) those that had suffered, 
produced a set of rules whereby authority was acquired in part by allowing witnesses a 
greater influence over proceedings and also by pursuing a broader mandate.  
 
The effects of this were best seen with the (legally dubious) decision to allow the prosecution 
to amend the Akayesu indictment after the testimonies of Witness H and Witness J, despite 
the fact that the prosecution’s case had all but ended at this point. Perhaps not coincidently, 
the new indictment was also pushed for by a human rights organisation, which submitted an 
amicus curie calling for the Tribunal to address sexual violence crimes, and as a result Judge 
Pillay’s presence on the bench, who was particularly attentive to this issue. Similarly, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, Danner and Martinez have suggested that the ‘intrusion’ of human 
                                                     
7 Dixon and Tenove, ‘International Criminal Justice’, 4. 
8  ‘However, because multiple forms of authority exist in International criminal justice, actors struggle over 
which authority will dominate in the field. Some actors push for International criminal justice to be dominated 
by the logic of interstate relations, others by legalism and still others by moral obligations.’ Dixon and Tenove, 
‘International Criminal Justice’, 14. 
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rights methodologies was behind the more ‘progressive’ jurisprudential developments in the 
Tribunal’s early years.9  
 
As the Tribunal progressed, legal and expert authority superseded moral authority due to the 
coming together of two different groups of agents within the field who began the process of 
shifting power away from the witnesses towards the legal agents within the Tribunal. First, 
and most important, was the intervention of diplomatic agents. As noted above, the UNSC 
increasingly viewed the ICTR as an unpopular, costly and inefficient organ that should close 
down as quickly as possible, and diplomatic agents within the UN encouraged measures to 
achieve this end through the implementation of the completion strategy. Second, and 
connected, there was the growing presence of judicial agents with greater access to legal and 
expert authority at the ICTR, generated from within their own primary fields of domestic 
criminal justice. Such actors included Erik Møse, but perhaps most important here was the 
appointment of Hassan Jallow as the first prosecutor to serve the ICTR exclusively (rather 
than both the ICTR and the ICTY), an appointment made by the UNSC. Both groups of 
agents successfully pushed for more efficient and more highly legalised trials, as discussed 
previously. The rules of the field shifted, and authority (largely legal and expert) was 
acquired through ‘efficient’ trials, which in turn effected the role afforded to the witnesses 
and what records the trials were to archive.  
 
This helps, in part, to explain the legal agents’ rejection of the amicus curie brief submitted 
during Cyangugu calling for an amended indictment to include charges of sexual violence—
even the prosecution rejected the amicus’ request to be heard on this issue—which markedly 
                                                     
9 Danner, and Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations’, 132–7. 
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differed from the response to the amicus in Akayesu, and, more generally, the legal agents 
increasingly coercive relationship with the witnesses. This was seen, for instance, in the 
difference in the treatment that Witnesses BAT and LBH received during Gatete and 
Cyangugu, respectively, in comparison to Witness J and Witness H during Akayesu. The 
latter two witnesses were encouraged to provide further details concerning the sexual assaults 
they had witnessed or endured despite these not being mentioned in the indictment. In 
comparison Witnesses BAT and LBH were rigourously prevented from divulging key 
information about the sexual assaults witnessed or suffered as a result of the (in part dubious) 
claim that these alleges were not properly charged within the indictment.10  
 
Two further points can be made about this. First, in addition to the competition that existed 
between the different types of agents within the field (say legal and political), these shifts in 
interests and practices occurred as a result of differences within these groups of agents (i.e., 
legal agents). Indeed, competing ideas about how the Tribunal should function emerged both 
between and within the different organs of the Tribunal. This was, for instance, seen in the 
clashes that occurred between the chambers and the prosecution over the prosecution’s 
indictment policy during Cyangugu. This was also apparent in the clear change of approach 
within the OTP that, for instance, rendered certain previously accepted practices as 
impermissible; such was the case with push back against Don Webster’s attempt at a mega–
history in Karemera et al.11 Second, I would also argue that the completion strategy, along 
with the change of guard in the leadership positions at the Tribunal, which occurred 
simultaneously, had an additional effect of bringing the three organs of the Tribunal closer 
together. Increasingly these organs appeared to sing from the same hymn sheet and worked in 
                                                     
10 It is also notable that in Chapter Three the vast majority of the references which detailed the witnesses’ ability 
to retain control over their testimony and its meaning came from Akayesu. 
11 See also Hagan and Levi, ‘Crimes of War’ (Intro., n. 87), 1499-1534. 
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unison towards the same goals, as they each switched their attention towards the efficiency 
drive. Indeed, what struck me when I was at the Tribunal was the extent to which these 
organs worked with each other for the sake of the Tribunal.12  
Whose Archive 
 
The significance of this in terms of the question of whose archive is that it supports what has 
been the overarching argument throughout this dissertation: at no point was the strategic 
function, the direction of the trials, nor the way in which the archive was constructed and put 
to use determined by the interests of those who had suffered during the violence in 1994. 
Rather, the moments when this constituency appeared to take on central importance were a 
result of other actors shifting their practices in a manner that meant they gained access to an 
alternative supply of authority within the field. Such was the case in the early years of the 
Tribunal when, as argued above, permitting the witnesses a greater role in the trial afforded 
the legal (and to an extent political) actors greater access to moral authority. The result of 
this, overall, was that the needs and interests of the witnesses specifically—but Rwandan 
society more generally—were consistently subsumed by, or rejected in favour of, the interests 
of the other stakeholders of the Tribunal.  
 
Whilst sometimes interests overlapped and cut across the divisions within the Tribunal and its 
stakeholders, producing what might be thought of as moments of justice, when tensions 
emerged between stakeholders’ interests these were not settled in favour of those that 
endured the violence, be they victims or perpetrators. As discussed more below, this is not to 
                                                     
12 In this respect, it was significant that Peter Robinson, Defence counsel in Government 1, noted his active 
resistance to this sense of becoming part of the ‘Tribunal’s club’, which appeared to be a norm, as he felt this 




deny the witnesses’ important contribution to the archive (both in terms of the records that it 
contains, but also how those records were produced). However, this points to an underlying 
problem with how international criminal justice has operated to present and the role allocated 
to witnesses (and the community affected by the violence more generally) within the process. 
Indeed, a consequence of the apparatus’ treatment of those affected by the genocide, seen 
most clearly at the end of Chapter Six, was that in a number of respects those who had 
suffered in 1994 were further harmed as a result of cooperating with the Tribunal. Even 
during Akayesu, then, when the witnesses’ influence over the trial process was perhaps at its 
greatest, numerous individuals associated with the trial were persecuted and killed in 
Rwanda. The question becomes, then, who, if not those that suffered as a result of the 
violence, was the Tribunal for, and whose is the archive? 
 
As argued in Chapter Three, the manner in which the defendants were treated suggests that 
the Tribunal was also not working with their interests in mind either and, in fact, one of the 
shifts that occurred at the ICTR was a de–centring of the rights of the defendant as the central 
pillar of the trial process. Instead, as the above demonstrated, the Tribunal and the archive 
predominantly belonged to, worked and was primarily constructed in the interests of three 
other groups of actors.  
 
First the Tribunal worked in the interests of itself as an institution. This only became more so 
as time went on, as it appeared that the Tribunal had lost sight of those that it was created to 
assist, instead becoming more introverted in nature as it began to focus on fine–tuning its 
legal practices and on surviving amidst its ever more hostile environment, in the end 
seemingly existing largely for itself. This helps to explain the decision not to pursue the RPF 
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cases mentioned previously, which whilst questionable from every other perspective (and 
despite the negative impact this could have on Rwandan’s transition) meant that the Tribunal 
could at least survive. This was, overall, also reflected in how the Tribunal projected and 
focused its legacy, and what it understood to be the importance of the archive: showing that 
international criminal justice could work; improving its efficiency as an institution; and 
producing an important institutional memory. These priorities were, moreover, also 
increasingly reflected in the content and form of the archive, as the Tribunal’s legal actors 
asserted greater control over how, and what, records were created.13  
 
Second, the Tribunal and its archive served the interests of the RPF. Whilst ultimately the 
decision as it currently stands for the archive to remain in Arusha runs counter to the RPF’s 
wishes, the RPF has nonetheless left an indelible and important mark on the archive. 
Retrospectively its successful bullying of the Tribunal into shelving the RPF indictments and 
pursuing Barayagwiza is staggering. Even though it does not (yet) have possession of the 
physical archive, the records of the archive very much reflect the RPF’s understanding of the 
genocide. The account of violence contained within the archive, and the way the Tribunal has 
functioned more generally, has, moreover, as Peskin has argued, only added further capital to 
the RPF’s victim status, used to pursue dubious politics elsewhere.14  
  
Finally, the archive worked in the interests of, and was shaped by, the UNSC. Here the 
Tribunal and its archive symbolically demonstrated the international communities’ resolve to 
make ‘Never Again’ a reality, offering a supply of symbolic capital even in the midst of 
                                                     
13 This is not to say, however, that the way in which the early trials were conducted did not, as argued above, 
reflect this group’s interests also. Indeed, the way these agents adapted to the political climate that surrounded 
the Tribunal, and produced records accordingly, demonstrates their hold over the archive throughout.  
14 Peskin, International Justice (see Intro., n. 75), 192. 
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ensuing violence and authoritarianism elsewhere (including within Rwanda and its 
neighbouring countries). Once this was thought to have been achieved, or where the costs of 
pursuing this outweighed the benefits, the UNSC instead turned its attention to closing the 
Tribunal down as quickly as possible, which came with the consequences that were discussed 
above. Ultimately, as the UNSC’s decision over the location of the archive suggested, it was 
really this constituency that controlled the archive and determined its function to the greatest 
extent. Had the UNSC, or perhaps more exactly the P5, decided to allow the Tribunal to 
complete its mandate as it had originally intended, had it provided more finances for it to do 
so (or at least equal finances and support to what was offered to the ICTY), and had it applied 
more pressure on Rwanda to cooperate with the Tribunal (as it—along with the EU—more or 
less successfully did with Serbia and Croatia at the ICTY),15 then the contents of the archive 




When looking to the future of international criminal justice, two aspects need to be 
considered. The first is to consider what gaps in our understanding of international criminal 
justice need to filled in order to better understand the ICTR’s purpose and lasting effect on 
the international system. The second is to make some provisional suggestions as to how the 
current international criminal justice project might be improved.  
 
It must be stressed that I do not wish to once more dismiss the significance of the witness in 
the trial process, nor write off the value of the archive. Rather the analysis has sought to place 
                                                     
15 Hagan and Levi, ‘Crimes of War’ (see Intro., n. 87), 1516. 
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the witness’s role in context and to explore what, at its core, the Tribunal was trying to 
achieve and in whose interest, and why the archive exists as it does. Even if the witnesses 
worked under a set of rules determined to a large extent by other actors, this does not 
essentially detract from the important role that they played in the construction of the archive, 
nor the mark they left on it, particularly in the Tribunal’s early years. To dismiss this once 
more would not only present an unreflective portrait of these courts (and to fall back on the 
overly simplistic notion of victim passivity) but it would also be to miss that the archive 
contains records of great value for various types of actors in the future. This leads to two 
further lines of enquiry.  
 
First, whilst I have explored the way in which the Tribunal and witnesses worked with and 
against each other in the construction of the archive, I have not explored how this process 
impacted the witnesses personally. As such I have tried to avoid making claims about 
whether or not this process empowered or re–traumatised the witnesses—claims that remain 
largely unsubstantiated within the current literature. Before any final conclusions over legacy 
of the Tribunal can be made, more needs to be learnt about how the process was experienced 
by witnesses, and by Rwandan society more generally.16 This would need to include a 
consideration of how different sections of Rwandan society (e.g. victims, perpetrators, 
bystanders, returnees) responded differently to the Tribunal. This would also contribute 
towards our understanding of what impact these courts have on societies that have endured 
violence. This is especially important as the findings here suggest that these courts are likely 
to have either a limited, or worse negative, impact on these communities.  
                                                     
16 Only three studies have attempted to begin to explore this question: in relation to the ICTY (Stover, The 
Witnesses (see Intro., n. 54); and ICTY and University of North Texas, ‘Echoes of Testimony’ at: 
http://www.icty.org/en/about/registry/witnesses/echoes–of–testimonies––a–unique–research–project (last 
accessed 15/08/2017).  African Rights and Redress also produced a short analysis on this based on witnesses’ 




Further research is also needed to explore how, and to what effect, the records of the archive 
have been used beyond the ICTR. This is both to consider the role that these might have 
played in constructing a ‘collective memory’ of the violence in Rwanda and beyond, and here 
the GSP becomes of central concern. But this would include a consideration of how, or if, 
particular legal decisions rendered by the Tribunal had any effect ‘outside’ of the courtroom 
in terms of how individuals, states, militaries, and, in indeed, other courts act.17 This becomes 
particularly important when considered in the light of the findings here, which have shown 
the problematic nature of certain jurisprudential decisions rendered at the ICTR. How has, for 
example, the jurisprudence on sexual violence, JCE or superior responsibility fed back into 
various acts of violence being committed in the ‘real world’? This would also respond to 
Edkins’ and Dauphinee’s call to be aware of the ways that these courts have perpetuated 
some forms of violence within the international system.18 Combined, then, this calls for the 
‘afterlife’ of the archive to be understood in greater depth.  
 
What do these findings suggest for ways in which the current approach to international 
criminal justice can be improved? A relatively simplistic, but important, change would be for 
all parties to be more aware of the implications of the (political) messages that result from the 
accounts of violence they produce. This is not to suggest that the legal actors need to become 
‘historians’ (although I would dispute any claim that there was a huge difference between the 
two) nor that they need to ‘corrupt’ the principles of law. Rather they should take heed that 
any legal proceeding tells a story and so what that story is needs to be seriously thought 
through before its telling. Indeed, as I have suggested above, there is an extent to which this 
                                                     
17 As Sally Merry has shown, the way that international norms are ‘translated’ into local contexts is a 
complicated process. Merry, ‘New Legal Realism’ (see Intro., n. 87), 978-9. 
18 See Chap. One, n. 85. 
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is already a common practice amongst legal actors. All prosecution offices, for instance, 
construct indictments to reflect certain interests (both legal and political), such as the initial 
attempts at the ICTR to construct a broad account of the genocide, or the focus on child 
soldiers in Lubanga at the ICC. As such, arguably all that is required is that more attention be 
paid to make sure that these stories produce positive statements about the type of 
international community that these courts are involved in constructing. For instance, the 
prosecution in Lubanga should have been more aware of the negative consequences of their 
refusal to exclude sexual violence charges in their indictment. This, however, requires a 
greater amount of forward planning than appears to be the norm at present in international 
courts, so as to avoid some of the errors that were made at the outset of the ICTR, which it 
never recovered from (such as the neglect of sexual violence during initial investigations).  
 
Equally, all legal actors need to seriously reflect on how they are, at present, handling 
evidence. Of particular concern is how sexual violence evidence is being approached and the 
higher standard of proof it is being assessed against. The extent of the challenge in securing 
change in these respects can be seen from the difficulty that activists, scholars and 
practitioners have faced when trying to make municipal courts recognise the gendered and 
racially charged nature of their decisions—acknowledging this kind of deep–unconsciousness 
bias threatens the whole system.19 However, without change in this respect, courts will 
continue to function as spaces that work in the interests of the powerful rather than those 
most vulnerable within society.  
 
                                                     
19 See Intro., n. 94. 
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Finally, if international courts are to continue to be used in response to violence, greater 
thought needs to be given as to how witnesses and affected communities can be better 
integrated in the trial process. If the focus shifts away solely from trial efficiency and output, 
as this dissertation suggested was the case in the early trials at the ICTR, then it is possible to 
think through more carefully about how and where the needs of the affected communities 
could be incorporated within these spaces without fundamentally altering the main purpose of 
the courts: to deliver verdicts of guilt or innocence. Such changes could include: working 
with affected communities to determine what charges and crimes are important to them 
(something that the ICC’s statute provide for, but that the OTP still appears to resist); 
informing them in greater detail about the processes and outcomes of the court; and seeing 
where other support might be offered. These relatively small and achievable changes would 





Throughout the dissertation, I explore the specific accounts of violence that were produced in 
three trials (Akayesu, Cyangugu, and Gatete) at the ICTR. As stated in the introduction, I am 
interested in exploring the patterns that exist with how accounts were constructed at the 
Tribunal, and as such I am not exploring the trials individually, but rather what each of these 
tells us about broader themes and issues at play; this is also why I elected to structure the 
dissertation as I have, rather than having a chapter for each trial. However, this means that I 
never discuss any particular trial at great length, so this appendix briefly outlines each of the 




Jean–Paul Akayesu was a bourgmestre (roughly equivalent to a mayor) of the Taba 
commune, Gitarama Prefecture, during the genocide. He was captured in Zambia in 1995.1 
The initial indictment contained twelve counts ranging from genocide to war crimes, and 
focused on Akayesu’s role in leading the genocide in Taba from his position of authority as 
bourgmestre.2 The crux of the case was that Akayesu was a power–hungry individual who 
would do anything to advance his political career. As such, he had opposed the genocide in 
his commune when it had politically suited him to do so. However, having attended a 
prefectural meeting in Gitarama on 18 April 1994, where the interim government called for 
all Hutus to unite against the common enemy (the Tutsi) in order so that the political elite 
                                                     
1 ICTR–96–4, ICTR–96–4–0459/1, Akayesu – Judgement, 02/09/1998, para 9. 
2 ICTR–96–4–0003, Akayesu – Indictment, 13/02/1996. 
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could cling onto their power, Akayesu became a willing participant in the violence. 
Consequently, Akayesu returned to Taba where, at a meeting in Gishyeshye, he publicly 
incited the local population to begin killing. The killing commenced shortly after this.3  
 
Specific charges were also levelled against Akayesu for the period after the violence began. 
Primarily this concerned the murder of eight refugees delivered from the neighbouring 
commune (Runda) to the bureau communal and the murder of a number of teachers and other 
intellectuals also at the bureau communal. Another important narrative constructed at the trial 
concerned Akayesu’s crazed pursuit of several individuals who were seen as significant 
persons within the local community. These included the hunt for Emphrem Karangwa (the 
former Inspector of Judicial Police), which resulted in the death of his brothers in a 
neighbouring commune, and a similarly crazed pursuit of Alexia, wife of Pierre Ntereye (a 
prominent figure within the commune), which resulted in a number of victims being 
tortured.4 
 
This story was expanded at the end of the prosecution’s case, as the OTP requested leave in 
order to submit an amended indictment, which would introduce three counts of sexual 
violence.5 This was for Akayesu’s role in overseeing the systematic rape of women at the 
bureau communal, which two witnesses had brought to the Tribunal’s attention whilst 
testifying in court. The Chambers consented to the prosecution’s request, and the 
prosecution’s case reopened with five additional witnesses heard.6 
 
                                                     
3 See CONTRA001175, Akayesu – Transcript of 9/1/1997, 09/01/1997, 8-73. 
4 ICTR–96–4–0003; and CONTRA001175.  
5 ICTR–96–4–0555, Akayesu – Leave to Amend the Indictment, 17/06/1997 
6 ICTR–96–4–0459/1, Akayesu – Judgement, 02/09/1998, 37. 
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Overall, over 43 trial days, 41 witnesses took to the stand, in a trial that, from arrest to 
appeals judgement, took just over five years and eight months.7 Ultimately, the trial chamber 
found (as upheld on appeal) Akayesu guilty of all counts in the indictment, which included 




Cyangugu resulted from the merging of an indictment against Samuel Imanishimwe, 
Emmanuel Bagambiki and Yussuf Munyakazi with one against André Ntagerura.9 However, 
Munyakazi, a local businessperson in Cyangugu, was severed from the proceedings, after he 
continued to evade the Tribunal (he was finally captured in 2004 and convicted in 2010). 
Ntagerura, a Cyangugu native, was the Minister for Transport and Communication during the 
genocide; Bagambiki was the préfet of Cyangugu; and Imanishimwe was the commandant of 
the Cyangugu military barracks (Karambo camp). The trial marked the second phase in the 
OTP’s indictment policy which, after the failure of a mega–indictment against 29 individuals 
(including Ntagerura) in 1999, saw smaller multi–accused indictments clustered around an 
institution (such as military or government) or region (such as Cyangugu and Butare). In 
many ways, Cyangugu was typical of how the OTP ultimately came to see the genocide play 
out as it saw a member of government (Ntagerura) take responsibility for the genocide in 
their home region, working with local and regional military and political personalities 
                                                     
7 Ibid., 17, 23–24. 
8 Ibid., 293. 
9 Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR–96–10 (hereafter ICTR–96–10), ICTR–99–46–0018, 




(Bagambiki and Imanishimwe) and other people of significance (Munyakazi) to ensure the 
success of the plan.10  
 
The trial hinged on a number of accusations.11 The first was that Ntagerura was the person 
responsible overall for the genocide in Cyangugu. To this end he convened meetings with 
local political and military personalities (such as Bagambiki and Imanishimwe) to incite the 
population to violence prior to the genocide and also ensured, by working with the military 
(including Imanishimwe) and utilising his access to large vehicles, that the Interahamwe were 
adequately trained. Once the genocide began it was up to Bagambiki and Imanishimwe to 
make sure that the violence continued as planned. This resulted in a number of large 
massacres at Mibilizi, Shangi and Nyamasheke Parishes, as well as on Gashirabwoba football 
field. This happened along with a sustained attack against refugees in the Kamarampaka 
Stadium, where Bagambiki and Imanishimwe, on a number of occasions, took refugees out of 
the stadium in order to execute them. This included one occasion (particularly important 
during the trial) when seventeen refugees were extracted, killed and then buried in a latrine. 
In addition, Imanishimwe was accused of rounding up civilians and murdering them in the 
military camp, and both Bagambiki and Imanishimwe were accused of being responsible for 
attacks in Kamembe town and in the Nyarushishi refugee camp towards the end of the 
genocide.12 Unlike the charges against Akayesu, for many of these acts of violence the 
accused were not believed to be present during their commission. Rather, they were accused 
                                                     
10 ICTR–96–10, TRA000207/01, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 18/09/2000, 
18/09/2000, 1-63. 
11 See ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0311, Ntagerura Amended Indictment, 01/11/1999 
12 See also, TRA000207/01, 1-63. 
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of creating the conditions whereby the violence could occur and directing this from behind 
the scenes.13  
 
The trial took 111 trial days, during which 123 witnesses were heard, and lasted, from the 
date of Ntagerura’s arrest until the provisional appeals judgement, just under ten years.14 For 
the OTP, the trial was an unmitigated disaster. Due to a combination of believed defects in 
the indictment, a scepticism of perpetrator witnesses, and a trial bench driven by an 
institutionally inspired agenda, the trial chamber found Ntagerura and Bagambiki innocent of 
all charges and Imanishimwe guilty of only one instance of genocide and one of crimes 
against humanity (murder).15 Things got worse on appeal as, due to additional issues with the 
prosecution’s charging, Imanishimwe was acquitted of genocide.16 As such, not one of the 




Jean–Baptiste Gatete was a minster within the Ministry of Family Welfare at the time of the 
genocide, and was previously the bourgmestre of Murambi commune from 1987 until 1993, 
at which point he was removed from his post amidst accusations that he had been a central 
figure in a series of attacks against the Tutsis within the region. Gatete’s trial was one of the 
last trials to occur, with the trial judgement being delivered in 2011, after 49 witnesses were 
                                                     
13 ICTR–96–10, ICTR–96–10A–0272, Ntagerura – Prosecutor Request for Leave to File an Amended 
Indictment, 02/12/1999. 
14 ICTR–96–10, ICTR–99–46–0599/1, Trial Judgement – the Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura Emmanuel 
Bagambiki Samuel Imanishimwe, 25/02/2004, 1–4. 
15 Ibid., 208-14. 
16 Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–99–46 (hereafter ICTR–99–46), TRA003809/1, 
[Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 07/07/2006 – Appeals Judgement, 07/07/2006, 54. 
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heard over 30 trial days. Whilst Gatete’s trial was amongst the quickest (with the substance of 
the trial over in under five months), it took nearly ten years from his arrest for the Tribunal to 
deliver his appeals judgement.17  
 
The main accusation against Gatete was that once the genocide had started he returned to 
Murambi where, from 7 April onwards, he organised and incited the locality into 
participating in the genocide. This included his role in a number of large scale massacres at 
Kiziguro and Mukarange Parishes where he personally directed the killing and provided 
weapons as he contributed to a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ that was designed to wipe out the 
Tutsis within the region.18 
 
As even this description suggests, Gatete’s trial was the most compact out of the three, and 
over the course of a series of amendments to the indictment a number of charges against 
Gatete were dropped as the OTP pursued increasingly streamlined and efficient trials.19 
Gatete was found guilty of all remaining charges, mostly for his role in a joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE).20  
 
 
                                                     
17 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0240/1, Gatete – Judgement and Sentence, 31/03/2011, 1 and 177–178. 
18 ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0036/1, Gatete – Amended indictment, ICTR–00–61, 10/05/2005; and ICTR–00–
61, TRA001643/1, Gatete – Redacted Transcript of 20/10/2009, 20/10/2009. 
19 ICTR–00–61–0036/1; ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0074/1, Gatete – the Prosecutor's Submission Complying 
with the Decision on Defence Motion Concerning Defects in the Amended Indictment Dated 3 July 2009, 
07/07/2009. 
20 ICTR–00–61–0240/1, 169-70 
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1 Organisational note: these transcript references are organised by trial, in the sub-headings, and then by specific 
document code, as CONTRA00001 in the first record. The latter are then used for the shortened footnotes. 
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15/10/2002, 15/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001782/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
16/10/2002, 16/10/2002. 
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Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001783/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
30/09/2002, 30/09/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001785/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
01/10/2002, 01/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001793/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
17/10/2002, 17/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001794/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
21/10/2002, 21/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001795/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
22/10/2002, 22/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001796/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
23/10/2002, 23/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001797/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
24/10/2002, 24/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001798/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
28/10/2002, 28/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001799/1 [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
30/10/2002, 30/10/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001800/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
04/11/2002, 04/11/2002. 
Accounting for Violence 
340 
 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001801/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
05/11/2002, 05/11/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001802/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
06/11/2002, 06/11/2002. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001851/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
20/01/2003, 20/01/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001907, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
21/01/2003, 21/01/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001908/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
20/02/2003, 20/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001909/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
24/02/2003, 24/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001910/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
25/02/2003, 25/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001911/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
10/03/2003, 10/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001912/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
11/03/2003, 11/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001913, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
12/03/2003, 12/03/2003. 
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Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001914/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
17/03/2003, 17/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001915/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
24/03/2003, 24/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001916/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
25/03/2003, 25/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001918/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
27/03/2003, 27/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001919/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
31/03/2003, 31/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001920/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
01/04/2003, 01/04/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001921/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
02/04/2003, 02/04/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001922/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
03/04/2003, 03/04/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001993/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
22/01/2003, 22/01/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001998/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
05/02/2003, 05/02/2003. 
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Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA001999/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
10/02/2003, 10/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002000/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
11/02/2003, 11/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002001/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
13/02/2003, 13/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002002/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
17/02/2003, 17/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002003/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
18/02/2003, 18/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002053/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
11/08/2003, 11/08/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002063/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
13/08/2003, 13/08/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002064/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
14/08/2003, 14/08/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002065/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
15/08/2003, 15/08/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002066/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
12/08/2003, 12/08/2003. 
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Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002090/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
26/03/2003, 26/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002112/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
19/02/2003, 19/02/2003. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002303/2, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
26/02/2004 - Decision, 26/02/2004. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002960, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
06/02/2006 – Appeals Hearing, 06/02/2006. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002962, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
07/02/2006 – Appeals Hearing, 07/02/2006  
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA002964, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
08/02/2006 –Appeals Judgement, 08/02/2006. 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No. 
ICTR–99–46, TRA003809/1, [Cyangugu] – Ntagerura et al – Redacted Transcript of 
07/07/2006 – Appeals Judgement, 07/07/2006.  
 
Gatete (Case No: ICTR–00–61) 
 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018137, Gatete – 
Redacted Transcript 04/11/2009, 04/11/2009.  
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018674, Gatete, 
Redacted Transcript of 02/03/2010, 02/03/2010.  
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Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018748, Gatete, 
Redacted Transcript of 11/3/2010, 11/03/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, CONTRA018865, Gatete – 
Redacted Transcript 25/03/2010, 25/03/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, CONTRA021639, Gatete – 
Transcript of 07/05/2012 – Appeals Hearing, 07/05/2012. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR ICTR–00–61–0009, 
Gatete – Initial Appearance of Accused (Pursuant to RR 62), 17/09/2002. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0014, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses (Pursuant to Art. 21, 
RR 54, 69, 73, and 75), 14/03/2003. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0022, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Response to the Defense Preliminary Motion Challenging Defects in the form of 
the indictment Pursuant to Rule 72, 09/05/2003. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0023, Gatete – 
Extremely Urgent Defence Motion Seeking Leave to File Preliminary Motions, Out of Time, 
Under Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 08/04/2003. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0025, Gatete – 
Defence Preliminary Motions, Under Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
12/04/2003. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0028, Gatete – 
Decision on Prosecution Request for Protection of Witnesses, 11/02/2004. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0029, Gatete, 
Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion, 29/03/2004. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0035, Gatete – 
Decision on the Prosecution's Request for Leave to File an Amended indictment, 21/04/2005. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0036/1, Gatete – 
Amended indictment, ICTR–00–61, 10/05/2005. 
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Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0043/1, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motion for Protection of Witnesses, 10/04/2007. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0046, Gatete – 
Request by Ibuka and Avega for Leave to Appear and Make Submissions as Amicus 
(Pursuant to Rule 74 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence) in Support of the 
Prosecutor's Rule11 Bis Request for the Referral of the Case of Gatete..., 09/01/2008. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0047/1, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Response to the ''Request by Ibuka & Avega for Leave to Appear and Make 
Submissions as Amicus (Pursuant to Rule 74 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence) in Support of the Prosecutor's Rule 11 Bis Request for Referral..., 08/02/2008. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0048/2, Gatete – 
Defence Reply to the Motion Entitled: Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of the Case of 
Jean–Baptiste Gatete to Rwanda Pursuant to Rule 11 Bis of the Tribunal's Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, 26/02/2008. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0059/1, Gatete – 
Decision on Amicus Curiae Requests (Ibuka, Avega and Icdaa) Rule 74 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, 30/06/2008. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0066, Gatete – 
Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Republic of Rwanda, 23/09/2008. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0068/1, Gatete – 
Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 17/11/2008. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0069, Gatete – 
Defence Preliminary Motion Alleging Defects in the form of the Amended indictment, 
22/05/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0070, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Response to the Defence Preliminary Motion Alleging Defects in the form of the 
Amended indictment, 27/05/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0073, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motion Concerning Defects in the Amended indictment, 03/07/2009. 
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Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0074/1, Gatete – 
the Prosecutor's Submission Complying with the Decision on Defence Motion Concerning 
Defects in the Amended Indictment Dated 3 July 2009, 07/07/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0076, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts (Pursuant to Rule 73bis (B)(II), 10/07/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0078, Gatete – 
Defence Response to Prosecution's Request to Admit Facts, 15/07/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0079, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Pre–Trial Brief (Pursuant to Rule 73bis (B) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence), 21/07/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0080, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Rule 94 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, 03/08/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0081, Gatete – 
Defence Response to Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Facts of Common 
Knowledge, 07/08/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0084, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Application for Certification to Appeal the Chamber's Decision on 
Defects in the indictment, 19/08/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0086/1, Gatete – 
Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Judicial Notice of Facts of Common Knowledge, 
21/08/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0088, Gatete – 
Defence Motion Raising Defects in the Prosecution Pre–Trial Brief of 19 August 2009, 
03/09/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0088, Gatete – 
Defence Motion Raising Defects in the Prosecution Pre–Trial Brief of 19 August 2009, 
30/09/2009. 
Accounting for Violence 
347 
 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0091, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Response to "Defence Motion Raising Defects in the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief 
of 19 August 2009", 08/09/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–010, Gatete, 
Motion on Admissibility of Allegations Outside the Temporal Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
15/10/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0100, Gatete, 
Decision on Defence Motion Raising Defects in the Prosecution Pre–Trial Brief of 19 August 
2009, 02/10/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0104/1, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motions for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 66 (A)(II) and Commencement 
of Trial, 13/10/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0115, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Reply to "Defence Motion on Prosecution Disclosure and Commencement of the 
Trial" and Motion for Reconsideration of Decision of 13 October 2009, 16/10/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0116, Gatete – 
Decision on Prosecutor's Motion to Vary List of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 73BIS(E) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 19/10/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0128, Gatete – 
Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, 30/10/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0131, Gatete – 
Motion for Disclosure of Rwandan Judicial Records Pursuant to Rule 66 (A) (ii) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, 02/11/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0133, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motion on Admissibility of Allegations Outside the Temporal 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 03/11/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0149, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure of Rwandan Judicial Records Pursuant to Rule 
66(A) (II) and Order to the Prosecution to Obtain Documents. Rules 54, 66 and 98 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 23/11/2009. 
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Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0151, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Evidence (Rule 89 (C) of R.P.E., 24/11/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0155, Gatete – 
Report on the Results of the Enquiries with the Rwandan Authorities Made by the Prosecutor 
in Respect of Witnesses BBQ, BVR and BVQ, 01/12/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0160, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motion to Admit MFI3 into Evidence Pursuant to Rule 89 (C) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 15/12/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0161, Gatete – 
Decision on Prosecution Motion for the Disclosure of the Particulars of the Accused's Alibi, 
18/12/2009. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0162, Gatete – 
Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Delineation of Defence Case, 20/01/2010.  
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0164, Gatete – 
Prosecutor’s Response to the Defence Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Delineation of 
the Defence Case, 25/01/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0166/1, Gatete – 
the Pre–Defence Brief of Jean–Baptiste Gatete, 29/01/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0170, Gatete – 
Scheduling Order and Order for the Defence to Reduce its List of Witnesses Rule 54 and 
73TER (D) of the R.P.E., 02/02/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0172, Gatete – 
Prosecutor's Motion to Make the Trial Record Conform to the Evidence, 03/02/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0188, Gatete, 
Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Delineation of the Defence Case, 
26/03/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0198/2, Gatete – 
Decision on Defence Motion for Confidentiality of information, 16/06/2010.   
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Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0199, Gatete – 
Decision on Site Visit to Rwanda (Rule 4 and 54 of R.P.E.), 17/06/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0202, Gatete – 
Prosecution Motion to Admit Statements in Reply to Defence Motion for the Admission into 
Evidence of Statements, 18/06/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0207/1, ICTR–00–
61, Gatete – Decision on Defence and Prosecution Motions for Admission of Written 
Statements and Defence Motion to Postpone Filing of Closing Briefs (Rule 73 Bis, 
74ter,89(C) and 92bis of R.P.E.), 24/06/2010. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste Gatete, Case No. ICTR–00–61, ICTR–00–61–0209/2, Gatete – 
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